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21 June – 31 August 1956

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
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

AT HAMBURG, WEST GERMANY, 16 JULY 1956

Selected works of Jawaharlal Nehru

Second Series

Volume Thirty Four

(21 June – 31 August 1956)

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FOREWORD

Jawaharlal Nehru is one of the key figures of the twentieth century. He symbolised some of the major forces which have transformed our age.

When Jawaharlal Nehru was young, history was still the privilege of the West; the rest of the world lay in deliberate darkness. The impression given was that the vast continents of Asia and Africa existed merely to sustain their masters in Europe and North America. Jawaharlal Nehru's own education in Britain could be interpreted, in a sense, as an attempt to secure for him a place within the pale. His letters of the time are evidence of his sensitivity, his interest in science and international affairs as well as of his pride in India and Asia. But his personality was veiled by his shyness and a facade of nonchalance, and perhaps outwardly there was not much to distinguish him from the ordinary run of men. Gradually there emerged the warm and universal being who became intensely involved with the problems of the poor and the oppressed in all lands. In doing so, Jawaharlal Nehru gave articulation and leadership to millions of people in his own country and in Asia and Africa.

That imperialism was a curse which should be lifted from the brows of men, that poverty was incompatible with civilisation, that nationalism should be poised on a sense of international community and that it was not sufficient to brood on these things when action was urgent and compelling—these were the principles which inspired and gave vitality to Jawaharlal Nehru's activities in the years of India's struggle for freedom and made him not only an intense nationalist but one of the leaders of humanism.

No particular ideological doctrine could claim Jawaharlal Nehru for its own. Long days in jail were spent in reading widely. He drew much from the thought of the East and West and from the philosophies of the past and the present. Never religious in the formal sense, yet he had a deep love for the culture and tradition of his own land. Never a rigid Marxist, yet he was deeply influenced by that theory and was particularly impressed by what he saw in the Soviet Union on his first visit in 1927. However, he realised that the world was too complex, and man had too many facets, to be encompassed by any single or total explanation. He himself was a socialist with an abhorrence of regimentation and a democrat who was anxious to reconcile his faith in civil liberty with the necessity of mitigating economic and social wretchedness. His struggles, both

within himself and with the outside world, to adjust such seeming contradictions are what make his life and work significant and fascinating.

As a leader of free India, Jawaharlal Nehru recognised that his country could neither stay out of the world nor divest itself of its own interests in world affairs. But to the extent that it was possible, Jawaharlal Nehru sought to speak objectively and to be a voice of sanity in the shrill phases of the 'cold war'. Whether his influence helped on certain occasions to maintain peace is for the future historian to assess. What we do know is that for a long stretch of time he commanded an international audience reaching far beyond governments, that he spoke for ordinary, sensitive, thinking men and women around the globe and that his was a constituency which extended far beyond India.

So the story of Jawaharlal Nehru is that of a man who evolved, who grew in storm and stress till he became the representative of much that was noble in his time. It is the story of a generous and gracious human being who summed up in himself the resurgence of the 'third world' as well as the humanism which transcends dogmas and is adapted to the contemporary context. His achievement, by its very nature and setting, was much greater than that of a Prime Minister. And it is with the conviction that the life of this man is of importance not only to scholars but to all, in India and elsewhere, who are interested in the valour and compassion of the human spirit that the Jawaharlal Nehru Memorial Fund has decided to publish a series of volumes consisting of all that is significant in what Jawaharlal Nehru spoke and wrote. There is, as is to be expected in the speeches and writings of a man so engrossed in affairs and gifted with expression, much that is ephemeral; this will be omitted. The official letters and memoranda will also not find place here. But it is planned to include everything else and the whole corpus should help to remind us of the quality and endeavour of one who was not only a leader of men and a lover of mankind, but a completely integrated human being.



New Delhi
18 January 1972

Chairman
Jawaharlal Nehru Memorial Fund

EDITORIAL NOTE

The late Edward Said, Jawaharlal Nehru's ardent admirer, referred to the pantheon of Bandung flourishing, in all its greatness, because of the nationalist dynamic which was culturally embodied in the philosophical explorations of great leaders like Nehru and Gamal Abdel Nasser. What was this nationalist dynamic all about? This volume, covering the period from 21 June to 31 August 1956, provides some answers.

In his speeches and correspondence, free India's first Prime Minister reflects on wide-ranging global issues. His foreword to the book, *Paths to Peace: Study of War, its Causes and Prevention*, is a good example of how deeply committed he was to peace. He talked of 'the process of the outlawing of war' through institutional changes that would 'render national policies and the trend of civilization becoming oriented away from conflict' (p. 237), and 'the hiatus and the divergence between the end—the abolition of war—and the means adopted to achieve it' (p. 238). He carried this message to the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference held in London between 27 June – 6 July 1956, where he spoke with great passion on disarmament. He also demonstrated his grasp of global events by talking of the nationalist ferment in West Asia, and the role of China and its relations with India and the United States. He wanted China to be admitted into the United Nations.

This is exemplified by his exchanges over the Suez Canal. During this crisis, he not only acted in unison with the other key players in the non-aligned movement, but also positioned India as a key player in world affairs. He talked of a 'strong team' represented at the London conference, led by Krishna Menon who 'has a remarkable capacity for dealing with situations of this kind [Suez Canal issue].' He added: 'It was partly due to his efforts that success came in the Geneva Conference on Indo-China and in the earlier Korean negotiations' (p. 437). Elsewhere, he mentioned that Krishna Menon's High Commissionership to the United Kingdom from 1947 to 1952 had been magnificent (p. 262). Likewise, during his stay in London people told him about Vijayalakshmi Pandit's high reputation in all circles.

Nehru's principal asset was his ability to grasp the challenges faced by the post-colonial societies. In his famous speech on India's 'tryst with destiny', he reminded his people that the task ahead included 'the ending of poverty and

ignorance and disease and inequality of opportunity.' A welfare state, of a socialist pattern, was his ideal for many decades. In a broadcast to the nation Nehru had explained the purpose of the First Five Year Plan:

> Our economy and social structure have outlived their day, and it has become a matter of urgent necessity for us to refashion them so that they may promote the happiness of all our people in things material and spiritual. We have to aim deliberately at a social philosophy which seeks a fundamental transformation of this structure, at a society which is not dominated by the urge for profit and by individual greed and in which there is a fair distribution of political and economic power. We must aim at a classless society, based on cooperative effort, with opportunities for all. To realize this we have to pursue peaceful methods in a democratic way.
>
> Democratic planning means the utilization of all our available resources and, in particular, the maximum quantity of labour willingly given and rightly directed so as to promote the good of the community and the individual.

The stress in this, as indeed in the Second Five Year Plan, was on the improvement of agriculture. Time and time again the Prime Minister talked of self-sufficiency in food grains as a major target. Concerned at the depletion of foreign exchange reserves, he told his chief ministers on 16 August 1956 that increased agricultural production was a vital necessity even for purposes of export to augment the country's dwindling resources (p. 436). The various strategies adopted for increasing food production were buttressed by improved agricultural methods and the extension of irrigated land. They paid off.

While agriculture continued to receive priority, the main feature in the Second Five Year Plan was the expansion of heavy industries. Nehru announced at the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference that his government planned an increase in steel production from about 1½ million tons to 6 million tons a year. He also announced that the Soviet Union, West Germany and the United Kingdom would help to build steel plants at Bhilai, Bokaro, and Durgapur. At the same meeting, he underlined the need for atomic energy.

Yet, there were those who suggested alternate models of development. Nehru did his best to accommodate their views in policy documents. But he insisted, in his letter to the chief ministers, that a popular government must be in direct touch with the people: 'A popular government cannot afford to live in its secretariats and offices' (p. 450). He must have felt this more strongly because his own objective, of eliminating illiteracy, removing poverty, preventing disease,

and creating equal opportunities, was far from being accomplished. He discussed the obstacles with his friends and colleagues with a view to remedying the underlying deficiencies.

This volume illustrates how national unity was a key phrase in Nehru's vocabulary. To preserve that ideal, Parliament adopted the States Reorganization Bill, 'an extraordinary culmination of the fierce and angry debates and all the upheavals and riots that had taken place during the past many months' (p. 437). Nehru had done much to soothe tempers, even though some of his own colleagues attacked him bitterly and his Finance Minister resigned from the Cabinet. Though relieved by the smooth passage of the States Reorganization Bill, he was deeply agonized by the outbreak of violence (pp. 450-1) in parts of Gujarat, especially in Ahmedabad.

Even though India's political landscape has changed over the last five decades, issues of governance that were once debated by Nehru and his colleagues continue to have contemporary relevance. In this volume, therefore, readers may well discover much that is new and refreshing. Moreover, they will be inspired by Nehru's statement in the Lok Sabha on 30 July 1956, for it expounds, with utmost clarity, Nehru's idea of India. He talked of 'old frontiers' breaking down to be replaced with borders inside the nation. He mentioned how the 'provincial outlook' would do more harm than good to the states and the nation. Lastly, he stated:

> Whatever internal divisions and dissensions and conflicts we had in India in the past few thousands of years, the concept of India has remained. The concept of India, Bharat or Hindustan—call it what you like—has remained and has kept us mentally together. It mattered not so much in the old days and that is why politically we were apart. But it does matter today, in the age we live, when we must not only be integrated in that matter—that is not good enough—but we must emotionally and intellectually be integrated. The painful thing that has happened in the last few months is to display, not to ourselves but to the world, how we are not so integrated in our minds and hearts. We have to get over that. (p. 123)

Nehru was troubled by developments in Kashmir and in the Naga area. On the escalation of Naga insurgency, he laid stress on the Army making friends with the Nagas—'our fellow citizens and not enemies'—and trying to win them over. In general, he sought to reconcile the diverse interests of various regions within the national frame, assigning, as he stated in his glowing tribute to B.G. Tilak on 23 July 1956, a critical role to the leadership. 'It is the job of a leader', he stated, 'not merely to reflect the people's aspiration and say what they want

to hear but to learn to recognize their thoughts and emotions and to take them forward on the road to achieving their goals by giving them courage and hope' (p. 4).

Many of us have grown up with an idea of India that approximates with Nehru's worldview that was so creatively expressed in his commitment to national unity, secular democracy, and to the building of a modern nation state. India 'is a myth and an idea, a dream and a vision, and yet very real and present and pervasive', he remarked in the course of the 'discovery' that he had made, and was continually making of India. 'For all of us in India', he told his chief ministers, 'the issue of communal unity and a secular state must be made perfectly clear. We have played about with this idea sufficiently long and moved away from it far enough. We must go back not secretly or apologetically, but openly and rather aggressively.' The Prime Minister did not waver in his belief that religious and caste strife must be fought tooth and nail no matter what the cost or how daunting the occasion.

Nehru always argued for the moral value and legitimacy of nationalism in a form compatible with liberal democratic principles and institutions. He also underlined that there was absolutely no reason why anybody should regiment India's infinite variety after a single pattern. In this and in many other ways, he left a legacy of reasoning, tolerance and fraternal living. To a whole generation of Indians he was not so much a leader as a companion who expressed and made clearer a particular vision of the future. The combination of intellectual and moral authority was unique in his time (Sarvepalli Gopal). To those who adhere to the clash of civilizations theory, Nehru's message was simple enough:

> Two thousand three hundred years ago, an Emperor of India, Asoka, gave a message to his people and inscribed it on rocks and stones which exist today. This message was a message of tolerance of other faiths and other opinions. He has said in his inscriptions that persons of other faiths should be suitably honoured. Acting in this manner, one certainly exalts one's faith and helps persons of other faiths. Acting in a contrary manner, one injures one's faith and also does disservice to others. (pp. 265-6)

A newspaper correspondent described Nehru as a Brahman, 'a man with a mystical quality of reaching . . . masses of men, a secret Caesar. He loves the British, he resents Western influence on his life, he is an artist, he is an intellectual snob.' Nehru, then camping in Ireland, told Edwina Mountbatten, 'It is extraordinary how a simple and straightforward person like me should be considered so mysterious' (p. 457).

On a different occasion, Nehru expresssed the view that, 'When we pay homage to great men, it must be with a view to learning something from their lives . . . (p. 4). We derive strength and courage by casting our thoughts back to those men who have scaled great heights' (p. 6). Nehru himself scaled new heights during his long and eventful career. Moreover, there are many important lessons to be learnt from his intellectual engagements and public commitments.

The leaves of the book of Nehru's life are closed, but India lives on, as it has done for centuries, and the idea of India—tolerant and inclusive, beckons, as it must do, always and forever. We will see many seasons go by, following each other into oblivion. We will watch many moons wax and wane and the pageant of the stars move along inexorably and majestically. Yet, what Shakespeare wrote of a very different type of man will always apply to Nehru:

> His life was gentle, and the elements
> So mixed in him that Nature might stand up
> And say to all the world, 'This was a man!'

We thank various individuals and institutions for their help in publishing this volume. Shrimati Sonia Gandhi granted access to consult and publish the papers in her possession. They are referred to as the JN Collection. We have also had access to important collections at the Nehru Memorial Museum & Library, the Secretariat of the Prime Minister, the Ministries of External Affairs and Home Affairs, Planning Commission, National Archives of India, All India Radio, and the Press Information Bureau. The All India Radio allowed us to use the tapes of Jawaharlal Nehru's speeches. One speech published in *Jawaharlal Nehru's Speeches*, vol. 3, has also been included in the volume.

For their scholarly and secretarial assistance, we are grateful to Dr Bhashyam Kasturi, Shri Shyamal Roy, Shri Amrit Tandon, Dr Etee Bahadur and Ms Saroja Anantha Krishnan.

February 2005 MUSHIRUL HASAN

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ABBREVIATIONS

AICC	All India Congress Committee
AIR	All India Radio
APO	Assistant Political Officer
C&AG	Comptroller and Auditor-General
CID	Criminal Investigation Department
CP	Community Projects
CS	Commonwealth Secretary, MEA
CSIR	Council for Scientific and Industrial Research
CSO	Central Statistical Organization
CTO	Central Tractor Organization
GOI	Government of India
I&B	Information and Broadcasting, Ministry of
ICS	Indian Civil Service
IG	Inspector General
ISI	Indian Statistical Institute
MEA	Ministry of External Affairs
MHA	Ministry of Home Affairs
MP	Madhya Pradesh
NEFA	North East Frontier Agency
NES	National Extension Service
NMML	Nehru Memorial Museum and Library
NR & SR	Natural Resources and Scientific Research, Ministry of
PMS	Prime Minister's Secretariat
PSP	Praja Socialist Party

RBI	Reserve Bank of India
UK	United Kingdom
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization
UNICEF	United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund
UP	Uttar Pradesh
US/USA	United States of America
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

1
GENERAL PERSPECTIVES

1. Lokmanya Tilak's Legacy[1]

Brothers and sisters,

You may be aware that I have returned to Delhi only today after a long trip abroad.[2] I inquired as soon as I got back what functions had been organized to mark this very special day in our history which is connected with Lokmanya Tilak. I was told about this function. For the last two weeks, I had practically no news from India.

I was a little surprised to hear that the function was going to be held indoors due to the fear of rains. We have not been in the habit of being afraid of rains in the past. So I wondered if we expected an extraordinary downpour today. The pity of it is that thousands of people who wanted to participate in this function are standing outside.

My mind goes back to the time when Lokmanya Tilak was born, over a hundred years ago, and all that has happened during this time in India. Innumerable people played a role in the events of the last century in India and great men were born who scaled great heights. I recall my childhood when I started taking an interest in Indian politics. I was in another country and most of my time was taken up in studies.[3] But I often thought of what was happening in India and the great leaders who were on the scene. The name which stood out among them and had a great impact on us young men was of Lokmanya. We yearned to be soldiers in his army. Then I came back to India after a few years and had an opportunity of meeting Lokmanya a little before his death.[4]

For the youth of today, all this is part of history, the story of a great man who lived and died. But he made a profound impact on the people who lived through those days and has left an indelible impression on their hearts and minds. Millions of people worked for freedom. But ultimately it is the men at the top who make a tremendous difference in the history of a nation. I have no doubt in my mind that Lokmanya Tilak laid the foundations of India's freedom by moulding the mind of India in a certain direction. Everybody knows that he was a man of

1. Speech at a public meeting organized by the Delhi Pradesh Congress Committee on the occasion of Bal Gangadhar Tilak's birth centenary, Delhi, 23 July 1956. AIR tapes, NMML. Original in Hindi.
2. Nehru returned on 23 July after a month-long tour of Europe and West Asia.
3. Nehru studied in England from 1905 to 1912.
4. Tilak died on 1 August 1920, at the age of sixty-four.

extraordinary courage and ability. Even if he had not done anything else the scholarly works[5] that he wrote bear testimony to his brilliance. He had an interest in many areas and added to every one of them. His name will always occupy a place of honour in the history of India's freedom struggle.

He died at a comparatively young age. I remember that by some chance, I arrived in Bombay on the day that he died after a severe illness. Millions of people turned out in procession to see him on his last journey.

When we pay homage to great men, it must be with a view to learning something from their lives. Only then do meetings like these make sense. Otherwise, it will be useless if we sing their praises on their anniversary and then forget all about them.

It was Lokmanya Tilak who gave a new direction to the Congress and for the first time talked of complete independence. Before that, people used to talk in soft and conciliatory terms. I do not mean to say that they lacked courage or spirit. We have to judge their work in the milieu in which they lived. Today we are free to talk boldly about anything we like without any hindrance. Even until ten or fifteen years ago, we would have had to bear great hardships for speaking half as freely. Twenty-five years ago, even a fourth of that would have landed us in great trouble. When Lokmanya Tilak lived and worked, most of our leaders were afraid to talk so boldly or freely as he did. It was he who for the first time declared that complete freedom was our birthright.[6] His call found an immediate echo in the hearts of millions of people in India because they had been yearning to hear such a call for a long time. It is the job of a leader not merely to reflect the people's aspirations and say what they want to hear but to learn to recognize their thoughts and emotions and to take them forward on the road to achieving their goals by giving them courage and hope.

Lokmanya Tilak inaugurated a new chapter in the history of India's freedom struggle by his clarion call. The Congress had been in existence for a long time before that. It had grown from very small beginnings. In the initial years, the members spoke in soft and conciliatory tones, taking care to express their loyalty to the British Government. I am talking about seventy years ago. Please do not underestimate those men. They were great men but were constrained by the milieu in which they lived and worked. Be that as it may, the Congress grew in stature and with it the people of India.

5. Tilak's published works include *Orion* (1893), *Arctic Home in the Vedas* (1909), and *Gita Rahasya,* his magnum opus written in Mandalay jail in 1911.
6. Tilak's seminal phrase, "Swaraj is my birthright and I will have it", was given in 1905.

At the beginning of the twentieth century, fifty years ago, commenced another era when Lokmanya Tilak began to play a more prominent role in Indian politics and challenged the British rule. He spoke in a voice different from any that had been heard in Indian politics until then. It led to tensions within the Congress, between the moderates and the extremists.[7] The difference was that Lokmanya Tilak had set his sights on a new age, and had the daring to work towards that goal.

Tilak's clarion call sowed the seeds of revolution in the minds and hearts of the people which sprouted roots and soon spread. Ultimately it led to the emergence of an India which flowered fully in the time of Mahatma Gandhi. It is our misfortune that Lokmanya Tilak did not live long to guide our destiny.

However, the fact of the matter is that it was he who sowed the seeds of India's freedom and served its cause by his calibre, sacrifice, hard work and effort. He laid the foundations of a strong edifice. It is easy to build on the foundation. What is difficult is to swim against the tide. When people are scared and timid and not in the habit of speaking out their minds, it is difficult to issue a bold challenge. This in itself is a yardstick to judge a human being.

Lokmanya Tilak was not given to lashing out in a fit of passion. He always spoke after careful thought and consideration. Tilak's voice made a profound impact on every Indian whether he was in India or abroad. He took a very big step which filled the British Government with panic. They tried to punish Tilak.[8] But that only helped to intensify the movement.

I remember the time more than fifty years ago when two bombs were exploded by one of the extremists.[9] You may remember that at that time Lokmanya Tilak had lashed out against the stupidity of throwing bombs and killing Englishmen. He said: "How can killing one Englishman remove British rule or make India independent? Fifty other Englishmen can take the place of the murdered one. Revolutions are not wrought by violence. A nation's strength lies in unity and organization."

All these things come to my mind. All these great movements took place one by one and India grew in stature and strength until we got freedom, fulfilling the pledge that India took under the leadership of Lokmanya Tilak. Then other

7. At the Surat session of the Congress in 1907.
8. In 1908, the British sent Tilak to six years of imprisonment to Mandalay jail ostensibly on charges of sedition. The real reason for Tilak's deportation was the powerful agitation he had launched against the partition of Bengal in 1905.
9. On 30 April 1908, Khudiram Bose and Prafulla Chaki attempted to assassinate Kingsford, the District Magistrate of Muzaffarpur. Instead their bombs killed two English ladies.

problems arose, naturally. Freedom implies tackling problems. Freedom by itself does not solve all the problems. It means new problems, tests and challenges. But in all these new tests and challenges, lessons learnt in the past help. We derive strength and courage by casting our thoughts back to those men who have scaled great heights. We are ordinary mortals though some of us have been given an opportunity to live and work at levels which added to our strength, wisdom and courage. In this way, we too grew a little in stature.

As you know. I have returned after touring a very large part of the world. I found that every one of the countries that I visited were confronted with extraordinary problems and developments. We can learn something from them. We can also learn what we should avoid. I found that there was great respect and regard for India and great hopes from us. It gladdens one's heart and yet it is a little perturbing too because it is not easy to fulfil such large expectations. Well, at least we can try to stick to the right path and avoid making mistakes. We should not allow ourselves to be led astray and must try to remember the lessons that we have learnt from our illustrious leaders and elders.

So on this day, it is very important to understand the lessons of bravery, wisdom and unity which Lokmanya Tilak stood for. We do not face the same challenges that the people of Tilak's generation did. Those were different times when we were in confrontation with a foreign government. Today we have our own government. We have the right to change it. The challenge that we face today is of a different kind. It is one of nation-building and helping a little to resolve the complex problems of the modern world. What we have done in the last six to seven years has made an impact upon the world. Other countries realize that we are capable of taking up great challenges. India's struggle for freedom itself made a profound impact upon the world. Now the steps that we have taken after India became independent have further impressed the world community.

Our responsibilities have grown both within and outside the country. We have the task of uplifting 36-37 crores of human beings. The expectations that other countries have from India is sometimes frightening. I do not know if we have the ability to fulfil them. But I am convinced about one thing. Whether we have the ability to discharge our responsibilities fully or not, so long as we follow our chosen path with honesty and integrity, it can only benefit India and the world. If we hold fast to the lessons taught by Lokmanya Tilak and Gandhiji, we can never make serious mistakes. It is difficult to gauge how far we can go. History will be the judge of that. But the achievements of the last few years fill one with fresh hope.

We have to be large-hearted to be able to handle great tasks. A nation's greatness does not depend on its size. India has always been a large country, it was so even when we were in bondage. A nation's greatness depends on its

courage, daring and spirit. Countries which are very small in size have great achievements to their credit. What counts is not sheer numbers or size but the quality of the people, their courage, the spirit of unity and wisdom. If we have these qualities, then there is no doubt about it that coupled with the physical size of India, we can go very far indeed.

So on this day, I can only repeat that all of you, particularly the youth, must strive to remember the people who were responsible for India's freedom. It was not achieved by merely making a noise. The blood, sweat and toil of millions of human beings were responsible for it. Great leaders like Lokmanya Tilak laid the foundations of the freedom movement by shaking up the nation to its core and showing a new direction to the people. In a sense, we are what we are today because of him. He will always be remembered for this great service to the nation. Now it is up to us to discharge our duties well and carry on the work that he started. *Jai Hind.*[10]

10. The following message from Jawaharlal Nehru, on the occasion of Tilak's birth centenary celebrations, was published in *The Hindustan Times* of 23 July 1956:

"It is difficult to write about persons who have dominated the life of a country during a crucial period as Lokmanya Tilak did. We cannot measure giants by our normal yardsticks. I remember that in my boyhood and youth, when I had not personally met him, how powerfully I was influenced by him. He seemed to be the embodiment of Indian nationalism struggling for freedom. Millions in India were influenced by him in this way and so he moulded the thinking of two generations of our people and undoubtedly brought them up to that pitch of endeavour and sacrifice which later resulted in India's freedom.

In later years I met him several times, though it was never my privilege to come into close contact with him. I saw him at the Lucknow Congress, at Amritsar and in some other places. I was young, and was overpowered by the great man who had inspired me since my boyhood. I arrived in Bombay early in the morning of 1st of August when Lokmanya lay dying. I then was one of the millions who paid their last tribute to him.

We of a later generation pay our respectful homage to him and, by thinking of him, gain strength and courage for the great tasks ahead."

2. The State of the Nation and the World[1]

Friends, if you wish, I will say something about my trip abroad. The difficulty is that it is not proper for me to speak about the private discussions. I do not wish to hide anything from you but if I tell you something in confidence, it does not remain confidential. That is the difficulty.

I had gone last year to the Soviet Union and Poland, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Austria and Egypt, that is, mostly to countries in eastern Europe.[2] This time my travels took me to western Europe and to some parts of West Asia. The world has divided itself into two camps—I visited one camp last year and the other this year. I could not visit the USA due to President Eisenhower's ill-health. These tours and meetings with the leaders in these countries are educative for me. It is possible they may also have profited by them in that different viewpoints were put before them. The more I travel the more I realize that people's opinions are moulded to a large extent by geography. You look at the world from where you are. You become the centre of your world. When you look at the map of the world, you think of it spread about around you. The map looks different when you go elsewhere. So though the world is one, the subjective view of it differs from place to place. If you were to find yourself at the North Pole by chance, your view of the world would be indeed fantastic. This is a matter of geography but then history comes in, the history of hundreds and thousands of years of each country. We have many problems of the world before us. But it is obvious that they are dominated by the problems of our neighbours like Pakistan, Ceylon, Nepal. These problems may not have much relevance for others but certainly they have a great deal of relevance for us. Similarly, if you go to the Arab countries, for them the problems of the world resolve themselves into the problems of their neighbours. If you go to Europe, to Germany, there the predominant question is of German unity, the rest is minor. So wherever you go, you realize that the perspective of the world changes and with the perspective, the past history.

On the first day of my tour I stopped in Damascus. Damascus is one of the ancient cities of the world. There is sometimes an argument as to which is older—

1. Speech at a meeting of the Congress Parliamentary Party, New Delhi, 27 July 1956. AICC tapes, NMML. Original in Hindi and English.
2. See *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 29, pp. 201-310.

Damascus or Banares—not that there is anything special in being merely very old. I went to Damascus and from there to Lebanon. Do you know the meaning of Lebanon? I did not know but somebody told me, Lebanon or Leban means milk. Why milk? I was given curd in Beirut for lunch and told, "We call this Lebanon". They have named their country thus as their mountains are always covered with snow.

Their history is thousands of years old. Often you dig down even one hundred or two hundred feet, you would come across layers of hundreds of years of history.

There is one place near Beirut where there are signs of eight or nine invasions—Greek, Roman, Turkish, waves upon waves came.[3] So the picture that comes before me is of thousands of years of history and I forget for a moment the present. There is a large, very old mosque in Damascus.[4] It is even older than Islam itself. It was a church which was later converted into a mosque. There are beautiful tombs like Saladin's,[5] dating back to the Crusades.[6] If you go a little further into the mosque, you come across a tomb which is said to be that of John the Baptist[7] who is mentioned in the Bible. One's imagination is fired on seeing it. In many parts of India, in western Asia, thousands of years of history is frozen in stone. The countries between Europe and Asia are a link, a chain, and they have influenced one another considerably. There were wars too—the War of the Crusades went on for hundreds of years.

So, travelling is not merely a physical thing. It is a journey of the mind into history for which it is not enough to merely read books—you have to visit those places—though if you have read something, obviously the picture that emerges is clearer.

3. Beirut was initially settled by the Phoenicians and gained prominence under Roman rule in the first century BC. It was captured by the Arabs in 635 AD. The Christian crusaders held it from 1110–1291, after which it was dominated by the Saracens, the Druzes and the Ottoman Turks. It became the capital of Lebanon, under French mandate, in 1920 and the capital of an independent Lebanon in 1941.
4. In 379 AD, the Roman emperor Theodosius I constructed a Christian church on the foundations of the temple of Zeus in Damascus. This church was rebuilt in 705 AD as the Great Mosque of Damascus.
5. Saladin or Salah al-din Yussuf ibn Ayyub (1137-1193); Kurdish sultan of Egypt, Syria, Yemen and Palestine and founder of the Ayyubid dynasty.
6. The Crusades were military expeditions by the European Christians against the Muslim powers between 1095 and 1291, and were aimed at gaining control of Jerusalem.
7. John the Baptist, a prophetic figure in the New Testament; he baptized Jesus and others at the River Jordan. Herod Antipas executed him.

But apart from all this, there are the present-day problems. It is obvious, in Europe, the most important problem today is the problem of unification of Germany. But connected with that is the bigger question of what the relations should be between these two big groups—the western and the eastern blocs—or the communist and the non-communist or the anti-communist blocs. In this context, everyone is agitated about what the Soviet Union has done in the last few months or in the last one year.[8] Every country views this question from its own angle, because the formulation of policy is affected a great deal by this. Well, obviously, this was discussed in the Commonwealth Conference.[9] Then I went to Germany where it was discussed at great length.

The disease that afflicts Germany at present is that of progress at too fast a pace—too much prosperity too quickly. It is strange how worried some of the countries of Europe are at this. They are scared of the consequences it might have for themselves. Ninety lakh refugees came to Germany—West Germany—from all over and as you know, West Germany is smaller than one of our big states. And yet, there is manpower shortage; it is a strange situation. They have had to recruit a hundred thousand from Italy to build roads, partly because their own men were busy elsewhere and partly because the Italians are supposed to be good at building roads.

There is no doubt about the importance of the Soviet leaders' visit to the UK[10] for both sides, I think. The people of both the countries were affected. Both came a little closer towards better understanding and tolerance. Whatever differences may continue to exist, the bitterness decreases by such contacts, by talking to one another, by frankness. The problem is that so many walls have been put up in the world that it becomes difficult to break them down. So this visit certainly had a beneficial effect.

In a broad sense, the events in the Soviet Union are of basic importance. They are not merely governmental acts; the changes are being brought about by the people themselves. Even in other countries, like Poland, the same thing is

8. The Communist Party of the Soviet Union at its Twentieth Congress, held in Moscow in February 1956, announced policies amounting to de-Stalinization. Also see *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 32, p. 334, p. 339 and p. 450.
9. Nehru attended the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference in London which started on 27 June and went on for ten days.
10. Nikolai Bulganin, Prime Minister, USSR, and Nikita Khrushchev, First Secretary, the Soviet Communist Party, paid an official visit to the UK from 18 to 27 April 1956.

happening. You may have heard of the small revolt which took place in Poland. [11] There may have been many causes for it, but the immediate cause was economic. There were acute food shortages, etc.

Well, purely by chance, I went to Ireland before going to Germany. I had four to five days free as the visit to the USA was cancelled. [12] So I went to Ireland. I had wanted to go there for a long time. There was an invitation to go there, so I went for rest. I found a new world there or rather a very old world. Our talks turned to the Eastern Rising of 1916 [13] and the civil war of 1920-21. [14] Even now, people have not forgotten those years and experiences. Another topic of conversation was jail experiences, ours and theirs. I had a very fond welcome there. They are an affectionate people. Our relationship is a long-standing one.

Then I stopped in Paris and went to Yugoslavia. Our relations with Yugoslavia have improved, that is, our approach and their approach to foreign affairs are very similar, though there are great differences in other respects. It was a useful experience to go there because Marshal Tito is a seasoned man. He has excellent contacts in Europe. Their relations with the Soviet Union are long-standing, some new ones have been formed with Germany, etc., due to common bonds of language. I enjoyed my conversation with Tito immensely. I met President Nasser also there and had long chats. Then I went to Egypt and after a stop over at Beirut I returned home.

The problems of the world are complicated. The map of the world is changing.

11. Widespread popular dissatisfaction with low wages, poor living conditions and high cost of living led to serious rioting in Poznan where, on 28 June 1956, thousands of factory workers armed with rifles attacked the headquarters of the security police and the local communist party, a radio station and some other buildings. Order was restored only after Polish army tanks and reinforcements were rushed to the city. Fifty-three persons were killed and over three hundred injured in the disturbances.
12. See *post,* pp. 260-262 and 309-316.
13. The Eastern Rising, an Irish republican insurrection against the British, began on 24 April 1916. Led by Patrick Pearse and Tom Clarke, some 1,560 Irish volunteers and 200 members of the Irish Citizen Army seized Dublin's General Post Office and other strategic points. British troops put down the rebellion after five days and fifteen leaders of the Rising were tried and executed. The executions caused revulsion against the British authorities and heralded the end of British power in Ireland.
14. A civil war (1919-1921) existed between the Catholic majority of southern Ireland, who favoured complete independence, and the Protestant majority in the north, who preferred continued union with Britain. Southern Ireland was granted dominion status and became the Irish Free State in 1921. It adopted the name Eire in 1937 and became a sovereign independent nation.

The fear of war increases suspicion of one another. You know the problems of Europe, and especially of Germany. Then the problem of Cyprus is causing a great deal of worry to the British. The French are worried about Algeria. The Arab nations have their own problems. But in spite of all this, the atmosphere was certainly more relaxed.

You have been reading about disarmament. The Soviet Union has reduced its armed forces, perhaps the United States will also do so. There are many proposals, but there is no doubt about their intentions. No country wants a war. But you have to remember one thing. Ever since these new atomic weapons have become available, the value of the numerical strength of the armed forces has gone down—in fact, they are slowly becoming redundant. Not entirely perhaps, but it is becoming unnecessary to maintain armies on a large scale. Conventional armies are becoming less useful for those possessing nuclear weapons. Therefore, reduction of the armed forces is not motivated merely by a desire for peace but to also cut down on useless expenditure. They may not be able to save much because these new weapons are very expensive. In this connection I would like to mention that we have brought out a book called *Nuclear Explosions*[15] on the consequences of such explosions. These have not been distributed yet but we have sent two or three copies to the Parliament library only today. Some of our scientists have written it at my request. People are interested so I wanted it written on the basis of known facts in order to stimulate discussion. An effort has been made to write it in simple language, but the subject is itself difficult and complicated. But I am sure you will enjoy reading it. I think more copies will be available in ten to twelve days. But the Parliament library will have it soon.

Now I shall speak in English. Before I do so, I would like to put before you Shri Chintamani Deshmukh's letter of resignation from the Party. His letter of resignation from the ministership was sent separately on the 22nd. . . .[16]

This was placed before Executive Committee and is now placed for your information. There is nothing to be done about it, just that the Party should be informed of this development. I do not wish to say anything about this matter here except to say this that it is our misfortune that in regard to the States' Reorganization Bill and all the matters connected therewith we have managed

15. *Nuclear Explosions and Their Effects* (a publication of the Defence Services Organization, 1956). Also see *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 33, pp. 154 -155.
16. Nehru thereafter read out the letter dated 22 July 1956 from C.D. Deshmukh about his resigning the associate membership of the Congress Party and the answer Nehru sent him the next day.

to get entangled in various ways and we have had to face a great many difficulties. I am not for the moment speaking on the merits of any matter but the mere fact of these difficulties is there for anyone to see. And I am not very much interested in trying to find as to who is to blame for this because I honestly believe that that blame is not the sole monopoly of any one person or group. I think we must all share that blame. Certainly, I am prepared to have my full share of it. We have arrived in this tangle and we have to extricate ourselves both from the point of view of the Congress and the country. Our attempt right at the beginning and throughout was an attempt that succeeded in some measure and failed in some other measure. Now the attempt was to try to find solutions and settlements by agreement as far as possible. In this matter, we did find solutions and agreements even though there was much feeling on the issue. But in some parts we did not succeed. This is not the occasion to go into these questions, but one fact I should like to stress. We are not likely to find any solution of any problem by the means that are not the right means. If any of our methods are such that they create more conflict and ill will then they are not likely to yield the right results. I do firmly believe in that general principle, but applied to our present conditions we should try our utmost not to say or do anything which adds to ill will and conflict.

I was a little sorry that Shri Deshmukh in his statement introduced an element of acrimony, though he was perfectly justified in expressing his views and in criticizing me.[17] Naturally, nobody likes to be told that he is full of animus or malice, nobody likes that. But it really does not matter if something like that is said in the heat of the moment. We need not stick on to it, and more so harbour a grievance. It is not for me to talk about myself or to justify anything that I may have done or may not have done. I am very conscious of the things I ought to do which I have not done or the things that I sometimes do what I ought not to have done. But I was a little hurt and distressed not so much by the direct reference to me, but rather to an indirect inference that my senior and junior colleagues in our Cabinet apparently do not count, and things are done over their heads. I think that is not fair to my colleagues at all. You know them as well as I do. Some of them are senior to me and, I have no doubt, wiser than me and I hardly take any step without consulting them formally or informally. But whether they are senior or junior we have been good colleagues and comrades. It is quite wrong for anyone to imagine that we are all of one opinion about important matters that come up before us, we differ frequently.

17. After resigning from the Union Cabinet, C.D. Deshmukh made a statement in the Lok Sabha on 25 July. See *post*, pp. 108-109.

We have long and frequent sessions of the Cabinet, sitting two, three or four hours at a time. Almost every matter of importance is brought up before the Cabinet, it is not disposed of by any ministry separately, and after full discussion some solution or some decision is arrived at which represents some measure of common thinking of the Cabinet. It does not represent possibly my hundred per cent view or any other person's and that is the way of joint functioning among colleagues. And I should like to pay tribute to my colleagues in the Cabinet not because they accept my opinions but because of the clear thinking and earnest effort that they have brought to their work, together with a spirit of cooperation which is so essential. That is largely due to the fact that most of you, all of us in the Cabinet or outside, have had this long period of comradeship in India's struggle for freedom, which has taught us how to, to some extent, think and act in a cooperative manner, accommodate ourselves to others even when we try to impose our wishes on others. It is the imposition of a comrade on a comrade and it means being subjected to his imposition sometimes too. It is a mutual affair. And we learnt to put up with each other, sometimes even when we were very angry with each other. But some larger cause kept us together and we as individuals, to some extent, merged in that larger cause. The issue in the days when we fought for India's freedom was relatively simple, that is, a straight fight for freedom. Of course there are many ways of fighting, we had to face very difficult questions. Nevertheless, the main issue was a clear one, and so in the course of a generation or two, we in India were trained by this. That stood us well in the subsequent and very difficult period. Because we realize, even more today than perhaps previously, how easy it is for us to develop certain disruptive, fissiparous tendencies and forget that binding link which goes with the service of a great cause. The question before us now and in the future is how far we can function as a congress and as a country, with that coherence, with that unity which does not try to put an end to the disparity or to the separate thinking but nevertheless which is always present there to prevent any weakening either in our organization or in the country. I do believe that if we approach our questions with this major objective in view and without malice or ill will, then it would be much easier for us to solve problems, if not suddenly, then step by step. But it is quite essential that that approach should be there. And the most regrettable feature of the past few months has been that our strong feelings, which may be justified on the merits about a question, have interfered with our good relations with each other and we have begun to suspect each other of malice and animus and all kind of evil intentions. I do hope that our party will be a model in this respect as I hope, and others do.

We shall meet, of course, in the course of the next few weeks often and perhaps discuss some matters. At the present moment I have been asked to place before

you a suggestion which was raised, I think at, the time when the Select Committee on the States' Reorganization Bill was meeting. This related to certain border disputes, more particularly, I believe, between Maharashtra and Gujarat, somewhere in the north, Maharashtra and Karnataka and, Karnataka and Kerala. It was suggested in the Select Committee formally or informally that the members of the concerned provinces might meet together and, if possible, come to a settlement about these border matters, or else they might meet together and select an arbitrator and then leave it to him to decide. Although very good progress was made it did not work. . . . There is no question of imposition on this but an attempt made for us to agree, that is, the groups concerned, if it is Maharashtra and Karnataka, let them meet, or representatives of Maharashtra and Gujarat or Karnataka and Kerala meet it is immaterial. If that is done, well and good. If on, the other hand, after meeting together, you cannot think of a suitable person to entrust this work to, then the selection of the person might be done by the Executive Committee of the Party, provided the parties are willing; there is no question of imposition. Time is of the essence in this business and I will suggest the Chief Whip and the Secretary of the Party, Mr Ram Subhag Singh, and other secretaries take this matter up and discuss it.

Now I should say a few words to you about my tour abroad. This tour had a very educative effect on me because it is interesting to look at the world from different viewpoints. Truth is many sided and so is a problem, and one begins to see sometimes, though perhaps it is rather dangerous, to see the other side of the problem. But at any rate one understands a problem more, and it has been my privilege that I have had occasion to meet many of the leaders of the big and small nations and discuss with them the problems of the world as well as the problems which affect us intimately. It was my intention to go to Washington to see President Eisenhower but owing to the fact that he was not recovered sufficiently at the time, this visit was postponed. I do not quite know when I shall be able to visit the United States again. It is not an easy time for me to leave India again, what with Parliament sitting. And in the United States itself there are going to be elections.

The Commonwealth Conference had three new members, well, not three new countries but three new individuals,[18] that is, Pakistan, Ceylon and South Africa. It is rather odd, but at this meeting of the Commonwealth Conference I was the oldest surviving Prime Minister. I do not mean old so much in age but the fact that since I started attending it from 1948 I think in every other country the

18. The reference is to Mohammad Ali, S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike and J.G. Strydom, Prime Ministers of Pakistan, Sri Lanka and South Africa respectively.

Prime Ministers have changed once or twice at least, sometimes three times. So there were these three new Prime Ministers and you can well imagine that this gathering of eight or nine Prime Ministers does not represent a unanimity of outlook. But nevertheless it is interesting and rather extraordinary that we meet together, and discuss world problems, and listen to each other carefully and express our own views which differ often enough. Sometimes there is much in common and thereby without committing ourselves or our countries to anything we learn from each other. I have no doubt myself that this Commonwealth arrangement has been a good thing not only from the narrower viewpoint of India, but from a world point of view too. The Commonwealth itself has undergone changes and one of the major changes being that India as a republic came in there with no allegiance to anybody outside India. You will see the other changes that are coming or likely to come in the Gold Coast where elections were held[19] a little while ago and where Dr Nkrumah won the elections. Fairly soon the Gold Coast will be a full dominion and will be a member of this Commonwealth Conference.[20] That will be a big change bringing in a full-blooded African country, which though not very big in size is already looked upon in Africa as a symbol of their coming freedom. You will see how even the context of the Commonwealth Conference is changing. What it will lead to ultimately I cannot say, but I think it is a good thing for these various elements to have this forum, meet together, try to understand each other, try to influence each other and yet be quite independent and follow their own policies. Naturally, at the Commonwealth Conference we discuss the larger problems of the world, and there is no fixed agenda. We talk about the European situation or the far eastern Asian situation or disarmament or other subjects broadly. It is really not so much discussion as such but an expression of views to throw light on a particular problem. Naturally the Asian members of the Conference speak a little more confidently about questions relating to Asia, just as the other members speak or lay more stress on the European aspects.

Then I went to Ireland for a few days, and they were very pleasant days because there is a spirit of kinship owing to historical and other reasons between the people of Ireland and us and we immediately feel at home there. Now, Ireland is very different from most of the countries I visited including India. Here apart from our other political problems we are engaged in the Five Year Plan, big

19. General elections were held in the Gold Coast on 17 July 1956. The ruling Convention People's Party, led by Nkrumah, won 71 of the 104 strong Legislative Assembly seats.
20. The Gold Coast became the independent dominion of Ghana within the Commonwealth on 6 March 1957.

economic problems, tussling, working hard, trying to push others to work hard, that is living under some stress and strain. So also in Europe more or less, somewhere more, somewhere less. In Ireland the whole atmosphere is a most soothing one of peace. I do not mean to say Ireland has not got its problems, of course it has. But broadly speaking it is not very much concerned with the world problems. It has its own difficult internal problems as all countries have, and the present generation like the present generation in India, has spent much of its life in the struggle for freedom and they are full of it, still more full of it than we are. We are after all getting rather busy with other things, but they are still rather full of these struggles, and of course a common interesting subject was to talk about our jail experiences. Well, it was a very pleasant time we had there and we got a very affectionate welcome there.

I went on then to Germany, where there has been a remarkable industrial recovery and the whole place bustled with activity. There is no unemployment in spite of a vast number of refugees coming from outside. They had all the wherewithal for their factories and trained men who could easily set the machines going. What I am saying applies to every country I was in, but perhaps I found it more in Germany, that is, a vivid realization that India was marching ahead fast.

India was changing. India was going ahead and undoubtedly within a relatively short term of years India will make good. There was this general feeling in every country that I visited, of India's progress and a great keenness and demand for copies of our Second Five Year Plan. Unfortunately I could only take about twenty to thirty copies with me. The demand ran into hundreds and thousands of copies. We just could not produce them. But there was this desire to understand, a feeling that we had done something worthwhile and that we were on the eve of doing other things that would make a difference economically and industrially and therefore a certain desire to keep in step with us.

In Germany they discussed our plan, they discussed all kinds of things with us and as you perhaps know the Federal Government offered us a hundred scholarships for technical students. The most interesting one was in Hamburg where German students collected money, for two Indian scholars to go and study in Hamburg. The general welcome I got in Germany was very warm indeed. I am talking about the people quite apart from the Government which of course was very cordial, and perhaps the warmest of all was in Hamburg. Hamburg, perhaps you know, is a very old free city.[21] A great part of it has been destroyed

21. After Napoleon's downfall, Hamburg became a member state of the German Confederation with the designation of "Free and Hanseatic City of Hamburg" from 1819.

in the war, yet it has recovered. They gave me two degrees there, and if there was some faint excuse for me to be made a Doctor of Law, there was none for me to be made a Doctor of Medicine. So they were very keen and anxious and they discussed with us, the members of our party separately. Chancellor Adenauer[22] was more interested in political problems, and in explaining his own outlook. But the ministers of economic policy were interested in economic problems there. The German Government has actually appointed a committee to study our Second Five Year Plan, to find out how they can cooperate. That is an example because Germans are rather active people. But to some extent that spirit was there almost in every country that I visited.

I went to France after that. In France one of the dominating questions is Algeria, very much so. It is obvious that our reaction to all these questions wherever they might be whether in Algeria or in Cyprus or anywhere else, is in favour of the freedom of the people concerned. The question, however, is always to be considered as to how we can help. If we function as we do in the diplomatic field, we are somewhat constrained from using strong language against any country even though we may not agree with its policy. We talk to it in diplomatic language, strongly if necessary but in a friendly way. The Algerian question is a fairly difficult question, chiefly because there is a very considerable population there of people settled there for the last hundreds of years, people of French or European descent, that is running into about a million and a quarter, for it is obvious that because they are there, they cannot obstruct the freedom of others. But looking at it practically you cannot ignore them, a million and a quarter people cannot be thrown into the sea and certainly no French Government can survive for a day if they agree to any such thing. So some way has to be found for the freedom of Algeria which incorporates these people as well as others. You will remember that I put some suggestions before the Lok Sabha, about two- three months back.[23] We have to be very cautious in what we say, because every country like our own, has a certain pride. You and I will not like it if some other country began telling us what to do in regard to our matters or in regard to our relations with some third country. One has to be very cautious in putting forward ideas without any element of being superior. So we made some suggestions which were: Firstly, that this fighting should stop, the terrible killing going on there. Secondly, that there should be negotiations between the parties—between the French Government and the leaders of Algeria. We mentioned that Algeria's separate individuality should be recognized. What is that? Because

22. Konrad Adenauer was the Chancellor of West Germany, 1949-61.
23. See *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 33, pp. 481-483.

under French law at present Algeria is a kind of a department [24] of France, just like the Portuguese say that Goa is a part of Portugal. However, we said that these descendants of European settlers should also have a full place there. At the present moment they are the most prosperous section of the community, occupying the coastal areas. No one rejected our suggestions, neither the French Government nor the others. Each party when they are fighting thinks if they agree to something it might give an advantage to the other party. But gradually people have come round to many of the things we have suggested there. The French Government has recognized the separate individuality of Algeria. They say, they want a ceasefire,; they say, they are prepared for negotiations. Naturally, there are difficulties. I think my visit there and talks were helpful.

I had to see Marshal Tito and I said I will come there for one day. It so happened that when I went there, Colonel Nasser was paying his visit. So accidentally we three met. It was interesting for us with much in common and yet with different approaches to different problems, meeting together and discussing matters. It was just about that time when we were at Brioni and leaving for Cairo when news came about the American and later the British having withdrawn their offer to give help for the building of the Aswan Dam. [25] We did not discuss that, it was none of my concern but naturally this produced some reactions there. The fact of it and the manner it was done.

After that I went to Lebanon, which is a very lovely country. It is a very small country. The population is a million and a half, of which half a million are in the city of Beirut. That is about the size of a small district of ours. But in that small size, they have every climate. They have the snow covered mountains and they have summer sea and they have almost every kind of fruit, it really is an extraordinarily beautiful place with this variety in that small area. You can bathe almost in a summer sea and go up to the snow in two hours' time. The little country is prosperous, probably there are higher standards there than in any Arab country. There are more Lebanese and Syrians outside Lebanon and Syria than in those countries; far more in the United States of America and South America. Most of those left their countries during the time of Turkish rule, they did not like Turkish rule. So they left it and they have prospered very greatly in America and South America and a good deal of money comes from there too and they have risen to high places there, and they are more or less permanent residents, and even become American citizens. But apart from that, it appears to

24. An administrative district in France.
25. See *post*, p. 319.

be a hard working mercantile community, with plenty of goods coming and going. And it has three great universities: one the oldest is an American university, nearly a hundred years old, which really has nurtured Arabic literature for the last hundred years, and published many Arabic books. Then there is a French university, and then there is a national university. And so from Beirut I came back to India.

Well, that is enough meat for you to chew and if you are vegetarian you can consider it vegetarian. Thank you.

3. Lokmanya—the Scholar-Statesman [1]

Mr Speaker,[2] Mr Chairman,[3] Mr Gadgil,[4] friends and comrades,
A little over two weeks ago, I had the privilege of unveiling a portrait of Lokmanya Tilak in India House in London.[5] It was fitting that that portrait should reside in the heart of London city in a corner which belongs to India. But perhaps no more fitting place can be found for a portrait of Lokmanya than in this Central Hall of our Parliament.[6] And standing here and looking at this indomitable face of a warrior and a scholar, I feel moved and I think of this century of struggle that this country has passed through and of the giants of old who laid the foundations of the freedom of India, and above all, of Lokmanya. We have, to my right here, the portrait of Dadabhai Naoroji, the Father, in a sense, of the Indian National Congress, and we may perhaps in our youthful arrogance think that some of these leaders of old were very moderate, we are much braver because we shout more. But every person who can bring the picture of old India before his eyes and the conditions that prevailed then will realize that a man like

1. Speech at the unveiling of the portrait of Bal Gangadhar Tilak, Central Hall of Parliament, New Delhi, 28 July 1956. AIR tapes, NMML. Extracts.
2. M. Ananthasayanam Ayyangar, Speaker of the Lok Sabha.
3. S. Radhakrishnan, Vice-President and Chairman of the Rajya Sabha.
4. N.V. Gadgil, Congressman from Maharashtra and a former Union Minister.
5. On 12 July 1956.
6. Gopal Deuskar painted the portraits of Tilak.

Dadabhai was, in those conditions, a revolutionary figure. If I say that of Dadabhai Naoroji how much more have I to say about Lokmanya!

Somehow I had imagined Lokmanya to have attained a very advanced age, because I had heard of him from my early boyhood, and throughout our youth we had heard of him and been under his spell. So, I thought that when he died he must have reached an advanced age and then when, sitting here, I calculated I was surprised to realize that at the time of his death, he was much younger than I am today. But in those crowded years of the life, not too long-lived, he put in such tremendous energy, ability, strength and sacrifice that it seems a very long life. After all time is not measured by the passing of years, but what one does, what one feels and what one achieves. And we have here in Lokmanya, a symbol of India's struggle for freedom and a man who was not only a brave soldier but a great captain—not a captain of some organized group but a captain who had to deal with India as it was in his day, that is to say, a rather amorphous India, not well organized, not even perhaps politically very conscious. Although among the youth of those days, there was a feeling of freedom, but still I take it, we were rather non-political mostly and rather frustrated, accepting our dismal fate as destined. There was inertia—not in the minds of everyone, but among most of our people. Now to shake them up and to bring about a mass consciousness, a mass awakening, and a sense of struggle, was I think, primarily Lokmanya's task.

The early founders of the Indian National Congress were great men. And they rather laid the intellectual foundation for the early stages of our freedom movement. It is unfair to them to say that they were not mass leaders in the sense that some of subsequent great leaders were to become. I think that the first great mass leader of this new stage of our revolutionary movement was Lokmanya Tilak. It was he who evoked this response from the masses. After him of course came Gandhiji, who evoked an even wider response because the mass consiousness was developing. Lokmanya affected the younger generation, what might be called, broadly speaking, the middle class, the lower middle class and millions of those people. The next stage was when Gandhiji came, when the peasantry were affected and it spread to the villages.

So here we find a man of great learning, great scholarship, of wide vision and ideas which went far. He writes about the philosophy of the Gita, the philosophy of action. He writes about the Arctic home in the Vedas. See how his mind travels long distances. He was not a mere politician, but the necessities of the moment, the shame of living in a country that was not free, impelled this great scholar-statesmen to throw his weight, his energy and his ability into the struggle for freedom, and rather an unusual thing for a great scholar of that type, to become a mass leader. Normally these things do not go together but

they did go together in him. This chosen scholar of the elect became a mass leader, influencing more than one generation of our people powerfully and influencing them not only in the sense of providing some kind of intellectual impulse towards freedom, but vitalizing them. He made them more dynamic and made them also realize that it was through organized effort and sacrifice that freedom would be obtained. In those early days there were some young men who in their spirit of anger and frustration took to the bomb. Lokmanya saw that that was not the way of achieving success or strength in a country. That was the way of despair and frustration and he raised his voice against this long before Gandhiji raised it in another context and he directed people's minds therefore towards more mass effort and mass struggle. Naturally he was a great nationalist and he thought in terms of nationalism rather than the social movements of a subsequent age. But he was not a narrow- minded nationalist; he had vision, looked ahead and it is obvious from many things that he has said and written, that he saw in those days the picture of a united India. He was prepared to go far to achieve that, to realize that.

He did not think of a particular corner of India but the whole of India as his field of battle, and his field of achievement. And so he laboured in prison and out of prison, as many of us, humbler folk, in our much more limited spheres, laboured. It was easy for us, because we were parts of vast waves of human enthusiasm when it did not matter very much. We shared such physical sufferings with hundreds of thousands. It is quite absurd for anyone to condole with us, because we went to jail for one or two or three or five times because we were exhilarated by that experience and became perhaps a little higher in stature by it. But it was an entirely different matter to be the one and only one to brave an Empire. To be a single person blazing the trail, not knowing who will follow, not knowing what will happen, that requires that supreme courage which only the greatest of people possess. Lokmanya blazed the trails in so many directions for this country, laid the foundations of our struggle and brought in, for the first time, this mass consciousness, political consciousness, this dynamic energy, because he was a tremendously dynamic person. And so there can be no fitter person whose picture should adorn this hall, which represents the achievement of that freedom and independence. I do not know what other portraits will be put up subsequently in this hall, but I can imagine no two worthier portraits than the two we have, Dadabhai Naoroji and Lokmanya. It was not my privilege to come into close contact with him. I was away in a far country studying but even there his voice, his story reached us, youngmen from India who studied there and fired our imaginations and which sometimes ran rather riot. We grew up under that influence, we were moulded under that. The youth of India had been prepared very largely by Tilak and by what he had said and what he had written

and above all what he had suffered. That was the inheritance that Gandhiji had. If there had not been that moulding of the Indian people and its youth and India's imagination by Lokmanya, it would not have been easy for the next step, next major step to be taken. So in this historical perspective we can see one great man after another coming and performing this act of destiny and history which led to the achievement of India's freedom. So we meet here not only to unveil the picture of this great man, Father of India's Revolution, but to remember him and to be inspired by him. . . .

4. Future of Bombay City[1]

Sisters and brothers,

The last time when I came to Poona, fourteen months ago, I was leaving for a tour abroad.[2] I visited many countries. I went to the Soviet Union, which is a great revolutionary country, and then to Poland, Czechoslovakia, Austria, Yugoslavia, Italy and England. I visited mainly the communist countries in Europe. It was a new world which I wanted to see and understand. I have just returned from another tour abroad. I went to some countries of Europe and Asia, to England, France, Germany, Yugoslavia and then to Egypt. I also went to Syria and Lebanon, two small but famous countries in Asia.

On these two tours, I saw two different worlds and ideologies, one, the communist world and the other, the western world. The world, as you know, has been divided into two armed camps for a long time now, between the communist and non-communist countries. There are great countries in both camps and in order to understand the modern world, we have to understand both the sides. Our policy has been not to tie ourselves up with either camp but to maintain friendly relations with all, and follow the path that we think is right. So I benefited by visiting all these countries and meeting their leaders. Perhaps my visit may have helped them also to understand a little about what is happening in India.

1. Speech at a public meeting, Pune, 1 August 1956. AIR tapes, NMML. Original in Hindi.
2. Nehru visited Pune on 4 June 1955 and addressed a public meeting there. He also visited the National Chemical Laboratory and the National Defence Academy at Khadakvasla. Thereafter, he went on his overseas tour from Mumbai.

The whole country is preoccupied with the problem of the reorganization of states and there is a heated debate going on in Poona, in Bombay and all over Maharashtra. I shall say something about that too because there must be no barriers between us. We should try to understand one another. It is possible that we may not always do so. But the effort must always be made because even if we are annoyed with one another or disagree sometimes, it is obvious that we have to live together as one nation. What we must strenuously avoid is to close our minds and hearts, for that makes it difficult to understand the other's point of view. I would say that this applies not only to our internal affairs but to the whole world. We have the right to decide upon a course of action and follow it. But the problems of the modern age are extremely complicated and if we take a rigid stand on one issue without understanding all aspects of the problem, we are liable to make mistakes.

I have come here, as you know, in connection with some functions at the Bhandarkar Institute,[3] the Vidyapeeth and the Poona University. The first of August is memorable for us for it is linked with Lokmanya Tilak's name. So it is an auspicious day. Lokmanya belonged not only to Poona but to the whole of India, though he had more contact with this city. And I am happy to be in Poona on this day.

Before I talk about the issues which are uppermost in your mind, I should like to say something about my travels abroad, not only because it is an interesting tale but mainly because of the great responsibilities that have descended upon India. They are the inevitable consequence of our being a free country. We cannot remain aloof from the rest of the world particularly when there are upheavals in the world. We have to understand what the consequences will be for us and how we can protect ourselves and keep marching ahead. This would be true at all times. But the modern age is one of extraordinary upheavals and change. On the one hand, we hear of nuclear weapons which can bring total destruction upon the world. At the same time atomic energy is a great source of power which if used wisely can alleviate hardships and sufferings of people all over the world. It is up to us to decide how we use it. We want to utilize atomic energy to solve some of our major problems.

Apart from nuclear weapons, there have been various other developments too. The Second World War ended eleven years ago. There have been a great many ups and downs during these eleven years. The war itself had wreaked

3. For Nehru's speech at the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute on 1 August 1956, see *post*, pp. 87-90.

great havoc. Then came a period of tremendous upheavals. The major development after the world war was the emergence of the two superpowers which dominate the world, the United States and the Soviet Union. This entailed a major shift in the balance of power in the world. All other nations are now dwarfed by the superpowers. The whole pattern of international relations has changed

The second development was the emergence of newly independent nations like India, Pakistan, Burma, Indonesia, Ceylon and others which had until the end of the war been under colonial rule. This too had an impact on international relations. The peoples of Asia began to play a more prominent role on the world stage. Even if India is not very strong at the moment, everyone has realized that a new star has been born in the firmament.

The third thing was the Chinese Revolution. China had been in a ferment for years and finally a new order emerged. As you know, China has an even bigger population than India. There are 60 crores of people in China as against 37-38 crores in India. It is a huge country and the united strength of such a large population has contributed to the emergence of China as a great power.

All these developments have upset the earlier pattern which obtained in the world. The dominance of the West began to be reduced at least in Asia and Africa. Indonesia got freedom about eight years after India. We were very happy and extended a hand of friendship and sympathy to them. Gradually, the colonial regimes of Europe which had dominated the Asian and African countries began to slacken their hold. New developments are taking place almost daily now. You must have read about the developments in the Suez Canal region and the steps taken by Egypt.

These are symbols of the receding power of Europe in Asia and Africa. The newly independent nations are gradually becoming more confident and vociferous. In short, the entire pattern has become topsy-turvy and we must understand the new order that is emerging. Unless we do so, the policy that we formulate cannot be realistic. We cannot evolve a policy in the air or out of fear or under pressure from others. We must have a clear understanding of world affairs in order to be able to cooperate with others and work for world peace.

You must have heard about yet another major development which has taken place in the last few months. The Soviet Union is a revolutionary country and its greatest leader was Lenin. Lenin died at a very young age for he had been ailing from bullet injuries he had sustained earlier. Then Stalin came to power and continued for years. He too died three years ago. He exercised even greater power than the old Czars of Russia. There was a new development after his death. The communist leaders who succeeded him began a campaign against his memory, maligning him and accusing him of great atrocities. There is

absolutely no personal freedom or right to express opinions freely in the Soviet Union and any aberration is severely punished. Now his own colleagues are criticizing Stalin. I am merely trying to show you the turmoil and upheavals which are taking place in these great countries and the impact they have on their governments and other internal arrangements.

One of the extraordinary consequences of this was the impact on the communist parties in other countries which had always looked to the Soviet Union for guidance and advice. They had always praised Stalin greatly. Now when the campaign against Stalin started in the Soviet Union, the others became rather perturbed. Their old established ideas had been uprooted. The communist parties in India and other countries are unsure of themselves even now and cannot understand how to react to the new situation. Similarly other parties all over the world are perturbed about the consequences that the developments in the Soviet Union may have for the rest of the world. The Soviet Union is a great country and whichever way it leans, it is bound to have an impact.

As you know, two great Russian leaders visited India last year[4] and went to many places in the country, including Poona. They found a new world which was not communist and yet believed in friendship with the Soviet Union. Somehow they had got used to the idea that either a country is with them or against them. They found that India is one country which follows its own policy but has no enmity towards others. So in a sense this was a new experience for them and made for closer understanding and friendship with India. As you may remember, we issued a joint communique[5] in which we declared our friendly relations with one another. We said quite clearly that though our political and economic organization was different from theirs, we believed in the internal sovereignty of nations. It was accepted for the first time last year by the Soviet leaders that it was not necessary for everyone to toe their line. The communists did not accept this to begin with and felt that communism was the only possible ideology to follow.

In short, all these developments, both within and outside the Soviet Union, have brought about a change in their perceptions. I do not wish to express an opinion about what is happening in other countries. What right do I have to criticize or praise others? But I will say this, that the Soviet Union is proceeding

4. Bulganin and Khrushchev visited India from 18 to 30 November and again from 7 to 14 December 1955. See *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 31, pp. 299-368.
5. The communique was issued on 14 December 1955.

in the right direction to ensure greater friendship and cooperation with other countries.

We will learn whatever we can from others. As you know, we want socialism in India and we are gradually going in that direction. If we can learn something from the Soviet Union or China, or Germany and the United States, we will do so. But the decision about what we ultimately do here is up to us. We must not copy others.

We are living in an age of great upheavals caused by world wars and the emergence of new powers and new sources of energy. New ideas have made their appearance and have not had the time to be consolidated. It may take years for the world to become stable again. At the same time nuclear weapons have created a strange dilemma. If there is a nuclear war, it can lead to total destruction. So it has become extremely important to avoid wars and usher in an age of cooperation in the world. It is obvious that a new order cannot emerge if the great powers continue to dominate and suppress weaker ones for the root of all wars lie in this. This is the big problem that the world faces today.

I found this kind of thinking in England too. The Soviet leaders had gone there and their visit had some beneficial consequences. I went to Germany which had suffered a resounding defeat in the Second World War. It had been completely crushed. But I was amazed to see that within ten years this country, which had been completely vanquished and its cities reduced to rubble during the war, is back on its feet once again and advancing rapidly. That is because the Germans have the capacity for hard work and for cooperation and unity. So they have built up their country anew from the rubble heap and have advanced more than the victors. It shows what a powerful nation it is.

From Germany I went to France and then to Yugoslavia. The foreign policy of Yugoslavia is more or less similar to ours. One, they do not belong to any of the armed camps in the world but believe in friendship with both sides. So I was able to form a very good picture of the way affairs stand in the world and returned to India ten days ago.

I was also able to form an opinion of what the people of the West think of India and the picture they have of us. I found that there is great interest in India, not only because of its size but because they realize the new awakening which has taken place in the country. We are forging ahead quickly specially with our Five Year Plans which has made a profound impression on the world. The Second Plan is even bigger and more ambitious than the First. The world realizes that if we succeed in that within the next five years, India would have grown greatly in strength. Therefore there is great respect for India. Ultimately there is respect only for the nations which can stand on their own feet and go ahead. So they want to remain on friendly terms with India and help with the Five Year Plans

and to establish trade relations. We have reached a stage which makes others want to have contacts with us. The world took no notice of us so long as we remained downtrodden. Now others see us progressing fast, they realize that India will soon be a force to reckon with.

I came back to India with many new ideas and with a fresh determination that we must pit all over strength and energy into implementing the Second Five Year Plan. You will be amazed to know that I was inundated with demands for copies of the Plan from all sides in England and Germany. I had taken fifty copies or so. But the demand is for thousands of copies. That shows the deep interest there is in the Five Year Plans. In Germany, the Government has set up a committee to examine India's Second Plan and to find out what they can do to help. This shows their interest. I do not know how much interest you have or how many of you may have read the document. It is obvious that I cannot expect all of you to read the fat tome. But all of us must understand the broad aspects of the Plan. After all, it is ours, not something foreign. This is the picture that I have brought back with me. The eyes of the world are upon us and so we must make a greater effort. If we slacken our efforts even a little, our progress will come to a halt and we will slide back. No nation stands still. It has to go forward or back. So I have come back full of determination that we must succeed.

The first problem that has come up on my return is the great furore over the reorganization of states. There is no doubt that it is an important problem and careful thought will have to be given to it. But ultimately, it is India as a whole which comes first. The parts come second. India cannot progress unless all the states progress too and vice versa. Countries like England, Germany and China have understood this and they have progressed very fast.

The debate over states reorganization has been going on for the last six or seven months. As you can imagine, the Central Government and I are not very much bothered about which states or territories go to which states. That is, I am not talking about the personal interest of individuals. What I am saying is that those who have the responsibility of administering the whole country cannot worry unduly about a small part of it. These are merely matters of administrative arrangement. It does not involve any great political or economic concepts. This issue is neither, but something totally different, though no doubt important. Nor is it something which concerns party politics. This is something apart from it. Very often, opinion has been divided within the same party. In other cases, some parties have taken up a particular stand in the hope that it will benefit them in the coming elections. That is a different matter. But the issue of states reorganization does not involve great principles or party politics. It is an issue which can be settled only by mutual consultations and consensus so that the maximum number of people are satisfied.

As you know, during the last seven or eight months, ever since the report of the Commission is published,[6] it has been our effort that irrespective of what the final decision is, it should be acceptable to the largest number of people in the country. This has proved very difficult because opinion has been divided. Let me give you an example. Bengal and Bihar are adjoining states. Bengal demands that some districts of Bihar should go to Bengal to which Bihar objects strenuously. I am not at all bothered if a district goes to one or the other state. But there is great heat over this in Bihar and Bengal. Whatever decision is finally taken, it is bound to anger one or the other. The sensible way of looking at it is that no matter where the boundary is drawn, so long as the languages are given equal encouragement and all other rights are protected, it cannot make much difference. It is true that initially there were some complaints. Now laws will be passed to see to it that all the languages are protected because no matter how the line is drawn in any province there are areas which are bilingual. Now if one language tries to suppress the other it is bound to anger the protagonists of that language.

Once these problems are solved, the divisions that will be made will only be administrative. In any case, no decision will be for all times to come. Changes can be made at any time. The important thing is to arrive at a consensus by peaceful methods. The principle that we have set before us is that we shall accept the recommendations of the Commission though to tell you quite frankly, I do not like everything that the Commission has said. But so long as there is a way out to reverse decisions why should there be a quarrel? This is the principle on which we have been working and there have been long discussions. You will be surprised to know that at the moment ninety per cent of the question has been settled by mutual consensus. Only ten per cent remains to be settled of which Bombay and Maharashtra are the major issues.

I am aware that the people of Maharashtra are very keen that Bombay should go to them. Nearly 44 per cent of the people in Bombay are Maharashtrians though others also live there. But the majority of them are Maharashtrians. But according to the principle we have been following, the decision should be by consensus. The recommendation of the Commission was that the greater Bombay state should be allowed to remain with both Maharashtra and Gujarat together with some areas of Hyderabad. We liked this idea. But the leaders in Maharashtra turned it down. So we were forced to come up with an alternative. Various plans were drawn up including one of a very large state which would include the whole of Maharashtra, Bombay, Gujarat and Saurashtra. It would have been a

6. The Report of the States Reorganization Commission was published in October 1955.

beautiful province. But that plan was also rejected. Ultimately we had to agree to the present plan. I would like to tell you that though the people of Vidarbha speak Marathi they were not willing to join Maharashtra. They wanted a separate Marathi province. After a great deal of cajoling, they agreed to join Maharashtra because we were in agreement with the Maharashtrian leaders that only such a province would be viable. In short, the conclusion that has been reached is that there should be a state of Maharashtra excluding Bombay and another to include Gujarat and Saurashtra.

There has been great uproar over the city of Bombay. Unfortunately it has involved great violence and rioting.[7] But what was worse was the bitterness that was generated. I am not referring only to Bombay but all over India. At a time when cooperation is absolutely essential, the disunity which marked the reorganization of states is an extremely dangerous tendency. It is extraordinary that at a moment when we are being tested in the eyes of the world, we have begun to fail. People have been wondering whether all the talk of progress in India had been merely for show or if we are in fact extremely weak and disunited as the British used to say. This is really terrible. Occasional quarrels may be unavoidable. But all this anger, bitterness and tension is very bad and what happened in Bombay and elsewhere has perturbed us greatly. As far as Bombay is concerned, we could not arrive at a decision by counting heads when we wanted to arrive at a consensus. If we regard one another as enemies, we would be striking at the root of our nationalism. We will prove ourselves to be weak before the world at a time when the tasks that we have taken up need unity and cooperation.

If you read the history of India you will find periods of great glory and efflorescence and others of degradations and misery. India has produced great men in every field. But the greatest malady afflicting us has been disunity. Several factors are responsible. One is the caste system. Now compared to Europe, there have not been many wars of religion fought in India. We have always believed in religious tolerance. Communalism is of recent origin in India. In Europe millions of people lost their lives in religious wars. But now they do not have this problem.

In India, casteism, linguism and provincialism have prevented the growth of nationalism. It is true that we presented a united front against the British. But once we became independent, these fissiparous tendencies have started surfacing, which poses a grave danger. The question of a district going to this state or that

7. See *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 32, pp. 180-182.

has become insignificant before the more serious one of facing the terrible forces which are tearing the people apart and creating anger and bitterness. We cannot move a step forward without combating these fissiparous tendencies.

Bombay is a famous city. People from all over India live there. How can the business of the city flourish if the people are constantly at loggerheads? Bombay has been built gradually over a 150 odd years. It would not make a difference either way whether it is in Maharashtra or outside. The question is to arrive at a solution by mutual consent and peaceful methods. Only then will both Bombay and Maharashtra and the whole country stand to gain. Once tempers cool down, the representatives of Bombay and Maharashtra will sit down to try and arrive at a solution without heat or anger.

We have declared this right from the beginning, at the Amritsar Congress[8] and the All India Congress Committee meeting held in Bombay in June.[9] I had suggested that we could come to a decision to be binding for five years. Once tensions had eased, we could talk at leisure. After all, Bombay and Maharashtra or India will not run away. The one principle that I have learnt fully well from my own experience as well as the stress laid on it by Mahatma Gandhi is that the best ends can go wrong if arrived at by wrong methods. The intentions may be most honourable. But they cannot be reached by wrong methods. So this was our suggestion. It was not aimed against Maharashtra or any other state. But I am convinced that if this issue is not settled amicably, by mutual consent, then if Bombay is merged with Maharashtra, it will become a nuisance instead of benefiting anyone. Bombay is a valuable heritage of ours which should flourish instead of becoming a thorn in the flesh. Later on, if Bombay decides to join Maharashtra, it will have our blessings. But we must not arrive at any decision in haste or by wrong methods. The atmosphere has been terribly vitiated and there is a great deal of bitterness and anger. This is not right.

You can say what you like. As you know, I am completely thickskinned. It will make no impact on me. It will be like water off a duck's back. It is important not to create an atmosphere in which it will be difficult to work later. You will have to shoulder great burdens in the future. After a long time, the great state of Maharashtra is going to be created. It is a historic province which has played an important role in the history of India. It has now been given an opportunity to

8. The Amritsar session of the Indian National Congress was held in February 1956. For Nehru's speech on the reorganization of states at the Subjects Committee meeting in Amritsar on 10 February 1956, see *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 32, pp. 227-232.
9. See *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 33, pp. 339-340.

participate in the great task of building a new India. At a crucial time like this if we strike at the very roots by creating an atmosphere of bitterness and destruction, it does not seem a very sensible thing to do. Whether you look at it from the point of view of India or the narrower one of Maharashtra or Bombay, this is not the right path. I am aware that the people of Maharashtra are very agitated about this. There is no doubt about it that their feelings are legitimate. It is understandable. But the question is how to find the right path keeping in mind their emotional involvement. I would like to point out very humbly that the right path is not of violence and chaos or to keep up the issue at fever-pitch all the time. Tempers must be allowed to cool before a solution can be found, and the longer it takes, the greater the delay.

People undertake satyagraha but it has become a meaningless exercise. They are arrested and released by evening without being punished. On the other hand, rioting is worse. So I shall humbly request everyone who is connected with this, our own comrades in the Congress and other parties, that they should cooperate and any changes that may be necessary can come later. If we try to change things by fighting, it will weaken us and do incalculable harm to the country. So that is not the right path. So I appeal to you to think constructively about these issues. We have the task of building a new India, a new Maharashtra. So we must think constructively and clear the atmosphere of the bitterness and poison which have vitiated it. Otherwise the old vices of groupism and internal dissensions will weaken us more and more as they did in the past. We had fallen before invading forces again and again and yet we learnt nothing. We were steeped in conceit. There is something wrong with an intellect which creates disunity.

We are living in an extraordinarily dangerous world. It is obvious that only the powerful are held in respect. Many of the countries are militarily extremely powerful. Some possess nuclear weapons; others have the power of wealth. We have neither the one nor the other. Our armed forces are excellent. But there is no comparison between us and the forces of the big powers which have nuclear weapons. We neither have them, nor are we going to acquire them. We believe in the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes and have already made headway in that field. Atomic energy research centres are coming up in several places in India, like Trombay near Bombay. We are among the select few countries which have advanced in this field because our scientists are excellent.

Since we have no wealth or military might, the strength of India depends on our unity and economic progress. If we remain poor, the country will remain weak. The Second Five Year Plan will mean that we have to bear hardships and tighten our belts. I would have liked to have said more about this if there had been time. I want you to understand it and put all your strength into implementing

it. The most important thing is to increase production in every possible way, agricultural as well as industrial production. Only then will we become self-reliant and not have to depend on others. If we have to import machinery and other basic goods, it will be a great drain on our resources and secondly, all our calculations for the Second Plan will go awry. So we must work hard, in unity and cooperation. If there is any slackness, we will lag behind.

We became independent not because of our armed strength or the power of wealth, but through unity, hard work, sacrifices and service to the people. The need once again is for these three things. Unity, hard work and sacrifice can be of different kinds. We have to pay attention to day to day work. The history of our freedom struggle has been an extraordinary one. It was unique in the world. The Congress introduced a new method of working. If you read the speeches of the founding fathers, you will find a great difference between the India of those times and now. Gradually the great banyan tree of the Congress spread. At the beginning of the 20th century, a brilliant new star was born in the Indian political firmament. That was Lokmanya Tilak. He was the first one to release the freedom movement from the clutches of effete intellectuals and English educated intelligentsia and brought it within the reach of the masses. He gave it a historic twist by involving the people in the movement.

You may remember that it was at that time that Bengal was partitioned. Lokmanya Tilak took great interest in what was happening in Bengal as well. He was the first leader of the masses in the new age that was dawning in India. He was a great scholar himself. But India's cry for freedom drew him like a magnet and he entered politics. If he had lived in independent India he may have been content to be an author. He was drawn in and gave a historic new direction to our freedom movement. The movement grew and spread and then came the war and the second stage of our struggle. By the time we reached the third stage and Gandhiji came on the scene, Tilak passed away, 36 years ago on this day.

I would like to draw your attention to one thing more. Mahatma Gandhi became famous as an apostle of peace and nonviolence. But Tilak had even then raised his voice against the violence and bomb throwing which were rocking Bengal. People are not aware of this fully. Tilak had said that we cannot win freedom by killing the British, for if you killed one ten others would take his place. Freedom can be won only through unity and people's strength and cooperation. Under Gandhiji's leadership the Congress grew into a great national organization which influenced millions of people. The movement was based on unity, peace and sacrifice. All this contributed to India's strength and we got freedom.

The problems before us are of a different kind. But the task is even bigger and it is only by clearly grasping the fundamental things that we can hope to

progress. Today is a special day devoted to the memory of Lokmanya Tilak. We must pay homage to the great leader who taught us an invaluable lesson and played a great role in the history of India. We must try to follow the path he showed and succeed in the new tasks that are waiting to be done. *Jai Hind.*

5. Renewing the Pledge[1]

Jai Hind. Greetings to all of you on the ninth anniversary of Indian independence. The new star of independent India blazed out in the firmament nine years ago. India was new and yet very old too, at the same time, a country moulded by centuries of experience and by the sacrifice, hard work, blood, sweat and tears of its people. India donned a new garb in the time of Mahatma Gandhi, she acquired a new glitter and a new manner. You will remember how we fought for freedom during the last two generations. We struggled, millions of us, with courage and bravery. We struggled gloriously, in a civilized manner, without lifting a finger against anyone. We fought with the enemy but made a friend of him. It was a unique method that we adopted. Rather Gandhiji did, and we followed him as best as we could. That is how the millions of human beings in this country of ours have been moulded. This is how we became independent.

The independence of India has had an impact on other nations also. Not because we are a vast country in size with some 35-37 crore living here. But because the world saw a unique method unfolding before them, an entirely novel method of fighting a war in a civilized manner. I want to remind you that the real greatness of India lies in this and it has had a great impact on the world. We acquired a new pride in ourselves and were emboldened to play a role on the world stage. We had a hand in solving some big international problems. At the moment when war drums can be heard in the distance and the world is preparing for war, all eyes are drawn towards India. Not because we have big armies or that we use threats to achieve our ends but because we have learnt to serve and make friends with others. It is because we have helped to bring about peace in war-torn areas, and to unravel knotty problems, that India has become famous

1. Independence Day speech from the Red Fort, Delhi, 15 August 1956. AIR tapes, NMML. Original in Hindi.

in the world. There are grave dangers facing the world today. Therefore we must refresh our memories about the lessons learnt long ago and try to serve the world.

You must have heard of the expression Panchsheel. It had its origin in our country thousands of years ago but has acquired a new meaning now. It is a code of conduct between the nations of the world. There are long traditions as well as new ideas behind this concept which has gradually spread and come to be accepted by many nations of the world. There are only two courses open to the world today. One is of war and ruin and the second is of peace and Panchsheel. There is no third path. The world is gradually beginning to realize this.

Today grave danger threatens us once again and the world is in deadly peril. Good as well as bad things have happened in this month of August. We meet here on the 15th of August to celebrate the anniversary of our independence and the end of centuries of colonialism and imperialism, and the beginning of a new era. It was in August that both the world wars, in 1914 as well as 1939, began. It was in August that the Second World War came to an end when Japan laid down its arms on the 15th of August. So it is an eventful month, full of dangers and at the same time of a number of good things too. So we must be vigilant. Danger there is in plenty because this is the age of nuclear weapons. There is no room for complacency or forgetting our responsibilities even for a minute. Nor can we afford to forget the lessons taught by Gandhiji. If we do, it is bound to lead to ruin.

I hope that in the conference[2] which is going to be held in London from tomorrow in connection with the Suez crisis, a way will be found to settle this matter peacefully. We have friendly relations with all the countries and particularly with Egypt and England. Therefore we are given the opportunity to be of service to both through friendship. We do not use threats, for whom can we threaten? I hope that through mutual consultations the participants in the conference will find some way to uphold the honour and self-respect of both sides. It is only those decisions which do not humiliate one side or the other that are enduring. Humiliation sows the seeds of enmity and war. If matters are settled by friendly methods, the solution is more permanent.

Do you remember how the centuries old problem of India's independence was solved? In spite of great difficulties and the atrocities which were committed, it was solved by peaceful methods, friendship and cooperation, with the result that there is no vestige of bitterness between the British and us. We have even

2. Convened by Britain, France and the USA to tackle the situation arising from the nationalization of the Suez Canal by Egypt. It was held on 16-23 August 1956.

tried to forget the old bitterness altogether and now we have friendly relations with England. We solved our problems peacefully, in a civilized manner. If we had tried to use violence or coercion, the pattern would have been quite different. We would have become free but the bitterness would have remained for a long time. So there is only one way of solving problems and that is by not humiliating anyone and the preservation of rights and the self-respect of both sides. I hope that the Suez crisis will also be solved like this. Even if it is not solved in London, efforts should continue. No problem will be solved by military strength or threats because the consequences of such actions would be disastrous. It could start a conflagration which would engulf the world.

I just now mentioned Panchsheel, words which originated in India and have spread all over the world. But when I look at India, I wonder how far we have been able to understand the five principles ourselves. In the last seven or eight months, we have seen some strange spectacles in the country, with men fighting against their own kin. We fought the enemy successfully and made friends with them and yet we do not have the patience and understanding to solve our own internal problems. Has the influence of Mahatma Gandhi vanished completely? Is it only the people of my generation who were moulded by his teachings? Has it left the succeeding generations so untouched that there is no self-control, mental or physical, among them? What is the matter? I want you to think about this. Our youth go out on the streets and beat up people. Is this the way to show their bravery, by beating up their own kith and kin? In our time, we have faced the guns and the might of a great empire without a word of complaint. What are the youth made of today? Have the qualities in which we were moulded and which led to India's freedom and fame in the world disappeared? I am getting old. We have become old in the service of the country. Our days are almost over. But we have proved what we were capable of in the service of the country. We learnt a unique method of working at Gandhiji's feet and we were proud of that. India acquired a great name in the world. Therefore when people come out on the streets to fight over petty issues, one wonders where India is going. All of you must think about this.

As you know the question of the reorganization of states has come up. It is not a great political or economic issue but merely a matter of administrative arrangement. I agree that it is a sentimental issue. I agree that people are interested in it and their sentiments ought to be respected. But it is absurd for people to fight with one another, and resort to arson, loot and damaging public property. These will lead to the country's ruin. After all, the ultimate decision will be taken by the Parliament which has representatives from all over the country. And the people of India should accept the decision of Parliament.

It is absurd that there should be riots against the decisions of Parliament–

there are cases of burning of government buildings, beating up the police and what not. I want all of you and all the opposition parties in India to think seriously about these matters. In a large country like ours, there are bound to be different opinions and strands of thoughts. We want that there should be complete freedom of expression so that we can choose a path which is best suited to us. But debate is one thing, violence another. Any party which leads India towards violence is not patriotic. It strikes at the roots of India's freedom. Every individual and party in India must think carefully about these things.

Soon we are going to have general elections. Everyone has the right to express his views and parties can present their programme to the people and try to bring them round to their opinion. If you do not like the present government, you are welcome to change it. I will be happy to serve in any capacity. But violence and chaos have no connection with democracy. We must think carefully where all this will lead us. Is the carefully moulded civilization of India beginning to develop cracks? India has been moulded by thousands of years of culture which cannot be taken away from us. Secondly, we have been moulded by the freedom struggle. If the people represent neither the old nor the new but believe only in hooliganism, how can they serve India?

New avenues are opening up. The Five Year Plans are big steps. But they also impose a tremendous burden. We will have to face a great challenge in the years to come and we will have to pit all our strength and energy into the tasks ahead. To argue over the boundaries of states is absurd. I want everyone, particularly the youth, to think where they are going. Are we adhering to the principle of Panchsheel in our own country?

Panchsheel means friendship with all the countries. How can we practise that when we are not able to be friendly towards our own neighbours? So long as we continue to fight over petty issues, no decision can be arrived at. As far as the government is concerned, you have every right to remove it from power. But threats will have no impact on us. The decision of Parliament is binding and will be implemented. It cannot be changed by such obstructionist tactics.

Everyone must understand quite clearly that the decision of the Lok Sabha[3] about the states reorganization will be binding. You have put me in a position of great honour. But ultimately it is the will of Parliament which is supreme and all of us will have to bow to it. Everyone must understand this clearly. There are legal, constitutional methods of changing the decisions of Parliament. But anyone who thinks he can change the decisions by rioting is mistaken. It would be an unpatriotic act against national interest.

3. The Lok Sabha passed the States Reorganization Bill on 10 August 1956.

On this ninth anniversary of our independence, we must look back as well as to the future. India has come a long way in nine years and the new India which is emerging is held in great respect in the world. We must keep our eyes on the future and march ahead. We must implement the Five Year Plans with strength and determination and pour all our energy into it. We cannot afford to fritter away our strength in futile acts. We have to build a new India by getting rid of poverty and unemployment and reducing the disparity between the haves and the have-nots. India must emerge as a strong and prosperous nation and serve humanity and the cause of peace. These are difficult tasks. But we are accustomed to difficulties. On this day, we must not only look back on our past, but also look at the future and take a pledge to abide by our ancient culture and civilization, and not stray from our chosen path.

This year we are celebrating yet another great anniversary. Two thousand and five hundred years ago Gautama Buddha attained nirvana. The Buddha is held in great reverence not only in India but all over the world because what he stood for are enduring, eternal truths which do not disappear with the passing of time.

One feels proud that the soil on which we have been born has produced great souls like Gautama Buddha and Gandhiji. There is something in this soil which has kept the nation together by a strong bond. It is something spiritual which is reflected in our ancient culture and civilization. Let us refresh our memories once again and pay homage to Gautama Buddha and Gandhiji and great souls like them who have moulded this country. Let us follow the path shown by them with strength and determination and cooperation.

Jai Hind. Please say *Jai Hind* with me thrice.

6. Violence in Gujarat and Poland[1]

When we met here a few days ago,[2] you may remember, we discussed the question of making Bombay a composite province and after much argument, our Party decided in favour of it. There have been many incidents since then of which you are aware. There were some riots in Ahmedabad and elsewhere in Gujarat and

1. Speech at a meeting of the Congress Parliamentary Party, New Delhi, 22 August 1956. AICC tapes, NMML. Original in Hindi and English.
2. On 6 August 1956. See *post,* pp. 125-129.

Morarjibhai decided to go on an indefinite fast till peace had been restored there.[3] Many of our Party members desired to send a message to Morarjibhai in this connection. So after consulting them, a telegram was sent by Ram Subhagji.[4] This has been published in the papers today.

We have also received a reply, in which Morarjibhai has said that normally he does not like hunger strikes, but on this particular occasion he considered it his duty to undertake this fast, because he felt sure that the incidents taking place in Gujarat were disastrous and would bring ruin. He could not tolerate this. So he decided on this course of action.

Morarjibhai's general condition is deteriorating day by day. His health is not very good. As far as Ahmedabad is concerned, the situation is better. The city is returning to normal and the shops are open. But there is tension and though there have been no incidents, the atmosphere is not good. Perhaps the situation will improve further in a day or two. We hope that Morarjibhai will be able to break his fast soon. So I cannot say very much except that our eyes are turned towards Gujarat, not merely because he is our colleague and a special person, but because the picture that Gujarat presents today is a dangerous one. We have to find out where we have gone wrong. Why has our rapport with the people ceased to be? This is a matter which requires deep thought. It is not enough to blame one another. Maybe we are right, maybe we are wrong.

These are important matters which we have to consider and understand in order to do our work well. People's attention is now on the coming elections. Elections, in my opinion, have less relevance than the atmosphere in the country. Which way does the wind blow? What are the people thinking? These things are

3. Following the Union Cabinet's decision on 6 August 1956 to form a bilingual Bombay State comprising of Kutch, Saurashtra, Gujarat, Maharashtra, Bombay city, Vidarbha and Marathwada, violent protests and rioting occurred in Ahmedabad for several days resulting in imposition of a curfew, closure of textile mills and the death of eighteen persons from police firing. On 19 August, Morarji Desai, Chief Minister, Bombay State, went on an indefinite fast in Ahmedabad to restore peace in the city. On 26 August, he ended his fast and addressed a public meeting asking all citizens to ensure that hooligans did not rule the city.
4. In his telegram to Morarji Desai, Ram Subhag Singh, Secretary of the Congress Parliamentary Party conveyed the Congress Parliamentary Party's "deep and anxious sympathy in the great ordeal through which you are passing . . . The full meeting of our party considered the proposal for a great composite State of Bombay and approved it almost unanimously. We stand by that decision and give you our full support . . . We earnestly hope the clouds that have darkened men's minds, and led to so much misunderstanding will fade away and Gujarat, which has so often set an example to the rest of India, will come back to her moorings. . . ."

of greater importance. We ought to understand them and look for the key to solving this difficult problem. Morarjibhai has taken this step after considering these things carefully, to try to win over the people. I hope good will come of it. But all of us have to think about how we can purify this poisonous atmosphere by our service, honesty and hard work.

I shall now say a few words in English. Gujarat has had intimate associations with Gandhiji, Sardar Patel and other great leaders. The Congress there is a fine organization and is known for discipline, and all that. If even in Gujarat people can get so vastly excited and, if I may use the word, misbehave, quite apart from the merits of a problem, then it is a serious matter. Essentially these kinds of violent upheavals strike at the root of all democratic governance or ordered functioning. People may do them in the excitement of the moment. Some people may feel strongly about something or other but the point is that this type of behaviour is not only harmful but ruinous for the country. It does not matter what they are for or against. Such a behaviour is opposed to every kind, every type of democratic functioning. We often talk of non-violence and violence. And we are presumed to be a little proud of the fact that we have stood for non-violence in this country. Non-violence is a high and difficult ideal. But in a democracy even ordinary folk behave peacefully, whether they believe in non-violence or not. Certainly in major revolutions no law or democracy functions. That kind of situation is not very applicable today.

Things have changed. People do not behave like that anywhere whether it is a communist country or whether it is a non-communist country. About two or three months back, there was rioting in Poland. Much was said here about our utilising the police force. In Poland tanks were used against the people. If violence on a mass scale takes place, a government either abdicates and runs away or functions as a government. A government is placed in an extremely difficult position because, when such a thing happens, it is the wrong people who come on top. The anti-social elements have a field day and they try to control the situation by sheer terrorism. No kind of ordered society or ordered government can function in these conditions. We must consider deeply why this kind of atmosphere has spread among our young people, students and others. In Ahmedabad practically the entire labour force, kept away from these troubles. A few might have joined, but the working class of Ahmedabad kept away. Students and others took a prominent part. Who are these students? They are our own sons, daughters, brothers and so forth. They are not strangers to us. They are part of us. This should lead us to a great deal of heart searching to find out where we have failed to influence them in the right direction. It is not enough to condemn people even though their action may be condemnable. In a democracy one has to win people over to our side. We have to go against anti-social elements

of course. Many of you may be thinking about the elections due in five or six months' time or whenever they take place. But what I have referred to is far more important than all the elections that are going to take place.

I told you, I think, when I came back from Europe just a month ago,[5] about the extraordinary interest in Europe today in India specially in our Five Year Plan. It was quite extraordinary how the people were anxious and eager to understand our Five Year Plan. Why? Not because of some sentimental attachment for India. But because they felt that India was making good, that India had succeeded in the First Five Year Plan and launched a Second Five Year Plan of much bigger dimensions and that a time would soon come when an industrialized India, with higher standards, would count more and more in the world. It was a realization of this, that has made people desire to cooperate with India. I have been going to Europe almost every year and there are plenty of people who are interested in India, but I never found this intense interest in what we have done and what we are going to do in the economic sphere and in the social sphere and all that. . . .

I just referred to the troubles in Poland. Poland is passing through a very interesting phase.[6] There is more self-criticism in Poland today than almost in any average country and that is such a tremendous change from total absence of criticism before. It is amazing what has happened in the last three or four months. In the course of these semi-public debates in Poland about their economic policy, some very eminent leaders of Poland, economists and others actually suggested that they should learn from India's Second Five Year Plan. They felt they had gone too far in one direction and had got into difficulties. Anyhow it was interesting that attention there should be drawn by some eminent people to the broad approach of India's Second Five Year Plan.

In India the people may differ from us in regard to minor matters of foreign policy, but broadly speaking, I think it is right to say that our foreign and international policy has a tremendous weight of opinion in this country behind it. Of course we may have trouble about states reorganization but it is not really an economic or social programme and does not affect the past or the future. So just when we have made an impression on the world, here at this moment we cannot have an inner rot creeping in into our body politic. . . .

I might just say a few words about this Suez Canal Conference which, I imagine, will finish its labours in London today. I do not quite know what the final shape of things might be, although even the news that has come indicates

5. See *ante*, pp. 17-18.
6. See *post*, pp. 397-398.

that a large number of countries invited there have given their broad agreement to the formula proposed by Mr Dulles. You may have seen the formula or the proposal made on behalf of India.[7] Essentially the Indian proposal was to indicate certain broad principles and to prepare the ground for further detailed consideration later. Certain facts were most important to us. One of course was that this matter must be settled by peaceful means. It is obvious that if our objective is to have the Suez Canal as a free international highway that is important for all the world, that objective is not gained by an attempt of certain nations to impose their will on Egypt. Any attempt to impose brings conflict and the conflict puts the Suez Canal out of action and you do not let the Suez Canal function. Therefore our approach was a cautious approach to utilize this conference, which was an ad hoc conference not representing any particular group, to avoid those dangers and going a step or two forward towards some peaceful settlement. An attempt to go too far was likely to fail, because the principal party was not present there and even something that might be considered good, will result in unfavourable reactions if it is done in the shape of coercion and imposition. On the other hand, there is no half way house between a settlement by agreement and a settlement by coercive methods. You cannot have half coercion, because the half coercion prevents the half settlement. Anyhow we shall see in the course of the next few days how matters develop there. I am not saying that there will be a war but it is a serious situation. . . .

7. See *post*, p. 370.

2
NATIONAL PROGRESS

I. ECONOMY

1. To V.T. Krishnamachari [1]

New Delhi
August 12, 1956

My dear V.T. [2],

I think you were present at the Cabinet meeting [3] when I raised the question of the rise in prices. The Cabinet decided to consider this matter fairly fully, that is, not only the present rise but the background and the reasons for it, etc. I am much concerned about this as well as the way our foreign balances are gradually disappearing.

In this matter the Planning Commission will have to help a great deal. Much depends on the proper information and statistics that we collect and the manner of doing so. I asked Mahalanobis [4] today as to what was being done in this respect. He told me that Pitambar Pant [5] and others from the CSO [6] had suggested, some considerable time back, some new forms for gathering this information and about progress reports. But thus far this had not been utilized and the old method was continuing.

I think this matter should be looked into. It might be desirable to entrust the work of the progress report to the CSO.

What is happening about perspective planning? [7] I asked Mahalanobis and he could give me no satisfactory answer. What is the Research Programme Committee of the Planning Commission doing? I take it that it is dealing with long-term planning.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. File No. 37(35)/56-59-PMS.
2. Deputy Chairman, Planning Commission.
3. The meeting took place on 8 August 1956.
4. P.C. Mahalanobis, Member, Planning Commission.
5. Personal Secretary to Nehru in the Planning Commission.
6. The Central Statistical Organization was set up in May 1951 as an attached office of the Cabinet Secretariat.
7. See *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 30, pp. 153-154.

2. To A.P. Jain[1]

New Delhi
August 16, 1956

My dear Ajit,[2]

I find from newspapers that, in answer to a question in the Rajya Sabha, you made some kind of a statement about the rise in prices of agricultural commodities and the reasons for this rise.[3] As a matter of fact, questions on this subject have been asked from Finance Ministry also, and they are going to be answered soon. It is obviously desirable that answers given by various Ministries of Government should be more or less on the same lines and should not differ. I think, therefore, that all statements made about the rise in prices should be made after full consultation with the Finance Ministry.

As far as I remember, you laid stress on what is called deficit financing as a cause of this rise in prices. That may be so, especially the excess of purchasing power of the people, but there are other causes too. And, therefore, it is desirable to present a balanced picture.

As you know, we are going to discuss this matter fully in the Cabinet. Finance Ministry have produced a note on this subject of rise in prices. I have asked them to send copies of this note to your Ministry and [the Ministry of] Commerce & Industry so that your Ministry can prepare your note on the subject also. We want to have as full a presentation of relevant facts as possible to be able to judge all aspects of the case.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. A.P. Jain Papers, NMML.
2. Minister of Food and Agriculture.
3. A.P. Jain informed the Rajya Sabha on 14 August that inflationary tendencies caused by deficit financing was one of the reasons for the rise in the prices of foodgrains. The other factors, according to him, were the speculative activities of the traders; hoarding of stocks by them and the producers; the failure of the rice crop in East Pakistan and the consequent pressure on supplies in parts of eastern India; and the lower production of kharif coarse grains.

3. A Private Member's Resolution on Nationalization[1]

If this matter comes up for discussion in the Lok Sabha, the Minister[2] of Commerce & Industry is well capable of dealing with it and it is not necessary for me to make any suggestion.

If the Lok Sabha wants any information, I would say that the resolution is rather an extraordinary one, which has no precise significance and yet which may have very far-reaching meaning. Two points arise: the desirability of wholesale nationalization and the obstructions which the present Constitution may place in the way of such nationalization.

We have recently proclaimed our industrial policy also which divided up industry into three sectors.[3] This resolution is in direct conflict with that industrial policy which has presumably been accepted by Parliament. Our Second Five Year Plan is also based on that policy. It would be rather odd to debate a resolution in the House in a rather casual way, which completely upsets our Second Five Year Plan and the policies we have enunciated.

As for the amendment of the Constitution, I take it that the amendment aimed at is that this nationalization should take place without compensation; that in fact it should [be] expropriation. There is no bar in the Constitution to nationalisation, but normally compensation has to be given and that is our policy.[4] To expropriate without compensation would certainly be opposed to our Constitution.

To suggest, therefore, these vital changes in our Constitution and in our policy in a vague resolution to be moved in the House rather casually seems improper.

1. Note written around 24 August 1956. JN Collection.
2. T.T. Krishnamachari.
3. See *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 32, pp. 72-79.
4. The Constitution (Fourth Amendment) Act, 1955, defined more precisely the State's power to acquire and requisition private property and to fix the amount of compensation. The question of compulsory acquisition of property was dealt with in Article 31 of the Indian Constitution.

4. To V.T. Krishnamachari [1]

New Delhi
August 31, 1956

My dear V.T.,

As I mentioned to you this morning, I should like the Planning Commission to consider the question of reorganization of work rather thoroughly and I should like to be present during these discussions. Now that the Second Five Year Plan has been launched, we have immediately to look ahead. We have, of course, to keep this Plan in view all the time and push it to the best of our ability with the State Governments. We have in particular, as you are doing now, to deal with the food production programme. In regard to this, I hope that we shall have a special meeting of the Planning Commission after some days to consider it together with Thapar's[2] note after his return from China.[3] I am anxious to help in this in so far as the State Governments are concerned and also to create strong public opinion in favour of it.

Then there are the financial and resources aspects of the second five year programme which have always to be kept in view.

But, apart from all this, we have to look ahead in regard to technical manpower and statistical surveys, etc., that is, we have to take a long-term view; otherwise we shall be held up later. Some time ago, we had discussed the long-term perspective planning and asked Mahalanobis to proceed with this.

I think that we should now give more definite and formal shape to these matters and a separate Division or Department of the Planning Commission might deal with them. This should be placed under Mahalanobis and should

1. File No. 17(5)/56 -PMS.
2. P.N. Thapar, Secretary, Ministry of Food and Agriculture, was part of a four-member delegation that visited China in July-August 1956 to study its agricultural planning and techniques.
3. Thapar's observations on Chinese agriculture dealt with two issues: First, the substantial and steady impetus to agriculture because of State guarantee for both prices and markets. Second, the cooperative movement formed the "keystone" of China's agricultural development. Thapar concluded that China's progress "in the last few years may only be a little better than ours", but China had created conditions for future progress "which are more promising than what we have done." Thapar also said that while Beijing was following "totalitarian methods" to increase food production, it was difficult to believe that "all the progress [was] due to compulsion."

deal with (1) statistics and surveys, (2) research, (3) technical manpower and (4) long-term perspective planning.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

II. FOOD AND AGRICULTURE

1. To A.P. Jain[1]

New Delhi
July 31, 1956

My dear Ajit,
You sent me a few days ago the report of your Mussoorie Conference.[2] I have not read it yet. But from some bits that I have seen, I am surprised and distressed. This Conference appears to me to have tried its best to damp everyone's spirits and to take the gloomiest view possible.[3]

It is obvious that if the view of these gentlemen is correct, then we had better wind up shop and throw aboard the Five Year Plan. Also the general ideas on cooperation might have been advanced a generation or two ago, but have hardly any place today.[4]

1. File No. 31(37)56-PMS.
2. The Conference of Central and State Ministers of Agriculture was held on 28-30 June 1956.
3. The Second Five Year Plan envisaged a 40% increase in agricultural production within the existing resources. However, most of the state ministers who attended the Conference on Agriculture saw no prospects of any spectacular increase in agricultural production within the allocations for the Second Five Year Plan. A.P. Jain wrote on 22 July that additional allocations of upto Rs 116 crores were required to raise food production from 10 million tons to 16.4 million tons.
4. The Conference of State Ministers on Cooperation accepted the target of 500 cooperative farms in 1956 to be located in National Extension Service Blocks and resolved to accelerate the setting up of 10,400 large-size credit societies as an "essential step towards increasing agricultural production." But some ministers suggested that cooperation would not succeed in India because of the large gap between the privileged and the underprivileged. The lack of cooperative spirit, according to some, would also be a stumbling block.

Food prices[5] are rising and, as a result, the whole estimates for our Five Year Plan have to be revised. Our foreign exchange position is weak. The only major remedy for all this is much bigger food production. I can think of no other remedy. If we cannot succeed in that, then indeed it is waste of time pottering about little things.

Also I am not prepared to accept the advice of experts and the like that, in order to increase our food production, we must import vast quantities of fertilizers from abroad, thus adding to our exchange difficulties. Personally I do not believe in too much use of fertilizer unless it is accompanied by organic manure.

I think we shall all have to think again and, if necessary, throw our experts overboard. We are facing a dangerous situation and we shall have to think accordingly.

This is a brief reaction. I want to write to our State Ministers on this subject also.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

5. The wholesale price index of rice rose from 399 in January 1955 to 463 in December 1955. The price index of wheat rose from 498 in January 1955 to 529 in January 1956.

2. To Chief Ministers[1]

New Delhi
August 12, 1956

My dear Chief Minister,

I must apologize to you for not having sent you the usual fortnightly letter for a long time. Indeed, even now, I do not consider this particular letter as a normal fortnightly one. I was away, as you know, for a month. Since my return, I have been overwhelmed with work. And so, although I wanted to write to you about many matters, including of course my visit abroad, I have been unable to do so.

1. File No. 25(30)/56-PMS.

2. I am writing today, more particularly, about one special subject. This is about agricultural production, especially food production. Soon after my return from abroad, I learnt of the Conference of Central and State Ministers of Agriculture, which was held at Mussoorie at the end of June of this year. A brief account was sent to me, and this was followed by a longer report.

3. I was distressed by this report and by what some of the Ministers of Food and Agriculture from the States said at this Conference. Reading a report of their remarks, I felt that they had probably not cared to read our Second Five Year Plan report. This applies more especially to the reaction of some of the Members of the Conference to cooperative farming.[2] I am astonished that any person in India should consider cooperative farming inadvisable or not feasible. If there is one thing that is generally recognized all over the world today, it is this: that cooperative farming is essential, both from the economic and the social points of view. It is true that from the economic point of view, a large farm will also be very productive. But once we give up these large farms, and have relatively small holdings or farms, then it becomes inevitable for cooperation between a number of small farmers. This is the economic aspect.

4. From the social point of view, cooperative farming is equally necessary. We talk about a cooperative commonwealth. What exactly does this mean? In the world of today, there is an inevitable tendency for everything to be done on a larger and more centralized scale. This has certain advantages, but it has also many disadvantages, more especially if these large-scale operations are controlled by a few private individuals.

5. We talk of decentralization, and I think in many ways we should encourage this. But, decentralization by itself is not likely to succeed unless we bring into it the advantages of large-scale cooperative working through cooperative processes. The alternative is State ownership.

6. To say, as some people do, that the Indian farmer is too much accustomed to his old methods and is not prepared to change them, does not help at all. If he will not change his methods, his lot will become harder and harder, and he will go to the wall. Our farmers, even though they might not be well educated, are intelligent enough to understand when something is explained to them. But, apart from this, we have no other choice but cooperative farming. The real

2. S.K. Dey, Administrator of the Community Projects Administration, stated at the Conference of Central and State Ministers of Agriculture on Cooperative Farming, held at Mussoorie from 1 to 3 July 1956, that unless the disparity between the privileged and underprivileged sections was removed, agricultural cooperation could not succeed. Similarly, N.G. Ranga, Member of Parliament, expressed himself against cooperative farming from being carried out in the lands of owner-cultivators.

alternative is collective farms owned by the State, which most Communist countries have. That, I take it, is further removed from the customs and habits of the Indian farmer, to which a reference[3] is made.

7. I have not heard of the argument that we should not increase our railway system or even scrap the railways that we have, because the Indian farmer is used to the bullock cart. We live in a different age and, indeed, even the age we live in is, perhaps, ending before long, to give place to yet another age, the atomic age. If we are not wide awake to these obvious facts, then we fail as a nation and as individuals.

8. I am convinced that it is essential for us to have cooperative farming. There are, of course, many types of cooperative farming, and we need not be rigid about a particular kind. But the principle and the essential elements of practice have to be accepted and acted upon. It has also to be remembered that, in the world of today, the pace is fast. Those who lag behind get left to fend for themselves in a world against them. Therefore, these changes to bring about cooperative farming cannot be slow. No doubt, they take some time, but we have to work hard for them.

9. Even as I write this, a delegation[4] of ours is visiting China to enquire especially into the very rapid growth of cooperatives there. Within two or three years, millions of cooperative farms have sprung up there. Now, they are being converted into collectives.[5] We do not want to go in that direction. But the forces at work which are driving China in that direction—a vast agricultural population, the need for greater production, etc.—are at work in India, and we have to find some solution. After a great deal of thought and consideration of this problem, we have definitely come to the conclusion in the Second Five Year Plan and, indeed, in the earlier one also, that we must have cooperative farming. At this stage, for anyone to challenge this surprises me.

3. A.P. Jain doubted whether a large number of cooperative societies, depending for their establishment and growth on the voluntary efforts of millions of illiterate and uninformed peasants, could be set up in India.
4. A delegation led by R.K. Patil visited China in August-September 1956 to study agrarian cooperatives. In its report to the Planning Commission, the delegation said that cooperative farming was necessary in India for economic as well as social considerations. Cooperation would open up avenues of employment and help in attaining higher standards of living.
5. Plans for the gradual collectivization of agriculture in China were announced in January 1954. The aim was to increase the number of cooperatives from 14,000 to 35,000 by the end of 1954, and to 800,000 by 1957. By the end of 1955, some 60% of peasant households were said to have joined collective farms. In January 1956, Beijing announced a twelve-year plan based on complete collectivization of agriculture.

10. The other and even more important problem is greater agricultural production and, more particularly, food production. I find from the report of the Mussoorie Conference a singular lack of appreciation of the urgency of this matter. Many Agriculture Ministers take it for granted that additional increase in agricultural production cannot be had unless additional funds are available. I dispute that argument and, certainly, it is not an admitted proposition. It may be, of course, that, with some more money thrown in, we can achieve more results. But that is begging the question. We cannot create money out of nothing, and we have gone as far as we could possibly go in estimating our resources for the Second Five Year Plan. We dare not increase them, unless we make good in the first two or three years to such an extent that we can confidently take a further step even within this Second Plan period. The problem before us is to increase our food production considerably within the limits of the resources provided for in the Plan.

11. I am sometimes told that our calculations have been carefully made and are based on expert opinion. How, then, can we challenge them? All honour to the experts. I believe in expert knowledge, but I believe even more in solving a problem than in giving an expert excuse for not solving it. After all, there are other countries in the wide world, which have dealt with similar problems. Why have they done much better than we have done or than we think of doing? Are human beings in other countries made of a different mould or is it that experts there are different? I am sorry that I am writing strongly in this matter. But I have to do so as I feel very strongly. I think that many of us, and more especially our experts, have got into a groove and a rut of thought which is peculiarly unhelpful. We shall have to get out of that rut and be a little more active and original in our thinking. Necessity, they say, is the mother of invention. Is it that most of us, including the experts, do not feel this terrible pressure of necessity and, therefore, do not care to think harder than they do?

12. One thing is patent. The entire future of our Second Five Year Plan depends upon our agricultural production. It is only the increase in this agricultural production that will give us the resources to fulfil that Plan or even go ahead. If that fails us, the Plan fails, and the future of India is dark. This applies to all agricultural production, more especially it applies to foodgrains because they are the basis of life here. It is bad enough that India, an agricultural country has to import foodgrains. It would be worse if we do not get over this in the near future and have surpluses which will give a basic strength to our economy.

13. How, then, are we to increase this production? We know for a fact that some other countries have rapidly increased their food production in the last few years without any tremendous use of fertilizers. How has China done it? China's resources in this respect are not bigger than ours. China is at the same

time laying far greater stress on industrial development and heavy industry than we are. Yet, they are succeeding in increasing their agricultural production at a faster pace than we are. Surely, it should not be beyond our powers to do something that China can do.

14. We are using our fertilizers and they have helped us to increase our production. We may use them more. But it is a very doubtful matter how far chemical fertilizers by themselves are good in the long run. We are laying far too much stress on chemical fertilizers. Few people talk about compost and manures and the like, although these can be made available in large quantities if we try hard enough. The great advantage that China has is the use of such natural manures.

15. I am not writing a technical treatise on this matter. But what I am venturing to do is to draw your attention to the extreme urgency of this problem. I am convinced that we can solve it and that we can do so without any large additional expenditures. We really have not seriously taken it up. I understand that in our community projects, the increased food production during the First Five Year Plan period was about twenty-five per cent. This was brought about without any great strain or effort. If that was so, surely we can expect a thirty per cent increase with a little more effort in these areas. In the course of the Second Five Year Plan, we intend to cover the country with Community Projects and National Extension Schemes. In all these areas, therefore, the increase should certainly be thirty per cent.

16. This means, of course, that our Community Projects and National Extension Schemes must be directed deliberately to this end. Further, there must be full coordination of the various Departments of Government. It is ultimately intensive cultivation that will make a major change in India. A little addition in the area of cultivation, though welcome, makes little difference.

17. I would beg of you to give thought to these matters and to share this letter of mine with your other Ministers and more especially your Agriculture Minister. The experts who advise you in these matters, should be asked to wake up and look at reality and not live in some textbook world. Also, they must not think in terms of America and England, but in terms of India and the problems we have to face.

18. As I write to you, the world is faced by one of the most serious crises which we have had during the past few years. This is the Suez Canal issue. The next week or ten days will indicate which way the world goes, towards conflict or away from it. This itself indicates how dangerously we live constantly on the edge of a precipice. We grow complacent and waste our time in petty disputes and arguments and sometimes writing long notes on files. In this dangerous world, the complacent and those with parochial minds have little place.

19. After a great deal of trouble and conflict and violence, we thought we had arrived at a haven in regard to the States Reorganization Bill. Nobody calls it an ideal solution of every problem. But I do believe that it is, by and large, a good solution. It is always possible to rectify minor errors later. The major decision about a composite Bombay State suddenly made a great change in the whole approach. We rejoiced at this change and the new atmosphere that had been created. Even as we rejoiced, violence and arson spread in Ahmedabad and other parts of Gujarat, and blood was shed. No greater warning of the dangers that surround us could have come to us than this from the old home town of Gandhiji. All of us will have to do a great deal of heart-searching. Where is the country going to, if we relapse into violence at every provocation or petty irritation? Unfortunately, there are some political parties which rejoice when this kind of violence takes place and which encourage it. This is called by them encouraging militancy in politics. Our young men and women, on whom the burden of running this country will inevitably be cast, go out into the streets and are 'militant' and burn and destroy. Our poor policemen are attacked as if the police are responsible for the decisions of Parliament. If this is the normal atmosphere of our country, then we speed towards chaos.

20. We talk bravely of the Panchsheel in the wide world and of peaceful coexistence. In our own country, we act in a contrary way.

21. I am disturbed and distressed by all this, as you must be and yet, my mind then goes to the great constructive work that is being done in India, our vast developmental programmes, our scientific advance and the millions of people who are building up new India. As a symbol of this great advance, came the other day the news that our atomic reactor had reached criticality and was producing atomic energy.[6]

22. In the world, our prestige stands high and we are respected among other nations. When a crisis occurs, many look to us to find some way out, because we have gained a reputation for some maturity in thought, some wisdom and a capacity not to lose our heads when a difficult situation comes. Yet many lose their tempers and their heads over the pettiest matters inside our country.

23. There is this race between the forces of peace and progress and friendly cooperation and development and building up and the other dark forces which think in terms of violence and conflict, of destruction and disruption and chaos. It is no good our drifting. We have to take our firm stand and adhere to it and make it clear to everyone in this country what stuff we are made of.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

6. See *post*, p. 210.

3. To M.S. Thacker[1]

New Delhi
August 16, 1956

My dear Thacker,[2]
Your letter of the 15th August about the multi-purpose food, etc.

You should certainly prepare a note about this and you should inform the Minister of Food & Agriculture[3] and the Minister of Agriculture[4] of the meeting of the Governing Body.

But the real thing is to push this matter and the Governing Body is not going to push it. It is the State Governments and other organizations that are going to do it. It is from this point of view that this note should be prepared. Indeed, if you send me a suitable note for the purpose, I shall send it to the Chief Ministers. We can ask the Health Ministry to send it to various hospitals and like institutes. The Food Ministry could also suggest how to proceed about this matter.

Therefore, I think that apart from your Governing Body meeting, much has to be done and should be done.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. JN Collection.
2. Director, Council of Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR).
3. Ajit Prasad Jain.
4. Punjabrao S. Deshmukh was Minister of Agriculture.

4. To A.P. Jain[1]

New Delhi
August 19, 1956

My dear Ajit,

Some time ago I wrote to you about the charges made in Madhya Bharat for reclamation. You replied to me that it is for the Finance Ministry to reduce these charges.[2]

Now I receive a letter from Takhtmal Jain, the Chief Minister. Reading this letter, it does seem to me that he makes but a fairly good case.[3] I really do not see how we can ask the poor peasants of Madhya Bharat to pay for our incompetence. Anyhow, I should like you to consider this matter carefully again.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. File No. 31(38)/56-PMS.
2. Replying to Nehru's letter of 18 May, A.P. Jain wrote on 25 July that the Madhya Bharat Government had sought remission of charges due to the Central Tractor Organization (CTO) for reclamation of land in Jhansi district in 1953-54. The state government claimed that it was unable to recover from the cultivators the charges for reclamation due to natural calamities. Jain suggested that the Finance Ministry could assist the cultivators out of a fund maintained for gratuitous relief. Since Nehru had taken over the finance portfolio after C.D. Deshmukh's resignation on 22 July, Jain saw no difficulty in overturning an earlier decision taken by Deshmukh against providing relief.
3. Takhtmal Jain wrote on 10 August that the rate of recovery for reclamation of land had been increasing every year without prior notice to the cultivators or to the state government. He added that the Seventh Report of the Estimates Committee on the working of the CTO had made it clear that the cost of reclamation had gone up owing to mismanagement. Jain contended that this gave a handle to opposition parties and even agitated the Congressmen, and warned that future efforts to collect the arrears were bound to create law and order problems. He also felt that the Centre should bear all further losses.

5. To M.C. Shah[1]

New Delhi
August 26, 1956

My dear Shah,[2]

There is a long-standing argument going on about the Central Tractor Organization's work in Madhya Bharat. This organization was started as a commercial concern on a no-profit and no-loss basis.[3] The idea was that the expenses incurred were to be debited to the State Governments who had to recover them from the cultivators. The organization itself has no separate funds at its disposal.

As a matter of fact, many mistakes were committed by the organization, with the result that the costs were heavy. Anyhow, we recovered all these costs from the State Governments and they passed them on to the cultivators. The poor cultivators are hit very hard indeed, and I have received appeals from the Madhya Bharat Government as well as many others.

I wrote about this matter once to Deshmukh, but he took a somewhat rigid view. He was right, of course, from the point of view of this being no concern of our Finance Ministry. But, from the larger point of view, it is very much our concern that we do not bear down too heavily on the poor cultivators for something that we are doing through the Central Government.

I wrote to the Food Minister about this matter again, and he has sent me a letter which I enclose. You will see that he suggests that the matter might be examined fully by an officer of the Finance Ministry together with an officer of the Food and Agriculture Ministry. This would enable as to know exactly what the financial implications are, and what we can do about it.

Will you please arrange to have an officer of the Finance Ministry appointed for this purpose and inform Ajit Prasad Jain of it?

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. File No. 31(38)/56-PMS.
2. Union Minister for Revenue and Civil Expenditure.
3. Formed in 1947 with American tractors left over from World War II for reclaiming land, the Central Tractor Organization secured a loan of $ 7.5 million from the World Bank to be repaid in five years. In 1948-49, reclamation operations commenced in Madhya Bharat, Madhya Pradesh, UP, and Punjab.

6. To S.K. Dey [1]

New Delhi
August 26, 1956

My dear Dey,[2]
I have received your note of the 24th August,[3] with which you have attached a copy of your letter to Shri V.T. Krishnamachari.[4]

I think your apprehensions are unnecessary. You know that we are attaching the greatest importance to food production. Some days ago, I sent a circular letter[5] to Chief Ministers, a copy of which you may have seen. I am issuing another letter to them.[6] It has really become a question of the highest importance that food production should grow.

I am quite certain that the only way this can grow is through the medium of the CP and NES and the intimate cooperation of these with the Ministry of Food and Agriculture. Indeed, I am going to discuss these matters both with you and the Minister of Food and Agriculture.

You appear to have been alarmed by the suggestion of the Deputy Chairman that some change might be made in the budget.[7] But the change that might be made would in no case affect the health, educational and other programmes of the CP and NES. If any change is to be made, it is only within the ambit of the agricultural programme. Surely, if it is seen that some different approach yields

1. File No. 31(30)/56-PMS.
2. Administrator, Community Projects Administration (CPA).
3. Dey requested Nehru to clarify whether the Administrator, CPA, or the Deputy Chairman of the Planning Commission was in charge of the Community Projects.
4. Dey said that success in agriculture depended on several factors namely, the availability of trained personnel in requisite numbers, facilities for expert supervision at the district and State level, and availability of supplies of seeds, fertilizers, fruit plants and animals for husbandary. Dey especially wanted the state departments of agriculture to take up agricultural programme in NES and Community Development Blocks.
5. See *ante*, pp. 50-55.
6. See *post*. pp. 61-65.
7. Dey's main worry was that Krishnamachari had suggested cuts in the CPA budget, without the Administrator's approval, thus undermining his responsibility. He also warned that alteration in the budget would 'damage' it. According to him, the agricultural programmes in their present shape could succeed only if villagers became a part of the larger programme of rural development that took care of the elementary things, such as education and public health.

greater results in the agricultural programme, without affecting the other aspects of the CP and NES, that is desirable.

Anyhow, if the CP and NES throw themselves heart and soul in agricultural production, if necessary more money will be found somewhere or other for this purpose. There is nothing more important to do from the point of view of our Five Year Plan or future development than rapid addition to our agricultural production.

I hope to see you soon.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

7. To A.P. Jain[1]

New Delhi
August 26, 1956

My dear Ajit,
You will remember the letter[2] I addressed to Chief Ministers of States some two weeks ago about food production. I am now sending them another letter,[3] copy of which you will receive. I want to shake them up and make them function with greater speed and enthusiasm.

Now that Thapar has returned with some ideas as to what the Chinese people are doing, I hope that your Ministry will write a brief note of what we can learn from them and do here. We cannot obviously do everything that they do because our conditions are different. But we may be able to do some other things which are profitable to us. Also I hope you will send me a brief report of Thapar's visit, the longer report can be made later.

I am anxious that the Community Projects and the National Extension Service organizations should be switched on more and more to food production. This

1. File No. 31(30)/56-PMS.
2. See *ante*, pp. 50-55.
3. See the next item.

necessitates the closest cooperation with your Ministry. In fact it means that the two function in this respect together.

I should like you to come and have a talk with me about these matters.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

8. To Chief Ministers[1]

New Delhi
27 August, 1956

My dear Chief Minister,

On August 12th, I sent you a letter[2] in which I drew particular attention to the urgency and vital importance of increasing agricultural production and, more particularly food production. The particular occasion for my writing to you then was my reaction to the Conference of Ministers of Food and Agriculture of the States that had been held at Mussoorie. At this conference, the statements made on behalf of several States seemed to me to indicate an extraordinarily static view of a dynamic position.

2. We have been compelled by circumstances to give more and more thought to this matter. There is the rise in prices, the urgent necessity of importing foodgrains from abroad and generally our foreign exchange position which is not a happy one at all. In a sense, all these revolve round our agricultural production. A rise in prices of foodgrains is, I need hardly point out, of vital significance to our people and to our Second Five Year Plan. All our schemes are likely to be completely upset if we cannot control prices. The price index very largely depends upon the prices of foodgrains and cloth. We have to control these two, and this means that we must produce enough of both. When an emergency arises, we have to import foodgrains, as we are importing today, but the drain on our foreign exchange because of this, is terrific. We cannot, in effect, import both foodgrains and machinery, etc., from abroad. If we have to

1. File No. 25(30)/56-PMS.
2. See *ante*, pp. 50-55.

import certain essential articles from abroad for the purposes of our Five Year Plan, then we have to pay for them with our exports. For us to have to import even foodgrains is really to undermine the whole structure and to give up the idea of importing heavy machinery and the like, which we so badly require for our Plan.

3. As a matter of fact, the only sound way of dealing with this situation is for us to export both agricultural produce, including foodgrains, as well as cloth, apart from other commodities. It is because of this that it has become essential for us to increase our cloth production. There is an argument about the relative values of mill-cloth production and the Ambar Charkha and handloom production. We all want to encourage handlooms and the Ambar Charkha, and we are doing so to the best of our ability. But, obviously, we cannot export the produce of the Ambar Charkha. We can only export mill-made textiles, apart from fancy handloom textiles. It is, therefore, necessary for us even to increase our mill production of cloth for export. We have natural markets all round India and we are losing them to other countries like Japan, Italy, etc., because we have not had enough of these for export. Consumption in India is growing, and that is welcome as it is a sign of somewhat higher standards. But, if this leads to the diminution of our exports, then it will hit us badly.

4. But, I am writing to you principally about the food situation and the increase in the production of foodgrains that we should aim at. As I have previously pointed out to you, the general attitude exhibited at the Mussoorie Conference was depressing in the extreme. It seemed to me that that had no relation whatever to our Second Five Year Plan or, indeed, to existing conditions in India. Stress was laid there on more and more money being provided for agricultural development in order to increase the food supply. This indeed is the easy way which required no particular intensity of thought. If we had enough money, we could do a thousand other things also, such as many more industrial projects and railway extensions and roads and so many other things. We could build up our heavy industry more rapidly. Obviously there is a limitation on our resources and we have extended them to the utmost in the Second Plan. In this Plan, we have provided, in various ways, a sum of over rupees one thousand crores for increase in rural production. In addition to this, there are arrangements for provision of short-term credits in Community Projects and National Extension areas. It is not possible for us to increase the allocation for agriculture. If we do so, we shut up shop elsewhere and give up a number of our important projects.

5. This is the problem. And I would like you and your colleagues in your Government to realize it. We cannot have it both ways. Are we then to conclude that there is no help for it except to give up the idea of increasing our food production above the fifteen per cent mentioned previously? That would be a

confession of defeat. I do not think that this is at all necessary.

6. On the 5th of June, the Planning Commission sent a circular letter[3] to all State Governments on the subject of a review of targets of agricultural production in the Second Five Year Plan. I would particularly draw your attention to this letter because it deals at some length and in some detail, with this urgent problem. It makes specific proposals, each one of which is completely practical. I shall not repeat those proposals here, but I would like you and your Government and, more particularly, your Agricultural Department to consider this letter of the Planning Commission carefully. What surprises me is that, while the Planning Commission had indicated in such detail as to what should be done, this seems to have had little effect on the Mussoorie Conference. I am inclined to think that neither this letter nor, indeed, the relevant chapters in the Second Five Year Plan had been studied with any care by many of those who attended the Mussoorie Conference. It would have been helpful if the various proposals made in this letter had been examined seriatim. The letter asks for certain information. I do not know if any effort had been made to supply this information although the letter was sent two and a half months ago.

7. One thing appears to be quite essential, and that is the closest possible integration of the Community Projects and National Extension Service with the States' agricultural development schemes. In these Community Projects and National Extension Service we have built a very fine organization and, if we utilize it to the full in this respect, as we should, then the results obtained can very well be far-reaching. The Community Projects and the National Extension Service should give priority to this and definite targets should be laid down for each group of villages. We have decided to extend the Community Projects and National Extension Service to practically the whole of rural India in the course of the Second Five Year Plan. This means that we can reach almost every village in this specific and detailed way. But it is essential that the Agricultural Departments of the States utilize to the full these agencies which are really parts of their own set-up.

8. Our chief difficulty in the past has been that while we take good decisions we cannot translate them into action easily. We cannot reach the man in the field

3. The circular stressed that: (i) national extension schemes and community projects be made an integral part of the agricultural programme; (ii) extensive use be made of dry farming, seeds and fertilizers; (iii) credit and market cooperatives be increased so as to increase food production; (iv) agricultural incomes should rise through better management of existing resources and by doubling agricultural production, and (v) the gap between incomes from agriculture and industrial growth be reduced.

and our decisions remain somewhere in the files of our various departments or offices. This difficulty need no longer exist because of this great organization that we have built up through the Community Projects and the National Extension Service. This means, however, a clear realization of the objective in view, of the targets and of the importance of utilizing the Community Projects and National Extension Service for this purpose.

9. We have immediately to revise the schemes and targets for agricultural production in the Second Five Year Plan and to lay down specific steps that have to be taken to realize these targets. We all know what these specific steps are in theory. The question is how to translate them into practice, how to reach every village and almost every family in the village, and to organize supply of approved seeds, organic manures, apart from chemical fertilizers, etc.

10. I shall be grateful if you will have all these matters examined fully in terms of the letter of the Planning Commission of the 5th June, and to write to the Planning Commission giving the information required. Recently, our Food Secretary. Shri P.N. Thapar, visited China at our request. He has just come back and the information he has brought with him will, no doubt, help us in many ways, because there is much in common in the agricultural conditions in China and India. It appears that the great difference between China and India is in the average per acre production.[4] Our best production in India is in no way inferior to that of China. But the great part of our food production is of a very low yield indeed. The gap between our good production and bad, is a very big one. In China, this gap is a small one. Thus, while the best yield of India is much the same as in China, the average yield is far greater in China than in India. It is for us to pull up these low-yield areas and this can undoubtedly be done. It is feasible and practicable. What is required is hard work and a detailed programme for each village.

11. We have begun to think too much in terms of chemical fertilizers. I have no doubt they are good and we should use them. But, I have also little doubt that too much reliance on chemical fertilizers is going to be bad for us, as indeed for any other country. Apart from this, it is wasteful for us not to utilize natural manures which are far better. Little attention apparently has been paid to this utilization of natural green manures. Here also, we adopt the easy way of getting a bucketful of chemical fertilizer and using it.

4. The average per acre production of paddy in China increased from 1,665 lbs in 1949 to 2,355 lbs in 1955. In India, the per acre production for 1954-55 was 1,100 lbs. Similarly, the per acre production of wheat in China increased from 565 lbs in 1949 to 755 lbs in 1955. In India, it was 713 lbs in 1954-55.

12. In this matter, China is far ahead of us. They do not waste anything and they concentrate on the use of natural and green manures. Even human excreta is used to the fullest extent. Perhaps, our social customs come in the way to some extent, though I do not see why they should. Anyhow, in this hard and competitive world, we shall have to give up some of our old customs if they come in the way of national advance.

13. It is well known that great loss is caused to our food production by insects, pests, wild animals, etc. Something is done here, but that is not at all adequate. In China, they have had campaigns against these pests and have practically put an end to them, thus automatically increasing their food production greatly. In India, on the other hand, we are taking some steps which actually lead to a further destruction or loss in foodgrains. Again, our old customs come in the way. Recent legislation in some States, banning the killing of cattle, has had little effect on the protection of the cattle which we aim at. It is producing strange results in other directions. I have been informed that many of these cattle, which have been left to fend for themselves, have turned wild and are doing a good deal of damage, apart from injuring food crops. As is natural, the good cattle suffer and the standard goes down. So, not only are the cattle not properly protected or looked after, but a new danger arises and our food production suffers.

14. You will, I hope, soon reply to the Planning Commission. But, I would beg of you to write to me on this subject also as I am not only interested in it greatly but consider it of vital importance. I repeat what I said before, that we must get out of our old and static ruts of thinking. We have to take this matter up as some kind of a crusade with some missionary zeal. Our experts have to wake up and give up thinking in some academic way which has no relation to the problems of today.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

III. INDUSTRY AND LABOUR

1. Production of Cheaper Antibiotics[1]

Mr Reddy,[2] Col Dogra[3] and friends,

Coming here this morning, I was reminded of the long arguments we used to have six or seven years ago about the starting of this plant for the making of penicillin. Penicillin, obviously, is an important drug and the question arose whether we should start it as a State concern or get one of the great manufacturing firms of some foreign country to start it here. In the two viewpoints, naturally, there were certain immediate advantages: on the one side, a certain assurance that the risk was taken by somebody else, and there were obvious advantages on the other side. Well, if we had probably considered that question later, two or three years later, we would not have had much argument because, by that time, our thinking, as well as various other factors had developed much more. Anyhow, we decided then in favour of a State-owned adventure in cooperation with UNICEF, and this is the result. I do not think anybody can now doubt that that was a happy and right decision to make. If we have any similar plant to put up, we should really put it up as a State concern. Not because we want to put up big industrial concerns. We want every kind of energy, initiative and capacity to be employed in the development of the various types of industrial production. We are in favour of both the public sector and the private sector. But, I think that what might be called basic things should be State controlled and where possible State-owned.

Now, in regard to any drugs which are commonly used, there is an inevitable tendency to exploit the market. In India, people just cannot get drugs that are necessary for them, because they cannot afford them. That is not right. Certain basic things should be available to everybody who needs them. I hope a time will come when there will be in India, as in some other countries, a national health service which can be taken advantage of by everybody. There are certain things which are of great public advantage, public use, public benefit, which

1. Speech at the Hindustan Antibiotics factory at Pimpri, near Pune, 2 August 1956. AIR tapes.
2. K.C. Reddy, Minister for Production.
3. J.R. Dogra, Managing Director, Hindustan Antibiotics Ltd.

should not be secrets. I don't think it is right that something of wide public use and advantage should be controlled by some secret formula owned by some private firm. I think science does not advance, or, has not at least in the past advanced very much by methods of secrecy. Secrecy is understandable in war time. Broadly speaking, the scientist seeks truth, he seeks courage, he proclaims it to the world for others to know it and then takes the next step. So, when the question is of remedies for diseases that afflict humanity, private firms having secret processes and utilizing them, may no doubt be doing good, but nevertheless, their main objective is to make profit. I do not think it is the right approach. Therefore it becomes necessary for the State to take to the manufacture of these basic drugs. I suppose this is what we shall ultimately do in India. This penicillin plant, which has now been functioning for about a year,[4] has demonstrated its success; in fact it has done better than was anticipated, and thereby falsified many of the people who thought that it could not prove a success.

I am glad, therefore, to come here, and to meet our young scientists, men and women, who are running this plant and to see how keen and eager they are in their work and how they are aiming at ever high standards. After all, it is quality that counts, it is standard that counts, in everything we make and in everything that we do. We do not want anything second-rate in this country, not second-rate human beings or second-rate anything. It must always be our endeavour to improve the quality of everything, to make it as good as we possibly can, and, then try to make it better. It is not good enough to think that because the State is doing it or anybody is doing it, therefore, we can relax, become complacent and bring out something which may just be tolerably good. That is sometimes supposed to be the normal official mentality, of sitting in office and doing something as one's forefathers did before. We should do everything in a more efficient way than was being done. Of course, we have to learn from what is being done elsewhere, but the whole point is that our aim should be to improve, taking advantage of the new knowledge and experience available.

I congratulate those who are running this penicillin factory.

Thank you.

4. The factory went into full production in August 1955.

2. To K.D. Malaviya[1]

New Delhi
August 7, 1956

My dear Keshava,[2]

. . . Your letter of August 7th about the refinery in Assam. I cannot give you the information you ask for about the communications to Assam. I know that everyone including Lal Bahadur[3] was anxious to improve these communications and to have more Railway lines. I do not think this idea has been given up, but because of lack of steel and other resources, it was decided to consider this a year or so later. What the final decision was on this subject, I do not remember. All I can recollect is that every attempt should be made to improve communications to Assam. There is no question of profit about it, but just the lack of resources at the present moment. You should talk to Lal Bahadur about it.

Yours affectionately,
Jawaharlal

1. JN Collection. Extracts.
2. Minister of Natural Resources.
3. Lal Bahadur Shastri, Minister of Railways and Transport.

3. Exploration and Exploitation of Oil[1]

This question, that is, the general principles relating to the production and refining of oil, has been considered by the Cabinet at least on two previous occasions[2] at some length. I have not got the proceedings of the Cabinet before me, but, as far as I remember, it was decided that the exploration and exploitation of oil was of the first importance. Further, that, apart from the areas already given to private companies, Government should undertake exploration and exploitation directly or through a company of which it was in control. The exact expenditures involved were not then known. . . .

3. I suggest that you adopt the following procedure. The note by Shri Bhattacharya[3] should be shown to the Ministry of NR & SR for their comments. Do they agree with the figures given and the consequences pointed out, quite apart from the decision to be arrived at? Further, can they indicate by what time these works and refinery will begin to yield results? There can be no doubt that these concerns would be highly profitable and will save foreign exchange. The point is when this process will begin and what is a very rough estimate of what we are likely to get out of it in the course of the next few years.

4. Having got the Ministry of NR & SR's comments on this, the note of the Finance Ministry should be revised accordingly and the facts stated and various alternatives pointed out.

5. This note of the Finance Ministry may be attached to the note of the Ministry of NR & SR or incorporated in it. It should be added that the acting Finance Minister[4] desires that every aspect of this question should be before the Cabinet to enable it to come to a decision. He has himself expressed no opinion and would like to reserve it for the Cabinet.

1. Note to M.C. Shah, Minister for Revenue and Civil Expenditure, 11 August 1956. JN Collection. Extracts.
2. For the decisions reached at the first Cabinet meeting held on 29 May 1955, see *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 28, p. 430. The second Cabinet meeting took place in May 1956.
3. P.C.Bhattacharya, Secretary in the Ministry of Finance.
4. Nehru was Finance Minister from 24 July to 30 August 1956.

4. A Hotel Project under State Control[1]

I have taken the trouble to read quite a number of papers in this file. Having read them, I confess I do not quite understand what all this argument is about. The matter appears to me a fairly straightforward one.

2. The hotel[2] was originally intended to be a joint concern—private capital and Government shares—the private capital predominating. Later, as enough private capital was not forthcoming, Government advanced money.[3] We were anxious that this venture should go ahead and we could not possibly leave it in the lurch. Later still, the matter was put up before the Cabinet and it became clear that there was very little possibility of enough private capital being raised. Cabinet decided, therefore, that Government should make itself responsible for this hotel.

3. That did not mean that the private capital that had already been invested in it should be returned, nor did it mean that any fresh capital that might be coming should be barred from doing so. But it was obvious that we could not wait indefinitely in this way and we had to apply the funds and gain proper control. We have, therefore, to take additional shares of Rs 50 lakhs. That gives us adequate control and the necessary legal changes in the Memorandum and Articles of Association, etc., should follow soon. In practice, it is clear that even now Government is very largely responsible for what is being done there.

4. I do not understand what is meant by the proposal of some of the promoters that they should be given a chance to raise more money. Nobody will stop them from doing so. But meanwhile we take our shares for an additional Rs 50 lakhs. If additional private capital is coming later, I am sure room will be found for it. We can then consider also whether it is worthwhile to dispose of some of the Government shares, but that will have to be a Cabinet decision.

5. Meanwhile we have to take these 50 lakhs shares and take the necessary legal steps.

6. Whatever risks there are in this undertaking and in the lack of experience on the part of Government to run a hotel, were considered by the Cabinet before

1. Note to Swaran Singh, Minister for Works, Housing and Supply, 12 August 1956. JN Collection.
2. The reference is to the Ashok Hotel in New Delhi.
3. The Lok Sabha was informed on 27 July 1956 that the government had subscribed Rs 26 lakhs to the Ashok Hotel.

it came to a decision. Obviously a Government department cannot and should not run a hotel. Some proper arrangement will have to be made.[4]

4. On the same day, Swaran Singh told the Lok Sabha that the government had decided to take over the Ashok Hotel.

5. To K.D. Malaviya[1]

New Delhi
August 13, 1956

My dear Keshava,
Your letter of August 13 about the refinery in Assam.

We seem to be going round the circle. The Railway authorities say, according to you, that transport facilities will be provided as soon as the question of refinery is settled. You say that one of main arguments against the establishment of the refinery in Assam is that there are no transport facilities. Surely this is not very logical. If the Railway authorities are prepared to make the necessary arrangements provided the question of refinery is settled, then the question of difficulty of transport does not arise. Other questions may arise.

Please write to Medhi[2] yourself and explain to him the position.

Yours affectionately,
Jawaharlal

1. JN Collection.
2. Bisnuram Medhi, Chief Minister of Assam.

6. To K.C. Reddy[1]

New Delhi
August 24, 1956

My dear Reddy,
Your letter of 24th August about the monetary reward to Sindri workers.

As this matter was decided by the Cabinet, I think that it would be desirable for you to prepare a brief paper for the Cabinet.

My own view is to some extent in agreement with you. Firstly, we must adhere to our decision that bonuses as such are not going to be payable in undertakings like the Sindri.[2] Second, I would not mind extending the ad hoc payment to workers drawing a salary up to Rs 500/- per mensem, if this is the workers' desire. Third, I think we should adhere to the sum we have allotted for workers' amenities. I attach great importance to this. Amenities are not merely the type of amenities that the Management have provided, such as, medical aid, schools, recreation centres, etc. There are any number of other things about which up till now no thought has been given: higher education for children, rest and holiday homes both near Sindri and at some good climate or a hill station. There are many other ways of improving not only the living standards, but also the cultural standards of the workers, and opening out fresh avenues of interest and advancement to them. The workers will gradually begin to realize this and appreciate the importance of this contribution. It must be remembered that the spending of it will largely be in the hands of the workers themselves, subject only to some restrictions so that it might not be misspent. Further, although we cannot guarantee it, it is our intention to add to this fund whenever possible.

I would, therefore, not reduce this sum. But, if the Managing Director[3] feels strongly about it, I might be prepared to reduce it by two lakhs, that is, rupees ten lakhs for payment to individual workers and rupees six lakhs for the amenities fund. I would tell the Managing Director not to mention this to the workers to begin with, and to try to keep the present division as it is. But, in the final analysis, we might give him discretion to do this.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. JN Collection.
2. The Sindri Fertilizer Factory in Bihar started production on 31 October 1951.
3. V. Nilakantan.

7. To R.S. Shukla[1]

New Delhi
August 25, 1956

My dear Shuklaji,[2]

Thank you for your letter of August 3, 1956, about the Nepa Mills.[3] I am sorry for the delay in answering it. I have been rather overwhelmed with work ever since I came back from Europe. Also, I wanted this matter to be examined fully in the Finance Ministry before I replied to you.

2. There is no doubt that the Madhya Pradesh Government has been intimately associated with the Nepa Mills. These Mills have had a somewhat adventurous career. Started by private enterprise, though helped by the Madhya Pradesh Government considerably, they proved unsuccessful. The Managing Agents could neither raise the funds required for the project, nor had they shown any efficiency or business capacity. Thereupon, as you have yourself stated, the Madhya Pradesh Government took over the management of the Mills themselves.[4]

3. I need not go into the subsequent history except to say that the Mills would have again got into deep water and perhaps ceased to function if the Government of India had not come to their help by giving substantial loans through the State Government.[5] It is true, I think, that some progress has been made in the working of the Mills. But I am inclined to think that your hope that the target of hundred tons a day will be reached fairly soon is much too optimistic in existing circumstances.

4. You refer to the reversal of the previous policy and a volte face of the Central Government.[6] I do not think this is quite correct. The fact is that conditions have changed very considerably and it is obvious that the main burden of carrying on the Mills has now fallen on the Central Government and that this

1. File No. 17(176)/56-57- PMS.
2. Chief Minister of Madhya Pradesh.
3. The National Newsprint and Paper Mills Limited, Nepanagar (Madhya Pradesh), was started by private enterprise in 1947.
4. This happened in 1949.
5. In 1951, the Nepa Mills project was included in the First Five Year Plan and the Central Government offered loans to the Madhya Pradesh Government on this basis.
6. Shukla opined that the Central Government's decision of taking over the Nepa Mills would kill the state government's initiative and added that it would give a bad name to it on the eve of the reorganization of the state.

burden is likely to increase from time to time. There is no desire on our part to do anything which might dishearten the Madhya Pradesh Government or give it a bad name or kill initiative on the part of a State Government. Our only wish is that this national undertaking should be run as efficiently as possible by the Central Government and the Madhya Pradesh Government acting together. When you refer to the question of handing over control,[7] this presumably refers only to the fact that the Chairman and the Managing Director will be finally appointed by the Central Government. In doing so, of course, the Madhya Pradesh Government will have to be consulted and their views will be fully considered. The fact that the Nepa Mills are situated in Madhya Pradesh connects it intimately with the development of that State. The question of appointing the Chairman or the Managing Director does not take away from this intimate association of the Madhya Pradesh Government with these Mills.

5. You refer to the formula agreed to at the July 1954 meeting.[8] If this is accepted in present circumstances, the Central Government will become the largest individual shareholder with a total equity holding of Rs 280 lakhs. The Central Government will also have to take special steps in regard to import control, waiver of excise duty, etc., if the Mills are to operate successfully.

6. What we have suggested to you is in keeping with our broad policy all over India. In other States the capital is sometimes shared between the Central Government and the State. Usually the Central Government share is the larger and the Central Government has the final say in the appointment of the Chairman and the Managing Director. I have little doubt that considering the all-India character of this concern, this is not only the best arrangement, but it will enhance the credit and the prestige of the Mills. I do not say this in any sense of criticism of the Madhya Pradesh Government, but because of the obvious fact that the Central Government's resources in technical personnel and money are greater than that of any State. They can make a choice from a larger field and get the best man. However much one may try to avoid it, a State controlled concern tends to have a provincial character.

7. It is quite likely that later these Mills might not only grow but may lead to

7. Shukla argued that the Madhya Pradesh Government could not agree to hand over control of the Nepa Mills, just at a time when the Mills had got into strides. He added that this could not happen "as a price for the Centre's guidance and assistance."
8. The decision of 15 July 1954 stated: " In regard to the Chairman of the Board of Directors and the Managing Director, it was agreed that the Chairman would be named by the Madhya Pradesh Government in consultation with the Central Government and the Managing Director would be appointed by the Madhya Pradesh Government in consultation with the Central Government."

the establishment of subsidiary or auxiliary concerns. From that point of view also, the final control of the Central Government would be far more advantageous. I do not rule out the establishment of such subsidiary concerns by private enterprise, but any such concern which supplies some essential product and raw materials for the Mills will have a certain monopolistic character, as it will have an assured market on the spot. Normally it should be the business of the State in a nationalized industry not to depend in this way on an allied plant under private control. It would be more fitting and more economical for the Mills themselves to put up such auxiliary plants.

8. You will observe that there is no question of pushing out the Madhya Pradesh Government from this picture. In spite of the fact that the Central Government will have the largest share, we have accepted a position of parity with the State Government in regard to the Directors. That gives a very large share in the control of the Mills to the Madhya Pradesh Government.

9. Looking at past history and the future possible developments, it seems to me an obviously wise and prudent course for the Chairman and the Managing Director to be finally appointed by the Central Government after full consultation with the Madhya Pradesh Government.

10. I hope you will agree.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

8. To V.T. Krishnamachari[1]

New Delhi
August 26, 1956

My dear V.T.,
During the last year or more, there has been a good deal of talk and discussion about oil exploration and exploitation in India. So far as I remember, on the last occasion,[2] we gave the Ministry of Natural Resources a somewhat free hand to

1. File No. 17(204)/56-66-PMS.
2. See *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 28, p. 430.

go ahead. We did not actually increase the allocation which we had made for this purpose, but we told them that when actual necessity arose, there would be no difficulty in adding to it.

There can be no doubt about the high importance of this programme not only because we need the oil, but also because we shall save a good deal of money later in foreign exchange if we get our own oil. In China there has been a surprising advance and I saw in an American paper, *New York Times*, that the target the Chinese Government have fixed is a very large one. They have discovered oil on the borders of Tibet and China and in Sinkiang in China.

In dealing with this matter, it is not much use just boring a hole here and there. There is a great element of luck in spotting the right place. If we try, let us say, in half a dozen or more places, the chances of success in one or two are very appreciably increased. Success in one repays us handsomely for all the other failures, while, if we try only one or two and fail, there is no gain and there is only frustration.

We discussed this matter rather fully with the Russians and, I think, to some extent, with the Rumanians[3] as well as people from England, America, Holland, etc. Our Minister for Natural Resources is likely to go to Canada chiefly to see the oil development there. I think that we should, in the Planning Commission, consider this matter fully again. There is an element of pulling in different directions, and there is a feeling in the Ministry of NR that they are not given full scope.[4]

I suggest that we have soon a meeting of the Planning Commission to discuss this with the Ministry of NR. I should like to be present.

There is the question of technical personnel which is of high importance. We shall inevitably have to get foreign experts, but immediate steps have to be taken to train our own people.

Reading about recent developments in China in this matter, I feel that we have lagged behind to our great disadvantage.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

3. On 19 March 1956, India signed an agreement for purchasing Romanian rigs for Rs 45.50 lakhs. On 21 May 1956, an agreement was signed in New Delhi providing for the supply by the USSR of oil drilling equipment worth Rs 7,400,000 to India.
4. See *Selected Works* (second series) Vol. 33, pp. 118-121. On 19 March 1956, it was announced that the Ministry of Natural Resources and Scientific Research would henceforth be in charge of establishing oil refineries.

9. The Handloom Industry[1]

Please write to the Yemmiganur Weavers' Cooperative in reply to their letter. Say that I shall gladly meet a deputation from them, but that will have to be some time later, as I am very fully occupied for many days.

You might further say that the decision of the Government of India in regard to allocations for cloth has been made after very careful consideration.[2] The Prime Minister does not agree that power looms are a menace though he agrees that the changeover should be done gradually and without creating unemployment. The future of the handloom weavers would be rather dark if they did not gradually shift over to more efficient means of production. So far as the Prime Minister knows, the handloom industry is doing very well today. This progress is entirely due to the policy of Government.

As for the statement that there is no apprehension about cloth scarcity in the country, as a matter of fact this is not only an apprehension but a fact. Cloth consumption in India has grown with amazing rapidity and is growing still. The whole handloom industry, if it works its hardest, cannot meet this demand. The Prime Minister is sure that if all the facts were known, the weavers will themselves realize that their apprehensions are not justified.

1. Note to Private Secretary, 31 August 1956. JN Collection.
2. The new cloth policy announced by the government on 18 June 1956 envisaged a requirement of 8,400 million yards of cloth for both internal consumption and export. As mills, handlooms and power looms produced about 6,700 million yards, the excess of 1,700 million yards was distributed as follows. Handlooms would produce 700 million yards. Another 200 million yards was expected by the introduction of 35,000 powerlooms in the handloom sector. And the mill sector was to expand to meet the needs of 350 million yards required for export.

IV. THE LANGUAGE QUESTION

1. To C. Rajagopalachari[1]

New Delhi
July 27, 1956

My dear Rajaji,
Soon after my return to Delhi from abroad, I saw your article on the official language issue which appeared in *The Hindustan Times* of the 9th July.[2] I have read it with care.

You know that I have often expressed my wish that the study of English should be encouraged and that we should not try to push out English. Also that we should not try to impose Hindi. It seems to me that the best way to protect the use of English in India is not to make it appear as a rival to our own languages but as one in addition to them. The argument you have advanced, though powerful, does tend to put the issue in a different light.

I hope you are keeping well.

Yours affectionately,
Jawaharlal

1. JN Collection.
2. Rajaji noted that the dislike for English on account of its past association with foreign rule was "mere unthinking prejudice". He pointed out that whereas English "gives to North and South (India) even advantage", the people of South India would henceforth have "to learn to handle (Hindustani) with tolerable ease and suspicion." Rajaji also stated that imposing Hindustani on the people of South India, "justified only on the principle that the opinion of the majority must prevail, induces a feeling . . . that there has not been emancipation but only change of masters." Without a Dakshin Pradesh, South India was divided into dialectical states separated by "water-tight administrative walls", and "there is little chance for united political resistance against this unwise Central policy", Rajaji added. He suggested that the Hindi policy laid down in the Constitution should be set right through an amendment.

2. To A.R. Wadia[1]

New Delhi
August 26, 1956

Dear Professor Wadia,[2]
Thank you for your letter of August 22, with which you have sent me a number of letters about English and Hindi.[3]

I think that this argument of Hindi replacing English within a stated period has unfortunately gone into wrong hands on both sides. Inevitably the question is not considered with much logic or reason but with a great deal of passion. I am glad that in the letters you have sent me, stress is different.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. JN Collection.
2. Ardeshir Ruttonji Wadia (1888-1971); Professor of Philosophy, University of Mysore, from 1917; Director of Public Instruction, Mysore, 1930-31 and 1942-43; Member, Mysore Legislative Council, 1930-31 and 1942-43; Principal, Maharaja's College, Mysore, 1938; Victoria College, Gwalior, 1946-49; Director of Education, Madhya Bharat, 1948-49; Pro-Vice Chancellor, Maharaja Sayyaji Rao University, Baroda, 1949-52; member, Rajya Sabha, 1954-66.
3. Referring to the Constitutional provision about the replacement of English by Hindi as the official language, the letter, signed by representative people in different parts of the country, asked the Government to declare that while acceptance of Hindi as the official language was welcome, English would continue as a "cementing bond" amongst the states and between the Centre and the non-Hindi speaking states. The signatories pointed out that, "linguistic and parochial considerations" had affected India's unity, and observed that "judging from the trends in the non-Hindi speaking areas, it looks fairly clear [that] if English is to be replaced, it will be by the regional languages and not by Hindi."

3. To Abul Kalam Azad[1]

New Delhi
August 26, 1956

My dear Maulana,[2]
I have received a bunch of letters signed by a large number of persons which I am forwarding to you.[3] These are all in favour of English continuing and not being replaced suddenly by Hindi.

There is much in their argument. There is grave danger of English not being replaced by Hindi but by the regional language. Thus English goes out and Hindi does not take its place at the same time. A gap is left and the unifying influence of language is removed. While, therefore, we should work for Hindi to replace English, I think we have to continue with English or else we tend to disrupt.

Yours affectionately,
Jawaharlal

1. File No. 34/31/56-MHA.
2. Union Minister of Education.
3. See the preceding item.

V. EDUCATION AND CULTURE

1. Help to Mihir Sen[1]

I do not know what I can do about this matter. I do not wish to approach the Education Ministry after they have refused to give further help. I am also not terribly keen on large sums of money being spent for swimming the English

1. Note to M.O. Mathai, Private Secretary, Camp: London, 4 July 1956. JN Collection.

Channel. Nevertheless, Mihir Sen [2] has gone too far to give all this up and there is some advantage in an Indian performing this feat. In the balance, therefore, I would like to help him.

2. It appears that apart from rupees five thousand from the Government of Orissa, he has only collected rupees two thousand and five hundred. A major item of his expenditure is travel by air, which is by no means necessary.

3. I think that we might try to send him from India, say, £150. If necessary, we might add a little to it later. You might write to him that I shall arrange to send him £150.

2. (b.1930); swimmer; trained as a lawyer, and joined the Calcutta High Court, 1956; successfully crossed the English Channel in September 1958; the only swimmer in the world to swim the following straits in one calender year (1966): the Palk Strait between India and Sri Lanka on 5-6 April; the straits of Gibraltar (Europe-Africa) on 24 August; the Dardanelles (Gallipoli to Sendubahir, Turkey) on 12 September; and the Bosphorus on 21 September. He also swam the Panama Canal on 29-31 October.

2. Archaeological Explorations in Afghanistan [1]

Sir Mortimer Wheeler,[2] who used to be Director of Archaeology in India at one time and is now the Secretary of the British Academy,[3] came to see me yesterday. He spoke to me about the great importance of archaeological explorations on the site of the late city of Balkh[4] in Afghanistan and suggested that a joint Indo-British expedition might be sent to this area for the purpose of this exploration.

1. Note to the Minister of Education, Camp: London, 6 July 1956. File No. 40(92)/56-59-PMS.
2. Eminent archaeologist and Secretary, British Academy, 1949-68.
3. The British Academy, a leading society for promoting historical, philosophical and philological studies, was founded in 1901.
4. Balkh or Bactra, the capital of the ancient Bactrian kingdom, lying between the Hindu Kush mountains and the Amu Darya river, was an important centre of Zoroastrianism and Buddhism in the early Christian era. Balkh was also an important meeting place of the arterial trade routes from India, China and the West.

The suggestion is that India should be the senior partner in this joint expedition. I asked him for a note on this subject and he has sent me a letter, a copy of which I enclose.[5]

2. I am much attracted by this proposal. This site of the late city of Balkh and the surrounding area is of course of great importance and is largely unexplored thus far. For us, in India, it is of special importance and would yield much information about the early history of India and its contacts.

3. I think, therefore, that we should agree to this proposal.[6] Of course, it is for the Government of Afghanistan to agree first as we can do nothing without their full approval and cooperation. But, before we approach them, we should be clear in our own minds. I suggest, therefore, that you will be good enough to have this matter looked into. If we are fully agreeable, then we can find out from the Afghanistan Government and get in touch with Sir Mortimer Wheeler. Before we approach the Afghanistan Government, we should come to an agreement with the British Academy.

4. I have no idea of what the cost of this would be. This can be calculated by our Department of Archaeology and some estimate made.

5. Wheeler stated in his letter of 5 July that he had proposed exploration of Balkh with the official backing of the British Academy, pointing out that Aurel Stein, the famous archaeologist and explorer, had specially mentioned Bactra while bequeathing his estate to the Academy for encouraging explorations in Western Asia. Wheeler also wrote that his proposal was influenced by the Indian Archaeological Department's special interest in Afghanistan and its members visiting that country for "archaeological reconnaissance."
6. Nehru replied to Wheeler on 6 July explaining that while the proposal for a joint exploration of Bactra was attractive, "the only difficulty at the present moment would be that our Archaeological Department is overburdened with work." Nehru referred to the ongoing work at Nagarjunakonda, where an old Buddhist town and a university were going to be submerged because of a river valley project and the entire site had to be relocated to save the relics.

3. To Yadunath Singh [1]

Camp: Aclare House Hotel
Ireland
8 July 1956

My dear Yadunath,[2]
I enclose copy of a letter[3] which the Duke of Wellington[4] has written to our High Commissioner in London.

I am inclined to think that we should agree to the proposal made by the Duke. I might have hesitated to agree if the proposal was from the British Government. But since it comes from a descendant of the old Duke,[5] I have some sympathy for him. Also, it is obvious that the various relics of Tipu Sultan are of special interest to us.

I should like you to bring this matter to the notice of the President[6] and find out how he feels about it. I am sending a copy of the Duke of Wellington's letter to the Governor of Madras also.[7] You might communicate with him about it.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. File No. 40(89)/56-58-PMS.
2. (b.1907); Military Secretary to the President of India, 1953-56; Chief Commandant, President's Bodyguard, 1957-60.
3. Gerald Wellesley, the seventh Duke of Wellington, wrote to Vijayalakshmi Pandit on 4 July that he possessed various relics of Tipu Sultan, the ruler of Mysore, and that he wanted to exchange these with a life-size portrait of Arthur Wellesley, the first Duke of Wellington, housed in the former Government House in Madras.
4. Gerald Wellesley, (1885-1972); British diplomat and soldier; trustee of the National Gallery, 1950-57; Governor, Isle of Wight, 1956-65; wrote several books on the first Duke of Wellington.
5. Wellington, Arthur Wellesley, the first Duke of (1769-1852); British general and statesman; served with the British army in India, 1796-1805; commanded the allied armies to victory against Napoleon at the battle of Waterloo; Prime Minister, 1828-30.
6. Rajendra Prasad.
7. Sri Prakasa, the Governor of Madras, wrote to Nehru on 19 July: "I do not think the Government of Madras will have the least hesitation in making a present of this picture to the Wellington family." Sri Prakasa added that Tipu Sultan was one of India's greatest men of the 18th century and he would be happy to have Tipu's relics for the Fort St George.

4. Foreign-trained Students and their Employment[1]

In Germany I met the cream of the industrialists, financiers and businessmen. They were all very greatly interested in India and more especially in the Five Year Plan. In fact, the German Government are making a special study of our Second Five Year Plan with a view to finding how they can help.[2]

2. As I have already sent intimation, a considerable number of scholarships to Indian students for technical studies have been offered. Some of these are on generous terms and include passage from and to India. There are, so far as I remember, 100 scholarships given by the Federal Government.[3] These include passage money. There are also 500 to 600 scholarships given by one of the State Governments.[4] Presumably, these do not include passage money. There are a number of others also.

3. The most interesting of these are, I think, two scholarships offered by German students in Hamburg who have specially collected money for the purpose. I have asked our Ambassador in Germany[5] to send full particulars of these scholarships. I think early action should be taken in regard to them. The Education Ministry will naturally be the Ministry chiefly concerned, but in view of technical studies involved, the Commerce & Industry Ministry, the Production Ministry, Defence and Railways and, perhaps, some other Ministries as well as the Planning Commission will be interested and they should be consulted.

4. It seems to me that when awarding scholarships we must have clearly in view as to what the student is going to do when he comes back. It is very wrong for us to spend large sums of money on students abroad and then not find employment for them. This is a question which can only be dealt with by the Ministries which engage people. The Education Ministry will probably be in a

1. Note to Y.N. Sukthankar, the Cabinet Secretary, Camp: Brioni, 18 July 1956. File No. 40(90)/56-57-PMS.
2. Nehru visited West Germany from 13 to 16 July 1956. He informed Subimal Dutt, the Foreign Secretary, on 14 July that the West Germans were particularly interested in the development of small-scale industries and improved techniques in cottage and like industries.
3. The West German Government had offered 100 scholarships for technical training in West Germany, with each student receiving 300 marks a month and travel expenses and remission of tuition fees.
4. The offer came from the state of Nordrhein-Westfalen.
5. A.C.N. Nambiar.

position to indicate the particular work that is going to be done.

5. I find that while many of our technical students abroad are doing very well, there is a sense of frustration among some at the possibility of not finding suitable work on their return. We must remove this feeling. Every Indian student who is suitably trained should have work offered to him. This applies more particularly to Government scholars. Indeed, I think that we should immediately pay some kind of an allowance to every fully trained technical man who returns till he finds a post. He might be attached to some project.

6. I think also that a special officer, of some competance and understanding, should be appointed specially to deal with all technically trained Indians and see to their employment. At present this is nobody's particular work and they roam about from Ministry to Ministry. This officer should be appointed, I think, by the Home Ministry and he should be in touch with all the employing Ministries and the Planning Commission.

7. The Cabinet Secretary will please send copies of this note to the Planning Commission and to all the Ministries concerned.

5. Social Service for Students [1]

I enclose a letter from the Chief Minister of Mysore State[2] and copy of my brief reply to him.[3] I shall be grateful if you will kindly consider the matter referred to in the Chief Minister's letter.

2. It appears that the chief point raised to the effect that the social service board should be an integral part of the university has been met. As for the larger question of students having to take up some such subject as a compulsory measure, the principle has been accepted by the Planning Commission. Indeed, they attach some importance to it. I think that it would be interesting and helpful for a university to experiment with this so that we can learn from their experience.

1. Note to the Minister of Education, 27 July 1956. JN Collection.
2. K. Hanumanthaiya.
3. Nehru wrote to Hanumanthaiya that he was attracted to the idea of some social and labour service for students, but that its implementation had to be carefully considered.

6. Setting up a New Technological Institute [1]

No commitments can be made or any important matter settled in Bonn in regard to the proposed technological institute and the scholarships offered to Indian students by the German authorities. As H.V.R. Iengar,[2] V.K.R.V. Rao[3] and Anjaria[4] happened to be available, they were associated with the Ambassador to discuss these various proposals with the German authorities (there are different ones) so that we may have a full picture of the offer. Our men could also give them some idea of Indian conditions and requirements. Our Ambassador will send us these fuller particulars and then necessary action will have to be taken here.

2. I have sent a telegram to our Ambassador in Bonn, copy enclosed.[5]

3. In the note[6] attached, it is stated that it is proposed to establish the next institute at Kanpur. I think it is right that this institute should be in North India as others are being situated in the South, West and East. But Kanpur is a very congested city and land values are very high.[7] I should have thought that Allahabad might be more suitable. There is plenty of land available at much cheaper rates and generally the atmosphere is healthier. I should imagine that across the Jamuna river in Allahabad, that is, near Naini, would be a desirable site for such an institute.

1. Note to the Minister of Education, 27 July 1956. File No. 40(90)/56-57-PMS.
2. Secretary in the Commerce and Industry Ministry.
3. Dean, Delhi School of Economics, 1956.
4. J.J. Anjaria (1908-1970); taught at Bombay University, 1933-45; Assistant Division Chief, Research Department, International Monetary Fund (IMF), 1946-48; Director, Monetary Research, Reserve Bank of India (RBI), 1948-50; Chief of Economic Division, Planning Commission, 1950-53; Economic Adviser, Ministry of Finance, 1953-56; and Chief Economic Adviser, 1956-61; Executive Director for India, IMF, 1961-67; appointed Deputy Governor, RBI, in 1967.
5. Nehru cabled to A.C.N. Nambiar that no commitments about fields of study should be made, though information about the type of help the Germans could give should be obtained, and added, "we presume that the technological institute will be similar to Kharagpur Institute".
6. A Ministry of Education note, forwarded to Nehru by Azad on 27 July, stated that the "Minister (Azad) has expressed the view that the next institute may be located in Kanpur."
7. Giving his reasons for the choice of Kanpur for locating a technological institute in North India, Azad noted on 23 August that this was based on the consideration that the institute should be in the "proximity to an industrial area." Azad also stated that the UP Government "has not expressed any difficulty regarding land for the institute at Kanpur." He added that Kanpur "hums with industrial activity and has some good technical institutions already functioning."

7. Sanskrit—India's Precious Heritage[1]

You have invited me from the dust and tumult of political affairs to this gathering and this occasion which takes one away to other realms and other regions of thought. I have gratefully accepted your invitation for a variety of reasons: first of all, because I have long admired this great undertaking of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute;[2] and secondly, because this is an auspicious day for all of us in India as it is connected with Lokmanya.[3] We who function on the political stage gain a lot of notoriety and headlines in the newspapers, and it is made to appear that we are performing very important functions and that what we do is of immense significance. I do not know how far that applies to the activities of politicians. It may be that sometimes they do something important, but undoubtedly there is a habit not only here but in all countries to exaggerate the importance of the day-to-day happenings which constitute, often, the essence of political affairs. Certainly they are important; certainly they affect human destinies. Nevertheless, in a long perspective, I often wonder if we do not exaggerate them very greatly.

Here we are, meeting on this particular occasion to note the publication of some volumes of this critical edition of the *Shantiparva.*[4] Our minds go back to this tremendous epic, the *Mahabharata,* and not only that book but all the background that it represents. Here is something which has outlasted kings and emperors and dynasties—I do not know for how long—and powerfully affected millions and millions of human beings. Where are all those politicians and kings and emperors who have ruled and come and gone during this period? But the *Mahabharata* continues as powerful as ever and I am inclined to think that the work that has been done and is now being done at the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute in connection with the preparation of this critical edition of

1. Speech at the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, Pune, 1 August 1956. From *Jawaharlal Nehru's Speeches,* Vol. 3, March 1953-August 1957, pp. 418-421. (The Publications Division, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting.)
2. The Institute, established in 1917, is renowned for research and instruction in Sanskrit and the Prakit languages and has more than 20,000 ancient manuscripts. It is named after its founder, R.G. Bhandarkar, Professor of Sanskrit, Deccan College, Pune, and a former Vice-Chancellor of Bombay University.
3. His death anniversary falls on 1 August.
4. One of the eighteen *parvas* or books of the *Mahabharata* which deals with Bhishma's discourses on the duties of a king.

the *Mahabharata,*[5] may have a greater significance in the scheme of things than much that we passing politicians of the day do. It is, therefore, an honour to me to be present here on this occasion and to be asked to announce to you the publication of these three volumes of this great work.

I often wonder which is the most important of the many things that have distinguished India in the past in its history of thousands of years. I have no doubt in my mind that it is the Sanskrit language. I think it is that which has embodied the genius of our race, the wisdom of our race and almost everything that has come out in later years can somehow be found to have sprung from that magnificent language. What is language, Sanskrit or any other language? Thought represented in words. The most powerful thing in the world is thought. But thought remaining in the region of thought is inaccessible. It leads to nothing. It may almost be called an abortion, if I may use the phrase, although thought by itself is sometimes action also. The mere thinking is action. Thought has been and will be the greatest thing in the world, and everything else comes out of thought. But thought has to take shape in words, words of power, and in this language of our race, the most magnificent thoughts are clothed in words of power. And so, this language, out of which again came this greatest of our books, was probably the strongest cultural manifestation of the Indian people.

The Governor[6] mentioned that the city of Poona has been a great centre of scholarship. It is so. But we know how the Sanskrit language has been nurtured in all parts of India, certainly in and round about Banaras and in the far north in Kashmir also. And even today in your library here manuscripts in the Sharda script[7] were shown to me which came from Kashmir. Devoted service was paid there to this great language of ours. In the far south of India great scholars arose and did service to it; and so in Poona and in the east and the west. However India may have been split up in the past in terms of political entities and whatever it may have suffered through the ages, this basic language, the thoughts that it represented, the dreams of our race that it has embodied, have continued to condition all of us equally. Throughout the ages, scholars of our race in various parts of India have paid homage to it. It is extraordinary that this language—I speak with a little fear because scholars are present—which I suppose has not

5. The Institute started work on a critical edition of the *Mahabharata* in April 1919 and completed it in September 1966.
6. Harekrushna Mahtab, Governor of Bombay State.
7. This script was prevalent in the Kashmir region in the tenth century AD and resembles the Devnagari script.

been a spoken language in the normal sense of being the mother tongue of the people ever since Buddha's day, and perhaps earlier, has yet been a vital and a vivid language throughout these centuries. It is extraordinary that a language which ceases to be the language of the common people should still have the enormous vitality which Sanskrit has possessed during these thousands of years. And so, this Sanskrit language, with its offshoots, of course, the daughter languages, but even more so with the force of thought and dreams and search for truth and wisdom that it contains, has been the inheritance of not only you and me but of everybody living in this country, whether in the north, or south or west or east. I do not know whether we have profited by it or not. Perhaps we have not profited enough, but it has been with us and it has been an essential and basic part of India and all that India has been in the past. I have no doubt that it will continue to be with us in India in the future.

We are a curious country and a curious people. Somehow the past is intertwined and mixed up with our present and somehow even the future is mixed up. And so we live in this past, present and future, all mixed up with one another. That may have some slight advantage, and it certainly has some disadvantages. The past has gone and the present is with us and we work for the future. But I have no doubt that whatever shape that future may take, one of the biggest, the strongest and the most powerful and the most valued of our legacies will be the Sanskrit language and this great epic.

I should like to pay my tribute to the work of this Institute. You have just heard Dr Belvalkar[8] say how people have laboured here on very little salary, very little recompense, sometimes none at all. This is true of not this Institute only. All of us know that in this city of Poona there are other institutions which have nurtured scholars of great repute who have served here not for the love of money but in the old Indian tradition of love of knowledge and love of service. In this age when money shouts a great deal and affects all of us, in this money age and money economy, it is good to remember that there are people who can give their devoted service not for money but for other purposes. Therefore I should like to pay my tribute to this Institute and other institutes which have served in this way. I do not speak, and it is not perhaps right for me to speak, as the Prime Minister, about the future of this Institute, but one thing I can assure

8. Shripad Krishna Belvalkar (1880-1967); Sanskrit scholar and Indologist; co-founder of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute and its General Secretary, 1917-18 and 1927-33; General Editor of the critical edition of the *Mahabharata*.

you of, if assurance is needed, that this work will not suffer in future for lack of money. It is my honour and privilege to present to you, to present to India, and to present to the world these volumes of the *Shantiparva*.

8. Technical Manpower Planning[1]

You were good enough to write to me two or three days ago about the German proposal to set up a technological institute in India. I sent you an answer stating that no commitment could be made till the matter had been fully considered here by our Ministry and others.

2. I have received information from Germany that the German Government is not very clear about this technological institute and they asked a number of questions to which it was not immediately possible to give a clear answer. This question arose about the scholarships also. As you know, they have offered a very large number of scholarships.

3. The idea is that scholars should be chosen with definite object in view of their being employed subsequently in one of our concerns, that is, in fact, their future use of employment should be kept in view right from the beginning and they should be trained for the particular kinds of work needed later.

4. This will require a good deal of thinking out and consultation with our Ministries which are concerned with our major plants.

5. I might add that some of our scientists and technicians are much concerned at this lack of coordination which leads to trained scholars coming back here not finding suitable places. Also to the curious fact that while we need trained men, there are trained men in India who cannot find work. All this necessitates a good deal of planning both to train the right kind of men for the right kind of work and to absorb trained men who are already here. This means careful manpower surveys.[2]

1. Note to the Minister of Education, 3 August 1956. File No. 40(90)/56-57- PMS.
2. The Government of India set up, on 1 October 1956, a Manpower Directorate to tackle the question of manpower potential in relation to the Second Five Year Plan.

6. It has also been suggested and is being considered that we might create a pool of such trained persons and every qualified and competent person should be put in this pool, even though he cannot find a post immediately. He may be utilized for some purpose or for some further training at some factory or plant or institute. In any event, he should not be lost sight of and wander about in a frustrated condition. The pool can be drawn upon, whenever need arises, by any of our ministries or corporations or plants. This, however, is an entirely separate matter which will have to be considered carefully later.

7. For the present, we have to consider what steps should be taken immediately in regard to the German technological institute and the scholarships. I suggest that a Sponsoring Committee might be formed for the technological institute. This Committee should consist of representatives of the Ministries concerned, such as, of course, Education, Commerce & Industry, Iron and Steel, Production and Finance. Also the Planning Commission. The Cabinet Secretary might be Chairman of this Committee. Possibly, though I am not sure, Railways and Labour might also be represented. We may have in this Committee one or both of the persons who were in Germany discussing this matter at my instance (V.K.R.V. Rao and Anjaria). H.V.R. Iengar has also been discussing this particular matter in Bonn and, as Secretary of the Commerce and Industry Ministry, he is naturally concerned. Both Rao and Iengar are due back in India in about ten days time. Anjaria has already returned.

8. This Sponsoring Committee can be formed immediately or in the course of the next few days, and can begin discussing the problems of the technological institute. Later it might be necessary to have some Germans to come over for consultations.

9. Probably a different committee will be necessary from these various ministries for the scholarships.

10. I think that, in regard to the technological institute, we need not duplicate our existing institutes. It might well be desirable to vary the emphasis and specialize in certain matters in one and in certain other matters in a second institute.

11. These are some ideas that have struck me and which I am sending you for your consideration. I feel that urgent action is necessary for the appointment of a Sponsoring Committee of the kind I have suggested. This will save time which is usually taken up by reference from one ministry to another.

12. In regard to the Committee for the Scholarships, I would suggest the inclusion of Professor P.C. Mahalanobis, named in it, in addition to the others.

9. State Patronage to Literary Works[1]

As the Minister of Education had suggested that perhaps the Buddha Jayanti Committee might consider this matter,[2] I sent the papers to the Vice-President, who has been good enough to write a note which is being sent with the file.

2. The principle laid down by the Minister of Education is a good one.[3] But the application of it might well produce difficulties, as the Vice-President has pointed out.[4] The Sahitya Akademi should certainly deal with books possessing a literary quality. But there are so many books dealing with historical and like subjects, which are of high literary quality and treated as such. As history, they have become out of date. They are still read for this literary quality.

3. I agree with the Minister of Education about our publishing religious books.[5] Normally, we should not take these up. But books like the *Buddha Charita* or the *Rig Veda* are classics of ancient India and can hardly be considered just as religious books.

1. Note to A.K. Azad, Minister of Education, 6 August 1956. File No. 40(7)/56-PMS.
2. This was in regard to the Hindi littérateur Mahadevi Varma's request for financial assistance for publishing her translation of *Buddha Charita*. Azad, in his note of 3 August, stated his "categorical opinion" that no translation in verse could do justice to the original.
3. Azad thought "the general principle should be that requests for financial assistance for works whose primary significance is their literary importance should be considered by the Sahitya Akademi", while requests relating to publication of other works should be considered by the Ministry of Education or the National Book Trust. He added that "state patronage of publication of works whose primary significance is religious should be avoided as far as possible."
4. S. Radhakrishnan, who was also the Chairman of the Buddha Jayanti Committee, stated in his note of 5 August: "The test for the Sahitya Akademi should be not so much the subject matter of the book as its literary excellence." He argued that "*Buddha Charita* is regarded as a classic in Sanskrit literature, though it deals with the life of the Buddha." Radhakrishnan also pointed out that "Edwin Arnold's *The Light of Asia* is based on this work and it is treated as a work of literature and not a text of Buddhist religion."
5. Azad opined: "If the state subsidizes the publication of the sacred books of one community, there will be a legitimate demand from other communities for similar patronage."

10. To Abul Kalam Azad[1]

New Delhi
August 8, 1956

My dear Maulana,
Thank you for your letter of the 3rd August about sports and athletics in India.

I do not know in any detail what has been happening, though I have occasionally had either notes from the Education Ministry or from individuals. But it seems to me that the state of affairs in so far as sports and athletics are concerned in India is not particularly satisfactory.[2]

My own view is that sports and athletics should be as far as possible conducted on a non-official basis and Government should only come into the picture to help in maintaining standards and by giving financial aid.[3] It is only in Communist countries that the Government comes into the picture very fully as it does in almost everything. We cannot follow that model, as our social structure is different.

Even if Government takes a greater interest, there seems to be no harm for private organizations to do their own work and they should be encouraged. I do not know very much about the Rajkumari Coaching Scheme,[4] but I believe it has done good work in raising our standards. So far as I know, not much money has been spent upon it, as coaches have been obtained sometimes free of cost.

1. File No. 40(85)/56-PMS.
2. Azad noted that both the Indian Olympic Association and the All-India Council for Sports had "done not a little to build up games and sports in a proper way." Things were "so bad and sports have got into the hands of sueh undesirable people that real improvement cannot be a quiek and easy process."
3. Azad asked Nehru whether it was proper for the government to function through parallel ageneies and whether it was fair to make the All India Council for Sports eompete with the government subsidized private organizations, "whose hands are eompletely free." Aeeording to him, the Edueation Ministry, working through the Sports Council, was subjeet to the serutiny and control of the Finanee Ministry, whereas the Health Ministry, working through a private organization to implement the Rajkumari Coaehing Seheme, was subjeet to no sueh serutiny or eontrol.
4. Since 1953, this seheme provided assistanee to sports federations in India to modernize their equipment and enable them to participate in international tournaments. The seheme continued till May 1961 when the National Institute of Sports was established in Patiala for the systematic and seientific eoaching of national teams.

As for the Indian Olympic Association, it is obviously in a bad way.[5] But the Maharaja of Patiala[6] has been a keen sportsman and has encouraged sports greatly in the past. Patiala is one of the few places which has a good sports stadium and has produced good athletes. It is a pity that there is this conflict with him.

The Indian Olympic Association is affiliated to the World Olympic Council. I am not quite sure if its constitution would allow it to go under some other organization. Probably the World Olympic Council would object to this.

I do not know if any grant has been given by Government this year to the Indian Olympic Association.[7]

Yours affectionately,
Jawaharlal

5. Azad wrote that the Indian Olympic Association, the executive body responsible for India's participation in the Olympic and Asian Games, was offered a place in the All India Council of Sports but the Maharaja of Patiala, who headed of the Association, chose to stay out. Azad also quoted the Maharaja as having said that the Association had "a considerable number of irresponsible men", and that it had selected a "crook" to lead the Indian contingent to the Olmypic Games.
6. Yadavindra Singh. He was President, Indian Olympic Association, 1938-60.
7. Azad wrote that the Indian Olympic Association was expecting a Rs 4 lakh grant from the government.

11. To S.D. Sharma [1]

New Delhi
August 13, 1956

My dear Shankar Dayal,[2]

A number of MPs came in a deputation to me today and told me that the condition of the Dargah Sahib at Ajmer was bad for the last ten years or more and practically no repairs had been carried out. Only recently a new Act[3] was passed and a committee has been formed consisting of four MPs and five others. Some of the persons who came to me were members of this committee.

They told me that as the zamindari was taken away and compensation has thus far not been given, the income dwindled and hence no repairs. It appears that the Bhopal Government has now agreed to accept the principle adopted in the UP and Bihar in regard to mosques, temples, etc., whose zamindari was taken over. This principle was to give an annuity instead of bonds. I am told that the Bhopal Government intends bringing in a Bill for this purpose.

Meanwhile, nothing much can be done and the various parts of the Dargah deteriorate rapidly.

My attention was particularly drawn to Shahjahan's marble mosque in the Dargah.[4] I was told that this was in danger of collapsing and that it would be a great pity if this happened. An appeal was, therefore, made to me that something should be done soon to repair this Shahjahan's mosque. The persons who came to me, including the Chairman of the new committee, said that they would look after other repairs but they had no resources to take up this major repair of Shahjahan's mosque.

I should like you to let me know what the position is. Have Shahjahan's mosque

1. JN Collection.
2. Chief Minister of Bhopal.
3. The Dargah Khwaja Sahib Act of 1955 (Act No. 3, 14 October 1955) announced as its aim, "to make provisions for the proper administration of the dargah and the endowment of the dargah of Khwaja Muinuddin Chishti." This Act gave the Government of India powers to appoint a committee to ensure the smooth running of the dargah's administration.
4. The Shahjahani mosque is the chief monument of Emperor Shahjahan's devotion to Khwaja Muinuddin Chishti, the Sufi saint. Shahjahan ordered the construction of this mosque in fulfilment of a vow made during his Mewar campaign. The mosque took 14 years to build and was completed in 1658.

especially examined by a competent engineer and get his report, both as to what should be done and the estimated cost of it.

Normally speaking, a building like Shahjahan's mosque should be a protected monument. But this is not so. Nevertheless, we should look after our historical monuments and not allow them to decay.[5]

I should, therefore, like you to look into this matter and let me have a fairly full report.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

5. The same day, Nehru observed in a letter to K.P. Bhargava, the Chief Commissioner of Bhopal, that "apart from the necessity of our preserving these historical buildings of note, our reputation suffers greatly if it is said that Shahjahan's mosque has collapsed."

12. To Abul Kalam Azad[1]

New Delhi
August 17, 1956

My dear Maulana,

. . .Two days ago, H.V.R. Iengar returned to India from Germany. While in Bonn, he had had further talks with the German authorities, together with our Ambassador in Bonn.

From these talks, it appeared that the Germans were not quite clear as to what type of technological institute was needed in India. Two types were suggested. One was of the German technical high school type. The other was more of a technical university type. The Germans evidently preferred the former.

It appears that the Germans themselves largely go in for the technical high school in Germany. This provides a great deal of practical training, apart from the theory. In fact, students there actually go to factories too, to work. The result is that, when a student comes out, he possesses not only theoretical knowledge, but also sound practical experience.

1. File No. 40(90)/56-57-PMS. Extracts.

I suppose that the Kharagpur Institute is more of the university type and concentrates much more on theory. It may be possible, of course, to have something in between the two. Personally, I attach a great deal of importance to practical work. Also, it might be a good thing for us to have two or three types of institutes so that we may be able to compare their work and judge of the advantages of each one of them from our point of view. There is no need for us to copy the German example or an American or British example. We have to evolve our own methods. In any event, practical work is of the highest importance.

After the talks which our Ambassador and H.V.R. Iengar had with the German authorities, the latter gave a note. I enclose a translation of this note.

It has been suggested that a German team should come to India towards the end of September or early in October to discuss this matter with our experts and to look at our institutes, also to examine locations and sites. I think this is a very good idea, and we should immediately invite such a team through our Ambassador.

A suggestion has been made that, whatever the type of institute that is put up here, a high-level industrial engineer from one of the big plants in Germany should be attached to it. He would bring his experience of employing students who pass out of the technical schools and universities. That is important for us because our educational system has no connection with factories, plants, etc.

The German authorities asked for full particulars about our existing technical institutes, such as Kharagpur and any others. I shall be grateful if you have all these sent to the External Affairs Ministry, and we shall forward them to Bonn.

You might remember that I suggested that a Sponsoring Committee might be formed with the Cabinet Secretary as Chairman and representatives of the various Ministries concerned. This Sponsoring Committee could prepare the ground for the visit of the German representatives and be ready to talk to them when they arrive. There are many matters to be considered, quite apart from the setting up of an institute, which is important enough. The main consideration should be, I think, how to fit in the educational institute with the practical work being done in India, so that students who have been trained, can automatically fit in with this work. I hope you will approve of this idea and have such a Sponsoring Committee constituted.

In one matter we have to take immediate action. This is to invite the German team to come here by the end of September or early in October. If you will approve of this idea, please ask your Ministry to inform External Affairs, and we shall take the necessary steps to invite them.

Yours affectionately,
Jawaharlal

13. The German Offer for Technical Education[1]

Thank you for your note[2] on the proposed higher technological institute and the offer of scholarships from Germany, which I have read with care.

2. I do not think that we are likely to receive much more information from Germany about these two matters. As a matter of fact, the German people are waiting for our own advice. Because of this uncertainty as to what our requirements are and at the same time what they can provide, it was suggested that a German team of experts should come here to discuss the matter with our experts and others. This is the most urgent matter to be decided first of all. I suggest, therefore, that our Ambassador should be informed that such a team should come on a convenient date. . . .

5. We can thus make no progress so far as the German offers are concerned, till the German team comes here. But, we can discuss these matters ourselves and thus prepare ourselves for the talks with the German team. That is, we must have our information and briefs ready for the purpose. It was with this object in view that I had suggested a Committee (I had called it a Sponsoring Committee, but the name is not important) whose sole purpose would be to discuss these matters amongst themselves and, later, with the German team. This Committee, in my opinion, would not be the final Committee appointed for the technological institute or for the scholarships or for any other purpose. It will only be a preliminary Committee solely limited to discussion with the German team and amongst themselves and later to make some recommendations.

6. You have suggested a Committee for scholarships.[3] If it is necessary, some such Committee might be appointed later. The Committee I proposed, was, as I have said above, a preliminary Committee which will have at least two objects before it. One is to discuss the best way of utilizing the German offer of a technological institute. What basic type should it be? Should it be rather of a

1. Note to Minister of Education, 23 August 1956. File No. 40(90)/56-57-PMS. Extracts.
2. Azad's note of 23 August suggested that if a planning committee for establishing a higher technological institute was formed, it should not confine itself to the question of German assistance, but deal with all issues regarding the proposed institute. Similarly, Azad indicated that another committee be established to discuss the issue of scholarships offered by the Germans.
3. The committee was to consider all matters including allocations for various purposes as well as the mode of selection of scholars.

university type or of a more practical type after German models? What would be most needed in India and what would the Germans be prepared to give us? It is obvious that we cannot dictate to the Germans as to what they are giving. We can only indicate our preferences.

7. As regards scholarships, the suggestion which I suggest might be considered, is that of creating a pool which, of course, should be available to private industry as well. This involves an entirely different approach to the question of choosing scholars to be sent abroad. In fact, the pool might contain people of the necessary qualifications whether they are scholars or not. At the same time, each scholar will later have to be chosen from the point of view of the needs of the various plants, industries and other projects that we are undertaking in the Second Five Year Plan. In this way, there will be a closer approximation to fitting these scholars in after they return and of supplying our urgent needs. The Committee I have suggested will not choose the scholars but indicate the needs and the method of approach.

8. As regards the higher technological institute about which you have written, I suggest that this matter be considered rather separately (and later) from that of the present German offer. It may be that the German offer may fit in with your proposal to establish such an institute. It may also be that it does not, and you have to consider this separately, because it is of a different type. This can only be decided after the talks with the German team.

9. The question of setting up a Planning Committee for the higher technological institute, therefore, does not arise at this stage, because we have to be clear about the German offer and the way it is going to be implemented first.

10. The question of location also does not for the same reason arise now.

14. To K.A. Abbas[1]

New Delhi
August 24, 1956

My dear Abbas,[2]
I have your letter of the 22nd August.[3]

It is physically impossible for me to read through your script for the next two months at least, and I do not know what will happen after that. All I can do, and I have done that, is to read the note attached to it and just glance at the script here and there. So, I cannot express any opinion about the script, apart from my lack of capacity to judge scripts.

The subject is a good one[4] and I have little doubt that it should make a good film under your guidance and with Russian technique.

Indira has read through the script. She seemed to think that the hero is too idealized. Otherwise, she appeared to like it.

So, go ahead with your work and produce your film which we shall then go to see.[5]

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. File No. 43(56)/56-57-PMS.
2. Well known writer, film producer and director.
3. Abbas wrote that the Soviet authorities attached great importance to *Pardesi*, the first film with Soviet cooperation under production at the time, and had specially deputed their director and writer to make a personal request to Nehru to read the script. Assuring Nehru that the film was inspired by his ideals of intenational goodwill, Abbas requested him to lend his approval to the script.
4. The film is about the first Russian to set up a trading mission in India in the 15th century. The Muscovite, Afanasi (played by Oleg Strizhenov), travels to India down the Volga, across Iran and the Arabian Sea. In India he meets Champa (played by Nargis) through whom he discovers Indian civilization. Amongst others who acted in the film were Balraj Sahni, Prithviraj Kapoor and Padmini.
5. The film, co-directed by Vassili M. Pronin and Abbas, was released in 1957.

15. The Importance of Yoga[1]

Without sufficient reasons it has become known about me that I practise a lot of *yogasanas*. Although I do not practise many, but it is correct that for the last twenty-five years I have been continuously doing something daily, though only for a few minutes. I must say that from whatever little I have been practising I have been greatly benefited.

I am not against heavy exercises, like *dund* and *baithak*. However, the kind of alertness of mind and elasticity of body which can be achieved by yogic exercise is not possible through strenuous exercises although these can make a person bodily strong and add to the body-weight.

I had been hearing and reading quite a lot about the activities of the Yoga Health Department of Bharat Sevak Samaj and I am happy to be amongst you today to see in person your programme.

I have noticed that you have included only seven asanas[2] in your course. They seem to be easy and not very difficult. What I have particularly liked is that instead of trying to teach difficult asanas and making them intricate and trying to show them on the stage, your training is such that everybody can receive it with ease, and this can have a mass appeal. Each one can learn and then teach others. The need of the time is that instead of preparing a few students for demonstration purposes only, this movement should spread among the masses. It should be introduced in our schools and colleges everywhere. Therefore the seven asanas which you have selected appear to me to be very good and they can be very useful for maintaining the health of the people. I wish and hope that your work will gradually spread throughout the country and our schools, colleges and other institutions will introduce this system. I am only afraid that in schools and colleges the teachers who are generally appointed for teaching *yogasanas*, start teaching so much and such difficult asanas that gradually the number of trainees goes down and at the end only a few selected ones remain attached to them. For this reason, I have particularly liked your standardized course. You have found out a way by which an ordinary householder who can spare but a few minutes, can benefit from the *yogasanas* and maintain his health, both physical and mental.

1. Speech at a ceremony for distributing diploma-certificates to yoga teachers trained by the Bharat Sevak Samaj, Teen Murti House, New Delhi, 25 August 1956. File No. G-1(A) 1959, AICC Papers, NMML, and *The Hindustan Times*, 26 August 1956.
2. Twenty trainees earlier gave a demonstration of the seven asanas.

I am happy this important work has been taken up by Bharat Sevak Samaj and I hope wherever you go you will propagate this system efficiently and effectively among the masses.

I congratulate those who have been awarded diplomas today.[3]

3. Forty-five persons received diplomas. These included medical doctors, physical culturists, government officials, business executives, school teachers, social workers, and a member of Parliament.

16. To B.V. Keskar[1]

New Delhi
August 26, 1956

My dear Balkrishna,[2]

I heard the other day, in answer to a question,[3] that your Ministry is bringing out a complete edition of Gandhiji's writings and, possibly, speeches also. This is a very good idea. It is a tremendous undertaking and will take time.[4]

I suppose this can hardly be considered a popular edition. Inevitably, it will be rather expensive. What I am wondering about is whether it is not possible for us to bring out selections from Gandhiji's writings at a very popular price for a wide circulation. It is desirable for these writings to reach the new generation which hardly know them. Unfortunately, the Navajivan Press, having a monopoly of publication thus far, has proceeded on very conservative lines.

1. File No. 2(114)/56-66-PMS.
2. Minister of Information and Broadcasting.
3. Replying to a question in the Lok Sabha on 23 August, Keskar said that the *Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi* would be published in a "uniform chronological series", comprising some 30 to 40 volumes of about 400 pages each. There would be a library edition and a popular edition, Keskar added.
4. The *Collected Works* project began in February 1956 and the first volume was published in January 1958. The ninetieth volume, which appeared in April 1984, was the last volume in the series. Subsequently, seven supplementary volumes were also published. The Navajivan Trust, Ahmedabad, held the copyright of the entire series.

Can you not arrange with them to bring out yourself a few books of appropriate selections from Gandhiji's writings and priced very cheaply? I think this is very necessary.[5]

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

5. Keskar, in his reply to Nehru on 27 August, said that he liked his idea of bringing out selections from Mahatma Gandhi's writings and speeches for a wider audience, but he thought that Navajivan Press might not agree to it. He suggested that the Prime Minister's good offices might be necessary to persuade them to agree and added that Morarji Desai, Chairman of the Advisory Board of the *Collected Works*, could also be of great help in this matter.

3
ISSUES OF GOVERNANCE

I. STATES REORGANIZATION

1. To C.D. Deshmukh[1]

New Delhi
July 23, 1956

My dear Deshmukh,
I returned to Delhi today and I received your letter of the 22nd July[2] in the afternoon. I am sorry you have decided to resign.[3] Since you have so decided and are anxious that early effect should be given to your resignation, I am forwarding your letter of resignation to the President. He will receive it early tomorrow morning, the 24th July. I presume that the President's office will issue a press note by about midday tomorrow.

I have not yet received a copy of the statement you intend making in the Lok Sabha.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. JN Collection.
2. Deshmukh requested Nehru to "move the President" to accept his resignation as Finance Minister as he wanted to make a personal statement in Parliament on 25 July to explain his resignation over some provisions of the States Reorganization Bill, 1956, especially those concerning the separation of Bombay city from Maharashtra. Deshmukh also simultaneously resigned his associate membership of the Congress Parliamentary Party. But he continued as a member of Parliament.
3. On two previous occasions, in January and April 1956, Deshmukh had resigned over the future of Bombay city. Nehru did not accept. In April, Deshmukh insisted on stating his case in Parliament. Nehru replied that he would have to resign first. See *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 32, p. 212.

2. C.D. Deshmukh's Resignation[1]

Mr Speaker,[2] Sir, it is with deep regret that I have listened to the statement[3] made by my honourable friend and my colleague in Government till yesterday. I regret having to part company in the work of Government from a valuable colleague. I regret also that on this occasion an element of controversy has been introduced.

I am not referring to the merits of the questions raised by my friend; these will no doubt be dealt with in the course of the subsequent discussions in this House. The honourable Member has criticized various actions for which I am responsible. I accept that responsibility fully as indeed I must, in my capacity as Prime Minister. But I am reluctant to enter into a controversy, which to some extent has a personal character. Since we are ending our close association as members of Government, I should like this parting to be with goodwill.

I shall only mention here two or three matters to which reference has been made. The account that the honourable Member has given of various developments is not in my opinion quite correct in all its particulars. It is incomplete and hence may give a wrong impression as to what happened.

Reference has been made to the proceedings of the Cabinet.[4] It is not usual to do so and it is a little difficult to deal with this matter without a full account of what Cabinet considered at various times. I do not think it would be proper for me to deal fully with the proceedings of the Cabinet. This matter has been under consideration, in various ways, for many months and it has always been our desire to have the largest measure of consultation and agreement not only in the

1. Statement in the Lok Sabha, 25 July 1956. *Lok Sabha Debates*, Vol. VI, Part II, 16 July-3 August 1956, cols 821-822.
2. M. Anantasayanam Ayyangar.
3. Deshmukh said that he had resigned as he did not want to share the responsibility for the government's decision to separate Bombay city from Maharashtra, adding that he wished to protest against the manner in which Nehru handled the issue.
4. Deshmukh alleged that the decision on Bombay city had not been taken by the entire Cabinet and added that Nehru's statement of 3 June 1956 was considered neither in the Cabinet nor individually by its members. Deshmukh charged Nehru and a few others with arrogating powers not delegated to them by the Cabinet. On 3 June, Nehru announced at the AICC meeting that Bombay city would be centrally administered and, after a certain period, its inhabitants would be given the opportunity to decide their own future. See *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 33, p. 307 and pp. 339-340.

Government but in Parliament and elsewhere. We discussed this in the Cabinet on many occasions and when the Cabinet appointed a sub-committee,[5] we kept the Cabinet informed of its work.

The honourable Member has said that my announcement early in June in regard to the future of Bombay was lacking in propriety as the States Reorganization Bill was before the Lok Sabha and had been referred to a Select Committee. I am wholly unable to appreciate this argument. What I announced then was the Government's policy which had already been included in the draft Bill before the Parliament. The only additional statement I made was that the future of Bombay might be decided five years later by Bombay, a fact which had been referred to repeatedly. There is considerable speculation and uncertainty about this which call for clarification. In such circumstances, it is necessary to state the position clearly. Apart from this, it is the business of Government to declare its policy and to place it before Parliament. It is of course open to the Select Committee and Parliament to accept it, vary it or reject it. I had, in fact, stated in Bombay that it would naturally be for the Select Committee and Parliament to decide what they thought proper.

A reference has also been made to the decision not to hold a judicial enquiry into the incidents in Bombay in November 1955 and January 1956. Those incidents were serious. But, after the most careful consideration and in consultation with many colleagues and others we felt that our principal aim of developing normal and good relations in Bombay between various communities and groups would be jeopardized by such a prolonged enquiry at that stage. We felt that our chief effort should be to establish good relations again.[6]

I should like to express again, Sir, my deep regret at this parting of the ways.

5. On 23 August, Nehru stated in the Rajya Sabha that the Cabinet had already decided that details of certain aspects of states' reorganization be considered by a sub-committee that included him, G.B. Pant and A.K. Azad.
6. For Nehru's views on the issue, see *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 32, pp. 186-187.

3. To Bal Krishna Sharma[1]

New Delhi
July 26, 1956

My dear Bal Krishna,[2]
I have just received your letter of the 26th July in which you say that you propose to move a resolution at the Party meeting tomorrow.

I am a little surprised that you should intend moving this resolution in this way. Not only does the resolution go contrary to the present decisions which we have taken, but it also will lead to an acrimonious debate which will not help a solution.[3] Should you so wish it, you should have a talk with Pantji and others and, if necessary, we will consider this matter even in the Executive Committee.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. JN Collection.
2. A Congress member of Parliament from Uttar Pradesh.
3. In his reply to Nehru the next day, Sharma said that he considered it wrong "to keep Bombay away from Maharashtra", adding that a large number of Nehru's followers in the Party had not been able to reconcile themselves to the decision to have central administration for Bombay. Sharma warned that "your decision will continue to rock the country for a long time to come."

4. To Kaka Kalelkar [1]

New Delhi
July 26, 1956

My dear Kaka Kalelkar,[2]
Thank you for your letter of the 26th July.[3] I am forwarding it to Pantji. I rather doubt if it is feasible to place bits of Belgaum and Dharwar districts under Central Administration.

As for your suggestion in regard to Goa,[4] I might inform you that we have done one thing. The Central Government is going to take charge of the entire Goa border.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. File No. 38/7/60-SR(R)- MHA.
2. Nominated member of the Rajya Sabha.
3. Kalelkar observed that the predominantly Marathi-speaking areas of Karwar and Belgaum districts, instead of being placed under Karnataka, should be centrally administered. He added that these areas needed to be centrally administered because Belgaum and Dharwar districts were prone to violence.
4. Kalelkar suggested that the area surrounding the Goa border might be taken over by the Centre. He said that if this was done, the growing bitterness and antipathy between Maharashtra and Karnataka could be checked.

5. To H.V. Pataskar[1]

New Delhi
July 29, 1956

My dear Pataskar,[2]
Thank you for your letter of July 29.[3] It seems rather difficult at this stage to accept the suggestion you have made which means that by a certain date Bombay will automatically go to Maharashtra, unless Parliament decides otherwise. What might be more feasible is to say that by a certain date Parliament will consider this question and leave it at that. However, I shall discuss this matter with Maulana Saheb and Pantji tomorrow and perhaps we can meet also.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. JN Papers, NMML.
2. Member of the Lok Sabha from Jalgaon and Minister of Legal Affairs.
3. Saying that he was convinced that the Central Government would not keep Bombay city centrally administered beyond the necessary minimum time, Pataskar inter alia suggested that after a fixed period the city should be merged with Maharashtra, unless at the end of that period Parliament thought it necessary to extend the period of central administration. He believed that the tension in Bombay had prevented its merger with Maharashtra and that it was bound to decrease after the formation of Gujarat. Pataskar also said that he had finalized his suggestions after discussions with B.S. Hiray, D.K. Kunte, Y.B. Chavan, C.D. Deshmukh and T.R. Deogirikar.

6. To G.B. Pant[1]

New Delhi
July 29, 1956

My dear Pantji,

You must have received a letter from Pataskar of today's date. This must be a copy of the one he has sent me. I am therefore not sending the original to you.

As you will know, I have been greatly distressed about this Bombay and Maharashtra matter and the fact that practically the entire people of Maharashtra feel almost unanimously and strongly on this subject, is rather an overwhelming one. Nobody can deny that there is a good deal of logic in what they say, although there is some logic for the other view too. Anyhow, we have landed ourselves in a position when we are doing something which intimately hurts the whole people of Maharashtra and their representatives. That is a bad position.[2]

I suppose that it will be difficult to accept Pataskar's suggestion[3] now, that is, his suggestion No. 4. But perhaps we might vary it somewhat and say that the question of the future of Bombay and whether it should form a part of the State of Maharashtra should be considered by Parliament on a date as may be notified by the Government of India but not later than. . . . (This may be five years.)

We might have a brief talk about this tomorrow.

Yours affectionately,
Jawaharlal

1. JN Papers, NMML.
2. Pataskar wrote to Nehru: "You have tried your utmost to accommodate all of us, and it pains me when people in excitement unjustifiably think that you are in any way responsible for this sad state of things."
3. Pataskar wanted Clause 8 of the States Reorganization Bill relating to Bombay to read: "Provided that, on such date as may be notified by the Government of India but not later than . . . years from the appointed day, the territories mentioned in this clause shall form part of the State of Maharashtra, unless Parliament decides that they shall continue for a further specified period to remain as a Part C State."

7. States Reorganization and Bombay City [1]

Mr Speaker, Sir, a week ago today, I returned to Delhi after visiting many countries and great cities in the West, and meeting many leading personalities there. I tried to understand the great movements that were taking place there, the thoughts in the minds of people there and the changes that had taken place. Even more so, I tried to understand what reflection there was of India in the minds of the people that I met in Europe.

I was interested in that naturally, because even as I watched something of the stuff of history being made in Europe, I wanted to know how far the history we might be making here was reflected in the minds of people in Europe. I found they were greatly interested, indeed sometimes more than interested, in what was happening in India, because they felt that something very significant was happening here, something that would not only change India, but would affect other countries and other continents. And I thought then of the work that we do here in India, the great problems that face us, and the tremendous responsibility of this Parliament of India. This Parliament of India indeed has this responsibility of making the history of India.

That was one thought that struck me. Another thought that struck me as I travelled from country to country was of how the old frontiers had gradually meant less and less. Within an hour or two, I travelled from the capital of a great country to the capital of another great country. There were problems, certainly many problems and many conflicts, but this idea of national frontiers became less and less important somehow in the modern scheme of things.

I mention this because here we are considering with considerable heat and passion not the frontiers of nations but the borders inside the nation between two States or provinces. If the frontiers of a nation become relatively less important than they were, and if in the course of a few years, they may almost be ignored for many matters, how much less important are these problems of State boundaries which we are considering? I do not wish to minimize their importance, but I do wish this House to consider this question in proper perspective. We are apt to lose that perspective in the heat of debate or otherwise. I know that this question which we are considering, and this Bill and its provisions, have moved people strongly, deeply and that even now there is a

1. Statement in the Lok Sabha, 30 July 1956. *Lok Sabha Debates,* Vol. VI, Part II, 16 July-3 August 1956, cols 1504-1522. Extracts.

great deal of feeling about them. I do not suppose that the most ideal solutions, whatever they might have been, could possibly have been pleasing to everybody.

So far as I am concerned—indeed, I might say, so far as Government here is concerned—it is of no great significance to us what part of India goes into this State boundary or that. Yes, certainly we must consider what is more desirable from various points of view. But in the ultimate analysis, it does not make much difference where one little part is from the Government point of view. From the individual's point of view or the State's point of view, it has certain importance; I do not deny that.

Therefore, the Government of India approached this question, if I may use the word, more or less objectively and without any particular desire to impose this decision or that. We have been told that we did not go through the proper procedure of consultation and decision, etc. But I think any person who knows what has happened in the last six, seven or eight months in this country, will also know that the amount of consultation and discussion about this matter that we have had is without parallel. In fact, many people say—and perhaps rightly —that we overdid this: it would have been much simpler if we had not tried to consult hundreds of thousands of persons in this process and thereby perhaps added to the confusion. However, it is a fact that this question has roused people. But I wish this House to realize this, and first of all look at this picture in proper perspective, lest we forget that perspective and get lost in the passions of the moment. Secondly, to realize that however important these questions of borders might be, they are, after all, administrative divisions inside the country. Thirdly, whatever we may decide today, surely nobody prevents us afterwards, subsequently, from making any variation.

I realize that nobody wants to decide things and change them everyday. That is a different matter. But nothing is final in the sense that it cannot be changed in the future.

Now, our difficulty has been that we have tried too much perhaps to balance respective viewpoints, to try to find a common way, to find as large a measure of agreement as possible. And naturally, in doing so, we have often succeeded in displeasing many people. Yet I would beg of you to remember that in this very very complicated business which affected the whole of India, by far the greater part of India has accepted, broadly speaking, the proposals that are made. True, very important questions remain; among them perhaps the one that has been talked about most is the question of Bombay and Maharashtra.

Now, I have felt—I say so with respect—that perhaps the approach to these questions has been too much marred by strong language and by direct or indirect reproaches, and, if I may use the word, by running down this group or that group, this community or that, not only in regard to Bombay, but in regard to

other places too—whether it is Bengal, Bihar or other places. I would beg this House to consider whether it helps in the slightest the consideration of these problems by running down any province, any community, in any part of the country, by considering one part more capable, more courageous, more independent or more nationalistic—whatever it may be. We are all here as Members chosen by some constituency or other in India. Naturally, we are interested in that constituency. But I submit that we are here as something else also. I am not here merely as Member for the eastern part of Allahabad district. I consider myself the Member for India here, and I do submit that every Member of Parliament is a Member for India. We are not members of some local municipality or district to consider the particular interests of that area only and forget the rest of India. We have to consider every question, I hope to the best of our ability, in relation to the whole country. I am not Prime Minister of Allahabad district. I am Prime Minister of India by the grace of this House, and I have to think or try to think in terms of India. I may make a mistake. Of course, I make mistakes; all of us make mistakes. But I do submit that when we begin to challenge each other's bona fides, then any discussion and any consideration of any problem on merits becomes a little difficult.

Let us consider these problems from this larger point of view, realizing that even if some decision which we dislike is made it does not make a terrible lot of difference, realizing that if the mistake is made, it is a mistake in a narrow sphere and it can be corrected later, because the greatest possible mistakes and the greatest possible error in this is having a wrong mind and a wrong approach to this problem and creating an atmosphere of conflict which is so vital to the development of any big thing in India. That is the basic approach.

Some honourable Members may well say, 'It is all very well; your intentions may be very good, but where have you landed us with your good intentions?' It is perfectly true that we have landed ourselves in a bit of mess. I admit it and I admit my responsibility for it because, naturally, as Prime Minister and otherwise also, I am at least partly responsible for it. I do not wish to run away from it. It sometimes happens that in trying to avoid one difficulty one lands in another. But there it is.

I do not wish to go into the past history of all these eight months' debate and consideration; but we have arrived at a certain stage now and we have to look at the picture as it is. Many things could have been done, large bilingual States and many other things might have been done; they might be done later too. I do not rule that out. But, what exactly can we do at the present moment so as to promote and help to bring about this larger atmosphere of cooperative endeavour. In a decision which we take—the decision may please somebody or displease somebody; it may be a right or wrong decision—the main thing to consider is

ON RETURN FROM A TOUR OF EUROPE AND WEST ASIA, NEW DELHI, 23 JULY 1956

August 5, 1956

Chintaman Deshmukh, who was opposed to the proposals on Bombay, cuts the rope which S.K. Patil has climbed. Beating the drum is Govind Ballabh Pant.

FROM *"DON'T SPARE ME SHANKAR": JAWAHARLAL NEHRU*

what is the final result of it in terms of goodwill or ill will. That is the main thing.

On several occasions, in regard to this very matter of Bombay and Maharashtra, we varied previous decisions. Each time we varied it—I am talking about the earlier stages—we landed in a fresh difficulty. We did it at the suggestion of somebody, some respected colleague of ours, and then, they themselves wanted something else. Ultimately we landed ourselves in this difficulty that any attempt to change it probably resulted in a worse situation than the first one.

Honourable Member, Shri Deshmukh said, he preferred a City State formula to the present state of affairs.[2] So did we and that was our first decision and, the honourable Member will remember that on one occasion, he told us not only on his behalf but responsibly and authoritatively on behalf of others too that we should adopt the City State formula.[3] We adopted it although we had come to some other conclusion because we were anxious and eager to please. But not 48 hours had passed when we were told: 'No; go back upon that; we won't approve that.' We went back upon it and so we shifted about in our anxiety to arrive at some decision which carried the largest measure of agreement and consent.

The honourable Member referred to what he called two crucial decisions which were taken without consultation. I am in a difficulty about this matter because I am really, totally and absolutely unable to follow him. I do not know where he gets his facts from. I consulted my papers, my Cabinet records and everything. There are two decisions—I leave out for the moment the statement that I made in Bombay. The first decision was taken, I say, absolutely and repeatedly with the consultation of everybody and my colleagues in the whole Cabinet. I have no doubt about it. Finally, I say—leave out the intermediate stages—this Bill itself was placed before the Cabinet. The Bill, after all, contains it and it was the Cabinet that adopted it before it came to this House. That is the usual procedure. I do not understand how anyone can say without forgetting all these that this decision was adopted without consultation. There was more consultation than on any other subject that I have had since I have been Prime Minister.

2. Deshmukh stated that the government's decision to have central administration for Bombay city "places Maharashtra in a worse position than even if Bombay had been made into a city state." He added that with the status of a city state, Bombay would not have to wait for five years for deciding whether it should join Maharashtra or not.
3. On 23 August, G.B.Pant, Home Minister, told the Rajya Sabha that Deshmukh had informed the Cabinet on 8 January 1956 that Maharashtrian leaders had authorized him to say that they would prefer a city state for Bombay.

The other matter is a small matter: what mistakes I might have made or anything said about me. Shri Deshmukh was kind enough and good enough to say that he did not refer to me when he said that there was a certain animus.[4] I thank him for that statement, but it is a small matter after all as to what I am and what I may be. But, it is a much bigger matter as to what our method of Government is, what the procedure we follow in our Cabinet and the Government of India and in this Parliament and elsewhere. It is no small thing. Are we following wrong procedures; are we overriding everybody and just imposing some individual will, mine or a small committee's will over this Parliament, over the country? That is a vital matter. It is more vital than, I say, this whole States Reorganization Bill. If we go wrong, how are we to function? It is a charge the honourable Member has made; it is a very serious charge.[5] It is not easy to reply to it and to justify my own conduct. But I do submit that he has done little justice to his colleagues in the Cabinet and even less justice to himself when he made that charge. He has functioned in this Cabinet for six years or more and he has been a valued and respected member and colleague of ours. Now, he makes this charge against his colleagues after six years of functioning together, a charge however much I may be guilty of or deserve, and I do submit it is a very very unfair charge on all my responsible colleagues in the Cabinet.

However, there was this question of the statement that I made at Bombay. Now, what is the crucial decision and the statement that I made in Bombay? Repeatedly I had said at Amritsar Congress[6]—and at various other places that statement had been made repeatedly—that Bombay will be given an opportunity to decide by some democratic process what it should do and where it should go to. For my part, I would be exceedingly happy if Bombay went to Maharashtra. I have absolutely no reason against it and I shall be completely and absolutely frank in this House that I think there are many valid arguments, good arguments for Bombay going to Maharashtra. But I also say that other valid arguments are also to be considered on the other side. In this difficulty we thought, many of us thought, that the best way was to allow Bombay to decide. It may have been done even now. But, as I pointed out, the conditions have been such that so

4. Speaking in the Lok Sabha on 30 July, Deshmukh said: "I believe there is some evidence of animus against Maharashtra among important personages of the Congress Party. . . ." Refuting the contention that he was "interested in making such a charge" against Nehru, Deshmukh said, "I am well aware that he (Nehru) is constitutionally incapable of animus against anybody."
5. This refers to the charge made by Deshmukh in the Lok Sabha on 25 July and 30 July that the decision regarding Bombay city was taken without consulting the Cabinet.
6. See *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 32, pp. 227-232.

much passion has been aroused that it was not yet the right time to decide that. Let things cool down. I have repeatedly said, "Let normality prevail and then let it be decided by them". I do not naturally mean that you will have a plebiscite or referendum and all that; but, if there is a good atmosphere, I have no doubt that it would be far simpler to settle this matter without any such cumbrous procedure. I was hoping for that and I still hope for that. In Bombay at the meeting of the All India Congress Committee,[7] I was not to my thinking making any great decision or announcement on a very big thing. I was merely stating what I had stated repeatedly—my view—and I am something; after all, I am the Prime Minister of India. And a Prime Minister is a Minister and he can lay down the policy of the Government—it may be repealed or it may be anything. I know something about democratic procedure; I know something about party procedure; I know something as to what the Prime Minister's duties are, and in the Constitution we have and in the Constitution that Britain has, the Prime Minister is a linchpin of Government. To say that the Prime Minister cannot make a statement is a monstrous statement itself. I entirely fail to understand where the honourable Member has got his acquaintance of democracy and what under the present Constitution of India and England the Prime Minister is and what he can do and what he cannot do. I am something more than the Prime Minister: we are something more; we are the children of the Indian Revolution. And although we may be toned down here and although we may forget much that we did before, we still have something of the revolutionary fire in us.

I venture to say that many of us know a little more about the Indian people, about those poor people, about those peasants than some other who talk about peasants. We have spent a good deal of our lives with those peasants and poor people, and it does not behove any person to talk of moneybags, in the sense of referring to our Party or to our Government.

I made that statement in Bombay, a simple statement, if I may say so, to give an assurance that this was not a final thing; a statement which said, "Let peace be restored first and then this matter may be decided calmly". I do not mind which way it is decided. I am perfectly prepared to plead the cause of Maharashtra with others. 'Animus' is a big word. I have no disinclination to Maharashtra, but 'animus' is a big word. I do attach much importance to this question being solved in a calm manner so as not to leave any headache behind.

I do not entirely agree with all that Shri Patil[8] said; I agree with much but I do not agree with something that he said. But I say that the main thing is that if you

7. The meeting was held at Mumbai on 2-3 June 1956.
8. S.K. Patil, President, Bombay Pradesh Congress Committee.

do something with Bombay this way or that way and as a result give headache to that party, the Maharashtra, it will do little good to Maharashtra to get that headache. By all means, let it get it in a friendly way, in a cooperative way, and it will be good for Maharashtra, it will be good for Bombay, and good for the country. That was the trouble I had in the way to do these things.

I do venture to submit not in this matter only but in almost every matter in an individual's life or in a national life, that the older I grow, the more I feel that what is more important is the manner things are done than the things themselves. Means are more important than ends. More and more I feel that. All our trouble in this business has been not that the ends were not good but the means employed somehow tarnished the ends, made difficulties and actually came in the way of achievement of those ends. That has been the difficulty. I am not blaming anybody. If I am to blame, I am quite prepared to blame myself. It is not a question of blaming anybody, but I believe it is a fact that if you employ the wrong methods and gain something, that end is prevented. Other considerations come in, passions come into play. Because of this difficulty I wanted this question to be considered in a calmer atmosphere. The more I thought, the more I felt it was good to postpone this particular decision for some time. I say five years, but I am not making any rigid limit. That, oddly enough—what is called the crucial decision—was, apart from being a repetition of what I said, an indication that our minds are not closed on this, an indication that this is not a finality that is coming in, but that the matter is left open for the future and whenever opportunity arises, it can be done. It was, to my humble thinking, a hand spread out to Maharashtra instead of against them, and, if I may say so—I do not know if it is quite proper for me to say so—the day before I made that statement in the All India Congress Committee, I had the privilege of meeting quite a number of leading gentlemen from Maharashtra—I do not say they all represented Maharashtra, but some did—and we talked about these matters. I told them my difficulties and said, "This Bill is there, what can we do about it?". I said that we can see that this matter is not closed, but is opened after a period. Then they said, "Can you not make your statement in the All India Congress Committee?" I said, "Certainly", and I made that statement.

It is not conveying any firm decision of Government as such or that the Cabinet and the Government have decided it. I made a statement. I know that when a Prime Minister makes a statement, it is an important thing, it is not a casual thing. That statement itself, if you examine it, was "the door being left open" and that there is no finality about it, it can be varied, it could have been varied slightly here or there, if you accept what the Bill contains, because it refers to my talk in Bombay about the Bill, which was, of course, Government's decision, etc. In order to lessen the shock of the Bill to those who do not like it, I found a

way by which this can be varied or changed a little. It is really to lessen the shock of the Bill that I did so rather than to come in the way of Maharashtra.

Some people talked about a big bilingual State, and for my part, obviously I welcome it. I do not mind if Bombay is a City State. I do not mind if any chunk of territory were to go from one side or the other. Maybe I do not have a sense of provincialism in me. I can consider economic reasons, geographical reasons. Geography is important, of course. Of course, geography of little patches becomes less important in this age of fast travel, etc. But the one thing that is really important, I feel, is this. Stress has been laid on this in the Report of the Commission—how linguistic minorities are to be treated—because it just does not matter where you put your boundaries, between this and that, but they are bound to be overlapping. You can put people speaking in one language in a closed house, in a closed province. But there are bilingual areas, maybe trilingual areas, whatever the percentage may be. How are you to treat them?

The House will remember that in the Commission's Report, there is a special reference in the concluding chapter to certain measures, certain protections, certain precautions, certain assurances, certain statutory provisions so as to give them protection—protection to the linguistic minorities. Now I am anxious that this should be done, and done in the form of words. At any rate this charge has some truth and I do believe that a language is not given protection or a group representing a certain language is not given protection when it happens to be in a minority or almost equal, whatever it is. That difficulty and that complaint must be removed altogether from India and removed in a way not merely by some pious protestations but by some active and precise instructions to that effect. One cannot get rid of all the evils of this world, but anyhow one should go as far as possible to prevent this happening. If this can be done, then the linguistic complaint goes or ought to go from every part of India. If I may say so, this fact, I am told, is in the Constitution, but nonetheless I do not think everybody realizes it.

I do think that all the fourteen languages mentioned in our Constitution are our national languages—not Hindi only, but all the fourteen languages. Hindi, not because of any linguistic superiority, but because it is spread over a larger area and for various reasons and facility and the rest, we have said, should be an all-India language; it should become an all-India language gradually and, after a certain period, for official purposes. But, all are national languages. We want to encourage them. And I am convinced that the encouragement of one language in India leads to the encouragement of others. The outlook that we can encourage one language by crushing others is completely wrong from any point of view—literary, or linguistic point of view. In this matter, for instance, I feel that any kind of application, letter or petition of any kind can be presented to courts: it

can be done in any of the fourteen languages of India and no court will reject it. It may be, of course, that the court may be unable to deal with it if it is totally unaware of it because no court can keep fourteen translators. That does not matter. It is a matter of convenience. But, a court in Delhi has to accept an application put in Malayalam or Tamil or Telugu or Kannada. Let them get it translated. Maybe, it will delay matters. But it is none of your business to say that you cannot get it. It is one of our national languages.

If that is so about every language in India, it may be so especially in regard to the actual languages represented in a certain area. There should be no difficulty. Certainly those languages should be given that official position in that area, in applications and others. After all Government issues notices and others so that they may be understood. That notices is (sic) not merely to encourage or discourage a language. It should be issued in the language of that area, regardless, I say, of whether it is sixty or forty per cent—whatever the percentage— provided of course there are sufficient number of people to be approached in that way.

I just mentioned about the frontier. We are, as the House knows, facing tremendous technological changes. We have got this marriage of science and technology and industry and that is producing enormous changes in the world. If you think of those changes, the problem that we face—such problems as in this particular Bill—becomes quite extraordinarily insignificant. Of course they have importance. I do not mean to deny it. I would beg of you to consider it in this particular context and consider the way the country is changing, we are changing, what our future is going to be. I am intensely interested in the future of India; so are the Members of this House. We work for it. We may pause but India will continue. We have laid the foundation of that future today. About our future, one thing is quite certain. It is not going to be a repetition of the past. The world is changing too rapidly and it is of the utmost importance that, in building that future, we should develop this all-India outlook. The provincial outlook is not going to pay either the province much less India. We cannot have it. I may come from UP, my ancestors might have come from Kashmir, but I consider myself an Indian. I feel that I have inherited every great deed and great tradition of India from Cape Comorin to the Himalayas. Sometimes, there are comparisons in this House that the people of this province are brave, that the others are not so brave and that the others are businessmen and these people are *saudagars* and so on. All this thinking which we find is unfortunately the reflex of the caste system—a bane and curse to this country which should be dealt with as such. We are too much immersed in these things. Which province is there in India, which State is there in India, which has not got a proud tradition of its own? Go to the south—the Tamils; there is a great language and there are great traditions—military and the rest. Go to Andhra—famous Andhra empires. Go to the

Malayalees, go to the Kannadigas—the Vijayanagar empire. Whether you go north or south or east or west, each area, each part of India has got great traditions, great stories of the past, best culture—even military glory they have in store.

I inherit all that legacy. Do you think that I can confine myself to the story of Allahabad, although it is an ancient city, because I was born at Allahabad! I claim to have a right to the glory of Andhra, or Tamil Nad or Maharashtra or Gujarat or any part.

Maharashtra—everybody knows the vital part it has played in India's history, military way, scholarly way, literary way, in learning and in so many ways and lastly in the struggle for freedom. The Maharashtrians or Gujaratis or the Tamilians do not require protection. They are big enough. But the people who do require protection are our border people. . . .

We talk of geography. Geography is important and will remain important though it fades away in this air age. But geography has made India of the past, with Himalayas and the two seas surrounding. Whatever internal divisions and dissensions and conflicts we had in India in the past few thousands of years, the concept of India has remained. The concept of India, Bharat or Hindustan—call it what you like—has remained and has kept us mentally together. It mattered not so much in the old days and that is why politically we were apart. But it does matter today, in the age we live, when we must not only be integrated in that matter—that is not good enough—but we must emotionally and intellecually be integrated. The painful thing that has happened in the last few months is to display, not to ourselves but to the world, how we are not so integrated in our minds and hearts. We have to get over that.

Even accepting the mistakes, even accepting or realizing that somebody else has committed the mistake, even accepting that the Government of India has committed the mistake, it will take time. It may be true. You can of course change the Government of India. You can change the decision—whatever it is—but keep, above all, the major thing in mind, viz, we have to face the situation as it is today and how we can preserve this big thing, that is, India uninjured in any manner. If we are making any mistake today let us calmly and quietly deal with it sometime later.

As for Bombay, I understand, I concede, the logic, the fairly strong logic. The logical aspect on behalf of Maharashtra, I do not deny. There are logical arguments on the other side too. Maybe, one is more powerful than the other. But, I look at it in the context of the present moment, after we have arrived through a devious and tortuous way, at a certain position. How are we to deal with it? Are we to go on quarrelling and quarrelling about that or allow matters to settle down and deal with it in a proper way? According to our Constitution, it is always open to this House to deal with a matter whenever it chooses and, apart from that, we

purposely say that we are not limiting this, we are not making it absolutely final; the thing will be open and in the meanwhile let us keep as many bonds as possible to prevent this kind of thing happening. . . .

8. To K.M. Munshi [1]

New Delhi
August 4, 1956

My dear Munshi,[2]
Thank you for your letter of August 4.[3]

A curious situation has arisen here in regard to Bombay, Maharashtra and Gujarat. Till three days ago, there was no talk of a bilingual State and we were proceeding with the Bill as it is. It is true that Pantji and I and others had said that we would have liked a bilingual State if that had been feasible.

Suddenly the back-bencher in Parliament began to move and to our surprise a great majority of the Members of Parliament signed a representation to me asking for a bilingual State.[4] This majority included not only a large number of Congressmen but a number of members of the Opposition. This put me in an odd position. As Leader of my Party or of the House, I could not very well order them to vote against the very thing which I had approved of. If I left it to a free vote of the House, there was no doubt that the bilingual State would win. Thus we were really cornered. For my part, I was not at all unhappy about it. But quite apart from my wishes in the matter, we were driven by circumstances into a certain direction.

1. JN Collection.
2. Governor of Uttar Pradesh.
3. Munshi suggested that there should be a bigger bilingual state in western India, with Bombay city as its capital. Such a state should have regional councils on the lines of the regional formula for Punjab, Munshi added.
4. One hundred and eighty members of Parliament submitted a memorandum to Nehru on 3 August endorsing the idea of a bilingual Bombay state. An amendment seeking to establish a composite state of Bombay was moved in the Lok Sabha by Frank Anthony, Tulsidas Kilachand, Jaipal Singh and eight others.

We shall be talking to Morarji Bhai and others tomorrow. Anyhow this matter will have to be settled in the course of the next three days or so.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

9. Congress Approval for a Composite Bombay State[1]

Friends and comrades,
You know very well why we have met here. In fact the initiative in this matter, not of this particular meeting but because of the meeting, has really come from many members of our Party and many Members of Parliament who are not members of our Party. It has been a strange experience for me and perhaps also for many of you, how, almost I may use rather odd terminology, almost some invisible force forced us into a certain direction. Certainly it was not I. I claim no credit nor, if I may say with all respect, it is Pantji, although Pantji and I gladly welcomed and welcome now the direction that has been given. But it was not we who gave that direction at this stage. Why was that so? Well, because nobody could have done clearly, because of certain unresolved feelings and doubts in people's minds which wanted some way of escape, some satisfaction in some other way. And the moment this idea was thrown out by somebody, the reaction was phenomenal. Reacting, mind you, not on those who thought that way, but even reacting on those who thought other ways. That itself shows the vitality of the idea.

Now I would not go into this story of the last four days since this idea came up. It has a short history; it has a long history before that of course. Because this idea of a bilingual state of Bombay stretching from the north, Kutch, Saurashtra, Gujarat, Vidarbha, Maharashtra and the Marathwada, part of present Hyderabad State—the great maritime province overlooking the Arabian sea—it is not a new idea. The idea, even of the bilingual State, was suggested by the States Reorganization Commission. Later it was suggested that Vidharbha might be

1. Speech at an emergency meeting of the Congress Parliamentary Party, New Delhi, 6 August 1956. AICC tapes, NMML. Extracts.

added to it, and at some stage or other, I want you to remember, both the Gujarat Pradesh Congress Committee and the Maharashtra Pradesh Congress Committee at various or different stages accepted that idea. But owing to developments later, they hesitated and they went in other directions. They had doubts about its possible success. But the basic idea has been accepted. Therefore, and undoubtedly many things occurred during these past few months which created doubts in our minds not only about that particular matter but even about the basic things, about the future of India itself. If our linguistic or State or provincial feelings, of all of us, I am including everyone of us, please do not imagine that I am accusing any particular State or language group and, if I may say so with all respect, I particularly asked the people from the Hindi speaking provinces to listen to me because they are apt to be a little aggressive—that if we feel this way then, however justified our feeling may be from some point of view, it does obviously come in the way of a larger all-India feeling. There is no doubt about it. Sometimes principles come into conflict. Sometimes even a good thing, good in itself, comes in the way of a better and a more important thing, and the moment we forget the better and the more important thing for a lesser good that moment we lower our status and our national status, and many of us begin to wonder and feel acute distress at this resurgence of what might be called local, however big the locality may be, local feelings in contra-distinction to an all-India consideration of the problem. And so this idea was not a new one but other things that happened created doubts and we, Pantji and I and many of us sitting here and amongst you who had advocated this, who had tried to do this, were forced by circumstances to be driven in a certain direction and ultimately to find remedies which were more or less temporary. It might last or not but the mere fact that we said that within five years something else may be considered itself showed that it was not a decision which might be considered permanent. So all this is the past.

Here we are facing this matter rather suddenly at the last moment. And after having given the fullest thought to it within these three or four days in our Cabinet, in our Congress Working Committee and with our senior colleagues from other places, notably from Gujarat and Maharashtra, we came to the conclusion that this was the right course, balancing all the possible difficulties. Do not imagine that the difficulties are over, do not imagine that there are not people who will oppose this and create trouble. There are people there. But thinking that, first of all, it was good for the nation, good as a proposition, as a way of deciding this, good even more so because I do feel that if we take this decision and take it with goodwill and with good grace we shall undoubtedly check this feeling of narrow parochialism that has grown in India. We shall undoubtedly create a healthier atmosphere in India, which will help us in solving

other problems, I have no doubt at all. And there may be groups here and groups there who may not like this, who may oppose it and all that, but I am absolutely convinced, if I know anything, about the pulse of our country that this will be received with a tremendous feeling of relief and satisfaction and people's minds will turn to other things, minds which had been tied up and imprisoned in this argument all the time, will gain freedom to think differently and to look at each other differently. You know that it is all very well for us to decide here, meaning members from other States, which are not directly affected by this Bombay State issue. Although the issue has undoubtedly become something much more than a state issue it is very much a national issue and all of us have felt it so and all our arguments in Parliament had been about this issue. Therefore everybody has a right not only to express his opinion but to participate in the decision. Nevertheless the basic responsibility is that of the people who will have to shoulder the burden—and it is going to be a heavy burden, a difficult burden even now onwards and more so later—that is to say, the people of Maharashtra and Gujarat, Saurashtra and Kutch and Vidarbha. It is not surprising that being told rather suddenly about this change, some of them are rather taken aback. Some of them had not only adjusted themselves mentally to a certain thing but they were actually making arrangements for the other things and now this uprooting of a mental adjustment is difficult, difficult for all of us. And so our friends from these various places told us their difficulties.

I met today our colleagues from Maharashtra, from Gujarat and Saurashtra and Kutch, from Vidarbha and from the city of Bombay and we had frank talks and I may give you an instance. Our friends from Vidarbha had a little complaint to make. Repeatedly we had asked them and brought some pressure to bear upon them to agree to this decision or that. They had always great loyalty and a disciplined manner although sometimes their decisions went against their own wishes in the matter. The Congress leaders and others from Vidarbha have been most cooperative throughout these decisions. So we met these people and we discussed this matter with them. They told us of the difficulties they will have to face, of certain doubts that they had. But all of them having said so, said that if it was so decided they will wholeheartedly accept it and work for it. Many of our colleagues felt that these decisions should not be considered temporary decisions to be changed from time to time. "We had at last, after a good deal of wandering and losing our way, arrived at a haven, and let us stay there." So this is the position.

And now I seek your approval, the Party's approval, to this course of action. There are some amendments which, broadly speaking, represent this. But what I am putting before you is not some particular amendment but rather the principle which you have all understood, of the bilingual State consisting of, starting

from the north, Kutch, Saurashtra, Gujarat, Bombay, Maharashtra, Vidarbha and Marathwada. How should these amendments be incorporated in the Bill. We have considered those amendments carefully. Although broadly they are right, we feel that the wording is not perfect or quite good. That is a small matter. The important thing is the principle which I put before you. It may be that in consultation with friends, who have moved those amendments, we may move an amendment to an amendment but the idea is the same. . . .

I should imagine that the view of the Party is clear but I think it is desirable to have it expressed more formally. Therefore I shall ask you to vote, by show of hands, on the proposition that there should be a composite State consisting of Kutch, Saurashtra, Gujarat, Vidarbha, city of Bombay, Maharashtra and the Marathwada part. Those in favour of this proposition will raise their hands. . . . Thank you.

Those against this proposition. . . . Thank you.[2]

The formal decision will naturally be taken by Parliament tomorrow or whenever the matter comes up.[3] There can be no doubt now what that decision of Parliament will be. Because it is enough that this Party has so decided but as a matter of fact we know that many members of the Opposition are also in favour of this proposal.

This decision of our Party on this particular subject this evening has a certain historic character. During the last many months we had strayed not only in Parliament but in this country, strayed far from our moorings. Strong winds have blown us about. We tried to recover our position at the Amritsar Congress and let me remind you that you are going back to the Amritsar Congress by this decision. It is because we allowed ourselves to stray from our own better judgement and from our own considered decisions that we fell into even greater difficulties. So we have gone back to Amritsar and in doing so not only decided about this particular matter but again gone back to that broad principle, the broad approach and outlook that Amritsar typified. Let us not be vain and imagine that we have solved India's problems. Even in this respect they are difficult of solution. There are many people who go the wrong way and so the path is not an easy one. But the real difficulty that came in our way was not the fault of others but the confusion in our own minds, in the Congress minds. There is no doubt that confusion weakens an organization like the Congress. It is hardly over what

2. Only N.V. Gadgil, member of the Lok Sabha from Pune Central and former Union Minister, voted against the proposal.
3. On 10 August 1956, the Lok Sabha approved the Bill for setting up the composite state of Bombay.

the opponent says or does. If we are not clear in our own minds, if we doubt, and if we cannot pull together in the Congress, how can we teach the lesson of unity to the country. That has been the great weakening factor for us and so we could not meet adequately and effectively this onrush of disruption or disintegration. We have been, we meaning the nation, for a moment almost possessed by some evil spirit which has crept into our minds and hearts, poisoned them and made brother turn against brother. I hope that by this decision of yours we have exorcized that spirit. . . .

This decision should mean to us a certain pledge, a pledge of working for the ideals for which the Congress has stood and stands today, working with unity of purpose and comradeship and the spirit of adaptation to each other and in this way facing the great task that the country has. So it is in a spirit of this pledge and a challenge that we should part this evening and in doing so we must remember that by this decision, we in this Parliament, will make a precious gift of the great composite State of Bombay to the nation.

10. To Lady Mountbatten [1]

New Delhi
August 6, 1956

My dear Edwina,

. . . The last four days have brought about a remarkable development here. You know all the trouble we have had about Bombay and Maharashtra. At last we had arrived at the final stage. A Bill was drawn up, placed before Parliament and referred to the Select Committee. In this Bill it was stated that Maharashtra and Gujarat would be two separate States and Bombay City would be administered by the Centre as a separate unit. This was not a very satisfactory arrangement, but there appeared to be no other way out. The Maharashtrians did not like this and in fact we had to agree that the matter might be reopened five years hence. These last eight or nine months have seen so much conflict and controversy about Bombay City that it became a national problem. As between Maharashtrians and Gujaratis, there was great bitterness.

1. JN Collection. Extracts.

On the 1st August I went to Poona for some functions. I was a little surprised and pleased to find that in spite of all that had happened, I was not too unpopular in the heart of Maharashtra. I had a good welcome in the streets and at a big public meeting I addressed.[2] Nevertheless, the Maharashtrians were sullen and dissatisfied.

I came back on the 2nd August when the clause dealing with Bombay City was being considered in Parliament. In the normal course it would have been finalized the next day. Suddenly there was almost an upheaval in Parliament and 180 Members of almost all parties sent me an appeal to vary these proposals and agree to having a composite State of Bombay including Gujarat, Maharashtra, the City of Bombay, Saurashtra and some other parts. We had of course recommended this earlier, but because of difficulties we had to give it up. I discovered that behind this appeal to me was a very widespread feeling in Parliament. All this had, you might say, risen from the back-benches and had rather captured the imagination of our MPs. In view of this, we postponed the consideration of that particular clause for three or four days over the weekend and had intense consultations. We summoned some people from other places. I met the Maharashtra MPs and the Gujarat MPs separately. We decided finally in our Cabinet to accept this proposal to have a composite Bombay State.

This evening we had a full meeting of our Party where I announced this decision and asked for their full support.[3] It was astonishing how this was received with great enthusiasm by practically everybody present, including people who had slanged each other only a short while before. In our voting at the Party meeting only one person voted against the proposal and all the others supported it. Suddenly there appeared to be a sea change in the minds and hearts of people and quite moving scenes of friendly reconciliation were witnessed.

And so we are now committed to the big maritime State of Bombay stretching from Kutch in the north to somewhere near Goa in the south. It will be one of our biggest and richest States. Parliament will take up this matter tomorrow and there is no doubt that it will be passed by an overwhelming majority. Practically the only persons who are against it now are the Communists who are very angry and feel that they have been let down.

This does not mean that our troubles in regard to Bombay or Maharashtra are over, because they have sunk deep even in the villages. But it does mean that the whole atmosphere has changed suddenly and we can face any trouble now with good heart and much greater strength.

2. See *ante*, pp. 23-34.
3. See the preceding item.

All this has been rather exhausting business, but I feel as if a burden was off me. And this is a common feeling in Parliament and outside here.

It is no good writing to you about the Suez Canal trouble[4] which prevented Dickie from going to Malta. Events march rapidly and by the time this letter reaches you, the situation may well have changed. I do feel that whatever Nasser might have done, and he has acted wrongly in some ways, the hysterical reaction to it in some countries has not been justified. Unless this is pulled up, trouble will spread. Surely this is not the way to solve the problem. We have not yet decided whether to participate in the London Conference on the 16th August. We are waiting for some replies from the UK Government. If these replies are satisfactory to our thinking, we shall participate. If so, Krishna will go to London for this purpose. Probably we shall decide in another two days time. There is not too much time left.

Yours
Jawaharlal

4. See *post*, pp. 318-375.

11. To G.B. Pant[1]

New Delhi
August 8, 1956

My dear Pantji,
This is to remind you of what I said to you on the telephone about the four southern *taluks* of Travancore which are going to be transferred to the State of Madras. I understand that it is proposed in the Bill to attach them to Tinnevelly District. If this is done, they would be lost in that large District and lose all their individuality which they undoubtedly possess. It is obviously a bilingual area–Tamil and Malayalam–and both languages have to be used and preserved there.

1. JN Collection.

Apart from this, that area has hardly ever in history been separated from the old Travancore State. I think, therefore, that it is desirable to constitute them into a separate District unit even though this might be smaller. Anyhow, it should not be tied up with Tinnevelly. I gather that Kamaraj[2] has given an assurance to the people from these *taluks* that he is prepared to have them as a separate unit if the Bill does not tie up his hands. I hope that this change will be made in the Bill.[3]

Yours affectionately,
Jawaharlal

2. K. Kamaraj, the Chief Minister of Madras.
3. On 10 August, the Lok Sabha adopted a motion constituting the *taluks* of Agastheeswaram, Thovala, Kaikulam and Vilvancode of the Trivandrum district in Travancore-Cochin as the Kanyakumari district in the state of Madras. At the same time, Shencottah *taluk* of Quilon district was transferred and became a part of the Tirunelveli district in the state of Madras.

12. Justification for a Composite State[1]

Jawaharlal Nehru: We are at the last stage of the long journey. I have, like other Members of this House, closely followed the career of this Bill and what has gone before it. Perhaps, I have spoken less here on this particular subject than many of my colleagues, many other Members of this House. That was not because I was not deeply interested. I followed much that was said, and there was much that was good sense and much that was not sense at all, and I did not think that I could add very much to this debate, but now that we have arrived at the last stage of this particular measure which is of so great importance. I should like to say something more really to associate myself fully with it, than to throw any additional light on this problem which we have had for this long time.

The honourable Member who has just spoken[2] referred to what the Congress

1. Speech in the Lok Sabha, 10 August 1956. *Lok Sabha Debates*, Vol. VII, Part II, 6 August to 25 August 1956, cols 2798-2812.
2. N.C. Chatterjee, Hindu Mahasabha member from Hooghly in West Bengal.



AT THE RED FORT, DELHI, 15 AUGUST 1956

AT THE HINDUSTAN ANTIBIOTICS FACTORY, PIMPRI, 2 AUGUST 1956

policy has been. May I respectfully inform him that I know more about the Congress than he does? May I respectfully inform him that what he has said has not been the Congress policy for the last several years? And may I tell him that when it was the Congress policy to begin with, it was under entirely different circumstances? And may I tell him that today Congress policies are opposed to that completely? Let us be clear about it. We do not stand for this principle of unilinguism. We may have a unilingual State, we may, but basically we stand for something different from that. That is the Congress policy. Naturally, no such policy can be rigidly applied this way or that way. It depends on so many factors, but when we are reminded and told repeatedly that in 1922[3] or earlier we spoke about linguistic provinces and therefore we are betraying that cause, I am really surprised that people, without knowing the circumstances, the context of a particular statement at a particular time and further not knowing what has happened subsequently, should make that remark. Repeatedly this matter has been considered by the Congress, by its highest organization, and we have repeatedly laid stress that the most important thing is not this unilingual province, that there are far more important factors than the linguistic formation of a province.

Language is important, but I should like to ask this House to consider that there is a difference between the importance of a language, the encouragement of a language and all that, and the boundaries of a state. Language should not be confused with the boundaries of a state. It may be that sometimes the boundaries may be linguistic. We have no objection. It is a good thing. But to think that it is a vital issue, that a State should be bounded by a certain linguistic area is, I think, a basically wrong approach, and I should like to say that in so far as I have any influence with the Congress I have put it the other way, and I am glad to say that the Congress over the last few years, if you look at its resolution, has clearly accepted that. So that, let there be no mistake as to what the Congress stands for. I cannot, of course, speak for what others may stand for, for other views, but we have seen in the last few months many things happening in this country in the name of language, in the name of linguistic provinces which I take it every Member of this House considers absolutely deplorable. It does not matter very much, in my humble opinion, where the boundary of a State is. It is a matter for careful consideration. There are sentiments about it. Let us consider sentiments. Let us consider the question, the economic aspect of it, the strategic

3. According to Chatterjee, Mahatma Gandhi said in 1920: "If you want to make the Congress a dynamic organization for the purpose of achieving independence, you must fashion your own constitution and the future constitution on the linguistic principle."

aspect of it, the cultural aspect or whatever you like. But it is not a question which one should say should be decided in the streets by fighting, by destruction, by arson or by firing, whoever may be right about it.[4]

And the misfortune has been that the authority of this Parliament has been challenged often enough. And sometimes, honourable Members of this House have encouraged that challenge of the authority of this House, even outside here near the gates or farther afield. I do submit this raises a very vital issue for this House and for Parliament. Where are we? If anything that we decide is challenged then where are we? It is not that it should not be challenged, but the point is the manner of the challenge, and the manner it is encouraged. It is becoming almost a habit; when something is done, it is disapproved of, and therefore, people should attack the police, commit arson, roam about breaking things then, the police comes in, the police stops them, the police fires. The police may be at fault, or the others may be at fault. I cannot speak of any particular instance. But this is a curious and vicious circle that we are getting into.

Then, of course, we have motions for adjournment saying it is a terrible thing, that the police has fired, there is ruthless oppression and all that.[5] I really would like this House to consider, where are we. Where are we going to in this world, with this encouragement of this kind of public violence, challenging decisions taken in this House or being discussed in this House? It is not the normal habit in any country, whether it is a communist country or a non-communist country. Where are we? I should like to know. In a communist country, there would be trouble if anybody raised his head against a decision of government. Honourable Members know that very well. Nobody dare raise his head there. If he raises his head, the head disappears too. That is all. There is no motion of adjournment anywhere, and no discussion about a subject.

4. Violent protests began in Ahmedabad on the 8 August against the government's decision to form a composite Bombay state. The call for a hartal given by the Maha Gujarat Vidyarthi Samiti led to police firing on several occasions resulting in the death of 18 persons. The rioting continued for 13 days, during which school and college students staged hartals, police pickets were stormed and roads were barricaded. Ahmedabad returned to normal only on 21 August when the Samiti called off its agitation.
5. On 10 August, the Lok Sabha speaker received notice of an adjournment motion from A.K. Gopalan, H.V. Kamath, Hiren Mukerjee and Renu Chakravarty. The motion read: "The serious situation arising out of the calling out of troops since yesterday in the city of Ahmedabad where the popular demonstrations of the people for a separate unilingual state of Maha Gujarat are being sought to be crushed by ruthless repression, resulting in the death already of twelve and injuries to many."

A.K. Gopalan[6]: So, you are also following it or beginning to follow it?

JN: The honourable Member's head is perfectly safe here, if the honourable Member wants me to reply to that. Is it the honourable Member's argument that people should go, commit arson, break people's heads, and no action should be taken? Is that the argument?

K.K. Basu[7]: Nobody has said so.

JN: I am glad nobody said so. But it is repeatedly said that the police is always bad. The police might have committed mistakes. Nobody said that the police is right. But the most extraordinary thing which the honourable Member said this morning was that these troubles in Ahmedabad have been provoked by the police.[8] I say this is fantastic nonsense, if anybody were to tell me like that.

A.K. Gopalan: Provoked by the decision of Government.

JN: Maybe; provoked by the decision of Government, and provoked by them, by the honourable Member's colleagues there, whose chief purpose is to create disturbances and troubles elsewhere. It is not the honourable Member's right only to speak on the floor of this House. I say and challenge this that honourable Members, some honourable Members sitting in this House, provoked these troubles and encouraged those people who provoked troubles. I am not giving way. I am glad that some words of truth have hit home. I am glad that some gentle reminders of some obvious facts have found an echo in the minds and hearts of honourable Members opposite.

H.V. Kamath[9]: They have gone home to you also. You have lost your temper.

JN: I would beg this House to consider this: Has a word been said condemning violence? I have condemned the police often enough, where they have been wrong. But has the honourable Member opposite ever condemned an act of violence?

An honourable Member: Not once.

Kamath: Of course, every time.

JN: I am glad. I was waiting to hear them condemn these acts of violence. . .

Kamath: You are deaf. You do not hear. You should have heard them already.

JN: . . . committed by those whom they encourage. This is the major question

6. CPI member from Cannanore.
7. Kamal Kumar Basu (b. 1918); CPI member of the Lok Sabha, 1952-57, from West Bengal; Mayor of Kolkata, 1985-1990.
8. Speaking on an adjournment motion on the situation in Ahmedabad. Sadhan Gupta (Calcutta, South-East) said that "sometimes it happens that the police provoke the people by shooting."
9. Member of the Praja Socialist Party from Hoshangabad.

for this House to consider, and not motions for adjournment repeatedly brought in, without realizing who does this, why all this happens. . . .

Kamath: On a point of order. It is within your powers to decide whether a motion for adjournment is admissible or not. It is not for the Prime Minister to question the right of a Member to table the motion. It is not for the Prime Minister to decide the admissibility.

Speaker: I have already decided the point of order. I have rejected it. There is no point of order in this. I have already disallowed the adjournment motion. The Prime Minister is entitled to say that this adjournment motion has been disallowed rightly; also, he is entitled to condemn what has happened there.

JN: I would not presume to refer to any particular adjournment motion. I was referring to a procedure which has become almost the monopoly of honourable Members opposite. In this world, I venture to remind this House, of strife and trouble and huge problems arising here, we sit down here and all we can do is to go on repeating the same thing in the same exuberant language, that the police is bad, the firing is wrong, there is ruthless oppression and so on; I really am amazed at the lack of intelligence of some people, who have found no novel idea. . . .

Speaker: I would request the Prime Minister to resume his seat for a minute. We heard Shri H.N. Mukerjee[10] use language which was very strong, and condemn Government. Is not the spokesman of Government entitled to say—when Government are condemned—who are responsible for this? Also, when he says that intelligence is wanting, or what the honourable Member said is not intelligent, why should there be any objection? . . .

JN: I am sorry if by any mistake, I committed the error of an unparliamentary expression. I am sure you, Sir, would call me to order, and I will express my regret. But if I say that loud shouting does not take the place of intelligence, that, I hope, is not unparliamentary. If I say that the cheap business of eloquence of hands and voice, and waving about of hands is not a logical argument, that, I hope, is not unparliamentary. We have had enough of this loud shouting and waving of hands and this kind of exuberant eloquence.

We are dealing with hard facts and hard situations. We are dealing with the world—and I say so with all gravity—which is in a very dangerous state; it may be in a more dangerous state, for what you and I know, in the future. Here it is, and we are playing about with these things, without realizing where we are;

10. Hiren Mukerjee, CPI Member from Calcutta North-East, accused the government of not solving the problems of the people of Gujarat, Maharashtra and Bombay. He also charged that the government encouraged disunity wherever unity prevailed.

whether it is the international situation, or whether it is our Second Five Year Plan, everything must go before these petty objections and petty reasons and petty shoutings. Let us consider matters in a reasonable way. What does it matter to this Government or to me—I would not say, any honourable Member of this House; it may—whether the Bihar-Bengal boundary is here or there, whether the border of this province is here or there. It is not a political question for me. Obviously, it is not an economic question. It may be a question of high sentiment and high importance for people who live there. I agree. But so far as this Government is concerned, it makes no difference to us whether the boundary is shifted this way or that way. We may make a mistake. We have made mistakes, but it was of no consequence to us, that is what I am wishing to submit, what the State boundaries should be.

Therefore, as the House very well knows, we went all out to get as great a measure of support as possible from the people by agreement. Let us say, we did succeed in a very large measure—90 per cent. We did not succeed in some measure. We had to come to some decision. We came to some decision according to our judgment of what we considered best.

Now, for the honourable Member, Shri N.C. Chatterjee to say that we did not consult this man or that man and this group or that group, I do submit, is not completely accurate. Obviously, we did not consult everybody. But I do submit that we consulted people outside the Congress ranks, outside groups, many a time, as he himself happens to say. I had the privilege of talking to him on these subjects on more than one occasion. So that it is not that there was no consultation.

Let us consider this matter apart from all the excitement that it has caused. Here was a simple matter, not as simple in that sense, but in the sense of its being non-political and non-economic. The country is concerned with major political and major economic issues. This was neither a major political nor a major economic issue. It was a major issue of high sentiment which often rouses passion. We admit that. Let us try to satisfy that sentiment. But where two sentiments come into conflict, difficulty arises and we have had to face these conflicts between sentiments.

Now, the other point is about the basic policy which we must pursue in regard to that matter. It has always been said, right from the beginning, by the Congress, and more recently in the last four, five or six years—and I take it that the House certainly agree with it—that the first, and absolutely first, consideration is the unity of India and the homogeneity of India. If that is so, we must judge every other argument from that point of view. The second point would be the economic advantage to India or to that particular place. These are two basic things; other things follow.

Now, we have seen in the last few months how much this question rouses

passion, how one neighbour attacks one's neighbour, how one linguistic area gets worked up against another linguistic area. All of us are guilty of that; nobody is free from it. We have seen that. It is a dangerous thing that we have seen; it is a bad thing that we have seen. It is a thing which, I hope, nobody has liked. Far from encouraging it, everything should be done to discourage this kind of thing.

Speaking for myself, I have come to the firm conclusion that this linguistic States idea takes us into a dangerous direction. I do not mean to say that we upset it; it is not that. But this talk of purely linguistic provinces and 'clean' boundaries is something which tends towards lessening the idea of the unity of India. I am told that that makes a group homogeneous socially. I agree and, therefore, I attach importance to the language. But I distinguish between importance to the language and the culture of the place, and the physical boundary of a State. I think the two ought to be kept apart.

Therefore, what we have seen has made us doubt about the basic conception of unity in India, how easily it is broken up and how easily people forget the first and second issues and go to the third and fourth issues. Therefore, I had ventured to become, even more than ever before, opposed to this idea of small States, each thinking in its own way and forgetting the larger issue. Therefore, although originally—not today, but 20 years ago—I was in favour of a large number of small States in India, I have completely changed my mind and I believe in big States now.

There are various other things; it is immaterial whether I believe in them or I do not believe in them. But I do wish this House to consider that everything should be judged at anytime, more especially today, in the context of the world, in the context of India, in the context of our industrial development and Five Year Plan, from these basic points of view, that is, the unity of India, the harmonious working of our Five Year Plan, etc. Everything else is secondary. It just does not matter where our boundaries are. If we do not make any real progress in our industrial development, the boundaries won't make, or bring about, that industrial development. And if we are too excited to do that work, and if we merely argue with each other and fight each other in the streets or outside about these matters, it is obvious that we shall neither have any reputation in the country or outside the country nor indeed in our minds or hearts.

Therefore, the primary thing is for us to cultivate this atmosphere in the country of having the freest discussion, having the freest expression of opinion, debate of every type and argument, but that must be on the peaceful level—not this kind of thing. It is, after all, degrading, very degrading, that this kind of thing is happening in our country. Whatever the merits of the question, whatever the disagreement on this, it is a wrong thing. I want this House to consider this. This idea that is thrust about, that it is a continuation of our national movement, is

completely wrong. It is one thing to fight an imperialist Power, and even that fight we did by peaceful methods. But this is another thing—the word 'satyagraha' that is bandied about today, something which is millions of miles away from any idea of satyagraha that Mahatmaji had.

We have here persons going to prison. It is a joke—a thousand men arrested and released one hour later. Everybody knows that it is a complete joke this business of going out in the course of the afternoon or, maybe, becoming martyrs. Where are we? Are we becoming an opera bouffe—this country—for the world to laugh at? This kind of thing, people coming with flags from the Punjab and forcibly sticking them on the engine and threatening the driver—what is this happening?[11] Is it some kind of a theatrical performance for the edification of others or is it a serious work?

The honourable Member Shri N.C. Chatterjee, referred to my coming down somewhere and dealing with this Bombay province and Punjab province. I can assure him—this is my uttermost conviction—that so far as the Punjab is concerned, I have never come across a more mischevous, a more misconceived and foolish thing, without any basis, than the Hindu Mahasabha agitation.[12] I venture to express my opinion. I can see the reasons for other people in the rest of India, whether it is Gujaratis or Maharashtrians or Kannadigas, agreeing or disagreeing. But there is not an atom of reason, except sheer mischief, so far as the Punjab agitation is concerned.

N.C. Chatterjee: That is for the full implementation of the SRC's scheme. Is that foolish, is that mischievous, is that anti-national? What is this nonsense?. . . .
JN: I say that this agitation, the manner it is carried out, the object of it, everything behind it, can mean only one of two things: either those who carry it on have not understood what this formula is or having understood it, they nevertheless want to do something that, I think, is completely wrong.

However, here it is. We have arrived, as I said, at the conclusion of this journey. I cannot say—nobody can say—that this has been the ideal solution of every problem in India. Of course, not; no problem has an ideal solution. But how do you deal with these matters? You arrive at a conclusion; after long and interminable delay, you arrive at a conclusion, and Parliament puts its seal upon it. When Parliament has decided—and I take it, it will decide—the matter becomes the law of the land.

What happens to this country if we go on fighting everyday? Is that the way

11. This refers to the railwaymen's strike in Kalka. See *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 33, p. 337.
12. See *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 33, p. 265.

a civilized nation carries on? Is that the way any kind of decent politics are carried on? Immediately if you lose in Parliament—anybody loses in Parliament—you take the issue to the streets and demonstration. This is a big country. A demonstration does not mean—I would beg the House to remember—that people are against it. Every minority can have a demonstration when the majority does something. It does not mean that the people are against it. The only way to ascertain the views of the people is, after all, by the vote at the general elections or other elections or some other way. There may be some other way of generally guessing it. We may have some kind of polls. But this business of challenging the decisions of Parliament in the streets and in a violent way—I am not talking about peaceful expressions of opinion—is something which is basically opposed to the whole democratic conception and method.

The honourable Member opposite talks about democracy being crushed by this Government. I really do not know what his idea of democracy is. It must be obviously something radically and absolutely different from the normal idea of democracy. Certainly, I never associated democracy with the workings of Rashtriya Swayamsewak Sangh or the Hindu Mahasabha organizations.

We have arrived at a stage and we shall soon pass this stage to come to another stage. It is for this House to be clear, it is for this Government to be clear and for every Member of this House to be clear that, having decided after long debate something, we should accept it. I understand—I was not here—that my colleague Shri Gadgil said, he has been a stout fighter; he has fought and has fought to the bitter end and he gave his vote against this. But, nevertheless, he said: if that is done and accepted, well, he accepts it. In the normal course of things he has to say something and has said it in the normal way. He accepts it. I submit that is the only way to deal with any matter. If Parliament decides something, accept it and work it. If it is a matter of deep conscience for somebody—I do not perceive a conscience concerned about a boundary and I hope conscience concerns itself with deeper matters than the boundaries of districts and States, etc.—if it is a matter of conscience with that person—well, I cannot say—let him, then, serve his conscience as he thinks fit. But how this conscience leads one to commit violence, it is beyond me. Therefore this must be accepted. What is happening in Ahmedabad? Really I do not know how to understand this kind of mob violence. Let us admit that those people who did it did not like the decision we came to.

First of all, after months of debate and argument and personal discussion and trying to throw light on the question, on every aspect of it, we here come to a decision.

A.K. Gopalan: This decision was taken within 24-hours.

JN: The decision was not a 24-hour decision.

A.K. Gopalan: Yes; it was.

JN: I may remind my honourable friend that it was always talked about. He is strictly right when he says that a certain intermediate decision was changed. Certainly, that is not the point. We came to a decision. And now, these gentlemen in Ahmedabad, or Calcutta or Madras or Allahabad, wherever you like, come out into the streets without, of course, having had the benefit of any discussion, that long, long discussion—probably they have not read anything about it—but simply because of sentiment they feel it is wrong. I say it is a reversal of the process of democracy or reasonable process of approaching anything. Parliament will cease to be. Let us say, the police did not stop the demonstrators outside here; they will simply come here and at next to you and threaten you. How will Parliament function? Indeed the police stopped them and in stopping them, the police pushed too hard. No objection could be taken to police misbehaving or repressing the natural instincts of those who were taken in custody. That is not a reasonable approach. I say, with respect to the House, not as Prime Minister or a Member of the Congress Party—although it is my high privilege to have been in the Congress for the last 40 or 45 years—but as a Member of this House, wishing to preserve the dignity of this House, the dignity of Parliament, the dignity of democratic procedure, the dignity of India and this nation—all these things, I take it, are dear to everyone here and to everyone in India. We may make mistakes—we make so many mistakes—but you do not correct a mistake by wrong procedure, wrong means and by going the wrong way. You have to build up this country and that requires the effort of everyone. It requires, I believe, free speech, free expression, free opposition and all that. But, it does not require—in fact, far from requiring, it cannot exist, free speech cannot exist, free expression of opinion cannot exist if you have violence in the streets. That is not free speech. What was happening in the Punjab? A man was to go and address a meeting. Ten, twenty or thirty rowdies prevented him from speaking. That is suppression of free speech; that is wrong. Government suppression of free speech is equally bad. They are both suppressions of free speech and they are both bad. A government can be regulated; but popular expression cannot be regulated. It is worse, therefore, when nobody is responsible.

Therefore, I would appeal to this House—this House is wise enough to act rightly—and to the wider public that these ways of violence should be given up not only because they are too bad but because they come in the way of future cooperation. We can never function in this country unless we cooperate with each other, unless the Tamil cooperates with the Telugu and the Kannada, the Malayalee and the Marathi and the Gujarati and the Bengali and the Punjabi and so on. All this trouble has somehow made it difficult for people to cooperate with each other. It has created an atmosphere. Now, having finished this, let us be done with it, right or wrong, and try to produce the atmosphere of cooperation.

13. To Shantilal Mangaldas[1]

New Delhi
August 19, 1956

Dear Shri Shantilal Mangaldas,[2]
I have received your letter of the 11th August.

I am afraid it is little use my discussing this entire question of States reorganization and, more especially that of the composite State of Bombay, as the Lok Sabha has decided. There is history of ten months behind all this, ever since the report of the Commission came out. Throughout this period, we have stated repeatedly that we were in favour of a composite State. But because we could not get a general agreement on it, we made some other suggestions from time to time. It is quite true, as you say, that the last proposal and decision came rather suddenly. It did not originate at this stage from Government. A very large number of Members of Parliament brought it forward. We had not been against it at any time and in view of this widespread desire in Parliament, we gave it earnest consideration in Cabinet, in Congress Working Committee and in the meeting of the full Congress Party in Parliament. There was almost universal approval of this proposal on these occasions. We accepted it, as indeed we had to, because we believed in the essential soundness of that proposal.

Personally I have no doubt that that was and is the right decision. So far as our Government is concerned, we are entirely bound by it and if people do not approve of it, it is open to them to change the Government by constitutional processes.

Constituted as I am, I am unable to think in terms of States living their separate lives. There have to be States of course for convenience of administration, but if people begin to think of States as something more important than the whole of India, then I am unable to agree. Nor do I understand the inherent right of the Gujarati speaking people or any other people to have a particular State. For convenience this may be done.

I need not tell you how distressed I have been at the violence committed in

1. JN Collection.
2. Prominent industrialist of Ahmedabad; President, Federation of the Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry, 1955-56.

Ahmedabad and the way our respected colleagues have been insulted.[3] Even Gandhiji's memory has not been spared.[4] So far as we are concerned, we hold to our old anchor and certainly we cannot submit to our national decisions being governed by violence in the streets or for Parliament to be coerced in any way.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

3. Protestors forcibly entered the Congress House in Ahmedabad on 8 August and set fire to a picture of Morarji Desai, Chief Minister. Houses of several other Congress leaders were also attacked.
4. On 10 August, demonstrators stoned the Gandhi Ashram in the Ellis Bridge area of Ahmedabad. This was the first ashram Mahatma Gandhi established after his return from South Africa.

14. To Narayan R. Modi[1]

New Delhi
August 27, 1956

Dear Shri Modi,

I have your letter of the 24th August. You have said many things in it which I cannot deal with at length. But there are one or two matters which I wish to make clear.

2. You say that I had been feeding the hope of the Gujaratis for the establishment of a separate linguistic State for them. I do not know how you say this, because I am entirely opposed to the idea of linguistic State as such and I have always said that. Throughout this argument I have expressed my views repeatedly in favour of a composite State of Bombay. It is true that there are what might be called linguistic States in India, partly due to circumstance and geography and partly to other developments which I could not counter. The point is, I have been quite sure in my mind, that the only right solution for Gujarat, Maharashtra and Bombay City was to form a composite State and I have been pressing for it

1. JN Collection.

throughout. I did not agree with the Maharashtra demand, nor did I ever agree with the counter Gujarati demand. Both seemed to me narrowminded, parochial approaches which ignored the larger conception of Indian citizenship and India's unity. For my part, I would prefer living in a composite State than in a unilingual State.

3. While this was my general view previously, it has become much more accentuated by recent developments in India, which have shown the power of linguism and how it rouses people's passions. I am quite sure that this is detrimental to the future of India.

4. Shri Deshmukh's resignation or his subsequent support of the bilingual formula had nothing to do with subsequent developments in Parliament, except in so far as he might have influenced some Maharashtrians. What had very much to do with this matter was the fact that a vast number of Members of Parliament from all over India expressed their views with great vigour on this subject. This was not a Party issue. In fact, this was originated by some leading members of the Praja Socialist Party and some Independent Members of Parliament.[2] It met with favour, however, with a very great majority of Members of Parliament.

5. It may be said that people from other States have no right to express an opinion about matters relating to Gujarat or Maharashtra. That argument cannot be accepted so long as Gujarat and Maharashtra are integral parts of India. Naturally the views of Gujarat and Maharashtra are important, but the other views cannot be ignored, more especially when an issue has become one of all-India importance. Both as Leader of the Lok Sabha and as Leader of my own Congress Party, I could not bypass or ignore the views of an overwhelming number of Members of Parliament. You will please remember that finally when the States Reorganization Bill was passed by the Lok Sabha and also when it was passed by the Rajya Sabha,[3] not one single dissentient voice was raised. Such remarkable unanimity in regard to an important and controversial measure is unique.

6. The Bill has been passed by both Houses of Parliament and will be the law of the land after the technical permission of the President.[4]

7. How some Congressmen or some policemen behaved in Ahmedabad, I cannot say. It may be that they behaved wrongly. Nor can I blame individual

2. Asoka Mehta of the Praja Socialist Party proposed in the Lok Sabha on 2 August that a bilingual Bombay state be formed. He claimed to have the support of the Praja Socialist leader J.B. Kripalani, S.K. Patil, and the Independent member, Tulsidas Kilachand.
3. The Rajya Sabha passed the Bill on 25 August.
4. The Bill received the President's assent on 31 August 1956.

students or any individuals, as I have no personal knowledge. As for the student body as a whole, I seldom blame them even if they have, in my opinion, committed a wrong thing. But I do claim the right to tell them that they have erred.

8. I have had a high opinion of the students of Gujarat. Undoubtedly that opinion has suffered a shock. That does not mean that I think that they are a bad lot. I do not think so, but I do think that many of them are swept away too easily by their feelings and become the tools of others for the time being. Whether it is the students or others, the idea of participating in violence in order to bring pressure on Parliament is entirely foreign to any conception of democracy or peaceful government. Ultimately it may lead to civil war. The people of two adjoining States may have different opinions about some matter relating to a piece of territory or to a boundary. Both sides may get excited about this and conflict may result. Normally these questions are decided by the elected representatives of the people in Parliament and elsewhere. If their decision is wrong, there are normal processes to try to change that decision. The acceptance of violent demonstrations is a negation of the democratic process. I am not aware of any country, apart from some very backward ones, whether that country is communist, socialist or capitalist, where such things occur.

9. The story of what happened in Ahmedabad last evening[5] at the meeting addressed by Shri Morarji Desai indicates what some people at least in Ahmedabad are capable of. Who they were, I do not know. There was no police on that occasion and a very large meeting was continuously stoned. This seems to me quite extraordinary behaviour for any person with a measure of sanity or decency.

10. If national issues are to be decided in this way in the streets, then why have Parliaments and the like? People go back to the law of the jungle.

11. You ask me if my blood boiled when I was a student in England when I heard of political atrocities in India. I do not pretend to be a model person and I am reputed to have a short temper. But during the last forty years in India I have personally seen many things and participated in them, which were far worse than the occurrences in India when I was a student in England. Many things angered me greatly, but I did not raise my hand or hit anybody, because that was a lesson I had learnt.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

5. During a public meeting held on 26 August and attended by some 50,000 people, a section of the crowd stormed the dais. Afterwards, they stoned vehicles and pedestrians. One person died when the police fired on the rioters.

II. STATES

(i) Delhi

1. To Gurmukh Nihal Singh[1]

New Delhi
July 26, 1956

My dear Chief Minister,[2]

Our Health Minister, Rajkumari Amrit Kaur, has written to me on the Prohibition policy which is being pursued by the Delhi State Government.[3] I do not know much about this. We are all, of course, in favour of Prohibition,[4] but there is always one danger in pursuing a policy of Prohibition. We might encourage illicit distillation and bootlegging. That remedy is worse than the disease.

The Health Minister has also laid stress on this matter, and she says that already some illicit distillation has begun and bootleggers are waiting for the final ban in order to increase this illicit distillation.

I hope that your Government will keep this aspect fully in view. It is better to go a little slowly and lay the foundations on a firm policy rather than create fresh evils. It was because of this reason that the Planning Commission, after long discussion, felt that no rigid line should be laid down and progress should be firm, even though slow.[5]

1. JN Collection.
2. Gurmukh Nihal Singh, Chief Minister of Delhi.
3. With a view to banning the production and distribution of liquor in the Delhi state, the Delhi Government decided on 20 July to issue bar licenses to eight clubs which had attached bars. So far these clubs had unrestricted rights to serve alcoholic drinks.
4. For Nehru's views on prohibition expressed on 17 April 1956, see *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 32, pp. 588-589.
5. The Planning Commission stated in the Second Five Year Plan, published in 1956, that a national policy on prohibition had to take into account such factors as enforcement measures, sanction of public opinion and voluntary work of social service agencies. It also pointed out that there was "practical advantage in each state government approaching the problem in terms of phased programmes setting out specific targets to be achieved."

You might, therefore, discuss this matter with your Government so as to avoid taking any steps which lead to wrong results.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

2. To Swaran Singh[1]

New Delhi
July 26, 1956

My dear Swaran Singh,[2]
My attention has been drawn to what appears to be profiteering and speculation in land in Delhi. I am informed that all the land on the Ring Road from Vinay Nagar to the Medical Enclave on both sides of the road has been bought up by the Chairman of the Delhi Improvement Trust, Dr Gopi Chand Bhargava, K.P.S. Menon,[3] Datar Singh,[4] Sanwal,[5] Shankar Prasad[6] and a number of other senior officers of the Central Government as well as some businessmen. The land was originally bought about a year or two ago, it is stated, from four annas to a rupee per square yard. It is now being sold in small lots at eight rupees per square yard. This does seem to me rather extravagant profit.

What is specially to be noted is that senior officers of government are involved in this business. Of all persons, surely, the Chairman of the Delhi Improvement Trust should not make money in this way.

Will you please enquire.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. File No. 28(30)/56-57-PMS.
2. Minister for Works, Housing & Supply.
3. India's Ambasssador to the USSR, Hungary and Poland between 1952 and 1961.
4. Development Adviser for Kashmir, Government of India, 1955-59.
5. Keshav Dat Sanwal (b. 1907); educated at Lucknow University and Roorkee; specialist in irrigation engineering; Chief (Irrigation), Planning Commission.
6. Chairman of Indian Airlines and Air India International, 1954 -58.

3. To Mir Mushtaq Ahmed[1]

New Delhi
July 27, 1956

My dear Mushtaq Ahmed,
Your letter of the 26th July.[2]

I do not think that any democratic values are in peril in Delhi. You can rest assured that every care will be taken about Delhi. In fact, we are giving thought to this matter.

Democracy does not necessarily consist in a large number of local assemblies.[3] Suppose there was a unitary Constitution for India, that would not mean that democracy had ceased to exist in India.

We are so over-burdened with work at the present moment that it has not been easy to deal with every matter at the same time.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. Mir Mushtaq Ahmed Papers, NMML.
2. Mir Mushtaq Ahmed, a Congress member of the Delhi Assembly who joined the Congress Party in 1956 after resigning from the PSP, contended that granting the Union Territory status to Delhi under the plan for states' reorganization would deprive the state of its legislature. Such a move, he wrote, would leave "a gap to be filled at the mercy of the iron framework of administration." The Delhi state was formed in 1951 by an Act of Parliament.
3. Mushtaq Ahmed, in his reply on 2 August, said that India's own political development and anti-imperialist struggle suggested that real democracy had come to mean that there should be a large number of local assemblies. "That is why our Constitution is based on [the] federal principle and [the] unitary form of government has been rejected as unsuited to Indian conditions".

4. Bomb Explosion near the Jama Masjid[1]

The explosion of the bomb near the Jama Masjid yesterday,[2] leading to the death and injury of many, is, as you will no doubt appreciate, a very serious affair. I gather that this is the fourth incident of this kind.[3] The previous ones did not attract much attention because they did not do much damage and perhaps people thought that they were just meant to frighten them. This last incident has, I am told, made the people round about there rather panicky, for the time being at least, especially Muslims.

2. I gather that all these incidents occurred in predominantly Muslim *mohallas* except the Tazia incident which took place when it was passing through some other *mohalla*. The area near Jama Masjid has been more than once the scene of such occurrences. Yesterday's bomb outrage was peculiarly disgraceful and despicable because it was thrown at a queue standing before a cinema. The actual deaths were chiefly of Hindus though Muslims were injured. Obviously a bomb thrower of this type cannot distinguish. It is possible that the Jama Masjid area was chosen because it might attract more attention both nationally and internationally.

3. I realize that it is not an easy matter for an individual miscreant who throws a bomb, usually in the dark, to be caught. It is a difficult piece of work for the police. Nevertheless, it is obviously the duty of the police to try to do something effective about this matter. The police force in Delhi has grown very greatly in the past few years. These incidents brought no credit to it, and there is a definite feeling that the Delhi Police is not up to the mark so far as these matters are concerned. Something has, therefore, to be done to indicate that the police and our Intelligence are wide awake and doing their best. It appears desirable that some special high class officer, perhaps from the Centre, might be directed to investigate these matters. Mere indiscriminate arrests will do no good, and might even frighten people all the more.

1. Note to the Home Minister, 25 August 1956. JN Collection.
2. Around 9 p.m. on 24 August, a bomb exploded outside Jagat cinema, killing three persons and injuring thirty-one.
3. The three earlier explosions also occurred in the Jama Masjid area.

(ii) Punjab

1. To Partap Singh Kairon[1]

New Delhi
August 26, 1956

My dear Partap Singh,[2]
Your letter of August 24.

So far as the seven demands of the Arya Pradeshik Pratinidhi Sabha are concerned, some are quite easy for us to accept. In fact, there is no question of our accepting some demands; we should do that ourselves.

Thus, all Government notifications should be bilingual at the District level and I would say even beyond the District level wherever necessary. Secondly, any application or letter can be in either Punjabi or Hindi and should be answered in that script.

I do not understand why it should be compulsory for office records to be kept in two scripts. That is merely adding to expenses and trouble.

As for Hindi replacing English at all levels of administration, this is not a Punjab question but an all-India question. Hindi will gradually replace English, but obviously it cannot do so for some time to come without grave detriment to the efficiency of administration.

When we decided that Punjabi and Hindi are both State languages of Punjab, both have to be learnt in schools. This merely means two scripts because the language is not very different. It involves no great labour on anybody. It would not be proper to make the learning of either language as voluntary. In fact this might very well hit Hindi more than Punjabi. The question may well be as to the particular stage when the second language is taught. That may be considered from the educational point of view.

The medium of instruction, broadly speaking, cannot be left to the choice of parents for each individual. To some extent, our principle is that subject to convenience a child should be taught in its mother tongue and I take it that the parents decide what the mother tongue is.

1. JN Collection.
2. Chief Minister of Punjab.

I might add that compulsory teaching of English in our secondary classes appears to me essential.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

2. To Partap Singh Kairon[1]

New Delhi
August 31, 1956

My dear Partap Singh,

I wrote to you the other day,[2] in answer to your letter, and said something about the language controversy in the Punjab. I should like to add that I think it is important that you should recognize in some way or other the Urdu language in the Punjab. I do not suggest that you should make it a State language. But, you might say that applications and letters in Urdu will be accepted and replied in the same language. Also, that, where a sufficient number of pupils want to study Urdu, arrangements will be made. This, indeed, is according to our rules.

Urdu is not a matter of controversy in the Punjab, and it will be a good gesture, welcomed by many, if you say something about it.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. JN Collection.
2. See the preceding item.

III. THE NAGA INSURGENCY

1. Limitations of the Military Approach[1]

You were good enough to write to me yesterday about the sad incident which resulted in the death of Dr Haralu[2] near Kohima. I was much shocked to learn of this. I have now seen the report submitted by Brigadier Sen,[3] Judge Advocate General, to the Chief of the Army Staff[4] and the note on it by the COAS.

2. I am glad that the Chief of the Army Staff proposes to take effective action to punish those who have been found guilty. This is the least we can do.

3. I am much troubled by this occurrence. It has far-reaching political consequences. Apart from this, it brings out some very unpleasant aspects about the behaviour of some of our men in our Army, including some officers. Our Army has a proud record of (sic) not only of courage but of good behaviour. It maintained this record in the operations in Kashmir. An incident like the one resulting in the death of Dr Haralu and the subsequent attempt to cover this up leaves a bad mark in this record. We must therefore try by our action to remedy this and to prevent any such occurrence in the future.

4. Ever since the beginning of the operations in the Naga Hills District, I have been laying stress on our Army making friends with the Nagas and trying to win them over. I have reminded them repeatedly that the Nagas are our fellow citizens and not enemies. If any of them behave in a hostile manner, then of course they have to be dealt with by force wherever necessary. But it should always be remembered that these people are our countrymen and they should be made to feel so. It was thus of paramount importance that our Army authorities should keep this in mind and insist on our soldiery acting up to these instructions. Otherwise even our friends among the Nagas would be forced to become our

1. Note to K.N. Katju, Defence Minister, 24 July1956. JN Collection.
2. The Government of India expressed, in a statement on 5 July, its "deep regret" over the death of N. Haralu, a 75 year old medical practitioner, "who was, accidentally killed [by the Indian Army] on the outskirts of Kohima due to mistaken identity".
3. D.M. Sen, Judge Advocate-General, Indian Army, 1948-57.
4. S.M. Shrinagesh.

enemies[5] and our own difficulties would increase greatly.

5. We have seen what has happened in Malaya where a relatively small hostile force can hold up large armies with aircraft because it has the goodwill of the population and is aided by it.[6] It is now increasingly recognized that the problem of Malaya cannot be adequately dealt with by military measures alone.[7] A political approach is necessary to win over, if not the insurgents, then at least those who aid them from the civil population.

6. I do not mean to imply that the Naga trouble is of the same quality or extent as that in Malaya. But there are points of comparison and we should learn from them.

7. We had some trouble in the Telengana area of Hyderabad State.[8] We dealt with that much more effectively and rapidly than what the British did in Malaya.

8. Apart from the practical difficulties that we may face in the Naga Hills, this continuing conflict does us little credit in the international sphere and much is made out of it by those who are not friendly to us.

9. I recognize fully the inherent difficulties of the situation in the Naga Hills. Nevertheless, I have a feeling that we have not acted effectively and indeed that we have not even come to grips with the situation. I think that we shall have to give much more thought to it from both the military and the political points of view. Wherever necessary, we should change the set-up and our plan of approach.

5. On 14 July, the Foreign Secretary, Subimal Dutt, cabled to Nehru in Germany that "loyalist Nagas who have suffered both at the hands of the rebels and as a result of army action, continue to be sullen." Dutt said that, according to the Director, Intelligence Bureau, the overall situation in the Naga hills had deteriorated, despite Kohima having been cleared of the hostiles. The Director had also warned of possible attacks on administrative centres like Wokna and Mokokchung.
6. In January 1948, the Malayan Races Liberation Army (MRLA), formed by the Communist Party of Malaya, began a guerilla movement against the British colonial government. By 1951, the MRLA expanded to its peak strength of 10,000 and the British forces also increased to 90,000. In an attempt to isolate the villagers from the guerrillas, the British introduced the policy of grouping of villages, as part of a larger military strategy, to suppress the insurgency. But it led to the government's unpopularity.
7. The British began addressing the political and economic grievances of the Malay population under the leadership of Gerald Templer, who was appointed High Commissioner in January 1952. Templer encouraged the formation of an Alliance Party under Tunku Abdul Rahman, and promised early elections to the Legislature and independence to follow. The Alliance Party contested elections to the Legislature in 1955 and won all but one seat.
8. The Communist Party of India launched mass movements in various parts of India in 1948-49, the symbol of this struggle being Telengana, where local communists liberated two districts and set up their own administration. The struggle was called off in 1951.

It does not seem good enough to carry on indefinitely in a manner which does not promise any speedy results.

10. I should like, therefore, the Defence Minister to consider this aspect in consultation with the Chief of Staff. After that, some of the members of the Defence Committee might meet informally for this purpose.

11. The larger political issues will have to be considered separately. But one aspect of them appears to me important. This is the association of civil officers with Army columns on the march. These military columns cannot be expected to be acquainted with the Naga customs or habits nor can they easily distinguish between friends and hostile people. A civil officer with knowledge can therefore be of much help and also prevent undesirable accidents.

12. This note might be shown to the Chief of Army Staff.

2. The Functioning of the Army[1]

I wrote a note[2] to the Defence Minister almost immediately after my return to Delhi about the situation in the Naga Hills. This note was occasioned more especially by the shocking news of the killing of Dr Haralu. I was glad to find that the Army Headquarters are taking strong and effective action to punish those guilty of this killing, and are transferring some regiments from those areas.

2. I have been giving more thought to this matter and today I saw Miss N. Haralu,[3] the daughter of Dr Haralu, who is employed in the Ministry of External Affairs. She gave me copies of two letters she had received from two brothers of hers. One of these brothers is Yao Haralu,[4] who is an APO in the NEFA. These letters were written under considerable stress of emotion. Nevertheless, there was some restraint in them. A detailed account was given in them about the killing of Dr Haralu, and other instances were also mentioned where such killing had taken place. It appeared from these letters that our Army, or at any rate some parts of it, are getting a very bad reputation there. It was stated that the

1. Note to the Defence Minister, 25 July 1956. JN Collection.
2. See the preceding item.
3. N.N. Haralu, Information officer, MEA, 1955-58.
4. T. 'Yao' Haralu, of the Indian Frontier Administrative Service. During the 1962 border war with China, he was Political Officer in the Lohit Frontier Division.

Army is in a state of disorganization and that the present A.Q. Brigade Commander is chiefly responsible for this disorganization. When there was the attack near Kohima,[5] a report was immediately made to the Deputy Commissioner[6] who did not believe it or attach importance to it. Thereupon, the persons making this report went to the Brigadier who was still sleeping. He was very angry that he had been disturbed. It is stated that the local public are publicly saying that soldiers have been sent to Kohima to fight hostiles and not to sleep late in the morning even when the enemy had already occupied the village.

3. The Deputy Commissioner is described as a person who is no good at all and who ignores complaints, suggestions, representations and intelligence that reach him, and that there is strong feeling against him. The GOC[7] also is not spoken of in complimentary terms.

4. In a letter which I have just seen, from the Governor of Assam[8] to the Home Minister, reference is made to information received about our Army burning villages and shooting people, including women, who are running away to the jungles. This has had a bad effect on the Aos. Even the houses of certain persons whose loyalty is unquestioned, were burnt by the Army though it was asked to spare these houses. Certain instances of needless killing of innocent persons are also mentioned.

5. Many of these reports may well be exaggerated. But the mere fact that they are widely believed has itself considerable importance. There are reports also, which may or may not be true, about cases of rape. Many young Aos signed a pledge with their blood that they would fight on the side of Phizo[9] to the last ditch. In fact, we appear to be succeeding in alienating even those elements among the Nagas who were opposed to Phizo and who wanted to side with us.

6. At the same time, there is no evidence whatever that we have made any marked progress from the purely military point of view. Thus, we appear to be failing both in the military sphere and in the psychological approach.

7. I was told that, as soon as the rains stop, rapid progress will be made in ending this trouble. I am beginning to doubt this. The terrain is difficult, hilly and heavily wooded, and the difficulties that our Army face will not be any the less after the rains stop. Our main obstacle is the jungle and not the rains.

5. The Naga extremists ambushed a convoy of trucks on the Dimapur-Imphal road on 11 June 1956. Again, on 13 June, six civilians were killed in Kohima. See *Selected Works*, (second series), Vol. 33, p. 201.
6. S.J.D. Carvalho.
7. R.K. Kochhar, General Officer Commanding of the NEFA and the Naga Hills.
8. S. Fazl Ali.
9. A.Z. Phizo, leader of the Naga rebels and President, Naga National Council.

8. We have, therefore, to consider afresh our entire approach to this question. The first thing to remember is that such a rising cannot be suppressed by purely military methods. We must have the goodwill and support of at least part of the population. If our military methods make even this population hostile to us, then we have failed. I shall again refer to the example of Malaya where the largest of armies with air support, have failed completely in dealing with a hostile population, although the actual insurgents are small in number.

9. We have definitely to aim not only at getting the goodwill of the Nagas but also of employing them in meeting this rising. This may sometimes involve some risk. The risk has to be taken.

10. A proposal was made that young Nagas should be trained by us and used for jungle warfare. I think this should be given serious consideration.

11. Our Army must be definitely told not to burn villages and to be exceedingly careful in shooting down individuals who might be innocent.

12. Our whole strategy must be reconsidered because what has been done thus far has not succeeded and it is not wise to continue doing something which has produced no results. Indeed, the actual results have gone against us. The hostiles increase in numbers and probably in ability to meet our people.

13. We cannot deal with this Naga rising in a casual way. I have been surprised to read somewhere that when the trouble occurred near Kohima, the GOC was in Shillong attending some social functions and that he did not come back to Kohima for three days after that. This kind of a thing does not indicate any awareness of responsibility or of the needs of the situation. We cannot afford to be soft in such matters and those who have not come up to expectations will have to be replaced by others. In effect, the whole reputation of the Indian Army is at stake, apart from the larger political consequences that we may have to face.

14. I am only noting down some odd points in my mind. There are many others. We shall have to consider the whole political background also and, if necessary, make radical changes in the administration of the Naga Hills. Every Naga that I have ever met wants the Naga Hills district to be placed under Central administration. I realize that this is a complicated matter and cannot easily be done. But we cannot shirk thinking about it.

15. I think that the present Deputy Commissioner of Kohima should be transferred, and someone who has some understanding of the Nagas should be placed there. I think also that more Naga officers should be employed there as was done in the Tuensang Division with success.

16. I am sending this note to the Defence Minister, with copies to the Home Minister and to the Governor of Assam. This is really meant to encourage thinking. In the course of the next few days, we should confer together in Delhi about these matters.

3. To S. Fazl Ali[1]

New Delhi
August 7, 1956

My dear Fazl Ali,[2]
Thank you for your letter of August 4th, which I have read with care and interest. I am replying to it rather briefly.

I have little doubt in my mind that the steps thus far taken on our part in the Naga Hills District have not been satisfactory. They have indicated little understanding of the problem, and our military folk have functioned in a conventional way in wholly unconventional surroundings. What distresses me is even the lack of trying to think more originally. Their sole refuge is to ask for more and more forces.

As you perhaps know, Sant Singh[3] is officiating for our COS Shrinagesh, who has gone to England for some weeks. In Sant Singh's place, Thimayya[4] is being appointed. Thimayya will continue to remain there even after Shrinagesh comes back. I have had a fairly long talk with Thimayya in Poona recently and I shall meet him again before he goes to Shillong. He is a man both of experience and ideas. When I talked to him in Poona, his mind darted about thinking of new ways and means of meeting this particular situation. He will, of course, see you and the Chief Minister,[5] when he comes to Shillong, which I hope will be very soon. I want to give him a free hand about changing his subordinates and in most other matters. . . .

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. JN Collection. Extracts.
2. Governor of Assam.
3. General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Eastern Command.
4. K.S. Thimayya, General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Southern Command.
5. Bisnuram Medhi.

4. To M.K. Vellodi[1]

New Delhi
August 7, 1956

My dear Vellodi,[2]

I am enclosing a letter from the Governor of Assam, in original. You will see that everyone is expecting some big attack on the 15th August from the hostile Nagas. Possibly, Kohima will be attacked, and Mokakchung. We have had a fair warning. If, even so, we are not fully prepared to meet this, then our Army and its officers are not much good. I think this should be made perfectly clear to those concerned.

There are some other matters too in the Governor's letter, such as roads, communications, etc.[3] Is somebody looking after these?

I should like Thimayya to go as soon as possible to Shillong.[4] I have told him that every personal or other consideration must be subordinated to the major issue that we have to face in the Naga Hills. If any of the present officers there have to be changed, this should be done without delay.

Please send me back the Governor's letter.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. JN Collection.
2. Defence Secretary.
3. Fazl Ali, in his letter of 4 August, emphasized the need for constructing new roads in the NEFA. This, he added, "will not only improve the present communications which is rather important from the point of view of the Army but also engage a large number of villagers." Fazl Ali contended that the Assam Government would not be able to undertake the construction of roads without substantial central assistance.
4. Thimayya arrived in Shillong on 10 August to assess the situation.

5. To Bisnuram Medhi[1]

New Delhi
August 12, 1956

My dear Medhi,

There are many subjects on which I want to write to you. But I have been so overwhelmingly busy that I have been unable to do so. For the moment, I am writing to you about your letter of August 2nd, in which you have dealt with the question of the ropeway from Shella to Cherrapunji, Shillong and Pandu. There can be no doubt of the need of this ropeway and the advantages which will accrue from it. I am sending your letter to the Deputy Chairman, Planning Commission, for a further consideration of this matter.[2] But I know the Planning Commission's difficulties. We have extended ourselves to the utmost, and there are grave risks and dangers ahead. If we are not careful now about our expenditure and foreign exchange, we may be landed in very serious difficulties. . . .

You have been writing to me about the refinery being situated in Assam. I have already told you that all of us are very anxious to have this refinery in Assam, and that we are trying our best for this. But we cannot be sure because of technical and like difficulties. You will agree that this aspect which is so important, cannot be ignored.

Lt- General Thimayya has gone to Shillong and Kohima and will be now in overall charge of the Naga situation. He is our ablest and most experienced commander in the field. Although he has no knowledge of Assam and these tribal areas, he has a good deal of knowledge of jungle warfare in the course of the last world war. I am sure that he will bring fresh ideas. After a few days' survey there, he will come back to discuss matters with us again.

I find that demands continue to come to us for more and more troops. Whatever troops are necessary will, of course, be sent, but I am quite sure that this is not

1. JN Collection. Extracts.
2. Forwarding Medhi's letter to V.T. Krishnamachari, the Deputy Chairman, Planning Commission, Nehru observed: "Assam is not only an undeveloped and backward area, but one that suffers from a complex about being neglected. They are now excited not only about this ropeway but about the proposed oil refinery also, and I hope we shall be able to do something for them."

the way to deal with such a situation.[3] What is necessary is an intelligent approach to the problem both from the military and the political points of view, and not merely adding on to troops. . . .

My own view is, and it has become confirmed with more thinking, that we must utilize more and more Nagas in the Naga Hills. We should utilize them in various ways—as officials wherever we can appoint them, as a group advising our military forces, and even as troops. There may be some risks about it, but it is far better to take these risks than to take the other major risk of not using them.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

3. Nehru wrote to Medhi on 13 August that in dealing with a military situation it was "very bad tactics to spread out one's forces all over in an attempt to give protection to everybody from a raid. We have to take the risk of raids and go for the heart of the matter." He observed that the larger the army, the more static it becomes and more difficult to function with speed. He preferred smaller forces "capable of quick action and movement."

6. The Need to Win Over the Nagas[1]

Jawaharlal Nehru: Mr Deputy Speaker,[2] Sir, I have welcomed this debate in this House on the situation in the Naga Hills; not that that situation from a military point of view is a very grave one but because it is essentially the kind of problem in which the House and Parliament should take interest.

Now, it has been repeated many times that this should be treated as a human problem; some honourable Members have said: as a political problem and not as a military problem. Well, if we had treated it as a military problem only, probably, the results should have been quite different. It is because we have not

1. Speech in the Lok Sabha, 23 August 1956. *Lok Sabha Debates*, Vol. VII, Part II, 1956, cols 4224-4242.
2. Sardar Hukam Singh.

treated it as a purely military problem, it is because we have issued all kinds of instructions, restrictions, limitations and inhibitions to our Army and to the others not to treat it as a military problem that from the military point of view progress is not being as fast as it should have been. I believe that if we had treated it in a military way and did not succeed in winning the goodwill and cooperation of the Nagas, we would have failed utterly. There can, and there should be no thought that you can deal with a problem like this, or that you should deal with it, in the sense of merely by force of arms suppressing the people. That is not our attitude.

I should like this House to remember that they should look at this in the larger context of our general policy in these areas, not only in the Naga Hills but in the NEFA area and roundabout areas. Many of these areas, for the first time, were brought under some kind of administration during the last six, seven or eight years. Vast areas have been brought under some kind of administration. I do submit to this House that they will probably not find a parallel of this kind of administrative system spreading out so peacefully and with very few incidents. Why was that so? Because we have issued strict injunctions and directions, saying that we have to win over the people and that we have to seek their cooperation. We have to build, whatever we do, on their goodwill. There have been incidents, but very, very few.

There has been one major incident which, the House might remember, was a little over three years ago.[3] In Auchinmore, in the NEFA area, in October, 1953, an officer of ours, with a number of troops, was going there, not to shoot or kill but for normal patrol work and inspection work. They were suddenly attacked, most unsuspectingly. The poor person was making a cup of tea in his camp, and the others were putting up tents. What was the result? 70 persons were killed—40 porters and 30 army personnel. It is a large number. This kind of thing naturally and normally produces strong reactions in a government. But I doubt if any government in the wide world would have dealt with the situation in the way we did. I must say that when we first heard of this incident, it made us rather angry. It made our Army, naturally, a little angry. It was not just fighting, but it was sheer cold-blooded murder—people coming and suddenly surrounding peaceful people who were sitting down, and killing them in large numbers. Yet, immediately, we recovered from the first shock and surprise and anger, and naturally we took steps to send our forces there. But we told our forces that they must realize who those people are. It is no good going about killing them and

3. See *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 24, pp. 307-310.

burning their villages. Some honourable Member suggested that the normal thing in British times was to go and burn the villages. Of course, bombing does not kill anybody there because they are not living in concentrated quarters. So, it was said that you can simply burn their villages. But we said, 'No'. The place was very much interior and it was very difficult to reach the areas. It was not plain. We refrained from doing that. We took enormous trouble and after weeks of trail, some of our forces got there. It took us months and months to deal with the situation. We did deal with it and we dealt with it essentially in a peaceful way and ultimately we captured the people who were supposed to be guilty, but we handed them over to the tribal councils to judge.

I mentioned this incident of nearly three years ago to show how we have approached these matters. This particular incident has nothing to do with the Nagas as such. I am merely saying that we issue instructions to the forces, to the civilian officers and to our Army, to deal with the situation in a peaceful way.

Last year, there was some trouble in the Tuensang area which is largely a Naga area.[4] Now, it is all very well for the honourable Members, Shri K.K. Basu and Shri Kamath, to say, "You must deal with it in a human way. Why do you send the army?" But then, what exactly is to be done when other people start killing? Do we send them messages of goodwill, or do we try to stop the killing? We got messages from the population of that area, asking for help. We got messages from the villagers and we got messages from the Government employees, teachers and others, saying "Protect us". What are we to do? Should we not give them protection? This happened in the Tuensang area. We had to send some of our forces with some rifles and the rest, quietly, without much fuss. Of course, it was easy enough to treat or deal with it differently, by military action or by the Army. But we proceeded rather slowly, because we had the object of winning them over and not merely crushing them. Of course, we had to shoot some because they shot at us, but that is a different matter. So the Tuensang problem was solved within a few months without too much fuss.

Now, when fighting was taking place in the Tuensang area, the Naga Hills were relatively quiet. That is, there was no major incident or acts of violence. There might have been some smaller incidents. At that time, Phizo had come to see the Governor and the Chief Minister of Assam.[5] Actually, he issued statements, more or less mentioning his adherence to non-violence. But we found that while he said so and actually issued notices, he was actually organizing for violence, at the same time. There is no doubt about it. It is absolutely true. He

4. See *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 29, pp. 131-132, and Vol. 30, pp. 283-284.
5. On 13 August 1955.

was encouraging the people and telling them that "I am doing this. It is a trick, just to give you greater chance to go ahead. Let us play this game here, and you carry on your activities there". This was the kind of thing they practised.

Now, I should like the honourable Members to have some idea of who the Nagas are. I should first like to say that the Nagas, correctly speaking, are not what might be called a tribe or one group of tribes closely tied to each other. I do not know when the word 'Naga' came to be used. I have an idea that it is a British word, that is, in the British times, that word was used. It may or may not be correct—I am sure. But their tribes are named differently—Acama, Ao and Angami. These are the names of major tribes. They do not call each other as Nagas. This is a word which you and I may use or the Britishers used. Perhaps, it was used rather in some kind of derision, because Naga means naked. It is quite likely that the Britishers used that word. But the biggest tribes are the Acama, Ao and Angami. If you go to this area, you will find that there is no common language, a common Naga language. Every few miles, over half a dozen villages, the language changes, or the dialect changes. You can hardly meet with one common language over a distant place, except in a broken kind of way.

Among the Nagas, of course there were, or there used to be, some tribes which might be called the dominant tribes, who are, militarily, stronger or tougher than others. The tribes which dominated the others received some tributes from the other tribes. So, there is a certain element of domination over the other tribes. There were some stronger tribes who claimed tributes, in the past, and if they did not get tributes, they took stronger action and stronger measures against the other tribes and forced them to pay tribute. This has been the position there. Then, our administration spread through in those areas.

Some figures about the Nagas might interest the honourable Members. I shall of course use the word 'Naga' as a generic term, because we are using this word in the records. The population at present all over the areas—not the Naga area alone—is a little over half a million. In the Naga Hills District, it is a little over two lakhs. In the Tuensang Frontier Division also, the population is slightly over two lakhs. In the Tirap Frontier Division, it is 50,000 and in the Manipur State, it is 80,000. So, the total is a little over 500,000 which is spread out. In the Naga Hills itself, it is a little over two lakhs.

Now, I confess that I heard about Nagas as such about 20 or 25 years ago, and I was rather attracted by what I had heard. Then came the case of that lady to which reference was made by Mr Kamath—Rani Gaidinliu—who, parenthetically, after suffering a long period of imprisonment, was released many years ago; and, I am glad to say that proper arrangements were made for her to

live in the house built for her—she built it herself and we gave her help[6] — and we made as much reparation as we could for the misdeeds of the previous Government. Although I became interested, I did not know much about the Nagas then.

Mr Jaipal Singh mentioned the sending of those people to see me.[7] Ever since then I have come into contact with them on a number of occasions. Mr Phizo and a number of his colleagues met me here; they met me twice.[8] There was one occasion to which reference has been made by Mr Keishing;[9] he said something about an incident[10] at Kohima, where, according to him, the Nagas came and were prevented from giving me an address, and therefore they became angry and walked away. The facts are not quite that. The facts are, I went to Kohima; to begin with, it was not a normal visit to Kohima. The Prime Minister of Burma had come over; flying across the frontier, he met me at Manipur, I think, and we were going to Burma a day or two later. I thought I might utilize that opportunity to go to Kohima. We went to Kohima and we relaxed. I suggested to the authorities there that some kind of a welcome might be given to the Burmese Prime Minister. He was our guest and the people gathered to say a few words. So, it was not a normal occasion on which I go there. What I found later was that the Nagas there wanted to read out an address to me. The Deputy Commissioner[11] told them, "You can hand it over to the Prime Minister afterwards; I cannot allow your reading it out to him at a meeting when the Prime Minister of Burma and others had come". So that, it is not correct to say that I refused to take the address. As a matter of fact, at Kohima on a previous occasion, a year before or so, I had actually met the Naga leaders—Mr Phizo was not there—discussed the matter with them and taken a long document from them just a year before. So, it is not true to say that I refused or even the Deputy Commissioner came in the way of the address being given to me. But, he did come in the way of that being read at the meeting. I did not know it at that time; I knew only later. Then, when U Nu and I arrived at the meeting place, these

6. Rani Gaidinliu, Naga freedom fighter, was imprisoned by the British. Nehru described her as the Rani of the Nagas. See *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 31, pp. 139-140.
7. Jaipal Singh, the Jharkhand Party member from Ranchi, claimed that "nearly ten years ago" he was "instrumental" in making Nehru and Phizo meet at Delhi.
8. A five-member delegation met Nehru at Tezpur in December 1951. On 11 March 1952, a three-member delegation met him in New Delhi. See *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 17, pp. 383-384 and p. 386.
9. Rishang Keishing, member of the Lok Sabha from Manipur.
10. See *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 21, pp. 165-166. Also see Vol. 33, p. 176.
11. S.N. Barkataki.

Nagas who were present, about a hundred or maybe a thousand, got up and walked away. I was very distressed at this, not because of me, but here I had taken the Prime Minister of Burma, an honoured guest of ours, and for him to be treated so discourteously hurt me very much.

Now, much has been said. Mr Basu talked about the atrocities of the military and Mr Kamath about Cypriots and Kenyans. I do not know what justification they have for using this language; or, it was merely a phrase they are used to without much significance, I do not know. Then, Mr Keishing referred to the burning of villages and shooting down of people. Obviously, in military operations and the rest, I cannot get up here and say that everything that is being done was as if we were sitting in a drawing room and that everything that was done can be justified completely. Sometimes mistakes are made. Sometimes, apart from mistakes, wrong things are done by individuals. That is a different matter. I do submit that mistakes have been made and one of the most regrettable mistakes which distressed us exceedingly has been in connection with the killing of Dr Haralu. Apart from this, his sons, as the honourable Member said, are important officers of ours—Assistant Political Officers here—and his daughter is serving with me in the External Affairs Ministry. It came to me as a tremendous shock when I came back—I was not here then—and we took immediate action in regard to it. We are taking action; in fact, courts of enquiry, etc., are carrying on the processes. Military processes, I believe, are fairly thorough, but they take a long time. Undoubtedly, we should punish those who are guilty. . . . I am not saying that wrong things are not being done there by individuals or groups, whether by civil authorities or by the military.[12] But, I do wish to remove this impression that our Army or anybody else there is just playing fast and loose with lives and with burning of villages and the rest. Apart from our instructions which are very strict, the General Officers Commanding and others have been constantly issuing instructions. Now, it is true that many villages have been burnt there. Our information is that a far greater part of the burning is done by the Naga hostiles. They themselves do it; that is our difficulty. Mr Jaipal Singh talks about more and more regiments or battalions to be sent there. It is true, but why do we send them? Principally, it is in order to protect the people who are being attacked. It is easy to attack; a group of 10, 20 or 30 persons can go about

12. After receiving an anonymous complaint through the deputy commissioner of Kohima, Nehru asked the Foreign Secretary on 19 August to refer to General Thimayya, for private enquiry, certain specific instances of alleged killing, rape and burning of villages by Army personnel. Nehru, however, had little doubt "that these are not true or at any rate not true in the manner stated."

and attack any village. But it is very difficult to send a garrison to every village. So, it is attempts of protection more than anything that has led to our sending troops in the Naga Hills as well as in the places adjoining them. So, I do submit that slight errors have been committed; most regrettable mistakes have been made. But, the general conduct of our forces there has been certainly better than any other similar operation that I know. I do believe that Mr Keishing is misled by reports he may receive, if I may say so, from Mr Phizo's publicity department, because I get them too and they are the most fantastic tales one can imagine; completely it has no relation to truth at all. These things are not sent to him only, but sometimes, not frequently, they are sent abroad to foreign newspapers in America and elsewhere.[13]

I said that Mr Keishing must have been affected by news emanating from Phizo's publicity department. I got the news too and many other Members get it. . . .

I do submit there are three types of burnings. Firstly, the Naga hostiles deliberately burn, because, after all, the tribes look at it from their point of view. They cannot, and any such group cannot, subsist for long unless they get help from the villages, unless they get food, money, etc., from the villages, if not out of loyalty, at least out of something imposed by fear. The result is they go about collecting money and food.

Now in the Tuensang Division there are at least one hundred defence societies of local people, Nagas and others, formed for the protection of villages from hostile Nagas and when the hostile Nagas come local people fight them. We have given some arms to those local people. So also—I do not know the number—to some extent in the Naga Hills it becomes rather a civil conflict between Nagas and Nagas and our information is that sometimes villages are burnt in this process. The figure of Mr Rishang Keishing may be correct, but I say that most of these villages have been burnt by the Naga hostiles themselves. Another way of burning is—after all they have only thatched roofs—when any kind of firing takes place between our forces and Naga forces, the firing itself sets fire to the villages. Maybe our firing sets fire to them. I believe that there were cases in the early days or some months back when, suspecting that some villages had been occupied by these hostiles, our armed forces either directly burned them or their firing burnt them. But that has been completely stopped, so far as our instructions are concerned. Where there is firing of this kind it is very easy for thatched villages to catch fire. As my honourable colleague reminds me, the Nagas fight, apart

13. Rishang Keishing pointed out that he had "never received anything from Mr Phizo regarding the figures which I have given."

from guns, with arrows with burning heads. This is a thing which particularly sets fire to thatched roofs.

I do not for a moment say that there have not been mistakes made by the civil or the military, errors committed; regrettable errors committed; but both our approach to this problem and to a large extent in the carrying out of our directions by the Army authorities have been rather remarkable for patience that is shown in the face of considerable provocation. I say provocation. Now any honourable Member can realize that it is very irritating to be sniped at, to get an arrow or gun shot suddenly while you are going along a road or passing through anywhere. Now it would be an easy enough problem to deal with armed forces, but the problem is of sniping, not everywhere, but at many places. This kind of thing is irritating. It makes an average soldier or civilian rather angry. Nevertheless, our instructions are: exercise patience, because we want to win over these people.

Even now in an increasing measure we are utilizing the cooperation of the Nagas. Quite apart from Naga officials and others, there are some Naga people in our Assam Rifles, some Naga regiments in our Army. I do not mean to say they have all been crowded up there; they are in various places. But our definite instructions are that they must seek the cooperation of the Nagas in every way and seek to make it clear to the hostiles and others that we have inevitably to meet them. We have to meet a person firing a gun at us with a gun.

I do not understand what Mr Basu and Mr Kamath meant when they suggested to us that we should treat it as a human problem—yes certainly—and withdraw our Army. I really am astonished that any person should make that suggestion, which means handing over large numbers of people there who have relied upon us for their protection, just, well, for their liquidation. . . . That will be an astonishing thing for anybody to do, whatever be the consequences. That obviously cannot be done.

So that, I submit that the broad approach that we have followed is very much on the lines of what several honourable Members have suggested. Apart from mistakes made here and there, we propose to continue to follow that approach.

The honourable Member—I think it was Mr Rishang Keishing— referred to the agreement which was made by the Naga National Council with Sir Akbar Hydari and Mr Bardoloi.[14] Now I do not accept his statement that that agreement

14. The nine-point agreement signed on 29 June 1947 between the Naga leaders and the then Governor of Assam, Akbar Hydari, broadly acknowledged the autonomy of the Nagas; Naga courts were to enjoy predominance vis-à-vis the application of central or provincial laws in matters of social beliefs and practices, civil and criminal cases, and alienation of land to non-Nagas.

has not been honoured. I do not accept that. He repeatedly said that it has been dishonoured. That agreement came up before the Constituent Assembly, or rather before the Special Committee of the Constituent Assembly. I was not in it. The whole of the Sixth Schedule[15] attached to the Constitution was largely drawn up keeping that in view. It may be that the Sixth Schedule as a whole was not an exact reproduction of the agreement. I was not in that committee. I cannot speak with authority as to what happened there. But the whole object was to give autonomy to those areas and to allow them, or to help them to live according to their own ways.

Now it may be that one may say that the Sixth Schedule as it ultimately emerged did not go far enough, or was not satisfactory enough. I can understand that argument. Let us then consider the Sixth Schedule; let us amend it; or let us do what we like with it. It is up to Parliament to do whatever it likes.

Throughout this period this question has been raised. It has been raised off and on in the last eight or nine years. It is not something sudden that has happened now. As I said, on three occasions I met Mr Phizo and at least once or maybe twice I have met other Naga leaders, that is to say, the colleagues of Mr Phizo. At least four times, or maybe five times, I have discussed this matter with them and pointed out to them that we are always prepared to consider any constructive proposal for amendment to the provision regarding these areas, but it is no good talking to me about independence. Certainly I have laid stress on that. It is no good talking to me about that. I consider it quite a fantastic idea for that little corner between China and Burma and India—a part of it is in Burma—being called an independent State.

Later it is true that when they wanted to see me certain conditions were attached. One of them was that I am not prepared to discuss independence. This was condition No. 1. The second was: you must give up violence. This was before this major violence and other things, when petty acts of violence were taking place. As a rule, I am prepared to meet anybody: [it] does not matter whether we agree or whether we disagree. But I was told that after each interview that I had had, the people went back and stated in those areas that they were going on the road to independence, because they met the Prime Minister. They go over the heads of the local government and local officials and generally try to strengthen their position there by reference to the interview they had with me. Their decision with regard to independence certainly came in my way. If they exploit interviews like that with me, should I encourage them? Even then I told them: I should be

15. The Sixth Schedule provided for central administration of the Naga areas through the Governor of Assam as the President's agent.

glad to meet you provided you make it clear that you do not demand independence. That is the position after I had met them four or five times in various places in various ways. Otherwise, there will be no difficulty in meeting them.

In fact, apart from me, the Governor—and the Governor of Assam, as you know, is our Special Agent, Government of India's Agent in regard to NEFA and the problems of NEFA and the problems of Naga Hills, although different, nevertheless, have a certain similarity and so the Governor has been taking great interest in these matters—often met the Naga leaders. He had a meeting with Phizo. The Chief Minister, last year, met him too, more than once I think. So, there has been every attempt on our part to meet them or to try to explain to them or to win them over from violence and all that. I do not mean to say that the Assam Government's policy or our Government's policy or every step that we took was absolutely correct or happy. We made mistakes, naturally. These petty mistakes do occur. But the whole objective before us was to win their minds and hearts and not to terrify them or frighten them. It is true, as some honourable Member has said some time back about this policy—what is called Assamization—perhaps it has been injudiciously pursued. But these are relatively minor things in this picture and the whole object was to deal with them directly, to establish conditions there which would lead to their progress and would allow them to lead their own lives without interference.

The one thing I was most anxious about was the establishment of basic schools there by their own people chiefly. As a matter of fact, a number of Naga boys had gone to Sabarmati to spend some years there and they go back as basic school teachers. We wanted them to establish schools there because I thought it would help them.

The second thing was the Community Projects. I thought these two things were more suited to that place and the Nagas themselves can work them with a little help from outside. Then there are the major schemes, of course, like communications, schools, etc. So, this has been our approach.

I have not referred to the military aspect. There is not very much to refer in it. But I will just say this. Our instructions to our military continue to be what I have just stated—that they must treat it as a human problem; and military cannot deal with a political problem. That is for us and we are prepared to deal with it and we do consider it as a political problem and a human problem, much less a military problem.

Then, some honourable Members referred to general amnesty. Yes, certainly there is the amnesty. There is a proclamation of amnesty. I do not understand this demand for general amnesty which some honourable Member has made. I do not know what he means by saying this should occur simultaneously as if

when there is a general amnesty automatically and spontaneously everybody surrenders.

Right at the beginning I have said that when amnesty was proclaimed there were some exceptions, exceptions I believe for persons who had committed murder or something. I have forgotten the phraseology; there were some exceptions. . . .

G.B. Pant: Heinous offence.

JN: Heinous offences or something. There is still that proposal for amnesty for whoever surrenders. Although the period expires from time to time, we extend it. In fact, there it is. So, there is no difficulty about it. We are not out to punish any individual or any group there. We want them to settle down because it is no pleasure for us to have to deal with this problem and certainly it is no pleasure to see the great majority of the people living there lead abnormal lives, for naturally they are afraid on the one side of Naga hostiles coming and making them pay up or otherwise extorting things from them and afraid on the other side of fighting that takes place roundabout or some accidents happening or their villages burning—all kinds of things happen and nobody likes this kind of thing. The sooner it is ended, the better.

Does any honourable Member expect Government to invite the leaders of the Naga National Council and treat them as the leaders of, well, a different State and have a treaty with them? What exactly is the meaning of that, I do not understand. We are prepared to talk to anybody but not about independence; that is the sole qualification. If they want to come, they can come. But if they do something in the wrong way, instead of discouraging them, should we encourage them? That is what we found in the past and that is our difficulty.

It is not a question of prestige. The Government of India's prestige does not come in dealing with the poor countrymen of ours. The Government of India is too big a thing for its prestige to suffer in these small ways.

There is the question of our not taking a step which is misunderstood, misinterpreted and which is criticized by our own colleagues among the Nagas, all those who are cooperating with us. Surely, the House will not expect us to betray all those Nagas who, in spite of difficulties, have cooperated with our officials and our civilians, who have looked to us for help and protection. We wish in the future more and more to bring in this element of cooperation with the Nagas there.

Now, with regard to the political aspect, an honourable Member said that Tuensang Division of the Naga Hills District should be made into a separate political entity. I think he added Tirap Frontier Track too. These are political problems which we can very well consider. But we cannot consider them in this particular context because that will require a change in our Constitution,

amendment, etc. If necessary, we shall change the Constitution and I have no doubt that the House will agree to change it provided the right conditions exist and in this matter, naturally, we have to consult the Assam Government.

We cannot simply brush it aside because the main thing is the well-being of the people who live there. It does not matter whether you have one unit or two units. They should have a feeling that they can lead their own lives and they should have autonomy and they should be proud of being citizens of India.

Now, Mr Jaipal Singh talked about diarchy, division of authority between the civilians and the military there. I do not know how far the present arrangements there have come in the way of efficient work. It was our desire not to go too far with the Army. That led us to send our Army in aid of the civilian power. It was easy enough to declare martial law or hand over the whole area to the military, but always we are thinking of not treating this as a purely military problem, the point that has been so much emphasized by honourable Members. So, we sent them in aid of the civil power. That is the present position. But, in effect, of course, the civil power functions in a very narrow way there; maybe in some centres it does, but in a very limited way. Naturally when the armed forces are functioning in the way they do and hostile elements are functioning, the civil power's activities are rather limited, but what the honourable Member Shri Jaipal Singh said is a matter worthy of consideration and we shall certainly consider it. I gather from my colleague the Home Minister that the chief function of the civil authorities there is really relief and rehabilitation. In fact, even the Army of course is doing that, and here I would say that the record of the Army and the civil authorities in regard to the building up of villages and giving relief is fairly creditable. It is an increasingly formidable record of help that they are giving.

Jaipal Singh: The armed forces could do any job a hundred times better than the civil administration, whether it is rehabilitation, building villages or houses or whatever it is. They are much better and more competent to deal with the situation.

JN: That may be so. Is the honourable Member referring to this relief and rehabilitation or everything?

Jaipal Singh: I am referring to everything in the light that the Naga situation is under discussion, not the whole of India. Anything I say relates to the Naga situation.

JN: I am inclined, if I may say so, to agree with the honourable Member that any kind of work of this type is likely to be handled much more efficiently by the Army than by the civil authority. . . .[16] They will do it and they will do it in

16. A member asked whether the Army would do a work of this kind "in a human manner".

a humane manner too. I have no doubt about that and, if I may say so, I was surprised to find that even in the field of the law the Court Martials of the Army are much more thorough than some of our civil courts. My colleague Dr Katju, who is an eminent lawyer apart from being Defence Minister, tells me that he is surprised to find the high quality of the law in the Army.

I have no doubt about that particular piece of work but—there is a big 'but' about it—in the short run that is good, in the long run that is not good. In the long run giving these activities to the Army produces certain results which may not be good, but that is not the fault of the Army.

One thing more. A proposal was made to send a parliamentary commission there. I must confess I do not quite understand what a parliamentary commission is going to do and where it is going to go. Wherever the commission goes, we will have to send a battalion round it to protect it, but I hope later a time may come when honourable Members of Parliament may be able to visit these areas.

7. To Bisnuram Medhi[1]

New Delhi
August 27, 1956

My dear Medhi,
Thank you for your letter of the 24th August which reached me today.

General Thimayya is here in Delhi. I have not seen him yet. I hope to do so soon and to discuss with him his own appraisal of the situation and what should be done. I still adhere to my opinion that large armed forces should not be maintained in the Naga Hills. Of course an adequate number have to be sent there or kept there, but a situation like this is not met by numbers but by techniques. I do not think those different techniques have been employed satisfactorily yet. I hope in future we shall do so.

I am not greatly worried about the military aspect of this problem, although it naturally is a matter of concern to me. What is much more important is how we succeed in winning over this area and its people to our side. That is the only

1. JN Collection.

permanent solution. Naturally we have to meet violence effectively and put an end to any idea that we can be challenged in that way.[2] As for political approaches, certainly no approach should be made which encourages Phizo or through weakness.

As regards the international reaction, it is not a question of some countries who are hostile to us, taking advantage of this Naga affair. Other countries do not proclaim our policies. Those policies of ours are to some extent undermined by the fact that for months and months we have to employ the military to deal with some people whom we claim to be Indian citizens.

I wrote to you about the Deputy Commissioner of the Naga Hills, because I had heard some complaints. I am not in a position to judge. One matter which rather irritated me was the slackness of the Deputy Commissioner as well as, I believe, some of our military officers, in dealing with the situation which resulted in the attack on the convoy from Kohima to Imphal.[3] I have no doubt that that shows a remarkable lack of alertness which is so necessary in an officer.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

2. Nehru wrote to Fazl Ali on 19 August that the "door to compromise must always be open to the Nagas", and that "the Nagas must realize that we are friendly to them, only that we cannot tolerate violence and terrorist activities." Nehru added that it would be very wrong to become vengeful and try and punish the Nagas "too heavily".
3. The reference is to the attack on a convoy of trucks on 11 June 1956. See *ante*, p. 155.

8. To S. Fazl Ali[1]

New Delhi
August 30, 1956

My dear Fazl Ali,

. . . I cannot say anything as to which officers should be employed. Broadly speaking, I am entirely of opinion that Naga officers should be trusted.

About your suggestion in regard to an amendment of the Constitution, there is some force in it. But I fear we cannot undertake any further amendments now. Parliament has no time for it.

I received a telegram today from Jasokie[2] from Kohima. Jasokie is one of the Naga leaders who is cooperating with us. He said that he and the Naga leaders who were cooperating with us were much alarmed at my statement[3] in the Lok Sabha on August 23 that I was prepared to meet Phizo. I have asked my Secretary to send a reply to him through the Deputy Commissioner at Kohima. This is to the effect that the report he refers to is not correct. What I said was that I am always prepared to meet Naga representatives. I have no intention of meeting persons who are carrying on a violent conflict against Government.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. JN Collection. Extracts.
2. John Bosco Jasokie (b. 1925); joined the Naga independence movement, 1948; publicity officer and acting Secretary, Naga National Council (NNC); broke away from Phizo in 1955 after the NNC resorted to violence; organized the Naga People's Convention and elected its General Secretary; elected to the Nagaland Legislative Assembly, 1964; Minister in Nagaland, 1964-74; Chief Minister, Nagaland, 1975; Member, AICC, 1976; re-elected to the state Assembly in 1977 and was leader of the Opposition; resigned from the Congress in 1980 and formed the Naga National Party and, subsequently, the Naga National Democratic Party; Chief Minister, 1980-82; re-elected to the state Assembly in 1987 on Congress ticket; Minister in the Hokishe Sema Cabinet, 1987-88.
3. See *ante*, pp. 160-172.

IV. ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS

1. Assistance to the Vice-President during his Foreign Tours[1]

I see from the attached telegram that the Vice-President[2] is likely to go to China in October next.

2. The Vice-President's visit to the Soviet Union and various countries in Europe and Africa[3] has been very helpful to us, as his visits always are. I feel, however, that we do not treat him properly, and these tours are a great strain on him. He is not even given some Secretary or someone else to accompany him. It is true that wherever he goes, some person in our Mission there is attached to him. But this is not enough. Both because of his high position and his age, it is necessary that whenever he goes out on tour, he should have a young officer of the Foreign Service or someone he approves of to accompany him as his Secretary.[4]

1. Note to Subimal Dutt, Foreign Secretary, and C.S. Jha, Joint Secretary, MEA, 26 July 1956. JN Collection.
2. Vice-President, S. Radhakrishnan, toured China and some South-East Asian countries from 8 September 1957.
3. Radhakrishnan toured Czechoslovakia, Poland, Bulgaria, the Soviet Union, Belgium, Britain, and East and Central Africa from 29 May to 18 July 1956.
4. At a meeting of the Cabinet on 25 July, Nehru referred to the Vice-President's visit abroad and said that, "he should be persuaded to take secretarial or other personal staff with him so as to minimize the strain involved in such extensive travels."

2. Selection of Members of Cultural Delegations[1]

On my return to Delhi from my tour abroad, I heard many criticisms about the personnel of our Cultural Delegation that has gone to East European countries under the leadership of the Deputy Minister, Shri A.K. Chanda. The Minister of Education was specially distressed about it and I gathered that there had been widespread criticism in the press also.

2. On enquiry I found that the choice of the personnel had practically been made by the Leader, Shri A.K. Chanda. Quite a number of persons from Santiniketan had been included and it was even said that some of them were relatives of Shri A.K. Chanda.

3. There need of course be no bar to a relative of Shri A.K. Chanda and certainly not to persons from Santiniketan. But one has to be very careful in such matters and I fear that the procedure adopted and the result achieved were not happy.

4. In all such Cultural Delegations going abroad, there are three Ministries interested—External Affairs, Education and I & B (because they are in touch with many artists). The Education Ministry has a special organization attached to it—the Sangeet Natak Akademi which is by way of being an expert at this business. Obviously every Cultural Delegation of this type must be chosen in cooperation with these various organizations and more particularly on the advice of the Sangeet Natak Akademi.

5. I hope this will be borne in mind for the future.

1. Note to the Secretary General, Foreign Secretary and Commonwealth Secretary, MEA, 29 July 1956. JN Collection.

3. To B.C. Roy[1]

New Delhi
July 29, 1956

My dear Chief Minister,[2]

I am writing to you about the case arising from the affairs of the McLeod group of jute mills which, some years back, evoked widespread interest and strong criticism in West Bengal and elsewhere. I enclose a note which briefly states the facts of the case and shows how the persons concerned obtained wrongful gains for some of the companies managed by them at the expense of others. There has been considerable delay in dealing with this matter and coming to a decision as to what steps should be taken and with this matter and coming to a whether a prosecution should be launched against those who appear to be the offenders. This is unfortunate because in such matters delay should be avoided both from the point of view of the public and the feasibility of getting adequate evidence. Anyhow, a decision has to be taken now, and I am placing this matter before our Cabinet here. Before our Cabinet considers it, I should like your advice as the West Bengal Government has been chiefly concerned with this matter.

My own broad approach to such problems is that, where there is a prima facie case, we should go to law and leave it to the courts to decide. It may be, of course, that the courts do not think that enough legal evidence is available and the case might therefore fail. Even so, from the public point of view, it is desirable to leave this decision for the courts rather than for Government to decide on probabilities of a conviction. The public is naturally greatly interested in such matters, and there is always an undercurrent of allegation that Government do not always take action when necessary and tend to hush up such cases. It is better to avoid any such criticism. Of course, before we launch a prosecution, we have to consider what evidence there is and what the chances of a conviction are. We cannot start such prosecutions lightly and without prima facie evidence.

It appears in the present case that, undoubtedly, there has been a great deal of misbehaviour and sharp practice. Some parties tried to make a great deal of money by these practices. When they were caught, apparently they gave back a considerable part of this money. That does not lessen the offence. Apart from

1. JN Collection.
2. B.C. Roy, Chief Minister of West Bengal.

the particular case involved, there is the larger question of such practices being indulged in from time to time and not being discovered.

The Inspector of the State Police Detection Department presented a special report, which was needed to strengthen the case made out in the inspection reports received under the Companies Act. On a study of this special report, the Public Prosecutor, who handled the case from the very beginning (under section 141 a (ii) of the Old Act) was of the view that the circumstances fully justified the charge-sheet being presented against the parties. Since then, certain technical difficulties had been pointed out by the Legal Remembrancer, West Bengal. These difficulties appear to have been settled. There have also been discussions between officers of the Finance Ministry here and the law officers of the West Bengal Government. It was understood in the course of these discussions that if the technical difficulties were removed, this case should be proceeded with and the sufficiency or otherwise of the evidence available could be left to be decided by the courts.

We have since been informed of the opinion of the Legal Remembrancer in March 1956, though the final views of the West Bengal Government on this matter have not been communicated to us. This opinion of the Legal Remembrancer appears to be that, due to the lapse of time and other circumstances, the evidence available might not be considered sufficient to secure a conviction and, therefore, that a prosecution need not be launched. I understand that this opinion has been brought to your notice also.

It is unfortunate that due to the size and ramifications of this matter, the investigation and the preliminaries in connection with the prosecution have taken a very long time. In view of the importance of this case, however, it appears inadvisable that the matter should be dropped without its being brought to court. While this has to be borne in mind, we have also to consider the possible difficulties in launching a prosecution. I would, therefore, be glad if you will be good enough to let us have your views on this subject, taking into consideration all the circumstances of the case. We shall then consider this matter here and the Central Government will take a final decision.

I shall be grateful for an early reply.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

4. Fitness Rules for Service Entrants[1]

When this matter came up before me previously, I expressed my agreement with the Home Minister's view on this subject. Since then, Chhatwal[2] has gone through a course of training and is reported as having done well. As it appears clear that, in spite of his loss of one eye at a very early age, he has consistently done well both in physical exercises, games and work, and, in fact, people do not even notice that he has not got one eye unless they are told so, I think it would be wrong to reject him at this stage. The mere fact that we gave him an year's chance and he has done well during this year is an adequate argument for us to continue him subject, of course, to what the Home Minister has said that if at any time Government found that his physical disability was a handicap in the performance of his duties, he could be discharged from service.

I do not know what other cases there are of this type to which the Health Ministry has referred and their fear, therefore, of creating an embarrassing precedent. I agree with them that physical fitness is necessary for a person entering Government service and certain rules should be followed. It is quite likely, however, that Chhatwal is physically more fit than many people who are passed as fit.

In any event, at this stage, I think we should certainly keep him subject to the above proviso. This need not be considered as a precedent. Each case of this kind is presumably different and has to be judged separately. I rather doubt if there is any case exactly like Chhatwal's case.

This note should be sent to the Home and Health Ministries. If they consider it necessary, we can consider this matter in Cabinet. I do not personally think it necessary to refer this matter to the Cabinet.

1. Note to the Foreign Secretary, 31 July 1956. JN Collection.
2. Subir Jit Singh Chhatwal (b. 1931); joined the Indian Foreign Service, 1955; under service training, 1956-57; served in the Indian Embassy, Madrid, 1958-60; Under Secretary, MEA, 1960-62; First Secretary, and Chargé d'Affaires, Indian Embassy, Cuba, 1962-64; Deputy Secretary, MEA, 1964-66; First Secretary, Indian High Commission, Canada, 1966-68; Consul-General in Seoul, 1968-71; Director, Ministry of Foreign Trade, 1971-82; High Commissioner to Sri Lanka, 1982-85, and to Canada, 1985-90; Member and later, Chairman, Union Public Service Commission, 1991-96.

5. To P.C. Mahalanobis[1]

New Delhi
2nd August, 1956

My dear Mahalanobis,
The Finance Ministry has sent me some papers about the Indian Statistical Institute. These papers indicate that twentyfive very well known Communists are working in the Institute. Further that they have formed some kind of a cell in the Institute and that some of them at least supply information regularly to the Communist Party for parliamentary and other purposes. A number of them have been proceeded against in various ways previously.

You may remember that there was a case some three years ago about one person, Kalyan Kumar Das. Although our Home Ministry, according to their rules, did not approve of this man being engaged, both Deshmukh and I thought that we need not take too rigid a view of such cases. Presumably this matter was not proceeded with further.

Now the West Bengal Government as well as our Home Ministry and Finance Ministry are rather worried and feel that these persons employed by the ISI convey information to others, and are rather nervous about their continuous increase.

As you know, I am not worried about theoretical Communists and should like to turn their minds to constructive work if they are good. But I do not quite know how to deal with this matter as the number is considerable and it appears that they function as active members of the Communist Party both inside the Institute and outside, and in fact help in recruiting others. Also that they supply information to others. According to our present rules, this kind of thing is considered objectionable and the West Bengal Government and some of our Ministries have, therefore, drawn attention to this.

I should like to know your own views on this subject.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. JN Collection.

6. To B.C. Roy[1]

New Delhi
August 8, 1956

My dear Bidhan,

You spoke to me about Bishop Morrow[2] when you were here. I had written to you previously about him because of an Intelligence report in which it was stated that he had made very objectionable remarks.[3] If that Intelligence report was true, then certainly his activities were very undesirable.

This matter has been referred to me by External Affairs Ministry, who have pointed out that the Bishop's record, so far as is known, (apart from that Intelligence report) has been relatively good. He has been in India for seventeen years and is now 64 years old and, as you told me, he has every intention of staying here till his death. In fact, he says that he has already had his sepulchre constructed in the cathedral.

Subimal Dutt has also written to me about him.[4] Apparently, he knew him when he was District Magistrate of Nadia, and he formed a good opinion of him. The Bishop was twice elected Commissioner of Krishnagar town headquarters of the Nadia district, and has been engaged in various other public activities. There is, apparently, no record of disloyal activities against him prior to 1955. Dutt feels that we should not pass sentence on him and force him to leave the country immediately on the basis of one confidential report which may be difficult even to verify. He points out that to turn out of the country an old man whose association with humanitarian and civic activities has received recognition in the past, would create a painful impression among Christian circles in India and abroad.

1. JN Collection.
2. L.R. Morrow (b. 1892); Bishop of Krishnagar, District Nadia, West Bengal, 1939-69.
3. See *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 33, pp. 276-277.
4. The Foreign Secretary, S. Dutt, noted on 8 August that although the intelligence report of the West Bengal Government gave instances of "some objectionable statements indulged in by the Bishop", it would not be proper to take "drastic action against him on the basis of a police report which apparently is not supported by any overt activities of this old man". Dutt also pointed out that the Ministry of External Affairs had received a representation from the Vatican on the Home Ministry's refusal to extend Morrow's permit beyond 17 July 1956.

In view of all this, I think we might take a more lenient view of the Bishop. I am more concerned with the wider repercussions of any action we take than with what the Bishop might or might not do. The recent publication of the Christian Missionary enquiry report[5] from Nagpur (which I have not myself read) has rather shaken up Christians in India and specially missionaries.[6] I would like not to add to that process of shaking up. Also, I am personally averse to pushing out an old man after seventeen years in India, unless there are very strong and obvious reasons.

I would suggest to you, therefore, to allow the old Bishop to continue here.[7] You might give him an extension permit for a year and his activities may be watched.[8]

Yours affectionately,
Jawaharlal

5. The Christian Missionaries Activities Inquiry Committee, appointed by the Madhya Pradesh Government in April 1954 with M.B. Niyogi, a former Chief Justice of the Nagpur High Court, as its President, in its report released on the 17 July 1956, recommended the (i) withdrawal of missionaries having proselyzation as their primary object; (ii) transfer of properties of foreign missionary bodies to national churches or holding bodies; (iii) legislative measures to control illegal conversions; (iv) prohibition of the circulation of literature meant for proselytization without the state government's approval and (v) prior approval for programmes of social and economic uplift by non-official or religious bodies.
6. On 19 July, the Arehbishop of Bombay, Valerian Gracias, criticized the Niyogi Report for the "sweeping remark" that foreign Christian missions had a political purpose, and demanded that the findings of the Committee be proved. On the same day, the Archbishop of Nagpur, Eugene D'souza, said that "the unfairness and unjustness with which a whole community has been slashed have pained us tremendously. We were not given a chance even to defend ourselves against the sweeping allegations."
7. Roy wrote to Nehru on 17 August that he had informed Morrow of the government's decision to extend his residential permit by a year "at any rate". Roy also warned Morrow not to indulge in even casual talks about political matters "in as much as rumours spread very fast and increase in volume as they spread." Morrow "refuted the suggestion" that he had discussed Goa or Kashmir "with his friends and co-priests", even though he admitted meeting them every month. The Bishop denied he had ever spoken against the Prime Minister.
8. G.B. Pant wrote to Nehru on 21 August that the Home Ministry's decision not to extend Morrow's residential permit beyond 17 July 1956 was taken on the basis of five reports submitted by the West Bengal Government. It was "right and proper", but the decision to extend his permit by a year raised the "serious matter" whether information received through the intelligence service of the West Bengal Government "was the result of mere guess work or even fabrication". Pant wanted this matter to be enquired into. Nehru agreed.

7. Legislation for the Indian Statistical Institute[1]

I have had a talk with Professor Mahalanobis on the subject of this legislation for the Indian Statistical Institute.

2. As far as I can make out, there is only one question about which there is a difference of opinion. This is about the audit. The two other questions mentioned in paragraph 10 of the note do not arise. Professor Mahalanobis has told me that he has no objection to adequate Government representation in the various controlling bodies of the Institute; also that he agrees that Government would have the power to issue directives to the ISI to amend its Constitution as well as in regard to broad questions of policy.

3. Thus we have only to deal with the question of audit. In the course of this note, there is repeated reference to this audit being conducted by a Chartered Accountant, who would be selected by Government in consultation with the C&AG, out of a panel of names to be sent by the ISI. This presumably is not the same thing as the audit being done directly by the C&AG although it is somewhere stated that the C&AG might issue directions to the Chartered Accountant. In the note it is mentioned that Professor Mahalanobis had accepted this proposal for audit previously, but has now resiled from it. The Professor has pointed out to me that he had accepted this proposal at a time when the idea of legislation had been given up and the old Constitution of the ISI was to remain. If, however, all the proposed changes are going to be made, then he thinks that from the point of view of efficiency and speedy work, the elaborate procedures of financial sanctions in regard to minute details would not be satisfactory and would hamper initiative, etc.

4. Professor Mahalanobis has stated his opinion quite clearly on this subject in his letter dated 4th August 1956 to Shri C.V. Narasimhan.[2] So I need not repeat it.

5. One thing appears to me clear that the normal elaborate procedure of detailed financial sanctions will not be satisfactory in this case. I think that we should

1. Note to the Ministry of Finance, 12 August 1956. File No. 17(199)/56-58-PMS.
2. (1915-2003); joined ICS, 1936; District Officer, Madras, 1937-42; served in the Madras Government, 1942-50; Deputy Secretary, and later Joint Secretary, Food and Agriculture, and Finance, GOI, 1950-56; Executive Secretary, Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East, September 1956-59; Under Secretary for Special Political Affairs, UN, 1961; Under Secretary-General, UN, 1962-67, January 1968-78.

try to profit by the observations of Mr Appleby[3] in his report. The old procedures may be good enough for work of a routine kind. But in a developing economy, with large developmental work, etc., or in scientific and research work as in our National Laboratories and Institutes, this kind of detailed control would, I think, lead to frustration and inefficiency. We shall have to devise, therefore, some method for all such cases which, while ensuring adequate financial control, yet avoids these detailed sanctions and leaves initiative to the scientists or experts who are dealing with a particular institution. We have devised some procedure for the CSIR, where block grants are made and the Governing Body or the Board deal with them as they think fit, subject to the advice of the Financial Adviser attached to the CSIR. There is also the Atomic Energy Commission and Department. There, I think, the procedure is that of a block grant with individual sanctions being made by the Prime Minister. A Financial Adviser is attached to them also for detailed advice and checking proposals.

6. As a matter of fact, neither an audit by a commercial auditor nor by the C&AG really meets the requirements of the case adequately. Both of them will no doubt see that the monies spent have been utilized without any breach of regulations. But the real question is how far they have resulted in certain achievements or in the objectives aimed at being attained. No auditor can judge of the results of scientific or technical work. Therefore, what is really important is that there should be some method of determining the fair cost and of evaluating the proper implementation of the programme laid down. I find that Professor Mahalanobis has mentioned this in paragraph 3(b) of his letter dated 4th August to Shri Narasimhan. I entirely agree with this proposal and attach importance to it. Thus, according to this, Government will appoint a competent body not only to settle the broad lines of the programme but also to determine the fair cost and to evaluate the implementation of the programme. This will of course not be the normal audit, but this will be in effect more important than the audit. The regular audit will of course take place in addition.

7. We have thus to aim at a normal audit plus the work of a reviewing body appointed by Government.

8. The question, therefore, is now a limited one. Who is to carry out that audit? It has been stated that a commercial auditor selected by the Government

3. In his report on the administration of the government's industrial and commercial enterprises, tabled in the Lok Sabha on 13 August 1956, Paul H. Appleby suggested the (i) development of intra-ministerial financial competence in programme-agencies; (ii) transfer of accounting functions to the Ministries under the general direction of Finance; and (iii) limitation of the role of the Comptroller and Auditor-General.

on the advice of the C&AG should do it. That apparently is agreed to. The only other point is whether that commercial auditor may receive general directives from the C&AG. I suppose there is no particular objection to this on the part of Professor Mahalanobis, though I am not quite clear about that. The whole point, I repeat, is that the whole way of sanctioning individual items should not be pursued and block grants should be made.

9. I suggest that Shri A.C. Guha[4] (who, I gather, has been dealing with this matter) and Shri Narasimhan might see Shri C.D. Deshmukh in his capacity as the President of the ISI.[5] Also because he has been in touch with this matter and knows much about it, his advice may be taken. After that, we may meet together and consider it.

4. Union Minister of State for Revenue and Defence Expenditure.
5. C.D. Deshmukh headed the ISI from 1945 to 1964.

8. To B.C. Roy

New Delhi
August 15, 1956

My dear Bidhan,
I am writing to you about the Governorship of Bengal.

I have spoken to some of my colleagues here, Maulana Saheb, Pantji, Dhebar Bhai and one or two others. Also to the President. We all feel that it would be better to choose a person from some State other than West Bengal.[2] Dr H.C. Mookerjee's[3] case was rather special. If his successor is also from West Bengal,

1. JN Collection.
2. In his letter of 8 August to Nehru, Roy recommended the names of Ashok Roy, a former Advocate-General, and K.C. Sen, a former Judge of the Bombay High Court, for the governorship. He wrote that he would particularly like a Bengali at that juncture of Bengal's political life. "Emotional Bengal will be greatly exercised one way or the other by the choice of the person who would become the next governor," said Roy. However, in case a non-Bengali was to be considered, then he suggested the name of the Madras Governor, Sri Prakasa.
3. H.C. Mookerjee, the Governor of West Bengal, died on 4 August 1956.

it would almost mean that in Bengal we have to choose a person from that State. This may be used as a precedent elsewhere and would create difficulties for us. In view of the narrow outlook which you have seen all over India and because of the agitation for States reorganization, it seems desirable not to encourage this by making even the Governor in various States a person from the same State.[4] I should like you to consider this.

I told you that it would not be wise or indeed possible for Sri Prakasa to be removed rather suddenly from Madras.

The President has for some time past been suggesting a name to us for a possible Governorship. I am merely mentioning it here, though it surprises me that he should suggest the name of a Bengali when he has told me that it is better to have a person from another State.This name is of Jogendra Narayan Mozumdar, a retired Judge of the Calcutta High Court, who has functioned as President of the Labour Appellate Tribunal and the Coal Industry Dispute Tribunal. For the reason I have mentioned above, we would rather not have a person from Bengal. Also Pantji feels that a retired High Court Judge should not be made Governor.

This argument would apply to the case of C.C. Biswas, our Law Minister also. I am merely mentioning his name as it has appeared in the press, although I had not thought of him in this connection.

A suggestion was made about V.V. Giri,[5] who used to be our Labour Minister. I rather doubt if he would be suitable for Bengal.

I wonder what would you think of one of the Princely Order. The Maharaja of Kotah[6] is a bright youngish man who has won the good opinion of many. He is at present officiating as the Rajpramukh of Rajasthan in the absence of the Maharaja of Jaipur.[7]

Then there is the present Lieutenant Governor of Himachal Pradesh, Bajrang Bahadur Singh, Raja of Bhadri. He was a *taluqdar* of Oudh, who has been a colleague and friend of ours from the days of the national movement and who has helped the movement in many ways in the old days. He is, I suppose, nearly 50 years old. He is a good pilot and one of the founders of the Flying Clubs. Since he has been to Simla, he has taken a great deal of interest in the winter

4. Nehru wrote to Roy on 10 August that in view of the "linguistic and other troubles", it was desirable to have a governor who was a disinterested person and not tied up with the linguistic or other urges of the state he belonged to.
5. V.V. Giri, a well known trade union leader and one of the founders of the All-India Railwaymen's Federation.
6. Bhim Singh Bahadur.
7. Sawai Man Singh.

sports there. Both Kotah and Bhadri are men of good presence and intelligence.

I am merely suggesting some odd names to you to find out your reactions. I confess it becomes more difficult to find suitable Governors.

As for public men, you know them as well as I do and can perhaps suggest some other names.[8]

Yours affectionately,
Jawaharlal

8. Padmaja Naidu was sworn in as the Governor of West Bengal on 3 November 1956. On 29 August, Nehru wrote to Roy that G.B. Pant had suggested her name. He added that Padmaja Naidu was "rather frightened at the prospect and is reluctant. But if we think she ought to go to Bengal, she would agree."

9. To Sri Prakasa[1]

New Delhi
August 22, 1956

My dear Prakasa,[2]

This is in continuation of my letter of August 20 about the Insurance fraud cases in which Damodar Swarup Seth is involved.[3]

I have enquired into this matter. There are three separate cases in regard to two Insurance Companies—The Jupiter and the Empire of India. Many of the accused are common in all these three cases. Damodar Swarup's name appears in the second and the third only.

1. JN Collection.
2. Governor of Madras.
3. Replying to Sri Prakasa's letter of 18 August, Nehru had written to him on 20 August that he did not know exactly what had happened to Damodar Swarup Seth, a leading Congressmen of UP, in the fraud cases. What he knew was that the people connected with the insurance business of Shankar Lal, a leading industrialist and prominent citizen of Delhi, had been convicted by the Sessions Court and the matter was in appeal before the High Court.

The first case relating to Jupiter General Insurance Co., was tried by the Sessions Court recently. Damodar Swarup was not involved in this particular case. But most of his associates in the other cases were involved. The Court sentenced two persons to five years' and Rs.10,000/- fine each. Two others to three years and Rs.5,000/- each fine. In the latter category came Sardar Sardul Singh Caveeshar,[4] who was a member of the Congress Working Committee in the early twenties. An appeal has been preferred to the High Court. A bail has been refused.

The second case is likely to begin soon before the Sessions Judge. In this Damodar Swarup is involved.

Presumably, the third case will start after the second case is over. In this also Damodar Swarup is one of the accused.

During the last four or five years this matter has come up to me on many occasions. Shankar Lal himself sent me some papers. I had some enquiry made and I came to the conclusion that I could not possibly interfere in such a serious matter, which has attracted so much attention.

It is wholly beyond my power even to take any action now, even if I wish to. The matter is too far advanced. Any suggestion of action on my part would be opposed and would create a furore. I am afraid that I cannot help Damodar Swarup in this matter, much as I would like to. As I have told you, I am quite sure that he has been exploited by others. But I cannot constitute myself as the Judge, now that the matter has gone so far.

In the case which has already resulted in conviction, I ventured to suggest that one of the persons who was ill and whose wife is also very ill might be given some better treatment in prison, as bail had been refused. I had an indignant reply from the Bombay Government refusing this.[5]

Yours affectionately,
Jawaharlal

4. A prominent Sikh leader, Congressman and freedom fighter of the Punjab; Chairman and Managing Director, New Hindustan Bank and People's Insurance Company.
5. On 11 August, Nehru wrote a note to his Principal Private Secretary suggesting that the Home Secretary should write to the Bombay Government as the "question now is one of transfer and not of giving special treatment." He stated that it might be mentioned in the letter that both he and Pant were of the view that, "owing to the illness both of P.N. Kaul and, even more so, of his wife here, it would not be appropriate to transfer him to Delhi." Saying that there was "no question of showing favour to the prisoner because of social status", Nehru added: "It is only because of the ill-health of the prisoner and his wife that such a transfer appears desirable. This would have been so whatever the status of the prisoner or the offence committed."

10. To Sri Prakasa[1]

New Delhi
August 25, 1956

My dear Prakasa,

Your great popularity everywhere in India is creating difficulties for us. You know that we have to appoint Governors in West Bengal and Bombay. In West Bengal there is a vacancy already and the Chief Justice[2] is functioning. In Bombay, Mahtab[3] is likely to leave by the end of September. Then also, the new States will be formed on the 1st of November—the new Madhya Pradesh, the new Mysore State, etc. . . .

You will remember that Bisnuram Medhi pressed hard to have you in Assam after Jairamdas Doulatram,[4] but I resisted this pressure because I did not want you to leave Madras at that particular juncture. The question now is whether you should hold on to Madras till April next or can leave that post some months earlier for another.

At least two States have been pressing me hard for you. These are West Bengal and Bombay. At first, I did not pay much attention to this, as I had thought you would stay on in Madras till April next. But, on reconsideration and on discussing this matter with Pantji, we felt that it might be advisable for you to leave Madras and go to another place much sooner. In any event, we shall have to find a new person for Madras early next year, as it is not desirable for the same Governor continuing in the same place after a full term.

Pantji and I feel that probably Bombay would be the right place for you. Morarji Bhai made the first suggestion about this and he has pressed for it. Bombay, as you know, is going to be one of our biggest States and will require a good deal of wise handling. Bombay is also the principal port of entry for our foreign guests coming here and there is a fair amount of entertaining to be done.

I hope, therefore, that you will agree to going to Bombay. The date can be fixed up later to suit your convenience, but I think it will have to be in September.

As for Madras, we shall have to think of some other person. T.T. Krishnamachari

1. JN Collection. Extracts.
2. P.B. Chakravarti.
3. Governor of Bombay.
4. Governor of Assam till May 1956.

told me that conditions in Madras are fairly quiet now and so your presence there is not so much needed now as it was previously.

May I have a reply soon.[5]

Yours affectionately,
Jawaharlal

5. Replying to Sri Prakasa's letter of 27 August, Nehru wrote on 29 August: "I quite agree that you should not leave Madras for the next two months. Provisionally we might fix early in November for you to go to Bombay, that is, when the new composite State comes into existence. Mahtab will leave probably on the 1st October, but some temporary arrangement can be made there with Chief Justice Chagla as Governor. I hope this will suit you." Sri Prakasa took over as the Governor of Bombay on 11 December 1956.

11. To V.T. Krishnamachari[1]

New Delhi
August 31, 1956

My dear VT,

I am sending you a personal letter[2] which Rajkumari Amrit Kaur, the Health Minister, has sent me. This is in the nature of a complaint about some activities or decisions of the Planning Commission which, according to her, interfere with the discretion of the administrative Ministry.

I should like you to look into this matter and to remove any misunderstanding that might exist. It is clear that executive action should only be taken by the Ministry concerned.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. File No. 17(206)/56-56-PMS.
2. In her letter of 30 August to Nehru, Amrit Kaur wrote: "There is a growing tendency for the Planning Commission to consider itself a super-Cabinet and arrogate to itself functions which normally pertain to the Ministry (of Health)." For instance, she pointed out, the allocation of Rs 11.15 crores to Delhi for water supply, sanitation and local self-government schemes was agreed upon in working-group discussions, but the Commission reduced this amount to Rs 2 crores without consulting the Health Ministry. She pleaded for additional water and improved sanitation in a city which was fast expanding.

4
INDJAN NATIONAL CONGRESS

1. To K. Hanumanthaiya [1]

New Delhi
July 26, 1956

My dear Hanumanthaiya,[2]
Your letter of July 22 reached me two days ago. Since I have returned, I have been terribly busy not only with work but with worry.

I would of course have liked to meet you, but being so heavily occupied, I thought I had better not send for you just yet. Also there was a meeting of the Central Parliamentary Board today and I felt that we should wait for this.[3]

The position had been clearly stated by you and others. For my part, I do not like quick changes or any change in the Mysore Government just two or three months before it undergoes a vital transformation because of the extension of the state. At the same time, if a large number of Members, who appear to be in a majority, sign a no-confidence motion, it becomes difficult to carry on.[3]

You will be informed of our discussions and decision of the Parliamentary Board today.[4] We felt that, broadly speaking, the proper course would be not to have a no-confidence motion, but for the Party to be given an opportunity to make a fresh choice of a leader for the next two or three months. It must be clearly understood that the choice would be for this brief period.

You have sent your resignation as leader. The Party might meet and choose anyone they want to. They can choose you if they so prefer.[5] Anyhow, this would put an end to this unseemly state of affairs. Whatever is done should be done

1. JN Collection.
2. Chief Minister of Mysore.
3. Hanumanthaiya submitted his resignation as the Mysore Congress Legislature Party leader after learning that a majority of the Congress members intended to move a no-confidence motion against him in the Assembly. He desired that his successor should command the confidence of the members of the Congress Legislature Party in Mysore and also other areas that would be integrated with Mysore as a result of the reorganization of states.
4. The Congress Parliamentary Board asked Hanumanthaiya to convene a meeting of the Mysore Congress Legislature Party to consider his letter of resignation and to elect a new leader.
5. On 16 August 1956, the Mysore Congress Legislature Party unanimously accepted the resignation of Hanumanthaiya and elected Kadilal Manjappa, the Revenue Minister, as the new leader.

with courtesy and without acrimony, if that is possible. We are having far too much internal conflicts which are doing enormous damage not only to the Congress but to the country. It is odd that this should be so when our reputation abroad is so high.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

2. To U.N. Dhebar [1]

New Delhi
July 29, 1956

My dear Dhebar Bhai,[2]
Kripalaniji[3] and Asoka Mehta[4] came to see me today and I had about an hour's talk with them. We discussed the general international situation as well as broad national problems. Then we talked about the Praja Socialist Party and the Congress. I told him that I was not aware of any major difference between them and us and I did not see any reason why we should waste our energy against each other. I referred to Jayaprakash's recent statement[5] which had seemed to me very curious indeed. Kripalaniji agreed and he said that he had been surprised at many things that Jayaprakash had said and done.

2. We talked about Lohia[6] and his purely adventurist tactics. I pointed out that if the Praja Socialist Party accepted Jayaprakash's advice, it would fade away. Some people belonging to it would go to the Communists, some would go to

1. JN Collection.
2. President of the Indian National Congress.
3. J.B. Kripalani, Chairman, Praja Socialist Party (PSP), and member of the Lok Sabha.
4. Member of the Praja Socialist Party.
5. Jayaprakash Narayan, the PSP leader, advised the party workers in Patna on 24 July to make electoral adjustments with the leftists, including the Communists, in the forthcoming general elections in 1957.
6. In November 1955, Rammanohar Lohia, a senior member of the Praja Socialist Party, broke away and launched a new Socialist Party.

Lohia's party and some might join the Congress. It would cease to have any individuality.

3. Kripalaniji broadly agreed to what I said, but enquired what was the way to bring about a real understanding. He seemed to think about some understanding between organizations. I suggested to him that this kind of thing was difficult and embarrassing. Anyhow he could discuss this matter with you and with other senior colleagues. My own impression would be that it is better for individuals or a group to join the Congress. I did not mean that people should just drift away from the Praja Socialist Party, but that the matter should be considered by their Executive on these lines.

4. Asoka Mehta pointed out that there might not be much difficulty at the top, but the question was of the State and the District. How could we bring about an absorption there. I said that of course that was desirable and should be aimed at.

5. This was briefly what we talked about. I said that we would meet again and meanwhile it would be a good thing if they could meet you. Perhaps you could arrange this.

6. The Praja Socialist Party Executive is meeting, I think, on August 4 in Delhi, that is, a day before our Working Committee. I told Kripalani that I did not propose to put this matter formally before our Working Committee but some senior members might discuss it.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

3. To U.N. Dhebar[1]

New Delhi
August 7, 1956

My dear Dhebar Bhai,
I enclose a letter from Keshava Deva Malaviya to me.[2] I do not know anything about this proposal to send Tandonji to the UP Assembly. I am inclined to agree with Keshava Deva that Tandonji's going to the UP Assembly will create an upset there. He cannot obviously play second fiddle there. If he has to stand, it is better for him to come to Parliament.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. JN Collection.
2. Malaviya stated on 7 August that he had learnt of efforts by U.N. Dhebar, Lal Bahadur Shastri and Algurai Shastri to send Purushottamdas Tandon, Congress member from Allahabad and a former Congress President, to the UP Assembly. He believed this would "perhaps make matters much worse" in UP. Malaviya suggested it would be better to make C.B. Gupta, the state industries minister, responsible for running the administration than to send Tandon to the Assembly. Malaviya thought that Gupta would welcome Tandon's presence in UP, as Tandon would "listen to Chandra Bhanu more than to anyone else."

4. To C.P.N. Singh[1]

New Delhi
August 31, 1956

My dear CPN,
Your letter of August 29th.[2]

Master Tara Singh came to see me. It was more of a social call than anything else, although he referred to the Akalis joining the Congress. He wanted [the] Akali Dal to retain a certain individuality in case necessity arose. I did not discuss this matter with him as this was being dealt with by Maulana Sahib and the Congress President.[3] I told him so, but I pointed out that under the Congress Constitution it was not possible for members of another political body to join the Congress.

I think that, in the balance, it would be a good thing for the Akalis to join the Congress. There are some risks of course, but we have to take them. This is the only way gradually to eliminate this communal outlook.

I have little doubt that it is due to Rarewala's initiative and the success he has had,[4] that the other Akalis have felt rather left out and want to join the Congress now.

About Jagat Narain,[5] the withdrawal of his resignation does not in any way

1. JN Collection.
2. C.P.N. Singh, Governor of Punjab, observed that the decision of some members of the Akali Dal to join the Congress "would eliminate one of the difficult factors in the politics of Punjab," and added that even if the Akalis did not stick to their decision, "it will have served the purpose of easing the tension at present and also rendering [the] Akalis very much weaker for any subsequent mischief." He did not agree with the view put forth by some Congressmen that the "coming in of a large number of men with extremely communal outlook" would weaken the Congress in Punjab. Singh opined that the admission of the Akalis into the Congress would "do more good than harm."
3. The Congress Parliamentary Board, at its meeting held on 13 August 1956, opined that the Akali Dal should cease to work as a separate political organization.
4. While crediting Gian Singh Rarewala, the former Chief Minister of Pepsu, for taking the lead in encouraging the Akali Dal members to join the Congress, C.P.N. Singh pointed out that Rarewala would not have been successful if Yadavindra Singh, the Maharaja of Patiala, "had not played his part properly." For Nehru's views on Rarewala's joining the Congress, see *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 33, pp. 360-361.
5. On 22 August, Jagat Narain, a former education minister in the Kairon ministry, along with 13 others, withdrew their resignations from the Pradesh Congress Committee. They had resigned in June 1956 in protest against the regional formula for Punjab.

mean that we are favourably inclined towards him. He had been told that his case could not be considered by the Congress Disciplinary Committee unless he withdrew his resignation. It will now be considered on the merits.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

5
DEFENCE

1. To M.K. Vellodi [1]

Camp: London
25 June 1956

My dear Vellodi,[2]
This is about the aircraft carrier. Dr Katju sent me a letter[3] as I was leaving, together with a note.[4]

I am inclined to agree with the suggestion that we should take a carrier of the *Hercules* type and not of the HERMES type. The HERMES is no doubt better, but it is much more expensive and will take a long time for delivery. By the time we get a HERMES type of carrier, no doubt several great improvements will have taken place. Also, the kind of needs we have will be adequately met, I think, by the *Hercules* type.

I had a brief talk with Lord Mountbatten about this and he agreed that the *Hercules* ought to suit us. I am sending Lord Mountbatten a copy of this note.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. JN Collection.
2. Defence Secretary.
3. K.N. Katju, the Defence Minister, stated on 20 June that factors relating to the cost and the date of delivery should be taken into account while considering the class of the aircraft carrier to be purchased from the UK. Katju pointed out that according to Admiral Carlill, the Chief of Naval Staff, the difference in cost between the MAJESTIC class, which India proposed to purchase, and the superior HERMES class was about Rs 17 crores. Additionally, the MAJESTIC class ship *Hercules* (which India eventually purchased and was christened INS *Vikrant*) would, after refitting, be available by 1960, whereas a HERMES class ship would take almost a decade to build.
4. This note, jointly prepared by Katju and Mahavir Tyagi, Minister for Defence Organization, stated that carriers of the HERMES class were faster and more efficient than those of the MAJESTIC class. But they were more expensive. It also drew attention to Admiral Carlill's opinion that the British Navy would not be able to spare a HERMES class carrier, then in service, before 1965. The Defence Committee of the Cabinet had, on 30 April 1956, accepted the British offer of the *Hercules*.

2. To Anthony Eden[1]

Camp: London
2 July 1956

My dear Eden,
I am sorry to trouble you with this letter when you are so busy. This is about the aircraft carrier of the *Hercules* type, which your Government has been good enough to offer us. I should like to thank you for this offer which we have gladly accepted.

There is one point which I should like to bring to your notice. The Admiralty suggested that we might pay £3,400,000 for the aircraft carrier as she is today in four equal instalments of £850,000, the first of such payments being made before the ship was taken in hand. The cost of completing the ship and refitting it on modern lines was to be met as this refitting took place. So far as the latter payment is concerned, that is, the cost of the refitting of the ship,[2] I have nothing to say; but we would be very grateful if the payments for the hull could be delayed somewhat and, more particularly, in the initial years. This would be a great relief to us. The next year is a particularly difficult year for us. I hope this will be possible.[3]

Please forgive me for this direct approach to you about this matter.[4]

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. JN Collection.
2. The refitting of the ship was estimated to cost approximately £10 million.
3. Eden replied on 6 July saying that the British government was prepared to accept "merely token payments" during the first two years to enable India to take title to the carrier before the work of completion and refitting. He also suggested that the remaining payments "should be the subject of discussion between officials."
4. On 6 July, Nehru wrote to Eden agreeing to his suggestions. The same day he also stated in a note to Vijayalakshmi Pandit, "What a token payment is is not quite clear to me and this will have to be informally enquired into. Lord Mountbatten suggested that we might make a payment of, I think, £100,000 in the first year as a token." Nehru added that "perhaps, the token payment might be somewhat less, say, £50,000."

3. To K.N. Katju [1]

New Delhi
July 28, 1956

My dear Kailas Nath,[2]
Your letter of the 27th July about our Tibet-China border.

I agree with you that there is no question of relying on another country's friendship in the future and a country should always take adequate precautions. At the same time, I am not at all concerned about the building of airfields, etc., in Tibet. That is the only possible way of developing communications in Tibet. What I am concerned much more about is the state of the country on our side of the border and, more particularly, the trouble we are having in the Naga area. About this, I am writing separately.

What will happen in ten or twenty years it is difficult to prophesy, but it is certain that scientific and technological advance, which is so rapid today, will change the situation completely. In addition, everything will depend on how far India or China have progressed economically and otherwise. The best defence is economic and industrial growth and consequent prosperity.

We have one of the best defences in the world in our north and north-eastern frontier. This defence consists not only of high mountains and difficult terrain on our side but on the other side a very difficult country, probably the most inhospitable in the world. Of course, this does not come in the way of aircraft flying over the Himalayas to India, but this cannot be prevented by any frontier arrangement.

I am not at all sure of what China may do ten or twenty years hence. But to protect ourselves against possible developments, we have to do other things and not try to put up a useless Maginot line. In particular, we have to have peace, quiet and contentment on our side of the border. I am worried more about the Naga trouble from this point of view than about anything that the Chinese may do.

I had intended writing to you separately in answer to your other letter about the Nagas. But there is not much that I wish to say which I have not said already. Making every allowance, I think that what our military have done is not

1. JN Collection.
2. Defence Minister.

satisfactory, and I see no reason to hush it up even in private.[3] I intend speaking about this to General Shrinagesh in a day or two when I meet him.

So far as the major political decision is concerned, I think it will have to be taken. But, meanwhile, there are many minor political decisions which can be taken without too much difficulty. It must always be remembered that if the Nagas are made to feel that they have no other alternative but to fight and die, they will prefer doing so. We must give them a better alternative and seek their cooperation or at least of those who are prepared to cooperate. This has not been done so far either by the Assam Government or by our military.

Yours affectionately,
Jawaharlal

3. This refers to the incident on 4 July. An army soldier accidentally killed N. Haralu, a medical practitioner, on the outskirts of Kohima. See *ante*, p. 152.

6
ATOMIC ENERGY

1. To K.S. Krishnan [1]

Camp: London
27 June 1956

My dear Krishnan,[2]
Your letter of June 26th addressed to Mathai.[3]

I see no difficulty in a group of scientists going to India from abroad round about the time of the Indian Science Congress to consider the hazards arising from the existence of nuclear weapons.[4] The cost involved to us will be their expenses in India. We shall certainly meet this cost. I have no idea how many scientists will go this way, but in any event this makes no difference. You can therefore inform Professor Powell[5] that I am agreeable to this proposal.

I do not know if you have been informed that the little book that Kothari was preparing on the atomic explosions and their consequences is coming out of the press within a few days.[6] I shall probably receive some copies of it within a week or ten days here.

I should like to meet you here in London. I tried to get in touch with you and found that you had gone out. When you come to London, please ring me up and we shall fix a time.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. JN Collection.
2. Director, National Physical Laboratory, and member, Atomic Energy Commission, Government of India.
3. M.O. Mathai, a close member of Nehru's personal staff.
4. C.F. Powell, an eminent British physicist, had suggested this to Krishnan. The Indian Science Congress was scheduled to meet in January 1957.
5. Cecil Frank Powell (1903-1969); Professor of Physics in the University of Bristol, 1948-63; awarded Nobel Prize for Physics, 1950; Chairman, Scientific Policy Committee of European Organization for Nuclear Research (CERN), Geneva, 1961-63; Director, H.H. Wills Physics Laboratory, 1964-69.
6. This refers to the booklet titled *Nuclear Explosions and Their Effects*, prepared by D.S. Kothari, Scientific Adviser to the Ministry of Defence, in association with Homi J. Bhabha and V.R. Khanolkar.

2. To Homi J. Bhabha[1]

New Delhi
July 29, 1956

My dear Homi,[2]
I met your Atomic Energy guests from Burma, Egypt, Ceylon, and Indonesia yesterday and had a talk with them. They appeared to be satisfied with their visit and the work they had done at your Conference.[3]

I have just received a paper containing your programme for your visit abroad. This shows that you will be in Austria on the 9th to the 11th and then for some weeks on leave. Would it not be possible or desirable for you to pay a brief visit to Yugoslavia from Austria? You will be quite near and it will be easy to go there. You have wanted to visit Yugoslavia for some time past.

I have not yet seen your note about the composition of the Indian delegation to the International Conference to consider the draft statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency.[4] I shall await that.[5] Meanwhile, the question that arises is as to how far this Conference will consider political questions or purely technical and scientific ones. I find that some of the other major countries are sending non-technical people as leaders of their delegations. It would probably be advisable for you and your scientific colleagues not to get mixed up too much with the political aspects.

Perhaps I might be seeing you on the 1st August in Poona. That will have to be rather late at night, because I am engaged the whole day.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. JN Collection.
2. Secretary, Department of Atomic Energy, and Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission, Government of India.
3. An International Conference on the peaceful uses of Atomic Energy was held in Geneva in August 1955 under Homi Bhabha's chairmanship.
4. The draft statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency, adopted unanimously by a 12-power conference in Washington in April 1956, was to be submitted for final approval to a general conference of member-countries of the UN and its specialized agencies in September that year.
5. Homi Bhabha recommended that the Indian delegation should be the same as the one at the earlier meeting in Washington: that is, Bhabha and Arthur Lall would be the leader and alternate delegate respectively. There would also be some experts attached to it. Nehru agreed.

3. Message of Hiroshima[1]

Eleven years ago, a new age was started by the terrible explosion of atomic bombs over Hiroshima and Nagasaki. These atomic bombs brought terrible destruction in their train and their menace hangs over the whole world now. Humanity faces today the alternatives of a dreadful atomic war and horrible large-scale extinction, and, on the other hand, peace and progress, utilizing the new forces placed at man's disposal.

Behind the atomic and hydrogen bombs lie man's hatreds, fears and animosities. If these hatreds and fears are allowed to continue, then they might well consume the human race.

There is surely a better destiny for humanity. But in order to realize this destiny we have not to remain passive spectators of these conflicts, but to decide deliberately and consciously to put humanity on the path of peace, wisdom, cooperation, progress and happiness. It is only through peaceful coexistence that the nations of the world will survive.

Not only must atomic war be ruled out, but even test atomic explosions must be ended, for it is feared now that even such explosions cause injury to the human race.[2]

1. Message to the Second World Conference against Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs, New Delhi, 4 August 1956. JN Collection. The conference was held in Tokyo and Nagasaki from 6 to 11 August 1956 under the auspices of the Japan Council against Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs.
2. In a message sent to the Mayor of Nagasaki on 4 August 1956, Nehru stated, "I wish to reaffairm the resolve of the Government and the people of India to seek, in conjunction with other nations, cessation of nuclear explosions which threaten to destroy the heritage of mankind." He added that nuclear energy "must only be used for peaceful purposes and for improvement of the lot of mankind." Nehru further said that "the people of Nagasaki were among the first to suffer from this terrible weapon, but their sufferings have helped to disturb the conscience of mankind." He hoped "that the men and women of goodwill in the world will help to banish the terrible spectre of atomic warfare from the earth."

4. Cable to Homi J. Bhabha[1]

Delighted to learn that our reactor reached criticality this afternoon.[2] This production of atomic energy for the first time in India is a significant event for us. I know how very hard you and your colleagues have worked for this, more especially during the last few days and nights continuously. Please convey my warm congratulations to all those who have been associated with this work and success.

1. New Delhi, 4 August 1956. File No. 17(65)/56-65-PMS.
2. India's first atomic reactor, Apsara, went into operation at Trombay, near Mumbai, at 3.45 pm on 4 August. It made available atomic energy for experimental purposes. The work on the 1,000 kw reactor, designed and built by Indian scientists and engineers, started in April 1955.

7
KASHMIR

1. To Bakhshi Ghulam Mohammad [1]

Camp: London
12th July 1956

My dear Bakhshi,[2]

. . .You may have seen in the papers that Mohammad Ali, Prime Minister of Pakistan, came to see me. We had a long talk lasting nearly two hours.[3] Although the talk concerned many matters, in the main it was about Kashmir. He was very suave and ingratiating. He asked me why we should not go back to the informal agreement we had arrived at in 1953, that is, when his predecessor came to Delhi.[4] I told him that much had happened since then and there could be no going back in this way. I need not give you a full report of our talk, but anyhow it came to nothing.

There is of course a great deal of suppressed feeling about Kashmir here in London. But there has been hardly any mention of it. No reference was made to it in the Prime Ministers' Conference. Sir Anthony Eden, Prime Minister, casually mentioned it to me because Mohammad Ali had been to him. He suggested vaguely that we three might meet, but I did not agree to this at all. After that there was no mention made.

I hope I shall be able to see you some time after my return to Delhi.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. JN Collection. Extracts.
2. Prime Minister of Jammu and Kashmir State.
3. For Nehru's note on his talks on 5 July 1956 with Mohammad Ali in London, see *post*, pp. 376-378.
4. See *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 23, pp. 343-344.

2. To G.B. Pant[1]

New Delhi
July 25, 1956

My dear Pantji,
A number of MPs have spoken to me about the constant stream of propaganda by Mridula Sarabhai[2] about Kashmir. Every MP receives bundles almost every day. This was mentioned at the meeting of the Executive Committee of the Party this morning also. There have been references to this in the Press, and there is a good deal of indignation.

I do not quite know what to do about it. I throw away, unread, everything that comes to my house from her. What are we to do about this?

There is another matter to which my attention has been drawn repeatedly. This is *Filmindia* of Bombay, which continues to print the most objectionable matter. I do not mind what it writes about me or others but what it writes about Islam and the Prophet Mohammad, etc., is enough to create a riot. I once drew attention to this matter but apparently nothing could be done then.[3]

Yours affectionately,
Jawaharlal

1. JN Collection.
2. An ardent follower of Mahatma Gandhi, Mridula Sarabhai was involved in the recovery of abducted women in India and Pakistan. She was closely associated with Shaikh Abdullah and a critic of Bakhshi Ghulam Mohammad.
3. See *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 18, p. 207.

3. Cable to K.P.S. Menon[1]

Your letter 13th July about invitations to Prime Minister of Kashmir and Yuvaraj and Yuvarani of Kashmir.[2] I have spoken to both of them who are in Delhi. They are grateful for these invitations.

2. As you know, Yuvaraj and Yuvarani have just returned from a long foreign tour and they cannot possibly go abroad again this year.[3] They would very much like to go to the Soviet Union next year.

3. Bakhshi Ghulam Mohammad would of course like to visit the Soviet Union[4] but it is not possible for him to go abroad this year not only owing to heavy work like Constitution-making but also because of many difficulties which require his presence. He hopes to be able to go next year.

4. For your information, I do not think it would be politically advisable for Bakhshi to go to Moscow at this stage.[5]

1. New Delhi, 26 July 1956. JN Collection.
2. Menon, India's Ambassador in Moscow, wrote that Khrushchev had told him at a dinner party on 12 July that the Soviet Government would like to invite Bakhshi Ghulam Mohammad and Karan Singh, Sadr-i-Riyasat, Jammu and Kashmir, and his wife, Yasho Rajya Lakshmi, to the Soviet Union.
3. Karan Singh and his wife toured Egypt and Europe for two months.
4. Menon wrote that the Soviet Government wished to follow up the informal invitation extended to Bakhshi by Khrushchev and Bulganin during their visit to Kashmir in 1955, "but they did not know how they should set about it." Khrushchev thought Bakhshi would like to visit the Soviet Union and "said that one hint from you (Nehru) would suffice; and they would extend a formal invitation in whichever manner we suggested", Menon reported.
5. With reference to the Commonwealth Secretary M.J. Desai's note of 2 July 1956 about the Czech Government's invitation to Bakhshi to visit Czechoslovakia, Nehru cabled to Desai on 11 July from London: "I agree with you that it is not desirable for this invitation to be accepted or for Bakhshi Ghulam Mohammad to go outside the country." Nehru also agreed that the Czech Government had "committed a breach of protocol propriety" in writing directly to the Prime Minister of Jammu and Kashmir.

4. Study Missions by Foreign Organizations[1]

I take it (I am not quite sure) that U Ba Swe,[2] Chairman of the last Asian Socialist Conference, is the present Prime Minister of Burma.

2. I think you might send the following letter to the Secretary[3] of the Asian Socialist Conference:

"Dear Sir,

The Prime Minister has received your letter of the 21st June 1956 on the subject of an Asian Socialist Conference study mission to Kashmir.[4]

He is surprised to learn that Shri Mobarak Sagher stated that he had agreed to a mission visiting Kashmir. What he had said to Shri Mobarak Sagher was that he had no objection to any person going to Kashmir, but this was entirely a matter for the Government of Jammu & Kashmir to decide. Also that international organizations did not usually send missions for the study of controversial problems in another country.[5] There are large numbers of people going to Kashmir in their private capacity as tourists or otherwise.

The matter was referred to the Prime Minister of Jammu & Kashmir and he has stated that it would not be quite proper or appropriate for any such investigation to be organized in his State on behalf of any external organization."

1. Note to Vishnu Sahay, Secretary for Kashmir Affairs, 27 July 1956. JN Collection.
2. (1915-1987); Myanmar politician; Secretary General, Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League, 1947-58; Minister for Defence, 1952-56; Prime Minister, 1956-57.
3. The Secretary General of the Asian Socialist Conference was Wijono from Indonesia. Its first meeting was convened at Yangon in January 1953.
4. According to Wijono, Mobarak Sagher, General Secretary of the Pakistan Socialist Party, had informed U Ba Swe that Nehru "had agreed to help the study mission to be able to visit Kashmir." Wijono hoped that Nehru would be able to "see this matter through". Mobarak Sagher met Nehru in New Delhi in March 1956.
5. Nehru informed Vishnu Sahay on 12 March that he had told Mobarak Sagher that the question of "three persons" of the Asian Socialist Conference visiting Kashmir was for the government of Jammu and Kashmir to decide. Nehru, however, opined that, "this business of investigative teams consisting of odd persons from these countries [visiting Kashmir] seemed rather peculiar". U Ba Swe, then Myanmar's Minister for Defence, was one of the members of the proposed study mission.

5. Territory of the State of Jammu and Kashmir [1]

I have read your note[2] as well as CS's note.[3] I consulted Pantji also on this subject.

It seems to me that the present description at page 9 of the Bill is satisfactory and no change is needed. This description is complete and there is no doubt left. The language is also in conformity with the language used for other territories. For us to go beyond this and to talk about accession or to state specifically that the sovereignty of the Union of India extends over the illegally occupied territory and that the territory is a component part of the Union, seems to be inadvisable. It indicates a doubt in our minds which we seek to remove by repeated assertions.

The amendment, notice of which has already been sent and to which you refer in paragraph 1 of your note, must of course be opposed. It is quite unbecoming to have this kind of thing in our Constitution.

In dealing with this amendment some brief explanation will of course have to be given.

Pantji agrees that no change appears necessary.

1. Note to V.K. Krishna Menon, Minister without Portfolio, 28 July 1956. File No. 78-KU/56, MEA.
2. The States Reorganization Bill, 1956, defined the State of Jammu and Kashmir as "the territory which immediately before the commencement of this [Indian] Constitution was comprised of in the Indian State of Jammu and Kashmir." Krishna Menon, in his note of 28 July, pointed out that it was not "self-evident" from this definition that the term "Indian State of Jammu and Kashmir" included the Pakistan-occupied areas and, in this connection, referred to an amendment moved by a member in the Lok Sabha seeking to include in the definition a reference to "that part of Kashmir known as 'Azad' Kashmir which is under the illegal occupation of Pakistan." Krishna Menon further posed the question whether the Act should not place it "beyond all doubt (i) that the sovereignty of the Union of India extends over the illegally occupied territory; (ii) that the accession is final; and (iii) that the territory is a component part of the Union."
3. In his note of 27 July, the Commonwealth Secretary, M.J. Desai, opined that the definition given in the Bill was "quite consistent" with India's stand because it "has only one meaning, namely, all territories comprised in the Indian State of Jammu and Kashmir which became part of the Indian Union in consequence of its accession to India." Krishna Menon had suggested that the definition in the Bill might be connected with accession so that it could be consistent with India's stand.

6. To G.B. Pant[1]

New Delhi
August 13, 1956

My dear Pantji,
I spoke to you the other day and also to Swaran Singh[2] about Mridula's activities in Constitution House. Swaran Singh has written to me that he spoke to Mridula and she said that she would give up some of her rooms in Constitution House as soon as she gets other accommodation.

Meanwhile, these activities are becoming more and more intense and her rooms are the centre of all such activities against the Kashmir Government and Bakhshi Ghulam Mohammad.[3]

During the last few weeks four new Urdu weeklies have been started in Delhi, namely, *Naya Payam*, *Inquilab, Awan* and *Jamhon.* Their chief aim is to run down in violent and highly offensive language Bakhshi and the Kashmir Government.

In one of the issues of *Naya Payam,* which I saw, there were many pictures including pictures of Prem Nath Bazaz,[4] Lakhanpal[5] and Mohiuddin

1. JN Collection.
2. Referring to Mridula Sarabhai's public support for Shaikh Abdullah through a series of statements and pamphlets, Nehru wrote to Swaran Singh, Minister for Works, Housing and Supply, on 13 August that "Constitution House has become a pest and a centre for intensive activities against us and against Kashmir." Expressing his concern "that an impression gets abroad that some of us are encouraging Mridula", Nehru said that such an impression must be removed.
3. On 27 July, the Jammu and Kashmir Government contradicted some "tendentious" statements and pamphlets that were issued by Mridula Sarabhai and distributed among the members of Parliament and others. The communique issued by the state government alleged that Pakistan made use of these pamphlets "even before they reach those to whom they are addressed here."
4. Prem Nath Bazaz, co-founder of the National Conference and leader in Delhi of the Kashmir Democratic Union at this time, was in jail. He had been imprisoned for one year in September 1955 for pleading for Shaikh Abdullah's release.
5. Puranlal Lakhanpal; author, editor and politician; detained thrice; placed under detention four times after Independence; Chairman, All-India Janatantra (Democratic) Party; Chairman, End-Kashmir Dispute Committee; author of *Essential Documents and Notes on Kashmir Dispute*; *Ghalib — The Man and his Verse*; *Documents and Notes on the Arab-Israeli Question.*

Kara,[6] who is a well known pro-Pakistani person.

The *Inquilab* is supposed to have as editor Atiqur Rehman Kidwai,[7] who is said to be the brother of Shafiqur Rehman Kidwai, who used to be a Minister in Delhi. A kind of patron of this paper is Saidullah Khan Razmi[8] (I think he is in the PSP now). These papers have no circulation in Delhi, but they are smuggled into Kashmir and sent to Azad Kashmir and Pakistan. The other day Ghulam Qadir,[9] MP, went to Srinagar. Many of these papers were found with him.

Om P. Saraf,[10] a PSP man from Jammu appears to be deeply involved in these matters. He often meets Mridula. I am told, though I do not know, that one Bahl of the Delhi Congress is also engaged in these activities.

A question arises as to where the money comes from for these four papers and for the other work. Surely, our Intelligence should be able to tell us something about this. I have often wondered why our Intelligence is so slow of the mark in this particular matter.

I think we must take some early steps about these Constitution House activities. I do not see why we should go on waiting indefinitely. Mridula occupies five rooms in Constitution House. She can be allowed for the present to retain two rooms for herself. The other rooms which apparently are used as office rooms[11] should be taken away. I am suggesting this to Swaran Singh.[12]

6. Ghulam Mohiuddin Kara; played a role in the "Quit Kashmir" movement; second most important member of the National Conference before 1947; post-1948 moved towards Communism; left the National Conference in June 1953 and founded, along with Ghulam Nabi Hamdani, the Kashmir Political Conference; arrested in June 1953 for publicly favouring Kashmir's accession to Pakistan; released in December 1954.
7. Minister for Education and Development, Delhi State, 1952-1953.
8. (b. 1900); PSP member of the Lok Sabha from Bhopal; joined the Congress, 1919; worked for the Khilafat movement; jailed in 1942 for participating in the Quit India movement; member, AICC, 1919-1939 and 1948-1953; elected to the Lok Sabha in 1952 on Congress ticket; joined the PSP in 1954.
9. Ghulam Qadir Bhat; member of Lok Sabha, 1952-57.
10. Om Prakash Saraf (b. 1922); founder chairman of the Jammu and Kashmir unit of the PSP in Jammu; contested the 1962 elections from Srinagar; patron of the Jammu and Kashmir Union of Working Journalists.
11. The Office of the Recovery of Abducted Women was under the control of the Central Recovery Organisation in the Ministry of External Affairs and functioned from the Constitution House.
12. On 26 August, Nehru enquired from Swaran Singh if "steps have been taken to put an end" to Mridula Sarabhai's stay at the Constitution House. Nehru added: "It is most embarrassing to see the stream of literature that comes out from there in regard to Kashmir, which, in effect, is a condemnation of our Government and its policy and which is utilized fully in Pakistan and in other foreign countries."

Mridula is not sending her numerous communications tome now. For this small mercy I am grateful. As a matter of fact, I used to send them back unopened to her. Also she has not come to my house for quite a number of days.

But all MPs are getting bundles of these papers almost daily.

Yours affectionately,
Jawaharlal

7. Mridula Sarabhai's Activities [1]

I think that our office must completely be aloof from Mridula Sarabhai. We have had enough of her interference. So far as I am concerned, I am returning any letters that she sends me, unopened, and I refuse to discuss any matter with her. Her good intentions may be accepted, but she has done more harm to India during the last two years or so than almost anybody that I know of here. It is because of her past record that no action has been taken against her. Nor is any direct action intended. But, probably, she will not be allowed to function much longer from Constitution House.

2. In any event, she should have nothing to do with the organization for the recovery of abducted persons.

1. Note to the Commonwealth Secretary, MEA, 13 August 1956. JN Collection.

8. To Bakhshi Ghulam Mohammad[1]

New Delhi
August 15, 1956

My dear Bakhshi,
As you know, D.P. Dhar[2] has been here and I have had a fairly long talk with him.

I have told him that I was much distressed at repeated reports of friction in the Kashmir Cabinet.[3] This was bad enough in any event. But when the news of this became public property, it must affect very badly the entire administration and even the public. Feelings of uncertainty would arise and make substantial work difficult. We have seen even in India how destructive tendencies are exploited by our opponents. In Kashmir the position is obviously a more difficult one. Dhar agreed entirely. Then I pointed out to him that it was obvious to me that the only person who could shoulder the responsibility of running the Kashmir administration was Bakhshi Sahib. There was no one else and there would be a collapse of everything we had worked for if you retired. Dhar agreed completely.

If this was so, I said; then, in spite of every difference, the first matter of primary importance was for all of us to support and strengthen you and to help in every way in consolidating your position and the position of your Cabinet. Dhar again fully agreed.

Every other question has to be considered from this basic point of view. While this principle is agreed to, it is true that all kinds of minor matters and personal differences come in and disturb personal relations. This should be dealt with frankly and fully. There should be as much consultation and cooperation as possible so as to remove any misunderstanding or suspicion that anything is done behind the back of someone else. Quite apart from the official meetings of

1. JN Collection.
2. Durga Prasad Dhar, Home Minister, Jammu and Kashmir state.
3. Nehru stated in a letter to Vishnu Sahay on 30 July that the situation in Srinagar had deteriorated, while Bakhshi Ghulam Mohammad was in Delhi discussing the draft constitution for Jammu and Kashmir. He added, "not only has the trouble within the Cabinet increased, but outside too hostile elements have added to their strength." At this time, Bakhshi Ghulam Mohammad had differences with G.M. Sadiq, President of the Jammu and Kashmir Constituent Assembly and a member of the National Conference. Mirza Afzal Beg and the Plebiscite Front pleaded that the framing of the constitution be deferred for a while. They boycotted the Constituent Assembly.

the Cabinet, an atmosphere of frequent consultation even about petty things and appointments should be created. If any misunderstanding takes shape, then there must immediately be a frank talk to remove it. The point is that there must be a team spirit. The biggest of men cannot discharge heavy responsibilities single-handed. I am sure that I could do little in India if I did not try constantly to develop and encourage this team spirit. Fortunately we have a good deal of team spirit here. The only person who did not quite fit in was Deshmukh. In spite of that, I managed to pull on with him for these many years without much difficulty. At last he broke loose.[4]

Dhar agreed again fully about this team spirit. He said that he, for his own part, would do everything in his power to strengthen your position and to assist and cooperate with you. He also will try, in so far as he can, to get others to function in this way.

I think that Dhar spoke to me frankly and honestly and that he will do his utmost in this direction. He is, as you know, one of your ablest assistants and you can get a good deal from him if you give him a measure of your confidence and trust. Indeed, this would apply to your other colleagues also. Confidence and trust can only be maintained as a two-way traffic. If you trust them, you get back that trust.

I think that during the last few years, you have done a wonderful job in Kashmir. Obviously you have carried a tremendous burden and I have admired the way you have done it. Great progress has been made. But the more we go ahead, the more problems we have, whether in Kashmir or the whole of India. The only way to face these problems is to get a larger circle of persons to share responsibility. Some mistakes might be made, that is inevitable. But, in the long run, as in the short, one has to spread out this responsibility and to supervise the whole structure of the State. The more persons shoulder responsibility, the wider and stronger the base.

This applies not only to the Government, but also to the organization. In the final analysis, the organization is perhaps even more important than the Government. You will have seen that U Nu actually resigned from the Prime Ministership in order to look after their organization in Burma.[5] We in India attach more and more importance to our organization. An organization consists

4. C.D. Deshmukh resigned from the Union Cabinet on 22 July 1956. See *ante*, p. 107.
5. After the victory of the Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League (AFPFL) under U Nu in the elections in Myanmar held in April 1956, U Nu announced that he would leave the office of the prime ministership for one year while remaining President of the AFPFL. See *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 33, p. 447.

of many things, but, in the main, of a cadre of good workers who have influence in their respective areas and whose reputation for integrity and work is good. It depends on the popular response and the popular feeling about the work of the organization. Therefore, much attention should be paid to the organization and more and more people should be brought in to shoulder the work and responsibility of the organization. Thus, a wide base is created. Individuals are important, but individuals come and go and the organization has to continue.

These are some broad matters which are obvious enough, but, nevertheless, which require to be kept in mind all the time. The main thing is team work of those in the Government and the organization; secondly, division of responsibility and at the same time close coordination of all activities; thirdly, the building up of cadres of workers with responsibility; fourthly, creating good reactions in the public about the work of government and the organization. Above all, there must be the strengthening of your position, not some kind of a rival of others, but as the undisputed head of responsible colleagues who work as a team supporting each other and frankly discussing every important matter.

I heard that you were likely to come here, but that for the present you have postponed your visit. I hope that you will be able to come before very long, so that we can have fuller talks.

There was some question, so I was told, of IG of police going from here to Kashmir.[6] I think it would be a very good thing to have a good and trained IG from here. The police in Kashmir probably requires toning up.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

6. D.W. Mehra, Assistant Director of the Subsidiary Intelligence Bureau at Amritsar, was appointed the Inspector-General of Police of Jammu and Kashmir in 1956.

9. To S.M. Abdullah [1]

New Delhi
August 25, 1956

My dear Shaikh Saheb,
Thank you for your letter of the 19th August.[2]

It is true that I had an unusual experience a few days ago in Kutch. I had gone there to visit the earthquake affected areas. Part of the route to some of the villages, which had been badly affected, lay through a sandy tract with practically no semblance of a road. We were going in a jeep. As we turned some kind of a corner, there was a mound and one side of the jeep mounted this mound. The wheels of the other side slipped and the jeep just managed to tilt itself and stand on its side. It was fortunate that it did not go over completely for then most of us would have been trapped under it. As it was, we simply slipped out of the jeep on to the sand and all of us escaped almost unhurt. So far as I am concerned, I only had a few small scratches.[3] Undoubtedly we were rather fortunate.

I received a report of Dr Subbarayan's talks with you which you sent me.[4] Dr Subbarayan had written to me previously that he was going to Srinagar as a member of the Official Language Commission and that he might pay you a visit at Kud. I wrote to him that I would be glad if he could visit you as he was round

1. JN Collection.
2. Shaikh Abdullah, expressing his concern over the accident Nehru met with near Anjar on 18 August, wrote: "It appears from the report [on the radio] that the accident was somewhat dangerous and that the escape was providential."
3. Nehru suffered bruises on the right knee, right arm and right shoulder when his jeep overturned near Anjar on 18 August 1956. Unruffled by the accident, Nehru joked, "I came to Kutch to see the earthquake affected areas, but here I experienced a little earthquake." On his return to Delhi on 19 August, Nehru told waiting colleagues: "It is fortunate that only a man like Lal Bahadur Shastri fell on me. If he were a heavier man, my condition would have been different."
4. During the talks held at the Kud jail on 20 June 1956, P. Subbarayan, a Congressman and member of the Official Language Commission, asked Shaikh Abdullah to reaffirm his loyalty to India and simultaneously reiterate his stand of self-determination for the people of Jammu and Kashmir. Subbarayan also asked Abdullah if he was willing to ask Nehru "to facilitate a meeting with you (Nehru)."

about there.[5] I did not meet Dr. Subbarayan after that and I did not ask him to trouble you with any questions or with long and detailed talks. The questions, to which you refer, were evidently of his own thinking.[6] However, it was good that he could meet you.

I hope you are keeping well.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

5. For Nehru's views on the Subbarayan-Abdullah meeting, see *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 33, pp. 387-388 and p. 391.
6. Shaikh Abdullah, in his reply to Nehru on 19 August, said that any statement from prison on the lines suggested by Subbarayan "is not only uncalled for, but also highly improper." Subbarayan had suggested that the proposed statement reaffirming Abdullah's loyalty to India was mainly intended to secure his release from jail. Shaikh Abdullah stated that this "is hardly complimentary to my public career and record of public service", and added that he "naturally felt hurt, indicating as it did that I should offer a price for earning my release."

10. To Swaran Singh[1]

New Delhi
August 26, 1956

My dear Swaran Singh,

I gather that your Ministry is responsible for the building of the new tunnel in the Banihal Pass in Kashmir.[2] This is being built by the Germans.

While this was being built, the old upper tunnel started collapsing and repairs were carried out at great cost. Also the road over the Banihal was repaired.[3] I

1. JN Collection.
2. In 1954, the construction of a 3 km long tunnel through the 9,000 ft Banihal Pass in the Pir Panjal range in Jammu and Kashmir was started. The pass was normally usable only in summers owing to heavy snowfall in winters.

understand that the new and lower tunnel will be ready in another month or two's time for passage.[4] The question now is whether we should spend large sums of money for the repair of the old upper tunnel which goes on collapsing. I really do not see why we should waste this money. It is going to be a continual drain for something that is not worthwhile. While we repair one part, another part collapses. We have now got the upper road for use and the new lower tunnel which will be ready in a couple of months' time. That should be adequate. Apart from everything else, the old upper tunnel is too low and many of our trucks cannot pass by.

I am told that some kind of a meeting is going to be held soon to consider whether this old upper tunnel should be repaired or not. I am therefore writing to you to say that it is clear to me that this should be given up. No money should be wasted on it. At any rate there is no point in spending money over it. Let us proceed with finishing the new tunnel and later we can see if anything is required to be done to the old one.

The work and repairs to the old tunnel is being done, I think, by the Transport Ministry. I am therefore writing to Lal Bahadur also about this.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

3. Banihal Pass was made motorable in 1916. It was opened to the public in 1922.
4. The new tunnel, named Jawahar Tunnel, was inaugurated on 22 December 1956 by the Vice-President, S. Radhakrishnan.

8
PORTUGUESE POSSESSIONS

1. The Portuguese Case before the World Court[1]

I had a talk today with Sir Frank Soskice[2] about the Portuguese case before the International Court.[3] The Professor[4] from Oxford and Soskice's Junior were also present. They told me that they would put in the preliminary objection, but there was no hurry to do so. The later we do it, the more time we get to prepare for the hearing of the merits if that is necessary.

2. Sir Frank Soskice's view was that while the preliminary objection was very well worth making, the likelihood was that the decision on it would be against us. On the merits, he said the probability was that the decision would be in our favour. He was anxious to have more particulars about the treaties and other engagements in regard to Nagar Haveli, etc.

3. He has promised to send me a note to Delhi soon indicating the kind of enquiries that are especially needed.

4. I mentioned to him the proposal made to us that a certain Portuguese lawyer might be engaged by us. This lawyer's name and address is as follows:

Dr Manuel Joao Da Palma Carlos,[5]
Rua Dos Sapateiros,
123-2° Lisbon (Portugal).

This was mentioned to us by Shri Purushottam Kakodkar[6] who recently came back from Lisbon after a long term of imprisonment. Soskice did not know this lawyer, but he said there might well be a certain advantage in having him to assist in the case provided he was really a leading lawyer in Lisbon. A second rate lawyer would be useless. I have given the name and address of the lawyer to Sir Frank Soskice and asked him to enquire, probably through the Foreign Office

1. Note to the Foreign Secretary, camp: London, 12 July 1956. JN Collection.
2. Stow Hill, Baron, Frank Soskice (1902-1979); British lawyer and politician; Solicitor-General of the UK, 1945-51; Labour Member of Parliament, 1945-66; Home Secretary, 1964-65; Lord Privy Seal, 1965-66; Treasurer, Inner Temple, 1968.
3. The Government of Portugal asked the International Court of Justice to recognize Portugal's right of passage across the Indian territory to Dadra and Nagar Haveli, and to direct the Government of India to allow Portugal to exercise the said right of passage. Dadra and Nagar Haveli, the Portuguese possessions in Gujarat, had liberated themselves in 1954.
4. Edgar A. Waldock, Professor of Public Administration and International Law.
5. A prominent member of the Opposition in Portugal.
6. Goan nationalist leader arrested in 1946 in Goa and kept in a Lisbon jail.

here, about the status and position of this Portuguese lawyer. If this is satisfactory, then the next step would be to enquire from him as to whether he is prepared to take up this work. This may well involve some difficulties for him with his own government. I think that, in view of Sir Frank Soskice's opinion, and if the Portuguese lawyer is agreeable, we should engage him.

2. To Peter Alvares [1]

New Delhi
August 27, 1956

Dear Peter,[2]

I have your letter of the 26th August.

I do not quite know how you imagined that Goa would be mentioned at the Prime Ministers' Conference in London and, presumably, find its way in the communique. Apart from the fact that such questions do not and cannot come up for discussion there, I would not like to bring them up there. I do not wish to make the Commonwealth Conference a superstate to judge us. It is obvious that many members of the Commonwealth Conference are not favourably inclined to us in this matter.

You refer to the Independence Day celebrations. Certainly, Goa should be mentioned then. If you refer to my speech[3] from the Red Fort, it is true that I did not mention this on that occasion, although I have mentioned it at public meetings elsewhere. My speech at the Red Fort is not a public meeting speech as a rule and is a relatively short one. The most urgent international issue was the Suez Canal issue, to which I referred.

I know and am much distressed by conditions in Goa and by the suffering of the people there. But, I do not think that this should lead us into what might be considered adventurist action. There has been a good deal of this adventurism about Goa in the past. I think this really has delayed the development of strength

1. JN Collection.
2. A prominent leader of the Goa freedom movement, Peter Alvares headed the National Congress of Goa from 1953-61.
3. See *ante*, pp. 34-38.

both in Goa and outside in regard to this issue. However, that is the past, and it is no good complaining of it.

I do not agree with you when you suggest that we should go back to that particular type of action which was indulged in a year or two ago. We have to act with some responsibility and some wisdom in this matter, even though we may be very angry. We have got entangled in an international knot and we cannot untie it by pulling in the wrong direction. Untie it we will. You must know also that there is a case before the World Court brought by the Portuguese Government with reference to Nagar Haveli, etc. That is different, no doubt, but it has a certain relevance.

I agree with you that we should constantly give fresh thought to this matter.

You refer to relief. How is the relief given and to whom and by whom?

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

9
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

I. GENERAL

1. War and Peace[1]

This volume of essays, *Paths to Peace*, is conceived as a study of the causes of war and of the means to prevent it. Each chapter is written by a specialist in his own field who views the problems more particularly from the point of view of his speciality and background, but happily not losing sight of the purpose of the study as a whole and the complex and overwhelming nature of the problem itself.

Victor H. Wallace,[2] Editor of this symposium, did me the honour of inviting me to write a foreword. I confess the idea appealed to me but I asked to be excused, feeling as I do that I would not be able to devote the time or the attention which an adequate introduction requires. I also felt that, perhaps, my preoccupation with topical and controversial problems discussed in these pages somewhat disqualified me. I could not, however, successfully resist the friendly and patient persistence of the Editor, supported as he was by others, including my friend R.G. Menzies, the Prime Minister of Australia, whose interest in this work and friendship I value. My own fascination with the problem also prompted me to yield to Wallace's repeated requests.[3]

My contribution, however, must be brief and necessarily general in character.

1. Foreword, written on 12 August 1956, to the book, *Paths to Peace: Study of War, its Causes and Prevention*, edited by Victor H. Wallace (1957). File No. 9(2)56-PMS. Sending it to Wallace, Nehru wrote to him, "Your book is a study of the most vital problem of today . . . I felt I could not do justice to it without reading it."
2. (1893-1977); Australian medical practitioner; lectured and wrote on health, family planning, marriage guidance, drug addiction, eugenics, world peace, disarmament and politics; Honorary Secretary, Eugenics Society of Victoria, 1936-61; Editor, *International Journal of Sexology* (Australia) 1947-66; Editor, *Good Health*, 1968; President, World Government Movement; Fellow, Royal College of Surgeons, UK.
3. Nehru stated in his letter to Wallace: "I was anxious to carry out your wishes but could not find the time to do so. My friend and colleague, V.K. Krishna Menon, then came to my help, and he read the manuscript and helped me greatly in this matter. It is with his help, therefore, that this foreword has been prepared."

I shall not try to evaluate the contents of this book—a task more appropriately left to the reader himself.

Professor Geoffrey Sawer,[4] Dean of the Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University, Canberra, has contributed a most helpful concluding chapter. Professor Sawer's chapter serves as a far better introduction to this book than any that I am able to write. I agree with him that while each of the authors urge judgment on "the ancient and complex institution known as war according to their particular specialists", they all come to the same conclusion, viz., the abolition of war. Mankind today echoes this sentiment and yet our civilization has to find the ways and means of achieving this end and of releasing itself from fear and the passions, the complexities and the uncertainties which they have created and sustain.

Mankind, and the world's statesmen, must however find a way out; for, in this day and age, a global war means unprecedented destruction if not annihilation.

There are few problems that call for more calm judgment than the issue of war. Yet, the approach to, and consideration of, this problem is more often than otherwise in the context of emotion, passion or prejudice, or at best in terms of pious virtue and sentiment. This is true whether it be of its causes and, as some argue, its justification, or, as humanity ardently desires, to bring about the end of war. I rather agree with Professor Oliphant[5] when he says: "A pious or well-intentioned belief in peace is merely irritating unless inner conviction is backed by real knowledge of the causes of war with some idea of how peace might be maintained."

It is unrealistic, and indeed perilous, to rest in the belief that this world of ours would be rid of the scourge of war and that war would be abandoned as a method of settling disputes and problems, merely because there is the general desire for peace. Too often this desire is coupled with placing the onus of existing tensions and threats to peace and of their calamitous prospects on others—individual national leaders, nations or groups of them. The plea for peace has thus become inseparable from political acrimony, and almost the language of

4. (1910-1996); Foundation Professor of Law, Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University, 1950-74; Dean, Research School of Social Sciences, 1951-56; Special Magistrate, Australian Capital Territory, 1957-96; President, Academy of Social Sciences in Australia, 1972-75; Pro-Vice Chancellor, Australian National University, 1975; Chairman, Australian Press Council, 1982-84; author of: *Australian Federal Politics and Law, 1901-1929* (1956), *Law in Society* (1964), and *Australian Federalism in the Courts* (1968).
5. Mark Oliphant; Director, Post-graduate Research School of Physical Sciences, Australian National University, 1950-63.

war is used to promote peace! All this is part evidence that possibly the desire for peace, though well nigh universal, is not yet an informed and instructed desire, nor is it free from some of the very factors that threaten civilization with a holocaust. To this attention is paid in this study. They are referred to as the causes of war. This may be a somewhat simplified approach. For, even if we are able to discover and formulate all these causes, and do so, we cannot get rid of them by pulling them out as it were, each one by their root and trunk. The economic, ideological, social, racial and other factors are so woven into our institutions that they cannot be readily isolated only in regard to their evil aspects! We cannot therefore uproot them as it were.

This means, therefore, that we have to use our informed thinking to understand and assess these causes, and their relation to war and war institutions, their place in national and international politics, economy and thought, and seek to adapt and orient them in terms of our evaluation in relation to war or its avoidance. It also means that the process of the outlawing of war, in effective terms, requires institutional forms and changes, which would render national policies and the trend of civilization becoming oriented away from conflict.

That institutional changes and arrangements are necessary to this end is recognized by nations and governments. So is the war danger itself and all its ominous implications. But, side by side with this realization is also the persistence and often the accentuation of the factors that engender and promote national rivalries, frustrations, fears—economic, racial and political—which lead in the opposite direction. These baulk purposeful policies and condition the attitude towards institutional remedies. The approaches to them tend to share the characteristics of conflicts rather than cooperation.

The United Nations and its predecessor, the League of Nations, were conceived and they emerged as a result of the recognition to which I have referred. There have been earlier efforts also in the direction. We in the world of today, however, continue to encounter and be dominated by these same opposite forces and tendencies.

The Charter of the United Nations opens with the words in the preamble: "We the peoples of the United Nations determined to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war" and sets out as its purpose in Article 1 as the maintenance of peace and security, the development of friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, the achievement of international cooperation and harnessing the action of nations to attain these ends.

This is the primary and fundamental aim of the world organization. Since its foundation, many and varied as have been its activities to relieve mankind of many pressures and menaces in the economic and social fields, and its efforts

even in the field of war prevention and cessation of armed conflicts have had some modest successes. The fact, however, remains that a decade after its foundation the world is more armed, more war-prepared, more sharply divided into camps, each claiming that its armed strength is for collective defence. Today, we are face to face with the potential of the hydrogen bomb and worse to come!

This then is our problem. In viewing it, would it not be right for us to consider, what in essence, creates and sustains this contradiction? There can be no short and conclusive answer to this question. To attempt any such would be to disregard the realities and the complexities which now govern power relationships and which have governed ill-poised equilibrium during interwar years in the modern world.

Yet, we should search our minds to discover and assess some of the basic factors in this contradiction. If these were understood, it would help to orient institutional changes for the better and for approaches and efforts to them to be more purposefully inspired. Again, it would profit us to examine and evaluate some of the bases on which present day international thinking and alignment rest. This latter, the authors have sought to do, and I shall also endeavour to reflect on them.

The main factor which underlies the contradiction to which I have referred and which impedes, if not nullifies, progress towards peace, and the idea of a cooperating world is the hiatus and the divergence between the end—the abolition of war—and the means adopted to achieve it, which latter constitute the core of the foreign policy of the major powers. Means have to be equated with ends. They should share the essential quality of the ends; otherwise the approach to the problem itself is one of conflict, and a hiatus between what we avowedly desire and what we do to attain it.

Peace and cooperation must therefore be sought, not by war-preparedness, as an effective or constructive instrument for their attainment. I can understand a case for nations being prepared for their own defence, and also of collective defence, if attacked. The Charter of the United Nations (Art. 51) provides for this. But to seek to establish an equilibrium, or an orientation towards peace, by each party seeking to maintain a disequilibrium in its own favour is to contradict and nullify the very purpose this policy seeks to achieve.

This, however, is the pattern of power relations and the approach to peace in the world of today. The balance of power is often spoken of as an "equilibrium". The world has, however, been tilted from this "equilibrium" by one side tipping the scales against the other, and being always alerted to do so. This does not save us from "the scourge of war", nor can it hope "to save succeeding generations" from it. As a basis of international policy which would rid the world of war its importance stands proven.

For the last three hundred years, since the emergence of nation states in the modern world, nations have relied for survival or fulfilment by this process, of mobilized antagonisms. All these years, the nations of the world have been engaged in wars with brief intervals during the greater part of which war clouds gathered on the horizon.

There is, however, a significant difference between power balances, as it used to be and as they are in the world today! Hitherto, there were several rival power groups, the alignment of one or more of which to one or other of the prospective contenders would have tilted the balance against the opponent. The uncertainty of that alignment, or sometimes, the prospect or threat of one of them joining the opposite camp was a deterrent. To that extent, the balance of power finds its historic justification.

Today, however, the "balance" rests on a bipolarity. There are the two blocs: the Western alliance and the Soviet group with no other power grouping, either powerful enough or placed geographically and politically to render its alignment on one side or the other a deterrent.

To a certain extent the old position may still be the case, when there is only a cold war and the relations of some countries to either of the groups are not exclusive, and some countries like my own remain uncommitted to the rivals in the bipolarity. But this ceases to have any value, or any great power of deterrence, in a major crisis.

The balance of power today, therefore, is devoid even of that amount of breaking power that a group of countries may have been able to exercise on the mounting momentum to conflict as between two rival alliances in a multiple balance system.

The bipolarity not merely totally discredits the balance approach, but it makes it ominous and the portent of catastrophe.

The advent of thermonuclear power and the weapons of mass destruction as part of the armoury of the great powers has totally deprived any validity that might have existed in the conception and policies of balance of power and has rendered it a menace instead of a means of security in the world of today. This is the case both in regard to the nations concerned on either side in the present bipolarity as well as for the rest of mankind. These weapons and the magnitude in which they will be employed have erased the differences between the capacity to inflict punishment and of receiving the same; for the side that employs them is not immune from the lethal effects of their own offence. They have no defence before the proximate and almost instantaneous retaliation any more than the enemy had against the attack delivered on her.

It is argued that the accumulation of destructive power and the military alliances which subserve them are purely "defensive" and therefore politically

and morally justified. They are argued to be part of the mechanism of world peace. In its political aspect this argument cuts right across the conception, the purpose, the procedures and the machinery provided and contemplated in the Charter of the United Nations. It takes away from the world organization not merely the control but the decision for the use of sanctions and, therefore, the way to collective peace or security.

It is also argued that the power grouping enables negotiating with the other side from positions of strength, an argument that fails to be convincing when it is realized that each side considers it has, or seeks to attain, superiority in this respect.

There are those again who have begun to look on the hydrogen bomb and the capacity for mass destruction as a "deterrent" to war. It may be conceded that this may be the case in the beginning and in the short term. But fear is no basis on which to build peace and, what is more, we cannot be certain that the hydrogen bomb will function as a deterrent against its use by the possessor of it. Some miscalculation, panic or some internal changes within a country, and even fear overreaching itself, can trigger this force. Nothing deters global conflict thereafter. If the hydrogen bomb is thus elevated to the level of being the custodian of peace, the inter-war nuclear race would claim that it stands justified as a peace agent.

A divided world is also argued on ideological grounds. No doubt, differences in ideologies, national backgrounds and in moral or social values engender and sustain differences between nations. This aspect of the causes of war has been examined in this study. The conclusion is that "the view that the conflict between ideologies is the main source of international conflict is not supported by historical evidence". Ideological differences there always have been. It is a reflection of the diversities in civilization and history. Ideas, however, have greater potency than the means adopted to destroy them. War and even less the threat of war do not stifle ideas or their extension. The contention that the present world division is due to ideological conflict justifies the propaganda in this regard and psychological warfare, fear and suspicion, as the normal mechanism of international behaviour. The ideological aspect today, however, is more the instrument than the cause of our divided world.

International cooperation means international tolerance. We are today, by and large, sufficiently civilized in the context of our national communities to regard tolerance as the basis of communal life within our national societies. Without it, national groups and certainly democratic institutions cannot survive. For nations to learn to tolerate, to coexist peacefully, is but the extension of this idea into international relations. It means an attitude of live and let live and a belief in the power of example and persuasion rather than in arbitrament by force. We must

take down our fences, at least to some extent, for he who sets himself against being persuaded cannot hope to persuade another.

The hydrogen bomb is not an instrument of persuasion. Yet it dominates the thinking and behaviour in world politics and, as I said before, is set out to be regarded as an instrument of peace. The world must outlaw these weapons if it is to survive. Their outlawing would in itself promote confidence. They do not add to the sense of security. Is it not odd that the most powerful nations of today feel the most insecure, and therefore seek even more power, and in turn feel still more insecure?

Disarmament, therefore, is not merely a desirable alternative to the present competitive arming, it is an imperative if we are to survive. The nations accept this in principle and the United Nations has been discussing disarmament for a decade. The world's armament stocks and destructive power, however, have grown more to more, during the same period.

I do not propose to enter into the controversies surrounding this problem and the different disarmament plans. It is, however, a reflection on the statesmanship and wisdom of our age that we seem to be bogged down by this problem and drawn deeper and deeper into the tragic pool of the balance of power and the doctrine of "peace by horror". I would like to say, however, and briefly, that while we argue, we drift perilously into greater complexities. We should therefore view the problem of world disarmament not as one of producing a perfect system for it, but as a process which we must begin now, and seek to hasten building up confidence and agreements as we go on and not plead disagreements on ultimate plans in bar of our objective. We could make a beginning even now if the Great Powers would agree to the cessation of explosions of weapons of mass destruction by the stopping of further manufacture of the weapons of mass destruction and also by making at least a token beginning in the abandoning of these weapons by publicly dismantling at least a few of them by the atomic powers. We could all agree to submit our military budget figures to the United Nations. We could each aim at some reductions even unilaterally. We could utilize the areas of agreement in the disarmament controversy instead of alone stressing disagreements.

Another field in which the world has made progress in the last half century and can now move fully and speedily to the goal are the freedoms set out in the United Nations Charter. Colonial ideas and institutions do not accord with a peaceful world. This study, *Paths to Peace*, has examined this problem also. With some of the approaches made and conclusions reached I am in agreement, with some other I find myself at variance.

I would echo the sentiments of the Editor that "Human liberties and rights which have been peacefully, labouriously won should be the heritage of all men,

of every nationality". I would assume that Mr Wallace does not exclude women and children from this heritage. I feel sure he does not. People have been deprived of their freedoms in the interests of more powerful nations. The world is the poorer for it. To view this problem as appears in another part of this study that "A part transfer of sovereignty from Imperial power to the formerly subject peoples has made more difficulties" as a general proposition would be an error. This would be to argue for a divided world again, divided not as between two powerful groups but as between those who are bound and those who are free, with the suggestion that it is best for the former to so remain.

It is true that often "domestic officials or landlords may be just as tyrannical and greedy or remorseless as the deported foreigners" as Sir Fredrick Eggleston[6] says. They may be even worse! But that would be no argument for inviting the return of a foreign rule any more than putting up with one. Existence in the great metropolitan countries of such antisocial elements would not be an argument for their reduction to colonial status or a benevolent rule by a despot.

More than one of the contributors have argued for some kind of World Government and World Law. As an objective to which our civilization should seek to progress there can be little disagreement. The problems of our age cannot, however, wait for this consummation. They seek solution in our time if we are to survive and progress. Nations by cooperating with one another, in tolerance, and recognizing diversities, by respect for one another as sovereign nations, by not interfering in one another's affairs, can survive, progress and advance to greater and greater degrees and spheres of cooperation. Such peaceful coexistence in our time is the forerunner of one human race and one world. We frustrate our destiny if we continue to base our hopes on a divided world, resting on fear and armed might; and each of us arrogate to ourselves the larger share, if not the monopoly, of virtue or of national, racial or moral superiority. We can then only see the rest of the world as evil to be exorcized! Fortunately we are not in this extreme state of intolerance in the world of today.

Happily we, as though moved by some elemental forces or destiny, move towards world cooperation. Ours is a shrunken world. Science, trade and commerce, communications and the march and impact of ideas have made nations

6. Frederic William Eggleston (1875-1954); Australian politician; called to the Bar, 1897; Member, Legislative Assembly of Victoria, 1920-27; Attorney-General and Solicitor-General, Victoria, 1924-27; Minister for Railways, 1924-27; Chairman, Commonwealth Grants Commission, 1934-41; Minister to China, 1941-44, to USA, 1944-46; publications include, *State Socialism in Victoria* (1932), *Search for a Social Philosophy* (1941), and *Reflections of an Australian Liberal* (1953).

and peoples, often despite adverse circumstances, belong more and more to one another. Sentiment the world over moves us in that direction too, despite all fears and inhibitions. In this scientific age both vistas hitherto unknown and unimagined by man, and terrors not dreamt of by him which cast the menace of annihilation on him and his world are before us. We, the peoples and nations of the world, and our statesmen and governments must make conscious and intelligent efforts to solve those problems that challenge the survival of humanity and civilization.

The paths to peace are difficult, but pursue them we must. They alone enable survival and fulfilment. The journey calls for patience and tolerance and the belief in our objectives. They demand, more than all, an equation of means and ends. They call for the endeavours of us all. To these, this study *Paths to Peace* makes a useful contribution. I am happy to commend it.

II. VISIT ABROAD

(i) The Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference

1. Changes in Soviet Policies [1]

. . . Mr Nehru said that he was sure that he and his fellow Prime Ministers profited by these meetings. This was a fitting moment to consider the major changes taking place in the world. Various points of view would doubtless be put forward, and from these would come a broader appreciation of the situation which would be of great value when national policies were being formulated.

. . . Mr Nehru recalled that he himself had visited Moscow in 1955 and had subsequently received the new Soviet leaders in India. He was in no doubt that significant changes were taking place in Russia. These changes were broadly

1. Minutes of the first meeting of the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference, London, 27 June 1956. V.K. Krishna Menon Papers, NMML. Extracts.

based. The Russians were becoming a better educated and more widely read people; technological education had made great strides; the people were receptive to new ideas; and they were anxious to live freer and more normal lives. Mr Khrushchev had emphasized the desire of his country to establish better relations with other countries. There was no doubt that Russia wanted peace: she had been devastated in two world wars. The Russians were genuinely concerned at the prospect of German rearmament, and their concern was shared by the countries of eastern Europe. He had the impression that Poland was emerging from Soviet domination. The people of Czechoslovakia appeared to him to be rather unhappy when he was there over a year ago.[2]

The visit of the Soviet leaders to India had been the first occasion on which they had travelled outside the circle of Communist nations. The welcome they had received in India and Burma had shown them that it was possible to develop friendly relations with non-Communist countries. Before leaving India they had emphasized their desire for good relations with other countries, and had mentioned that India could help them to cultivate better relations with the United Kingdom.

An important stage had now been reached in world affairs. It was unlikely that the Russians would ever adopt a parliamentary form of government, but there was reason to hope for continued progress in restoring personal liberties in Russia.

The oppression of the Stalin period could not return. He believed that the statements of the Soviet leaders could be taken at their face value, not so much because he trusted their personal sincerity, but because their policies were based on and reflected changes in the attitude and intentions of the Russian people. Their public statements would also tend to commit them to continued adherence to these policies in the future. We should encourage these tendencies by developing as many contacts with the Russians as possible.

There was no doubt that the Russians believed in the validity of Communism as an economic system. At the same time they now realized that they could not seek to impose it on other countries by war. Indirect attempts to impose Communism on other countries by subversive action would be seen to be inconsistent with their present efforts to cultivate good relations abroad. Internal interference in other countries was consequently likely to be lessened; and these tendencies coupled with the effect on Communist parties in other countries of the denigration of Stalin, would probably mean that these Communist parties

2. Khrushchev visited Czechoslovakia in June 1955.

WITH SABRI ASSALI, PRIME MINISTER OF SYRIA, DAMASCUS, 21 JUNE 1956

WITH LORD DOUGLAS-HOME AND VIJAYALAKSHMI PANDIT, LONDON AIRPORT, 22 JUNE 1956

would receive less help from Russia. Hitherto Communism had been exploited largely for political and national ends rather than for its own sake.

The general recognition that major war was now unthinkable meant that national politics should be conditioned by other factors. If the heavy burden of armaments could be reduced, progress could be made with peaceful economic development. Russia would no doubt seek to exert her powerful influence in the underdeveloped countries, and the provision of economic aid to these countries to enable them to develop would provide the best assurance against the extension of Communist influence. As world tension relaxed and the fear of war receded the advantages of economic development should be universally shared. A substantial measure of disarmament was desirable in itself and also as a prelude to economic improvement. It should be possible to evolve a generally acceptable system of international control over disarmament.

He understood that the Russians used the term "competitive coexistence" as a contrast to a competition in armaments. He had heard it said that efforts should be made to meet the "menace" of Russian competition in the economic field. Such views were misguided. We could hardly take objection to the Russians giving economic aid to underdeveloped countries.

Summing up, Mr Nehru said that the most significant development in world affairs had been the universal realization of the catastrophic effect of the hydrogen bomb. Second in importance was the changed policy of Soviet Russia, which we should do well to encourage. We should seek to develop contacts of all kinds between the Soviet Union and the democracies. In this way we could exert a powerful influence for good over Russia and the satellite countries. Outstanding international problems might then be discussed in a more friendly atmosphere.

2. Disarmament[1]

. . . Mr Nehru suggested that too much emphasis was given to military factors in considering broad questions of policy. Admittedly, military considerations could not be ignored, but it would be misguided to discount other important factors.

1. Minutes of the second meeting of the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference, London, 28 June 1956 V.K. Krishna Menon Papers, NMML. Extracts.

The biggest development since the last war had been the break up of the old balance of power, and no new equilibrium had been established. The situation was continuously changing; and countries other than the major powers were becoming progressively more able to make a significant contribution to international relations. Such States had largely discarded the military approach. The militant policy of the United States had failed in its purpose, and the Americans' tendency to view world problems in military terms had obscured their vision of the new realities. During the last two years Russia had possessed the initiative. Whatever their motives might be, the Russian leaders continuously spoke of peace, which necessarily provoked a sympathetic response from uncommitted nations. The real strength of nations lay in their industrial and economic assets, and India sought to be strong and self-supporting. All countries had the right to arm to defend themselves but, so long as the democracies laid stress on their military strength, the initiative would remain in Russian hands. The aim of the democracies should be to develop international cooperation. In this way an atmosphere could be built up in which international disputes could be settled amicably. The alternative was to pursue military policies which would in turn create an atmosphere in which frictions would inevitably continue. The Russian leaders had stated they had no wish to interfere in the internal affairs of other countries. The democracies should do everything possible to encourage the Russian leaders to follow the path to which they had publicly committed themselves. If continued hostility was shown to the Russians they would be bound to react accordingly. The present world conditions required a new international approach to the problem of living together and there was evidence of growing doubt about the efficacy of past and present policies and of a recognition that a new situation was evolving.

Mr Nehru expressed concern at the dangers which might arise in the not too distant future if effective international control over nuclear weapons were not established. He realized the high cost of developing these weapons and the means of delivering them, but several countries were already making sufficient industrial and scientific progress to enable them to embark on the development of nuclear weapons. The acquisition of such weapons by less responsible powers would greatly add to the problems of control and would undoubtedly increase the risk of war.

Mr Nehru suggested that the possibility of the United States and the Soviet Union coming to some political agreement over the heads of other countries could not be excluded. The American and Russian peoples were not dissimilar in nature and the two major powers in the world might well decide that their mutual interests would be furthered in coming to some agreement which might not necessarily take account of the interests of the smaller countries. . . .

3. The Middle East and Algeria[1]

. . . Mr Nehru agreed about the gravity of the refugee problem, which would become increasingly difficult to solve the longer any settlement was delayed.[2] From his own talks with Arab leaders he had gained the impression that some of them would like to reach a settlement with Israel, based on some change in the existing boundaries. Any cooperative venture such as the implementation of the plan for the division of the Jordan waters would help to ease tension.[3] The Egyptian Government could play an important role in bringing about an improvement in the situation; Colonel Nasser seemed to be more moderate in outlook than most of the other Arab leaders. It must be recognized, however, that there could be no quick solution of the problem; it would be necessary to build up confidence gradually between the opposing sides. The Arab-Israel dispute could not effectively be considered out of the general context of the Middle East situation. There were divisions between the Arab countries, but the one point on which they were all united was their hostility to Israel. . . .

Mr Nehru suggested that the underlying cause of the present ferment in the countries of the Middle East was the growth of nationalist sentiment and the desire of the peoples of these countries for economic progress and improved standards of life. The democracies should encourage such tendencies. Economic progress was important, but it was not enough in itself unless the existence of powerful nationalist sentiments was also recognized and given a satisfactory

1. Minutes of the third meeting of the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference, London, 29 June 1956. V.K. Krishna Menon Papers, NMML. Extracts.
2. On 14 November 1955, Henry Labouisse, Director of the United Relief and Works Agency in the Middle East, informed the Security Council that "difficult political decisions" were a prerequisite for solving the "very human problem" of the 900,000 refugees "displaced from their homes in Palestine." According to Labouisse, the refugees caused tensions in the Middle East, for they constituted a "very large and restive proportion" of the population of the countries in which they now lived.
3. After lengthy negotiations starting in 1953 with the Arab states and with Israel, Eric Johnston, President Eisenhower's special envoy to the Middle East, prepared a plan to ensure a fair and agreed allocation of the waters of the river Jordan. However, this agreement was never signed as the Arab countries refused to sign any accord to which Israel would be a party or a beneficiary.

outlet. The countries of the Middle East were politically backward and many of their institutions were undemocratic. The apparent stability of some countries was probably superficial: their governments were unable to command popular support and there was consequently an ever-present risk of sudden upheavals. There had been a tendency for other countries to support somewhat reactionary regimes in the Middle East, often based on dynastic families. Stability could only be achieved when a government had the general support of the people in the country.

Recent developments had underlined the need to seek Russia's cooperation in bringing stability to the Middle East. These countries were close to Russia and it was natural that Russia should take an interest in them.[4] It would be inconsistent for the Western nations to seek Russia's cooperation in dealing with the Arab-Israel dispute but to try to exclude her from other parts of the Middle East. In fostering the Baghdad Pact they had probably provoked the Soviet bloc to extend their influence in the area, e.g., by supplying arms to Egypt.[5] He accepted Mr Selwyn Lloyd's assessment of the economic and social benefits which were to be provided to the countries in the Baghdad Pact, but he felt that aid of this kind would be the more valuable if it were not linked to a military alliance. It would be mistaken to suppose that reactionary regimes could be supported indefinitely by foreign money and military power.

The long-term aim of the democratic nations should be to secure the goodwill of the peoples of these countries, to encourage the liberal and democratic tendencies which were emerging there, and to give economic aid in order to improve standards of life. . . .

Mr Nehru doubted whether the Baghdad Pact could be justified as a means of safeguarding the internal development of the countries concerned from external pressures, since he did not think there was in reality any question of such outside interference. In the previous discussion on Anglo-Soviet relations he had spoken of the need for a broad approach to the problem of peace from a standpoint other than the military standpoint. The settlement of the problems in the Middle East should be approached in the same way. The military approach would not give positive or lasting results: pacts which might have been conceived for defensive purposes might be misunderstood by other countries and thus create new points of friction. . . .

4. The reference is to Egypt and Syria. Both these countries had established close economic and military links with the USSR in 1955-56.
5. In September 1955, Czechoslovakia supplied arms to Egypt, but it was well known that the USSR was the original supplier.

ALGERIA

Mr Nehru said India had made proposals calling in the first place for a ceasefire. France should then recognize Algeria as an international personality and Algeria in its turn should recognize the special position of the French colonists. If the present conflict were allowed to persist, passions would be still further aroused. He thought it hardly conceivable that the military measures now being employed would succeed in securing a lasting settlement. Outside interference could not, however, be justified: other countries could do no more than lend their good offices.

4. Cyprus and Germany[1]

Mr Nehru said that, when he had landed at Athens[2] on his way to the Meeting, the Greek Prime Minister[3] and Foreign Minister[4] had told him they felt satisfied that, with the support of the United Kingdom Government, they could persuade the Turkish Government to accept the principle of self-determination for Cyprus. They were ready to agree that the position of the Turkish minority should be safeguarded by a United Nations guarantee and that Cyprus should not be used as a military base except by the United Kingdom or the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. . . .

Mr Nehru suggested that a situation might well develop in which Western Germany, rapidly growing in power and prosperity, would feel free to choose its own path which might not necessarily be that of other Western Powers. Although there might not be a suitable testing ground, West German industrial power could well be used to manufacture nuclear weapons.

1. Minutes of the fourth meeting of the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference, London, 29 June 1956. V.K. Krishna Menon Papers, NMML. Extracts.
2. Nehru made an hour long stop at Athens on his way to London on 22 June 1956.
3. Constantine Karamanlis.
4. Evanghelos Averoff.

German rearmament was proceeding, but at a slow rate: the conscription Bill had not yet been passed into law.[5] It was planned to recruit the men for two divisions by the end of the present year, but it would be some years yet before any significant military forces were available. Meantime West Germany had been able, through her lack of heavy defence expenditure, to devote greater resources to the expansion of her trade than her competitors, and it might be that the Germans had reached the conclusion that their future power in Europe could more profitably be exercised by economic than by military means.

The future of Germany was but one part of that larger problem of a reduction of tension generally which the Meeting had already discussed. Far off though the reunification of Germany might now appear, a sudden change in the Russian attitude such as had happened over the Austrian settlement was still conceivable.

5. In May 1955, the West German Government presented to Parliament a temporary bill—the Volunteers Bill—designed to enable the government to raise the armed forces till such time as the necessary permanent legislation received parliamentary approval.

5. The Position of China[1]

Mr Nehru said the problems raised by the present position of China were perhaps the most important that had faced the world since the end of the war. They were of particular concern to India in view of her common frontier with China extending for 1,800 miles Certain facts stood out. First, the present Government of China were firmly established in the country; there was no question of their being overthrown by the Chinese Nationalists in Formosa. Indeed, any such attempt which could only be undertaken with outside help would be likely to precipitate a major war. Secondly, though China was a Communist state, Chinese nationalism was more important than Communism in providing the essential cohesive force of the new state. Thirdly, with the exception of Manchuria, China was industrially underdeveloped but she was receiving considerable help from

1. Minutes of the fifth meeting of the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference, London, 2 July 1956. V.K. Krishna Menon Papers, NMML. Extracts.

the Soviet Union and her strength would undoubtedly increase. By virtue of her size and strength China had always enjoyed considerable prestige in Asia. She had played an important part at the Bandung Conference, where she had been recognized as an important power and her prestige had been enhanced by the restrained and mature behaviour of her representatives. The United Kingdom had recognized the Peking Government[2] and so had almost all the Asian countries. The recent recognition by Egypt[3] was likely to be followed by the other Arab States. The Chinese Government were anxious to improve their relations with all other countries, including the United States.

The main issue was the relation between China and the United States. It was probable that the United States now considered China a more formidable problem than Russia. During the past two years India had advocated direct negotiations between China and the United States and had supported the idea of bringing China into the comity of nations. She had used her good offices to obtain the release of the United States Air Force prisoners previously held by China. The talks at present taking place between representatives of China and the United States at Geneva[4] had made little progress, but the fact that they were continuing indicated that neither side wanted them to break down. The United States Government were aiming at a joint declaration that neither side would employ force to settle outstanding issues. The Chinese were willing to agree provided there was a meeting of Foreign Ministers to consider these issues, and provided the situation in Formosa was not specifically excluded from the review. The Chinese would not accept that the present situation in Formosa should be perpetuated. In his opinion, the outstanding differences . . . should be capable of being resolved.

It would be impossible to solve any outstanding problem in the Far East without China's cooperation. This in turn would involve general recognition of the Peking Government and their admission to the United Nations. The persistent refusal of the United States to agree to the admission to the United Nations of representatives from Communist China was both illogical and inconsistent with the facts of the situation. The exclusion of representatives from the Peking Government diminished the stature of the Organization itself and reduced the

2. The United Kingdom recognized the People's Republic of China in January 1950 and opened an office of the chargé d'affaires in Beijing in June 1954.
3. On 16 May 1956, Egypt recognized the People's Republic of China.
4. See *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 33, pp. 467-470.

value of many of its specialized activities. It was probably true to say that their present hostility to Communist China damaged the interests of other countries more than China herself? And it forced China into closer association with Russia. The present embargo on trade with China should be brought to an end.[5] The economies of China and Japan were complementary, and the development of trade between the two countries would be to their mutual advantage. China also wanted to develop normal trade relations with the United Kingdom.

The situation of the offshore islands appeared to be quiet for the time being, but it was potentially dangerous and would be aggravated if the present talks at Geneva were to break down. Chou En-lai had repeatedly declared his desire to negotiate a peaceful settlement of the problem of Formosa, and his recent statement on the subject was consistent with these earlier declarations. The Chinese Communists were, however, opposed to the idea of two separate Chinas. The Nationalist Government, although bolstered by outside help, was weak; and the efficiency of its armed forces in Formosa was declining.

India had friendly relations with both China and the United States and had been able to act as a link between them, and she would continue to use her good offices to facilitate discussions between the two countries; but a successful outcome was dependent upon the goodwill of both sides. It would be wrong to regard China as a subordinate partner to Russia. The Chinese were proud of their independence, and the relations between them and the Russians were those of equal partners. The Chinese Government and people would be preoccupied for years to come with the agricultural and industrial development of their country. It was difficult to predict the future but it seemed unlikely that they would harbour aggressive intentions against any other country. India was confident that her policy of maintaining friendly relations with both Russia and China provided a sufficient guarantee for her own security, and she sought no additional protection. The cooperation of China was essential to any system of worldwide disarmament, since to ignore the position of China would rule out the possibility of any realistic agreement. . . .

Mr Nehru recalled that the problem of Formosa and the offshore islands had been discussed by the Commonwealth Prime Ministers at their meeting in 1955,[6] when it had been generally agreed that a valuable step towards the reduction of

5. This refers to the western strategic trade embargo imposed on China after the outbreak of the Korean war in 1950.
6. For Nehru's comments on Formosa (Taiwan) at the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference, 1955, see *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 28, pp. 168-170.

tension in the area would be for the offshore islands to be handed over to Communist China. The problem of Formosa could then be tackled at leisure in an atmosphere from which the immediate threat of war had been removed. The case for admitting Communist China to the United Nations was less a juridical than a practical one, based on the substantial and irreversible changes which had taken place in Asia. He recognized that the countries of the Commonwealth should take due heed of public opinion in the United States, but it was possible that American opinion on the question might change after the Presidential election . . . The countries of the Commonwealth should now direct their efforts to influencing opinion in the United States towards a more realistic appreciation of Communist China's situation, and the Americans should be made to realize that their continued hostility to China was contrary to their own interests. . . .

Mr Nehru said that on the mainland of China, support for the Chinese Nationalists had melted away to nothing and he agreed about the great psychological effect which the new Government of China was having on the whole of Asia. India had taken a natural interest in the way in which the development of Communist China was being carried out, for the problems of the two countries were in many ways similar. Missions had therefore been exchanged to study problems of mutual interest, such as flood control. The new Chinese Government did not regard themselves as in any way a Russian dependency: in the economic sphere they had made it plain to him that Russian assistance was being given on a strictly business footing, e.g., by loans. Equally in the political field the Russian leaders during their visit to India had indicated that problems such as that of Formosa were matters for the Chinese Government to settle.

Before the war the United States had been the most popular Western nation in China. The relations between the increasingly powerful Chinese Government and the United States had been greatly exacerbated by the latter's support of the Nationalist Government in Formosa. The present position whereby some countries recognized the Peking Government, while others still recognized the Nationalist Government in Formosa, as the Government of China, was bound to lead to embarrassments: but it was obvious that the United States could not yet be brought to accept the recognition of the Communist Government of China and their admission to the United Nations. The position of the Nationalist Government in Formosa was however indefensible, and the United States Government's support of this Government was inimical to their long-term interests.

Formosa was inhabited by a people of Chinese descent. It might be that if left to themselves they would prefer to be independent; but in any case General

Chiang Kai-shek[7] had no right to be regarded as their representative. There was no democratic government in Formosa and the Nationalist army in the island was an army of occupation. The Chinese Communist Government were inevitably suspicious of the United States argument that Formosa was a vital link in their defence chain, in that all Chinese history had shown that Formosa was the first of the stepping-stones (Formosa-Korea-Manchuria) through which her enemies had invaded China herself. The sabotage of the Indian airliner on its way to the Bandung Conference in 1955, which had been shown to be due to Formosan agents in Hong Kong, had caused a serious shock to opinion in India and China.[8] If the American position was questionable now, it would become dangerously false in the event of a collapse of the Nationalist regime, which was quite possible as a result of Communist propaganda and the uncertain future of the Nationalist cause, or in the event of an attack by Communist China on the offshore islands. There was no doubt that the Chinese could secure those islands by military force if they so desired, and the United States would then have the agonizing choice of declaring war against Communist China, which would be likely to lead to a general conflict, or of submitting to the Chinese action. Her friends should seek to safeguard the United States from so dangerous a position.

In reply to Selwyn Lloyd, Mr Nehru said that the overseas Chinese had been a big problem in Indonesia, but the Communist Government of China had declared their intention of abandoning the old Nationalist policy, whereby the overseas Chinese were regarded automatically as Chinese nationals, in favour of an arrangement whereby the overseas Chinese were given the option either of becoming nationals of China or of the country in which they lived. An agreement had been made on these lines with Indonesia and had, he understood, been promised to Burma.

7. President, Republic of China in Taiwan, 1950-75.
8. See *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 28, pp. 334-337.

6. India's Economic Progress[1]

. . . Mr Nehru said that India's economy was primarily rural, and agricultural development had therefore been one of the main objectives of the First Five Year Plan which had just been completed. This plan had been relatively modest in scale, but it had succeeded beyond expectations and had led to a considerable increase in food production. In the rural areas a Community Development Scheme had been started in 1952. This scheme was now operating in 130,000 villages and it was intended eventually to extend it throughout the country. The scheme was designed not merely to bring about an increase in agricultural production but also to better the lot and develop the character of the Indian villager by providing schools, improving sanitation and encouraging voluntary effort in providing better communications. It was a scheme peculiarly suited to underdeveloped countries and it had created much interest overseas. There had been a welcome response to it from the villagers themselves and the results so far achieved had been satisfactory. The lack of sufficient suitably trained workers was, however, making it difficult to keep pace with the enthusiasm that had been aroused.

The success of the First Five Year Plan had imbued the Indian people with confidence for the future. The emphasis in the Second Five Year Plan was on industrial development. Some provision had been made for building up cottage industries, but the main feature of the Plan was the expansion of heavy industries. The public sector of the economy would play the major role in the Plan. One of the more important developments planned was an increase in steel production from about 1½ million tons to 6 million tons a year. Three new State-owned plants were to be built with help from the Soviet Union, Germany and the United Kingdom respectively.[2]

The Second Five Year Plan would impose a great strain on the economy. It was estimated that £3,600 millions would be required over the five-year period. At present there appeared to be a gap of £850 millions. During the First Five Year Plan the Government of India had drawn on India's sterling balances to the extent of about £96 millions and they would expect to make further drawings for the Second Plan. In addition they would investigate the possibilities of

1. Minutes of the sixth meeting of the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference, London, 2 July 1956. V.K. Krishna Menon Papers, NMML. Extracts.
2. Namely, the Bhilai, Bokaro and Durgapur steel plants.

increased taxation, internal loans, borrowings from the International Bank and other international organizations, export credits, private investment and assistance from friendly Governments.

In general, the Government of India were anxious to see four developments in the future in the field of international finance and trade. First, they hoped that existing restrictions would be relaxed so that trade with the Soviet Union and other Communist countries might be increased. Secondly, they looked for a general reduction in international expenditure on armaments. Thirdly, they were strongly in favour of the establishment of a Special United Nations Fund for Economic Development since they felt that aid through an international organization of this kind might obviate some of the political complications which might arise when direct assistance was given. Fourthly, so far as concerned the flow of money from the United Kingdom, they were concerned about the high rate of interest and about certain special requirements; they also hoped that the Commonwealth Development Finance Corporation would be able to make more funds available for investment in Commonwealth countries.

7. Development of Atomic Energy[1]

. . . Mr Nehru reminded his colleagues that the need for atomic energy was likely to be particularly great in the underdeveloped countries. While in some districts of India power could probably be produced more cheaply by conventional means, there was no doubt that other districts would greatly benefit by the availability of atomic power. India had already made some progress. A small research reactor had been built,[2] and with the help of Canada a large reactor was being established[3] which it was intended should be available for training

1. Minutes of the eighth meeting of the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference, London, 4 July 1956. V.K. Krishna Menon Papers, NMML. Extracts.
2. This was the Apsara Research Reactor, built at Trombay, near Mumbai. Its construction began in 1955. The reactor went critical in August 1956.
3. This was the forty-megawatt Canada-India Reactor US (CIRUS) that Canada offered to build under the Colombo Plan. India signed an agreement with Canada to build the CIRUS Reactor in September 1955. This reactor went critical in July 1960.

technicians from other Asian countries. His Government maintained close collaboration in this field with authorities in the United Kingdom, Canada and other countries.

He was concerned about certain aspects of the development of atomic energy. First, was there not a danger that the disposal of radioactive waste in the oceans would have harmful effects? Secondly, India had taken part in the discussions which had led to the setting up of the International Atomic Energy Agency, but the work of the Agency would surely be more valuable if it were made an integral part of the United Nations, and made fully representative of all countries. The powerful new force of atomic energy should not remain the monopoly of a few countries. If countries such as China were excluded from the Agency they would not be subject to international control, and the scientific data on which the Agency would work would be incomplete. Thirdly, he was concerned lest progress in the development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes might facilitate its exploitation for military purposes. It was a cause for alarm that an increasing number of countries might engage in the production of atomic weapons. While there was no doubt that nuclear energy could be of great benefit to mankind, its menacing aspect could not be ignored. He supported the proposal that the secrecy hitherto surrounding atomic energy should be relaxed. Publicity provided a check against its misuse, and the Atomic Energy Conference at Geneva last year had underlined the advantages of free disclosure of information.[4] Finally, he drew attention to the possibly dangerous effects of nuclear radiation.

Mr Nehru also referred to press reports that the Russians had gone a long way in developing the use of the fusion process for power production. Was this not likely to provide a cheaper source of energy than that at present available? . . . .

4. A twelve-day conference on the peaceful uses of Atomic Energy commenced on 8 August 1955 in Geneva.

8. The Encouraging Trends in the Soviet Union[1]

. . . Mr Nehru agreed that there had been a change in the Russian attitude. In his view this had been developing for some years and might have become apparent earlier had Stalin not been in power. It was much more than a tactical change on the part of the Soviet Government. It stemmed from the Soviet people themselves. In the international sphere it had been evident in the new approach to such issues as, Austria, Finland and the reduction in their armed forces. It was unlikely that there would be any major alteration in the Soviet economic system. This would still develop along its own lines. There would, however, be less coercion and an increase in civil liberties.

Neither the Russian people nor the Soviet leaders wanted war. In the past there had been interference by the Soviet Government in the affairs of other nations, which had been due less to a desire to spread the Communist doctrine than to a feeling of insecurity in the Soviet Union and the need to protect themselves against potential aggressors. It was now likely that the Soviet leaders would adopt new policies as part of their wish to enter into more normal relations with other countries.

The Communist countries of eastern Europe and China would also be affected by the changes in the Soviet Union. It would be dangerous for the democracies to attempt to use these changes merely to further their own national interests, and their aim should be to do all they could to ensure that the present encouraging trends continued. . . .

1. Minutes of the ninth meeting of the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference, London, 4 July 1956. V.K. Krishna Menon Papers, NMML. Extracts.

9. Admission of China into the UN[1]

. . . Mr Nehru said that, in a statement which would inevitably represent only the views on which all members of the Commonwealth were in agreement, no Government could expect that its own point of view on a particular subject would necessarily be fully reflected. It would, however, be important to ensure that nothing in the statement conflicted with the declared policies of individual Governments so as to avoid embarrassing contradictions in subsequent interpretation. . . .

Mr Nehru said that the problems concerning the international status of Communist China were so important that here would be justifiable criticism if there was no reference to them in the final statement about the discussions at these Meetings. There was, in his view, no more vital or urgent issue than the admission of Communist China into the United Nations. Had she been a member some years ago the course of history might well have been altered; for example, the Korean war might never have occurred. The persistent obstinacy of the United States Government in supporting the discredited regime of Chiang Kai-shek in Formosa created dangers for the United States no less than for other countries. He recognized that nothing would be gained by forcing these issues with the United States at this moment but he considered that the statement should express the view that Communist China should be admitted to the United Nations.[2]

1. Minutes of the eleventh meeting of the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference, London, 5 July 1956. V.K. Krishna Menon Papers, NMML. Extracts.
2. Nehru suggested the broadening of the membership of the United Nations "to include a reference to the need for making the organization fully representative. He had in mind, particularly, the question of Chinese representation in the United Nations." This suggestion was made on 6 July. That was the day the communique for the Conference was being finalized.

(ii) The UK and Ireland

1. To G.B. Pant[1]

9, Kensington Palace Gardens
London, W. 8
26 June, 1956

My dear Pantji,

I have been here for four days now. One of these days was spent at Chequers with Sir Anthony Eden,[2] another day with the Mountbattens[3] at their country house, Broadlands, and the remaining two days in London. The Prime Ministers' Conference begins tomorrow afternoon.[4] So these four days have been spent in private conversations, not to mention some parties and going to the theatre. The English way of doing things appears rather casual. Important conversations take place after a meal and things are rather hinted at than directly discussed. Perhaps this is a more civilized way than heated arguments.

I have had a talk with Eden, chiefly about international affairs, and a talk with Sir Walter Monckton[5] who is one of the more important members of the Cabinet here. I shall be seeing them again privately. The two other important members of the Cabinet are Salisbury[6] and Macmillan.[7] R.A. Butler[8] is somehow not playing an important role now. I have also had a talk with St Laurent, Canadian Prime Minister, and Pearson, Foreign Minister of Canada. Also with Bandaranaike.[9]

1. JN Collection.
2. Prime Minister of the United Kingdom.
3. Edwina and Louis Mountbatten.
4. The seventh Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference was held in London from 27 June to 6 July 1956.
5. British Minister of Defence.
6. Lord Salisbury, Leader of the House of Lords.
7. Harold Macmillan, Chancellor of the Exchequer.
8. Lord Privy Seal.
9. Prime Minister of Sri Lanka.

June 24, 1956

FROM *"DON'T SPARE ME SHANKAR": JAWAHARLAL NEHRU*

COMMONWEALTH PRIME MINISTERS WITH QUEEN ELIZABETH II, LONDON, JULY 1956
(from l to r): J.G. Strydom (South Africa), Mohammad Ali (Pakistan), Sidney Holland (New Zealand), Louis St Laurent (Canada), Anthony Eden (UK), R.G. Menzies (Australia), Jawaharlal Nehru, S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike (Sri Lanka) and Lord Malvern (Rhodesia and Nyasaland)

All the people I have talked to are very definitely of opinion, in their various ways, that the international situation has changed greatly because of developments in the Soviet Union and there should be some response to it from their side. The chief difficulty appears to be, as always, the reaction in the United States where thinking is still more or less on the old lines, at least of those in present authority.

You must know that I have given up my intended visit to Washington.[10] On arrival here in London, I received a message from our Ambassador in Washington saying that the State Department was very anxious to postpone my visit; but they did not want to suggest it themselves. They wanted me to suggest it to Eisenhower. I had little choice in the matter and I sent a message accordingly to President Eisenhower suggesting that perhaps my visit, while he was convalescing, might be an additional burden to him and it might be better for this visit to be postponed. To that I had an immediate reply from the President agreeing to this. As a matter of fact, it appears that Eisenhower is far from well although newspaper accounts give too optimistic a view of his present condition. Recently he had a ten minute talk with the Foreign Minister of France and this exhausted him.[11]

My visit to Washington has been postponed, but Eisenhower has expressed his strong wish that I should go there later. In a sense, I am partly committed to this now. Of course much depends upon Eisenhower's recovery. Also, the later I go to the United States, the nearer will it be to the Presidential election and that is not a good thing. It is by no means certain that Eisenhower will be chosen as a Republican candidate for the Presidency although the Republicans are in a state of fright at the prospect of Eisenhower not standing.[12] Anyhow the question of my going to the United States need not be considered now and I shall certainly not go there for the next two months or more. We shall see later.

This postponement of my visit to the United States has suddenly left me with five days with nothing particular to do. I cannot change my subsequent

10. For details, see *post*, pp. 309-316.
11. G.L. Mehta, India's Ambassador to the USA, cabled to Nehru on 21 June that the French Foreign Minister, Christian Pineau, "saw the President (Eisenhower) yesterday for ten minutes but impression outside is that President felt very tired." Mehta added that doctors attending on the US President were of the opinion that "it might not be possible for President to undergo strain of long conversations for some weeks."
12. Commenting on reports about Eisenhower's decision to stand for the Presidency, Nehru wrote to G.L. Mehta on 11 July: "I suppose that he has been pushed into this by the leaders of the Republican Party who dare not face an election minus Eisenhower."

programme although I would like to do so, so as to enable me to return to India earlier. Any attempt at changing this programme would upset the arrangements in various places. I do not want to stay on in London either. I have, therefore, practically decided to pay a visit to Ireland. This is long overdue and I have repeatedly been invited and been unable to go. I am thinking therefore of going to Ireland, subject to the approval of the Irish Government, on the 7th July morning. I shall spend a day and a half in Dublin, more or less on an official visit. After that, I am taking three days off for rest somewhere in Ireland. I shall return to London for a day or so and then catch up with the rest of my programme.

I went to a theatre tonight and during the interval met some people. Among them was a big magnate of the city of London. He is the head of Liptons. He told me that he was much worried about the resignations from our State Bank,[13] that is, the resignations of Dr Matthai and Handoo.[14] He said that the old Imperial Bank was greatly respected in city circles here as a sound institution. These sudden resignations were causing much concern in the city. Some people were apparently connecting them with the conversion of the Imperial Bank into a State Bank and thought that this was a result of too much governmental interference. I told him that this had nothing to do with any governmental interference and I had no doubt that the State Bank was flourishing as before and even better. However, this made me think of the psychological reactions to these resignations. Banks depend a great deal on their prestige and the confidence they inspire. We shall, therefore, have to be careful in dealing with them as well as with the new appointments.

Vijayalakshmi[15] has got a very great reputation here in all circles. She is very popular with the public and is often cheered when she is recognized in the streets. She is also popular with the Government as well as with the Buckingham Palace. An important person was speaking to me very highly about her today. He mentioned that Krishna Menon's High Commissionership[16] had been magnificent and so was Vijayalakshmi's; but he expressed a very low opinion of the middle period when Kher[17] was here.

13. On the resignations of John Matthai and S.K. Handoo, Chairman and Managing Director respectively of the State Bank of India, see *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 33, pp. 256-257.
14. S.K. Handoo; joined the Imperial Bank in 1925 as a probationary assistant; appointed the first Indian Managing Director of the Imperial Bank, 1953; Managing Director of the State Bank of India since its inception in July 1955.
15. Vijayalakshmi Pandit, India's High Commissioner to the UK.
16. V.K. Krishna Menon was India's High Commissioner to the UK, 1947-52.
17. B.G. Kher was India's High Commissioner to the UK, 1952-54.

Mohammad Ali, Pakistan Prime Minister, on arrival here, issued a long statement dealing with almost every subject and, more particularly, with Kashmir. The newspapers only published brief extracts from it.[18]

I hope you are getting well.

Yours affectionately,
Jawaharlal

18. Krishna Menon, Minister without Portfolio, informed Nehru on 27 June, that the belief in press circles in London was that Mohammad Ali, in answer to questions by the Foreign Journalists Association on 25 June, had said that Kashmir should be discussed by the Prime Ministers. "He also implied that there was not much use in direct talks between the two of you, and that what was desired was talks in the presence of a third party." Krishna Menon added that the Pakistan briefing to the press was believed to have been in this direction, and that something similar might have been done on behalf of Anthony Eden, the British Prime Minister.

2. Towards One-World[1]

My Lord Mayor,[2] Your Grace, Your Excellencies, Your Eminence, Prime Ministers of the Commonwealth, My Lords, Ladies and Gentlemen,

Fifty-one years ago, I came to London for the first time. I spent a good part of my boyhood and youth in this city and became a part of it during those impressionable years. Since that period, half a century ago, I was engaged in many activities connected with the freedom of my own country and in later years I have had the privilege of coming here in a different capacity. Standing today in this historic hall, I feel moved and I am deeply grateful to you, My Lord Mayor, and to the Common Council of the City of London, for the high honour of the Freedom of the City which you have invited me to accept this morning.

1. Speech after being conferred with the Freedom of the City of London, Guildhall, London, 3 July 1956. JN Collection.
2. Cuthbert Ackroyd.

I am also grateful to the Chamberlain[3] for the kind words in which he has referred to me.

I feel happy and privileged to find my place as a Freeman of London in the long and distinguished line of men who have been honoured by your City for their services to their countries, to the world and to mankind.

Conscious as I am that the distinction you have conferred on me is a personal tribute, I am, however, well aware that your decision to confer the Freedom of the City on me, the Prime Minister of India, is a token of regard for India and her people and a happy reminder of the present free association of our two lands.

Three and a half centuries ago, from the confines of this Free City of London, its merchants sought adventure and fortune in our land. They called themselves "Merchant Adventurers" and they soon became the Honourable East India Company. Over the years, however, the Company ceased to be traders and found themselves the rulers of India. This phase of the relationship of our two countries passed and India came under the British Crown under Queen Victoria ninety-nine years ago. This was the second phase of our relationship and an empire was established.

The next phase soon followed. The great human urges and desires of freedom swept India and developed into a powerful national movement. There were legislative and institutional reforms and many administrators gave devoted service to India. These were, however, inadequate substitutes for the desire for national independence. There were conflicts and I, in common with vast numbers of our countrymen, participated in our struggle for freedom. But we may both happily recall that even these conflicts were of a civilized character. Thanks to the genius of our two peoples and their respective historic backgrounds, and, so far as India is concerned, to the leadership, the wisdom and the great moral and spiritual outlook of our great beloved leader Mahatma Gandhi, no hatreds were nursed and ill will was not fostered.

The tide of events ebbed and flowed. Three years ago, we passed to the newest phase of our relationship. The empire has passed into history and the fraternity of our free association has been born, linked to each other and to others by bonds of mutual interest and respect and rooted in the independence and sovereignty of our peoples. This is our common achievement. What we have established and, even more, the way we have established it, is unique in the annals of nations and peoples. Our relationship can play a great and vital part and serve well our two peoples, the Commonwealth and mankind as a whole.

3. Irving B. Gane.

The last few years have witnessed great changes in India. Our people and government, over which I have the honour to preside, have adventured in the fields of economic and political development and in the promotion of our fraternal relations, with confidence in ourselves, and with the awareness that in cooperation and friendship lies our best security.

India has become a great democracy, perhaps the largest democracy in the world. She has fashioned for herself a constitutional structure fit for free peoples, with free Parliaments and responsible Executives based on free elections and open debate. These institutions and the modes of life and thought that they follow are again a strong element in the free association between our countries. Political freedom in India has been followed by economic development. While we have a long way yet to go and much progress to make, this development is proceeding in an orderly fashion and on the basis of freedom and social justice which we have set out in the Directive Principles of our Constitution.

It has been our good fortune that in our endeavours we have received much goodwill from the peoples of the world, and not the least, of this country. For this we are profoundly grateful. As among our Commonwealth States, the Commonwealth Parliamentary institutions and the exchange of ideas amongst us, and the Colombo Plan are part of our unique relationship. It is our profound desire and hope that these relations will grow more and more and that we shall lend strength to each other in fellowship and for the service of our peoples in the world.

We have in our time and in our way, during our long history of thousands of years, welcomed and absorbed other cultures. We take pride in thinking that we have also to some extent imparted them. The one-world of tomorrow, which must come despite whatever clouds there may be on the horizon, can only be one where national cultures and interests are intermingled in the culture and interest of the human race. Therefore, we must seek wisdom and knowledge, friendship and comradeship wherever we can find them.

Our generation is a troubled one. We have passed into an era where great forces and energies, social and physical, greater than anything we have known, stand on the threshold of large-scale release—the atomic age. We could profit by them and indeed we can only survive them by cooperation and by the equation of means to ends. It is only through right means that right ends can be achieved. Those great forces can be used for the benefit of humanity as well as for evil and disastrous ends. It is only by tolerance and compassion that we can overcome the evil with which the atomic age threatens to overwhelm us.

Two thousand three hundred years ago, an Emperor of India, Asoka, gave a message to his people and inscribed it on rocks and stones which exist today. This message was a message of tolerance of other faiths and other opinions. He

has said in these inscriptions that persons of other faiths should be suitably honoured. Acting in this manner, one certainly exalts one's own faith and helps persons of other faiths. Acting in a contrary manner, one injures one's own faith and also does disservice to others.

My Lord Mayor, to these ends, with faith and fellowship, may your people and ours dedicate themselves.

3. To G.B. Pant[1]

9 Kensington Palace Gardens
London, W. 8
11 July 1956

My dear Pantji,
On return from Ireland today, I received your letter of the 5th July.

Ireland was a complete contrast to England. It is a quiet, somewhat sleepy country which lives very much still in the past. Almost all conversation is about the Rising of 1916 and the Civil War of the twenties and of jail experiences. Naturally we had much in common and I was myself dragged back in mind to our own experiences in the twenties and thirties and forties.

The Irish people are extraordinarily affectionate and hospitable and, in spite of many differences, there was a feeling of kinship. One of their major problems today is the way their young men and women are going out of the country to America and England and other places. In fact, their population according to their last census has actually gone down a little although the birthrate is a very high one.[2] It is extraordinary that Irishmen who go to America or elsewhere make good in high places. In Ireland, however, things move slowly. I talked about this to many people. The only reasons that they could give were the climate which is rather soporific, though pleasant, and the hold of Roman Catholicism on the people. . . .

1. JN Collection. Extracts.
2. The provisional figures of the census conducted in April 1956 revealed that the population of Ireland was 2,894,82 — a decline of 65,771 since the census of 1951. However, the natural increase of population was 9.2 per 1,000 annually in the period 1951-56, compared with 5.5 per 1,000 during 1926-36.

I shall not write to you much now about the Prime Ministers' Conference in London. As usual, there were many conflicts of views and ultimately some kind of a compromise communique was issued at the end.

I shall be leaving London day after tomorrow for Germany and within twelve days I hope to see you in New Delhi. The German visit is rather a strenuous one. I gather that I have to speak on eight different occasions, some of them very important ones. This will be a ticklish affair because of the German problem.

As you must know, I had a long talk with Mohammad Ali, Prime Minister of Pakistan, in London.[3] The talk was very friendly but, as expected, it led nowhere.

Today's papers announce that Eisenhower will stand for the presidentship. I am rather worried about the possibility of my having to go to Washington. I just do not know when I can do so and whether I should do so. In a sense, I am rather committed. The only possible time appears to be in the first half of September, but that is so near the elections that normally it would not be the right time.

I see that you are having a great deal of trouble and worry about the Punjab. I have received long telegrams asking for an enquiry into the Hoshiarpur affair.[4] Normally I should have thought that an enquiry was desirable; but I am not acquainted with all the circumstances.

Yours affectionately,
Jawaharlal

3. For Nehru's record of his talk with Mohammad Ali, see *post*, pp. 376-378. G.B. Pant stated in his letter to Nehru on 5 July that in spite of Mohammad Ali's efforts to raise the Kashmir issue "in season and out of season he does not seem to have received any encouraging response." Pant added that some "die-hard papers, which have always been hostile to us and feel a certain amount of irritation and annoyance at the respect and affection which you have widely won, have tried to boost him, but I gather, with little success."
4. On 13 June 1956, a public meeting organized in Hoshiarpur by the District Congress Committee to explain the Regional Formula for Punjab was disrupted by the Maha Punjab Samiti protesters. The police resorted to lathi-charge injuring seventy persons. The Maha Punjab Samiti and the Arya Samaj demanded an inquiry into the incident, alleging that the police had acted at the instigation of Amar Singh, a deputy minister in the Partap Singh Kairon cabinet.

4. To Anthony Eden[1]

London
12 July 1956

My dear Sir Anthony,
I came back yesterday from my four days' visit to Ireland and tomorrow I am leaving for Germany. Before I leave, I should like to express to you my grateful thanks. My daughter and I have had, in spite of the work we had to do, an enjoyable time in England. Indira has probably been working much harder than I have been, visiting all kinds of schools, reformatories, prisons, etc.

You might be interested in the following extract from a message I have received from our Ambassador[2] in Moscow, who had a long talk with Bulganin and Khrushchev recently. They were anxious to know what had happened at the Commonwealth Conference. In particular, they said that they were happy to learn that the United Kingdom Government now had a far greater appreciation than before of recent trends in the Soviet Union. Khrushchev said: "Evidently our visit to Britain has done some good."[3] Bulganin spoke very appreciatively of your kindliness and readiness to listen unperturbed to views differing from your own.

Khrushchev said that when he met Mollet,[4] he told him that while in India he had noticed how Great Britain had earned the friendship of the Indian people by leaving India at the proper time and in the proper way. The reference was of course to Algeria.

All good wishes,

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. JN Collection.
2. K.P.S. Menon.
3. Nikolai Bulganin, Prime Minister of the USSR, and Nikita Khrushchev, First Secretary of the Soviet Communist Party, visited the United Kingdom from 18 to 27 April 1956.
4. Guy Mollet, the Prime Minister of France, paid an official visit to the USSR from 15 to 19 May 1956.

(iii) West Germany

1. Peaceful Methods of Solving Problems[1]

Herr Bundeskanzler, Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen,

This is not my first visit to Germany. My first visit took place nearly forty-nine years ago,[2] nearly half a century ago, and that is a long time ago. But I have come to Germany after many long years and much has happened here since then and I have been greatly looking forward to coming here and I am happy that you, Sir, Mr Chancellor, were good enough to invite me to come here on this occasion.

Germany, as you have said, Mr Chancellor, has had a peculiar relation to India in the past, in cultural, literary and linguistic ways. Probably, German scholars did more to bring knowledge of the Sanskrit language and its literature to Europe than any other scholars of Europe. I know that many of our own Indian scholars in Sanskrit were, oddly enough, trained in Germany, that is to say, they learned their art of critical analysis in Germany. They learned the language in India but learned to apply modern methods of critical analysis in Germany. So there has been this bond. But apart from that, there have been many causes to make us think of Germany often enough and you have referred, Mr Chancellor, to our growing relations in trade and commerce. Indeed, as India grows, as she is growing, she is bound to develop her relations, her trade and commerce and other contacts with other countries. And we are happy, and we shall be happier still, if our relations and contacts with Germany grow. As you know, we are struggling very hard in India to raise our people. We know it is a very difficult piece of work and we feel, we are determined, and we are convinced that we shall succeed. Indeed, there is no alternative to success. Therefore, we must achieve it and, I think, recent years have shown that we can succeed in the Second Five Year Plan as we succeeded in the First. If we do so, then we shall

1. Reply to a welcome address by Chancellor Konrad Adenauer, Bonn, 13 July 1956. JN Papers (M.O. Mathai), NMML.
2. In his *Autobiography* (1936), Nehru referred to his visit to Berlin "in the summer of 1909."

have established a firm basis for future progress. We have taken up a tremendous task and we seek goodwill and cooperation of other countries, notably countries more technically advanced, as Germany is.

You have referred, Mr Chancellor, to the foreign policy of Germany. Everybody knows that the German problem is not only a vital problem in Europe, but is a vital world problem. We in India seldom presume to tell others what they should do. We wish to work in all humility in our own country, and we would rather have spent all our energy in building up our own country then in getting entangled in world problems. But we know that no country can remain isolated and away from them. Some problems inevitably affect us more than others, for geographical reasons: for example, problems of Asia, problems of the Far East. Europe does not affect us in the same way, but we know that European problems are world problems, and on their solution depends the peace of the world and the progress of the world. Therefore, inevitably, and for other reasons also, we realize fully the very great importance of what is called the German problem.

You have said, Sir, something which, if I may say with all respect, I have listened to with great satisfaction. You have laid stress on the fact that the way to solve a problem should be through peaceful methods. I think that if that is realized and accepted by all countries, the solution of the problem itself would become far easier. Everyone knows that it is fear and suspicion that come in the way. And fears and suspicions are not solved by threats and by measures which are intended perhaps to have a certain coercive effect, because these increase the fears instead of lessening them and we get into this vicious circle. I do not presume to offer remedies for the world's ills. We are working in our own limited sphere in India and offering, where it is possible, such help and cooperation as we have in other problems such as we did in Indo-China, Korea and other places, because we realized that every country should help in this process. And I am sure that if what you said, Sir, is accepted, these problems must be solved by peaceful methods, then most fears and suspicions will lessen very greatly, and I hope, ultimately, almost disappear. And problems that seem very difficult to us will move towards a solution.

It does naturally seem a little odd that these problems which might be solved in a spirit of goodwill, yet remain unsolved. And such is the legacy of past conflicts that countries are afraid of each other, and because they are afraid, they increase their strength, military or otherwise, and again this acts on some other country, and so, instead of moving towards a solution, we get more entangled in knots of suspicions.

This country, Sir, has, it is often said, performed something like a miracle in the recovery of the past few years after the terrible destruction of the war. That is a very remarkable feat. The people which can do that, can do anything, and I

have no doubt that the great problems that confront Germany will find a solution, and I hope earnestly that that solution will be through peaceful methods, which not only solve a problem, but leave no other problem behind, because it is solved in a spirit of cooperation.

Today is my first day here in Germany, and already I have sensed the warm hospitality of you, Sir, and your Government, and the people here. I am looking forward greatly to my remaining stay of four days here. But I should like to express now my grateful thanks to you, Sir, and your Government and the people of Germany, and my good wishes to them.

May I ask you, Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen, to drink to the President of the Federal Republic,[3] to the Chancellor and to Indo-German relations and improvement.

3. Theodor Heuss.

2. Ties that Bind Us[1]

Herr Bundespresident, Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen,
You have referred, Sir, to a variety of subjects of deep significance. But first of all may I convey to you, Mr President, the greetings and good wishes of our President to you, Sir, and to the people of Germany. In coming to Germany on this occasion I have fulfilled a long felt wish. I am only sorry that my visit is too short to get, if I may say so, the full benefit of a reacquaintance with Germany. I came here for the first time I think forty-eight years ago and came again on several occasions. The last time was long ago, I think twenty years ago. And a great deal has happened since these twenty years, and so I was anxious and eager to see for myself what Germany today was like.

Germany or the people of Germany have distinguished themselves in a wide variety of fields in the past. They have distinguished themselves in the arts of

1. Address at a luncheon hosted by Theodor Heuss, President of the Federal Republic of Germany, Bonn, 14 July 1956. JN Papers (M.O. Mathai), NMML.

peace and in war, in philosophy, in science, in technology, in literature. In every great field of human activity Germans have distinguished themselves. Then it is obvious that whatever might happen, whatever circumstance might bring itself before them or before the world, a people with such abounding vitality and ability must play a very great part in the world. And so even from a narrow point of view, apart from my feelings in regard to Germany, feelings of friendship, I was anxious to come here to understand this very vital and important part of the world as it is today. Although my visit is a short one I think certainly it will profit me and make me understand the people and the problems of this great country.

We ourselves in India are both a very old country and a very new country. Old in history, old in customs and philosophy, a succession of thoughts, sensations, experience going back thousands of years. And yet at the same time rather new and experimenting now in new fields. We have certainly in the course of our history dabbled a great deal in philosophy and in wandering about the realms of thought, though perhaps it is not true as some people imagine that the chief function of the people of India was to philosophize. They had to do the business of living, too. Anyhow, the business of living has become very important for us today, and so we framed all kinds of five year plans and the like for this business of living not for a few individuals but for 360 million people in the country. And that is a big task, and we are utterly absorbed in it and try to seek the way with such wisdom and experience as we possess, adding to it such experience of others and such advice of others that we can get, realizing of course that a country and a people stands and advances by its own efforts, though such help as it gets is always welcome. But if it cannot stand or run itself nobody else is going to give it the capacity to stand or walk or run. We have to shoulder this burden ourselves. That indeed was one of the principal lessons that our great leader Mahatma Gandhi taught us. The lesson of standing on our own feet and at the same time cooperating in friendship with others and learning from them, the lesson of keeping the doors and windows of our minds open for all the winds that blow but not allow ourselves to be blown off our feet. It is sometimes difficult to keep a proper balance, and we may err as we have often erred in the past. Anyhow, we try to do so, and in this world of travail and torment to which you have referred we try to the best of our ability not to be swept off our feet either by any particular policy or ideology or the excitement of the moment. I do not say we succeed always, but anyhow, that attempt is there.

Another thing that our leader Mahatma Gandhi impressed upon us and our country was that in trying for right ends one should never forget right means. Ends by themselves are not enough. The way to the ends, the means adopted, are of the highest importance. Otherwise wrong means may lead to wrong ends and not the ends sought. We are perhaps very far from being worthy of the lessons

taught by our leader and we have often failed, but at any rate we have made an effort to remember them and to try to follow them.

And so in the modern world the first thing is for us to look after the business of living of these 360 million people and try to get rid of their poverty and unhappiness and misery, and at the same time not to forget the deeper aspects of life, the cultural, the spiritual or the like. And perhaps in the world today which appears to be in a greater stage of transition than at any previous period of history it is important to think, to remember these standards and values of life which appear to be slipping away from us.

We live on what is called the threshold of the atomic age and science and technology make tremendous progress, and nobody quite knows where they will lead humanity to, to great advance or to disaster. Inevitably we are driven even in India to worship at the shrine of technology and science because in themselves they are good unless they are misused. But sometimes it does seem to me that this tremendous advance in technology might unpace completely the development of men's minds and thereby bring trouble in the end. However, we can try, as we do in all countries, to keep pace with this advance in our minds and not allow ourselves to be swept away by old or new hates and not allow ourselves to be swept again into the ways of violence. I imagine that if we could keep away from violence and try to free our minds from hatreds we would also get rid of the other great affliction of the age, and that is fear. And if that is so, perhaps the path of humanity might be easier.

You have, Sir, referred to me as a political personality. I suppose I am that, but I am that by compulsion of events, not by choice. And perhaps I would have been happier if events had not compelled me into the political field quite so much as they have done. You referred in your speech to coexistence and pointed out that coexistence, though obviously unexceptionable and good, might still be based on something that is not right or just or happy or normal, if I may say so with respect. It is obvious that you cannot treat abnormality, try to make it normal. If somebody had asked me that you must accept coexistence with India, if it was not free, I would not have accepted that because I wanted my freedom in India. That is true, but the point, I suppose, is how we can right the world's ills or abnormalities. I suppose most intelligent people would agree that the way to right them by violent methods and wars has proved a failure in the past. Whatever it did in the past, in the present or in the future it is likely to be an infinitely more catastrophic thing. If we rule out that way of solving problems then the only alternative is the peaceful effort of solving problems, the peaceful approach. If we have the peaceful approach then it seems to me to follow logically that our attempt should be to create a climate of peace. If there is a climate of conflict and hatred then, even though we are not indulged in the ultimate violence of

war, we remain enveloped in the atmosphere of conflict, and that leads to fear, suspicions and hatred or it follows them. And so it becomes necessary to follow up the idea of solving problems peacefully, to do that in a peaceful manner. There is a difference between the two: peace can be non-war, and peace can be, well, the opposite of war. Non-war does not take one very far, because we live on the verge of war as the world has often done to its disadvantage. And therefore—I speak with all humility and I am merely venturing to express our own thoughts in this matter and not advising anybody, I am not in a position nor do I have this capacity—and therefore we have felt strongly in India that if we are to have a peaceful solution of problems we should endeavour to have a certain change in our mental outlooks, people in every country. I do not pretend to say that our mental outlooks in India are very advanced or very high. I do not mean that at all. But I think there is something in the preamble to the UNESCO Charter which says—I forget the words—that wars begin to rise in the minds of men.[2] It is therefore the minds of men that have to be approached to root out the seeds of war. Now all this, of course, is very complicated and may sound pretentious nonsense. Perhaps it is to some extent. But I believe there is some truth in it also at the same time.

In any event in the solution of the world's problems it is obvious to me that the leaders and the people of Germany have a most vital part to play as they have done in the past, and so far as we are concerned in India, we shall consider it a high privilege to cooperate in all endeavours for peace and peaceful settlement of problems and for the progress of humanity and our own people.

I am very grateful to you, Mr President, for your kind and gracious words. I can assure you that I shall treasure them, and I hope that India and Germany will profit by their mutual interchanges and cooperation.

Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen, may I ask you to drink to the health of the President of the Federal Republic of Germany.

2. "Since wars begin in the minds of men, it is in the minds of men that the defences of peace must be constructed."

3. Press Conference[1]

Question: Do you share the unanimous view of the German Parliament that the German Federal Government is the only Government legitimately authorized to speak for the whole of Germany?

Jawaharlal Nehru: The gentleman asking me this question wants me to plunge headlong into the sea before I have learnt to swim.

Q: The communique that was issued at the end of the Commonwealth Conference contained one sentence to the effect that the Prime Ministers assembled in London regretted that no progress had been achieved in the matter of German reunification. I had later on an opportunity to ask a few English or British Members of Parliament what that sentence meant. And they said that the Prime Ministers also said that the reunification of Germany was a touchstone of Soviet political sincerity. May I ask you to comment first of all on the meaning of your sentence as you see it, and, secondly, this being a touchstone of Soviet policy.

JN: The communiques issued after the Commonwealth Conference are always remarkable, more for what they do not say than for what they say. The Commonwealth Conference is a gathering of Prime Ministers who have much in common and who also differ in many ways in their opinions. Nevertheless, we meet together and discuss many matters frankly and learn each other's viewpoints and then express in a communique some general outcome of our talks. The phrase to which reference has been made, that no progress had been made towards German unity, is quite representative of our thinking, that is, we should have liked progress to have been made towards that. The inference—the other inference to which some reference was made about this or any other subject being the touchstone of Soviet sincerity—that is a matter which I think the individual Prime Minister who said so went beyond his brief.

Q: Discussions are often held about the morality or otherwise of neutrality. Can you tell us something about it?

1. At the Federal Press Office, Bonn, 14 July 1956. JN Papers (M.O. Mathai), NMML.

JN: I don't understand this question, which you wish me to discuss or to say something about what is called neutrality. I am afraid when we enter into the religious or ethical sphere, opinions differ. People belong to different religions. If politicians begin speaking in terms of religious dogmas, as sometimes they do,[2] then it becomes a little difficult to deal with the question. I don't quite know what neutrality means. I thought that the word neutrality comes in when there is war. It is a new use of it in peacetime. I can understand a neutral nation in war or a belligerent nation in war. I do not understand a neutrality in peacetime. Every country is neutral in peacetime. Therefore, it is a misuse of the term neutrality in peacetime; it shows a confirmed war-mentality. The person who can't think in terms of peace, but can only think in terms of war—well, so far as we are concerned, we do not think in terms of war, and therefore the word neutral has no significance to us. If the word means that a country should adopt a certain policy of another country, that is a matter of that country's government. If a country wants to impose its policy on another country, that is domination, and that is a bad thing. If a country thinks that inevitably another country must follow its policy, that is dogma, in the religious sense applied to politics, which is bad. I do not believe in dogmas, religious, political, ideological or any other.

Q: At the Bandung Conference[3] your country and yourself have been one of the most prominent and most important people and persons. You managed in Bandung to get countries together from different power blocs, and countries which did not belong to any power bloc at all. Has it been possible since that time to unfreeze the rigid situation that was brought about by the existence of these power blocs?

JN: Yes, I think it did do some good in that respect. It did bring countries which were entirely opposed to one another nearer to each other. I can't say that it solved problems of South East Asia, of course not. But it made them a little easier of solution.

2. Talking to reporters at the London airport on 6 July 1956, Nehru stated: "I am sorry to say that Dulles criticized neutralism too strongly and went so far as to call it 'immoral'." Referring to comments made by the US Secretary of State, Dulles, and the US Vice President, Richard Nixon, Nehru said they had failed to understand the "real meaning of neutralism." Dulles had said in Washington on 9 June that, "neutrality was an immoral and short-sighted conception." For Nixon's remarks on neutralism, see *ante*, p. 317.
3. The Asian-African Conference was held at Bandung, Indonesia, from 18 to 24 April 1955.

Q: Do you think that in the 20th century each nation has a right to self-determination? And if so, what do you think of the persistent British efforts to suppress the old and ancient nation on the island of Cyprus?

JN: It is rather difficult to answer a question in general terms like that of self-determination. Certainly, one is in favour of self-determination but suppose a few villagers ask for self-determination, well, or a small area, in Germany, would you consider self-determination of half a dozen villagers in Germany? It would look absurd. Therefore, while the principle of self-determination is, generally speaking, correct, it cannot be carried to extremes. Other considerations also come in, area, etc. This, what I have said, is a general remark. It has nothing to do with Cyprus. Now I, come to Cyprus, I am not an authority on Cyprus. Broadly speaking, I am all in favour of the freedom of Cyprus. And I hope that that freedom will come to them. But there are obviously some difficulties, and, no doubt people here know, as between the Greek and the Turkish inhabitants there, in Turkey, and the Treaty of Lausanne, and various other considerations.[4] Therefore, it becomes a little difficult for me to give a straightforward answer to what should be done in Cyprus now, except to say that I should like Cyprus to have its freedom.[5]

I would add that the problem has been much complicated by violence and terrorism and counter-violence.[6] Whenever violence is used in this way it makes a problem much more difficult for a solution.

4. At the Congress of Berlin (1878), the Ottoman Empire placed Cyprus under British administration and, in 1914, Britain annexed it outright. By the Treaty of Lausanne, 1923, Turkey surrendered all claims to territories of the Ottoman Empire occupied by the non-Turks. The Greeks were confirmed in possession of all the Aegean islands except Imbros and Tenedos which were returned to Turkey.
5. Under British rule the movement among the Greek Cypriot population for union (ENOSIS) with Greece was a constant source of tension. Agitation flared into violence in 1954 and 1955, when a Greek Cypriot organization (EOKA), led by Colonel George Grivas, launched a campaign of widespread terrorism. Tension and terror mounted, especially after the British deported Archbishop Makarios III in March 1956. The conflict was aggravated by Turkey's support of the Turkish Cypriot demands for partition of the island.
6. There were intensified terrorist attacks in Cyprus in May-June 1956, which resulted in the death of a number of British servicemen, Turkish Cypriot policemen and Greek Cypriot civilians. The attacks on Turkish Cypriot policemen led to retaliatory Turkish attacks against Greek Cypriot shops and premises. As a result, the British decided to separate the Greek and Turkish areas of the capital Nicosia with barbed wire.

Q: You are going to France after leaving Germany and would you eventually consider the possibility to offer your help in settling another problem, and you probably know already what I mean.

JN: I am afraid there is a misunderstanding. I am not a professional helper and mediator offering my wares to all and sundry.

If we had our way, we would not interfere in anything at all just as we do not want to be interfered in our affairs. It is only when, owing to circumstances, we feel that we can be of some help, and people want us to be of help, then we do not wish to keep away. So far as Algeria is concerned, some weeks ago I made a statement in the Indian Parliament and made some suggestions in it.[7] They were not suggestions for any particular settlement. They were more or less these: First, a ceasefire, because it is no good going on killing each other. Secondly, that the parties should meet together and discuss matters, that is, the French Government and the Algerian nationalists. Thirdly, that separate individuality of Algeria should be recognized by the French Government. Fourthly, that the Algerian nationalists should recognize that the French settlers in Algeria for a long time have as much a right to be there as anybody else. And they should have full rights. These were broadly our suggestions. We did not suggest what the settlement should be. That is for them to decide. But before you arrive at a settlement you have to stop fighting and that is what we suggested. And I still hope that something on those lines might be agreeable to the parties, to the French Government and to the other parties. Nobody, no one has rejected our suggestions yet.

Q: In case the Federal Government approaches you with a request to act as mediator in order to assist in the reunification of Germany, would you make an approach to the four occupation powers, and what would be your ideas and your views if you were approached in this way?

JN: Well, first of all, these hypothetical questions are not usually dealt with by sensible politicians. I do not see any reason why India or I should be approached in this way. This is not the way things are done. Things are done either on the diplomatic level, or informally and sometimes they yield results. When they have led to some result, then formal approaches are made; otherwise one gets into a knot and can't untie it.

7. For Nehru's statement of 22 May 1956 in Parliament, see *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 33, pp. 481-483.

Q: May I ask you in that context whether you have discussed the question of the reunification this morning in your talks with the Chancellor?

JN: This question, the German problem, has been referred to in almost every talk we have had with anybody here. And it was referred to in the course of the conversation. . . . today also by the German Chancellor.[8]

Q: May I ask you, Mr Prime Minister, whether during your visit to Germany you have already had an opportunity of seeing something of the beauty of this country and to sense and feel that warm reception which the people undoubtedly gave you?

JN: I came to Germany first, before many of you, ladies and gentlemen, were born. I think I came here first in 1908. That is what it is—48 years ago. I came several times afterwards, but I have not been here for 20 years now. Last time I came was 1936, and I have always welcomed the opportunity of coming here. It is a very beautiful country with a very charming and friendly people.

Q: May I ask you on your views concerning the possibilities for intensifying economic cooperation between the two countries?

JN: As a matter of fact, for the last two or three years or so, there has been a great progress made in economic cooperation between Germany and India and yesterday and this morning we were discussing this and I was very happy to learn of some proposals and suggestions made on behalf of the German Government to help us in training our people in India and here.

Q: Do you think, Mr Prime Minister, that the countries situated in the centre of Europe can remain equally free from alliances as your country is trying to remain?

JN: I realize that the geographical situation of a country makes a difference, and it is not for me to say what another country has to do to preserve its freedom, for it is a difficult question for me to even suggest an answer, but what I would

8. The joint communique of 17 July on the talks held in Bonn between Nehru and Adenauer stated, "The two heads of Government discussed the German question . . . The Indian Prime Minister expressed his understanding and sympathy for the wish of the German people for peaceful restoration of their national unity, which would be simplified by reduction of existing tensions. . . ."

suggest for your consideration is this: that in the modern age with the atomic weapons, war has become far too dangerous even for persons who like war. Therefore all the leaders of the great nations say that there must be no war. If there is to be no war, no major war, then small wars should also not take place, because small wars lead to big wars. If, therefore, you rule out small wars and big wars, then the approach has to be by peaceful methods to solve problems. There are problems of course that require solution. It may take some time to solve them, but it is better to spend that time and solve them peacefully than gamble with war. It is not a gamble; it means destruction. We have seen two great world wars which were meant to solve problems. Apart from the tremendous destruction and misery they caused, they produced more problems than they were set out to solve. So that is no solution from the purely technical point of view. We have arrived at a stage when the method, I am expressing my opinion, when the method of seeking security through means which are essentially insecure and which lead to insecurity is illogical. Therefore, other methods should be sought, and those are peaceful methods. But this is a broad proposition and suggested for your consideration. It is not for me to advise other countries as to what in their particular circumstances they should do.

Q: India plays an important part in the United Nations. Now some European Governments have suggested that the United Nations Organization should be made use of for the purpose of distributing economic assistance in the under-developed countries, and that they should exclusively handle all this assistance and aid. What do you think of such a proposal?

JN: The proposal before the United Nations or one of their organizations is, that there should be some organization which is in brief called SUNFED.[9] I forget what SUNFED means but something "Special United Nations Fund for Undeveloped Countries". I have got it. Special was put in there, otherwise it sounded like unfed. Well, I think it is a very good idea for a variety of reasons, one of them being that if the United Nations does it, it has no political significance, but that does not mean that that should be the exclusive way of doing it. There are other ways too. Two countries may deal with each other directly. There are other ways. Now we have the Colombo Plan in South East Asia, by roundabout countries which is a very good plan which has done good work. We have dealt with, so far as India is concerned, with countries directly like the United States, like the United Kingdom, Canada and other countries.

9. See *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 32, p. 479.

There are many ways but we do consider that it is a good idea for the United Nations to undertake this work also.

Q: Did the Federal Government offer you a long-term credit? If yes, how much?

JN: No, there has been no such offer considered or made. There are various arrangements always on business lines, e.g., German experts are building a large iron and steel plant in India. There are some arrangements with regard to that; it is a business-like arrangement. And in fact there are quite a number of things being done by German technicians and experts in India. So far as I know, they are all in business-like terms. I just hinted earlier that some suggestions have been made, offers made on behalf of the Federal Government for the training of Indian technicians here and in India. But there has been no question of a long-term credit.

Q: This is the first time I believe that you met Chancellor Adenauer. If yes, what impression do you have of him?

JN: Chancellor Adenauer is a very striking and impressive person, and I have been impressed by him.

Q: What do you think of the efforts made in Europe for integration, first of all in the economic field, bearing in mind the source of atomic energy, and in the political field?

JN: These are subjects of high interest and importance but I really do not feel competent to deal with them. Europe is very very important in the scheme of things in the world. But my problems are more Asian problems with which I have to deal. So far as atomic energy is concerned, it is a world problem. And there is no doubt that some efforts should be made to control its misuse so that it might be applied for peaceful purposes.

Q: Are there any chances existing of a new conference along the line of the Bandung Conference?

JN: No, not at present.

Q: Can you say anything about the purpose and the significance of your meeting with Tito and Nasser in Brioni in a few weeks?

JN: The fact that we three will be meeting in Brioni is rather accidental. On my way back from Europe I decided to meet Marshal Tito for a day. I did not know that President Nasser would be there. But after this was fixed I learned that President Nasser was travelling about in Yugoslavia. As he was there, this meeting was made—so there is no very special purpose about our meeting. But of course, when we meet we shall discuss common problems as friends do, and try to understand them more in the light of what each other says.

Q: What are your views on that link that seems to exist between disarmament on the one hand and political questions on the other hand? Should one not rather endeavour to deal with disarmament separately, or do you think that there are certain inseparable links between the two and that political conditions must be fulfilled before disarmament is possible or vice versa?

JN: All these things are rather tied up with each other. Political questions arise when one might have two reasons. One is some national conflicts in regard to a particular matter, conflict of national interest; secondly, national fears. National fears are very intimately connected with armament and disarmament. If national fears could be removed or lessened, then political questions could be dealt with more easily. Probably, most of these things have to be taken together. But I should imagine that it would be very helpful in the solution of national problems, if some progress was made in regard to disarmament.

Q: Could you tell us what is the yardstick you use in determining whether or not any given Government merits diplomatic recognition?

JN: The main consideration is that a Government is stable and other minor considerations also play their part sometimes in accelerating or delaying recognition. But the major thing is that a Government is functioning and is likely to function.

Q: Are you interested in an extension of cultural relations between India and Germany and did you have conferences on that subject while you were in Germany?

JN: Of course I am interested in that. We have had no special conference on that but in a sense there have been cultural relations between Germany and India for a longer period than any country in Europe, excepting England which had a special relation because it governed India. I was told only today that the

University of Bonn first appointed a professor[10] of Sanskrit, or Indology, in 1818, that is, a long time ago. So we would welcome cultural relations and exchanges.

Q: I presume that you have now learnt how to swim and that you are now able to plunge into the deep sea. May I perhaps now repeat my former question in a somewhat different form: Would you think that those commentators were right who think and who say that your government will recognize the Pankow government,[11] the Soviet zone government of Germany, or are those right who say that you will recognize the Federal German Government?

JN: I don't know what you mean by recognizing the Federal Government. I can tell you what the present position is about East Germany. So far as diplomatic contacts go, we have none. We have certain trade contacts. We bought something from them and we have sold something to them. That is the present position, and I do not know what developments will be, not only there but in the whole world. It depends on so many factors and obviously no Minister of a government can tie down his government to say what it is going to do in the future.

Q: Can you tell me what exactly your government's position on the question of Germany's reunification is or perhaps your own personal view on that?

JN: I presume that the German people desire unity. It seems to me a natural desire. The question is how it can be attained. All I can say is that it should be attained by peaceful methods and peaceful negotiations.

10. August Wilhelm von Schlegel (1767-1845); the first professor of Indology in Germany at the University of Bonn.
11. During the cold war, the Western media used the term "the Pankow government" to identify the German Democratic Republic. Pankow is a district of Berlin, on the Panke river, where many departments of the East German state were housed.

4. Wandering Through Life[1]

Herr Burgermeister[2], Excellencies and Friends,
It is about twelve hours now since I arrived in Hamburg. I know, of course, that Hamburg is a great city, a great port with ships going to distant parts of the world and with a long history behind it. These are facts which one can read about, and I have read a little about them. And so, when I came and found this great city full of buzz and activity, I was not particularly surprised, I liked it. Well, gradually I sensed something more, something rather indefinable which I cannot describe. It was something—maybe a mixture of the past and present—something, which—unfortunately—is not always present in many places and which is gradually disappearing—at least apparently so. How shall I describe it? A certain depth, a certain graciousness, and graciousness is not found in life in many places today. Life becomes cruder. It is true that a superficial graciousness of a few is not good enough for the many lacking even the normal necessities of life. In the past, the few were gracious but the many had no remote chance of even living what might be called a normal, decent life. Nobody wants the graciousness of the few at the cost of that, that price paid by the many. At the same time, graciousness—whatever it may be—is a good thing and the world will be poor without that quality of some depth and graciousness. Unfortunately, it is more and more difficult to find. No doubt, it exists, but somehow, people shout too much nowadays or act in a way which is equivalent to loud shouting with the result that the smaller voices are rather drowned even though they might be much pleasanter to hear.

Anyhow, I sensed something which is rather pleasant here and something which I had missed often enough in many places and, therefore, my visit to Hamburg has not only been very agreeable but has left a dent in my mind which will endure.

You referred, Sir, to me in generous terms. In my own country I am not usually thought of in terms of being a very modest person, although I do believe I am generally modest. But others have a different opinion. But quite apart from this, it has been my good fortune to be a wanderer through life and to do the things I like to do. More or less, not always perhaps, but more or less, with the result that

1. Speech at a banquet hosted by the Hamburg Senate, Hamburg, 16 July 1956. JN Papers (M.O. Mathai), NMML.
2. Kurt Sieveking, Governor-Mayor of Hamburg.

I have rather enjoyed life. Obviously enjoyment of life does not consist of sitting on a soft cushion all the time. Life is something more than sitting on soft cushions. It is ultimately doing something worthwhile and doing something that you like which is worthwhile. And so I have had an enjoyable time through life, because, normally speaking, I have done what I wanted to do with the result, I fear, that I have developed, well, a certain vagrant attitude to life; I don't mean to say that I am frivolous but nevertheless a certain vagrant and a certain almost irresponsible attitude to life. Irresponsible is not a good word, of course. What I meant, really, was that I do not care too much about the possible results of the action I indulged. I tried to do my best as the most one can do and for the rest, well, what happens happens; I see no reason why I should burden myself with thinking of the possible unhappy consequences of what one is doing today, although one tries to avoid them, of course.

The world is much too complicated today for any person to presume to shoulder the burden of the world or even any particular part of it. All kinds of entirely novel problems come up and have come up and the past emerging into the present and developing into the future from day to day, seems that the process does not seem to be normal or smooth running. Heights come, and also gaps, and one seems to stand on some kind of verge of possible major changes. In such circumstances, what exactly is one to do—one with an infinite faith in the future or in a particular type of future? Well, faith is something which sustains one whatever the faith may be. But if one has not got that faith in a particular future although one may hope for the best and work for the best, then the only choice left is to do what appears to be right to the best of one's abilities and not care too much for the consequences. Herein lies the element of the responsibility that I mentioned. I was asked—was it yesterday?—I forget, maybe the day before at Bonn—somebody from the radio here—rather frivolous questions were put to me, one of them being: "Why do you keep so well?" Well, it was really a frivolous question. How am I to answer it? And so I always tell them something to these newspapermen—something which is totally irrelevant but is an adequate answer for them. I tell them I stand on my head! They are very happy to hear that. And they go away possibly thinking that they have found the secret of, well, very good health. And possibly they keep on trying to do it. If they do it without adequate preparations they will probably hurt themselves. Anyhow, it is not that, I do not know what it is, except the same I began with, that I am a singularly fortunate person in having largely done what I wanted to do and that does not leave too many regrets behind, although regrets there always are.

Well, you know, Herr Burgermeister, that many of us in India, including me, were powerfully influenced by the example of our leader, Mahatma Gandhi. I think he saved us from many things but most of all from that inner feeling of

frustration that is as bad for an individual as it is for a nation. He saved us from that because he made us act, he made us try to act in a way which was right to our thinking and not care too much for the consequences. Consequences are too big for any human being to be responsible for; and so, in this muddled and complex world of today, one travels through it, whether in terms of distance or in terms of time and age. And one tries to function to the best of one's ability, and when one is in grave doubt, one stands on one's head! That's helpful.

Anyhow, it has been a great pleasure to me and, I am sure, to my daughter, to come to Hamburg and sense this particular thing about Hamburg to which I made reference, which is something rather precious and to meet you, Sir, and to meet your charming wife, who not only hold high positions but, it has become evident to us today in the course of our brief acquaintance, have a store of wisdom which is given to few, and to meet many other eminent people here, eminent in trade, commerce and industry, eminent in education and science in the University and others; and to feel slightly envious of the happy lot of those who live in Hamburg.

5. Problems of Nations[1]

My Lord Mayor, Your Magnificence, Distinguished Senators, Professors and Members of the University, Ladies and Gentlemen,

When I heard that this great city and this great University were going to honour me in this way,[2] I was deeply moved; because it is indeed a great honour. But coming here for the first time in my life to this city of Hamburg, and coming to this Hall filled with this distinguished Assembly and listening to the wise words that have fallen from your Magnificence and from the Deans of the Faculties, I feel a little overwhelmed; and I do not quite know what to say on this occasion or how to express my gratitude to you. One thing, however, has saved me. Your Magnificence, in the course of your remarks, said that this great honour was not only for me as an individual but to the Indian people. And because it is for the

1. Speech at the Musikhalle, Hamburg, 16 July 1956. File No. 10(64)-Eur(W)/56 -MEA.
2. The Hamburg University conferred two honorary degrees on Nehru — a doctorate in medicine in recognition of Nehru's labours to improve India's living standards, and a doctorate of law for his contribution to international understanding.

Indian people, I feel emboldened to accept it, humble as I am as an individual. And because I am here not as an individual only, but as a symbol of my people, I feel happy that your city, this University, and this distinguished Assembly have held out their hand of friendship and opened a place in your minds and hearts to my country and my people. Hamburg is a symbol of many things—a long standing symbol of freedom and democracy, a symbol of wide contacts all over the world; for the hands and arms of Hamburg have stretched out across the seas to far lands, and so, even though the territory of Hamburg may be small, its interests are large. And it has developed, as your Magnificence's wise words have told us, a wide and catholic outlook embracing the world.

You referred in your address to past history and to problems of today, and as you spoke, this panorama of past history came before my eyes. The past of Asia, the past of Europe—how they have acted and reacted on each other, how they have brought good and brought evil to each other. And during these centuries and millenia of our existence, we have seen many tragedies, many crucifixions, and many resurrections. So, humanity has gone on facing all these ups and downs, and yet I believe it has gone on making progress towards better things. Sometimes, it may be, a doubt arises whether the good things for which humanity craves are not likely to be overwhelmed by the powers of evil. I suppose nobody can definitely say; and one can only have one's own faith in a particular future for humanity. For a considerable time, in earlier history of humanity, as Your Magnificence said, great civilizations rose in Asia, in that bit of Africa which is practically Asia but is Egypt, and they overflowed into Europe, and Europe also saw invading hordes come from Asia—invading forces, many of whom remained here with the original populations of Europe. And so, for a long period, Asia appeared to be, in this long panorama of history, rather a dominant force. Then came a turn of events when obviously Europe became a dominant and vital force in the world. It developed its culture—magnificent culture—in many ways; it developed also power and by virtue of that power, it dominated large parts of Asia and other continents. Now, recently, we have seen or we are seeing another change, that is, the emergence of Asia again—or the nations of Asia—and I think that one of the chief characteristics of this present age of ours is this fact that the nations of Asia have become or are becoming free or standing on their own feet and then looking forward to a greater self-fulfillment in the comity of nations. And, how exactly the future will bring about their cooperation in the larger scheme of things depends on many factors.

You will remember how India attained her freedom from British domination. We had a long struggle but throughout that struggle or during the large period of it, we had a leader who was rather a strange leader. He represented neither the power of physical strength nor the power of wealth. He just represented the

power of the human spirit. And to the surprise of many, he showed that this human spirit is sometimes more powerful than arms or wealth or anything else. And yet, in the ultimate analysis, the human spirit cannot be crushed by any power. That is one aspect of what he did. The other aspect was, as he told us, that whatever we did we must always remember that the way we did something, the manner of doing it, was of the utmost significance. That is to say, means are always important, not aims only. All of us seek ends of course. We seek to realize certain objectives, but how we realize them is of the utmost significance. So he said: because if the means we adopt are not good, that is, if the path we take is not the right path, then it will lead us to some other place, not to the ends we have in view. As a result of all this, when the time came for India and Britain to settle this problem of some centuries of conflict, it was settled in a civilized way. It was settled in a way so as to leave very little bitterness behind. And here is a test of how one does a thing, whether in solving or trying to solve a problem we do not create many other problems and more difficult ones, and whether in trying to solve the problem, we do not leave behind trails of bitterness and anger and hatred. And so this promising thing about the change in India was that we became free and independent after a long period of conflict with Britain but with very little ill will to Britain and we are friends today with the British people. We do not want to nurse the past nor to remember it and fill our hearts and minds with hatred which frustrate and narrow a person's mind and activity. We do not like many things or some things that the British people may do. They do not like, I have no doubt, many things we do, but there is no hatred or ill will between us and we try to cooperate whereever we can.

I do not mean to say that we in India have any special merit; please do not imagine that. What happened really was that it was given to us during this period to learn from a great and beloved leader of ours, and because we sat at the feet of greatness, something of the shadow of greatness fell on us too. We were and are simple and humble folk. There is little that we can pride ourselves in, but it was given to us, it was our good fortune to have this leader at a time of strife and trouble and difficulties for us, and he showed us a path which we followed not wholly but to some extent and which brought results which were not only good for us but for the world. I mentioned this to you because in a sense this is a governing factor in our thinking and action. What India may do tomorrow or the day after I do not know. We are a great country, a democratic country, and in which way the people will vote and act I do not know. But I believe that the lesson that Gandhi taught us has sunk to a large extent into the minds and hearts of our people. It was a lesson not of some external truth only but more of an internal peace, of an approach of peace even to an opponent and not the approach of hatred and violence. And yet during this very period, we have seen great

wars, terrible wars with destruction and what is worse than destruction, hatred to an extreme degree. We have not got rid of that hatred or the violence and frustration that it breeds. Many great nations, advanced nations and highly civilized and cultured nations, are still suffering from fear and apprehension and hatred; and fear and hatred are never good companions for an individual or for a nation, even though there might be great strength behind it.

You will forgive me if I refer to your own experiences in this great country of Germany. You have risen to great heights of power and you have been proud of your might and you used your might sometimes for evil purpose. You have taken to the sword and you have shown how great you were in the use of the sword in war, just as you have shown how great you were in the arts of peace and civilization and culture. Here in Germany, one sees every side of this picture of greatness in peace and greatness in war, greatness in victory and terrific defeat. The picture of the ups and downs of humanity can be seen here in the different phases of the history of the great people who inhabit Germany. But that really applies to every country in the world, not to Germany only; and the problem is whether the world has learnt its lesson from this tremendous experience, because if it has not learned that lesson, then indeed it will be bad for the world. Even today there is far too much talk of military power, military might and of preparation for possible conflict, armament and the like. And yet everybody knows that a future war is too terrible to contemplate and might mean the destruction of humanity. It is an odd thing that while every intelligent person realizes that, yet we follow the same path which led us to destruction in the past. Why is that so? Because fear and hatred blind us, and come in the way of the path that we normally would follow. Anyhow, here we are, having achieved the high degree of culture and civilization, having attained power to a tremendous degree, being on the threshold perhaps of a new age—the atomic age—and having attained technology and communications to an extent undreamed of previously, and thus being thrown into each other's laps, because everything is so near to us, and as you rightly said, Sir, we are grown more and more into one-world. While science has advanced and technology has advanced and power has advanced, the question is how far the mind of man is advanced to use those tremendous advantages for good purposes. It is an odd thing that every advance of humanity comes from the mind of man, and yet that mind of man lags behind the advance it has made. Anyhow this is the tremendous problem of today.

There are many problems of nations. Germany has her own problems, India has her own problems and every country in the five continents has its problems. But the major problem ultimately is this: Whether we shall gradually drift towards conflicts—violent conflicts—or whether we shall discard them and solve our problems in peaceful ways and whether, whatever our objectives be, we are

going to adhere to the right means, good means, and peaceful means or discard them, because we think some violent method may yield us results. Recent history has shown—if I may quote from the famous ancient text—that those who take to the sword perish by the sword.[3] And now the sword is something infinitely more powerful than it was before: it is the hydrogen bomb. Perhaps it is a good thing that this tremendous question has come before us and it forces us to think and not allow things to drift. And perhaps humanity as a whole will learn from this and I believe it is learning. If I may say so with all respect, even the leaders of nations are waking up to this fact, because the leaders are so involved in their day to day problems that they sometimes forget about the major facts of life and existence. That is a major problem. And then, as I said, this problem of Asian nations coming up; and not only Asian nations but turmoil and ferment in Africa and elsewhere too and wherever freedom is denied. It is clear, that people all over the world today are not prepared to put up with many things with which they have put up in the past. They are not prepared to put up with poverty. There is no magic remedy for these ills. And sometimes, so far as undeveloped and poverty-striken peoples are concerned, you cannot change them in a day. But the social urges are there and pressures are there. They are not prepared to put up with what they have put up during those decades and maybe for longer periods and one must recognize that. No amount of military force can suppress that longing in their mind and therefore, as His Magnificence has said, this past era of colonialism and domination has to go. I would like it to go by peaceful methods and by peaceful transfer of power. I would like suitable arrangements should be made for it to go, because in conflict, there is loss for everybody and the greatest loss of all is the creation of hatred.

Then there is plenty of racialism. It is not possible to expect people to put up with the idea now that some races are master-races or dominant races, or superior races, and, therefore, they should dominate. All human beings are not equal. It is absurd to say that everybody is alike. They are not. Some people, some individuals are cleverer, more intelligent than others and physically stronger; some are taller and some are short. They are not all alike and I don't mean to say that everybody is alike in the wide world; but I do believe that given the opportunity, one is amazed to find how even those we think are underdeveloped and all that, are able to rise to higher level and to the highest level. Anyhow, if it is bad for a person to be dominated over either politically or in the racial sense it is worse for those who dominate in the long run, because they themselves

3. From the Bible, St Mathew, Chapter 26: "All they that take the sword shall perish with sword."

deteriorate because of that. So, these things have to go; and we have to build up a world where there is equal opportunity for countries, communities and peoples. Those who are cleverer will take advantage of their cleverness and go further, and there should be nothing to prevent a man to develop his highest genius. How are we to get rid of all these barriers that come in our way? In my own country, we have tremendous problems. In our country we have misbehaved in the past and badly so. We developed a rigid caste system in which the so-called upper castes looked down on the lower castes and denied them the opportunity, or progress even of education in the past. It was a bad thing and we suffered for that. And there are other big differences in India, poor country as it is, and probably there is more inequality in India today than in Germany, I imagine. That is a bad thing. So, please, do not imagine that I am telling you something of which my country and my people are not also guilty. We are more guilty perhaps in some ways; and you may be in other ways. But we have to put an end to this kind of thing. In a modern world, it simply does not fit in, and it is not practical today and it breeds trouble and conflict.

And now, we have, I suppose, ultimately to go inevitably to this ideal of what is called one-world. There is no other way out. One-world does not mean, of course—at least I hope so—that under the name of one-world some group will dominate over the world, or some one nation or a few nations together will dominate over the world and then call it one world. That is not my idea of one-world. My idea of one-world is that subject to national freedoms, all countries joining together, even by giving up a part of their sovereignty for this purpose, in some kind of loose and vague federation of one-world, where problems are solved in a peaceful way, and where the present day conflicts either national or, racial or any other, do not arise, and each country functioning as it chooses, without interferring with another. You will remember, perhaps, that for the last year or two, we have been talking in India and in some other countries of what we have called Panchsheel, the Five Principles, the five foundations of international conduct. What are these five foundations to which we have referred? First of all, recognition of independence and sovereignty of the other countries; secondly, non-aggression; thirdly, non-interference in internal affairs; fourthly, mutual respect; and fifthly, peaceful coexistence. Now, if every country in the world accepted these Five Principles, and I cannot understand how anyone can reject them or dislike them, then, at any rate, the conflicts between nations may not disappear but they would lessen. And this constant fear and apprehension would lessen. I recognize of course that there have been good principles from the beginning of the world. The enunciation of some more principles does not mean that the human beings will become good and there is also a possibility that the countries or individuals may accept the principles and not act up to

them. All these are possibilities of course. But that applies to every kind of arrangement that you might make, every treaty system and, every organization that you may build up. After all, people agree, or nations agree to act according to some line of action. If they do not, well, so much the worse for them. But the point is that we have to recognize that it is wrong for one country to impose its will on another either by aggression or by trying to change its internal organization whether that organization is political, economic, or whatever it is. If the people of a country want to adopt a method of life or Government or economic structure of any particular type, well, whether we like it or not, it is up to them to do so. We adopt our own, because the attempt to interfere creates conflict. If there was free intercourse between the nations, the probability is that people would learn much more from each other, and the differences that exist would lessen. To some extent, the good in each nation would appeal to the other nation, and they would try to copy it. It is the barriers that keep up and heighten these differences. So, the mere fact of acceptance of a certain international code would be helpful.

It won't solve the problem; it could be helpful, just as the mere fact of the existence of the United Nations has been very helpful to the world. The United Nations has got a very noble Charter, a very fine Charter, but in its activities, it has not perhaps always lived up to its charter. That is a different matter. And there has often been criticism of its activities, and legitimate criticism too. Nevertheless, the fact remains that the United Nations has performed very great services to the world and to the cause of peace. And if we did not have the United Nations, we should have to create one. The mere fact that the United Nations has not done all that we wanted it to do, is no reason why we should not recognize its great significance and great value and try to improve it. So also, we can progressively lay down codes of international conduct, which will, gradually, help us to think along right lines and when any evil-doer comes, well, he will meet a mass of world opinion which will, probably, make it difficult for that evil-doer to function.

Now, another argument is put forward: What do you mean by coexistence, peaceful or other? Do you accept the present shape and picture of the world as it is and try to petrify it and stabilize it? Frankly, I do not accept the picture of the world as it is. If I accepted it, I would have to accept all the colonies that exist in the world and I do not accept colonialism. I would have to accept also racialism where it exists in the world and I do not accept racialism. And there are so many other things that I do not accept in the world. So, I do not wish to petrify the present state of affairs, but all I wish to say is that the changes that should be made, should be made through peaceful means and methods, partly because those methods are better and partly because every other method involves

great dangers of major conflict and wars, and should be ruled out, and almost every great leader has said so. What about smaller conflicts then? Surely, a small conflict may very easily develop into a major conflict. If you rule out major conflicts, then one should rule out minor conflicts too. If you rule out both major and minor conflict, then what exactly is the position of that thing which is called "cold war", which is simply cold hatred? Surely, if the cold war had any significance, it could only be the creation of the atmosphere for a shooting war. It has no other significance. If you are dead certain that you are not going to fight by merely continuing to encourage mutual abuse and hatred, then it does not seem to be a very wise course of action. You go on, in a sense, increasing the disease without applying any remedy. Remedies for international problems are presumably of two kind: one is the remedy by war—and whether it is a remedy or not is another matter. But anyhow, war has been used in the past to solve international problems. The other remedy is a peaceful one, that is, to settle it by peaceful methods. If you rule out war, then you are left with peaceful methods.

You cannot really succeed in applying peaceful methods, if you are constantly thinking or acting in terms of cold war, because cold war produces a climate of war, even though it is not war. And you cannot expect, reasonably or logically, to solve a problem peacefully when you are always encouraging a climate of war and a mentality of war. I submit, therefore, that, logically, we arrive at this conclusion that this kind of a cold war has no sense left in it in present conditions. If it had any previously, I do not know, but it merely delays the solution of a problem. Now, some people may think that not having a cold war means an acceptance of many things that we do not like. That need not necessarily be so. We need not accept many things and, as I said, I don't accept colonialism and racialism and many other things in the world. But I do not go about creating an atmosphere of hatred and bitterness and cold war, in order to solve those problems. Indeed, by doing so I would make their solution more difficult.

What I have been venturing to put before this very distinguished assembly is that what might have been considered high moral and ethical principles in the past, they are so now too, but they are something more, and they have another importance today, not on the ground of being high principles but being the only practical approaches today. Normally, people would say, and they have often said, that all this is very high principle, but life is different and, therefore, we have to be practical and not talk high piety. But the only practical approach today is what I submit to you. It is the people who think in terms of bigger and bigger weapons and of war or even of cold war, who are today horridly unpractical. They have lost touch with life. There is the fact that a person who has a big weapon, does not necessarily mean that he has a big mind behind the weapon.

In fact, I would say that the world has to face today a very crucial decision in a big way. This coming of atomic energy will probably have powerful consequences. Just as the Industrial Revolution changed the world so is the coming of atomic energy another type of industrial revolution which may well change the world rapidly in the course of fifteen, twenty or thirty years. And the tremendous power it brings, whether for good use or for bad use, it has put a new question before the world. And there is now no easy way out of evading an answer. We are likely to function more and more on a pinnacle of power which in uncontrollable, except by ethical means and except by the recognition of a certain ethical or moral approach to life. And here arises the question of disarmament and, as you know, this question of disarmament has been considered, at least to my knowledge, for the last thirty years, by the League of Nations sitting in Geneva. And year after year, they discussed it and discussed it and nothing happened. Now it is being discussed again by the United Nations or some sub-committee of it. But so long as any country thought that war might be profitable, it would not agree. And if one country did not agree, others could not agree. Now for the first time, the realization is coming that war is not profitable to any party and, in fact, there are not likely to be any victors in it. But whether there are victors or not, the point is that it is not profitable. It is because of this realization that the chances of disarmament have increased for the first time and this practical realization and not any moral or ethical belief in peaceful methods has contributed to it. But what I was venturing to put before you was that the problems of today cannot be solved by a race in armament. Even today, it is said that while one country may have far greater atomic bombs than the other, the other has enough to put an end to the number one country, or if not to put an end to that country, at least to cause enormous damage. That is to say, I believe the point of satiation has been reached. That is to say it is no longer a question of two big armies—one army defeating the other—because the smaller army, though it will get defeated, will be able to cause tremendous destruction to the other. Thus, there is no answer to this problem by going on piling armaments, because the other party has got enough to destroy you. You may destroy him twice or three times over—well, destruction once is quite enough.

What is the answer to this? As I submit there is no answer from the military or armament's point of view. Therefore, you have to seek an answer on some other plane and not the military plane. And, may I say, I am responsible to a large extent for my country, and being responsible, there are many things which in theory I should like to do but in practice I cannot and I dare not do. And if I did, my people would probably push me out. I cannot take risks, that is true. You might well ask me: Why does India keep an army? It is a small army, some battalions only, but still it is an army. But if we believed thoroughly in peaceful

methods, why keep an army, why keep a bit of a navy, and why keep an air force which we do, although they are small? Well, there is no answer in principle, except that there are certain risks which no responsible person can run. And more specially in a democratic country you have to abide by the urges and the wishes of the people. And there are many other factors too. So I am not suggesting that any country or any government of a country can—if I may put it rather crudely without any disrespect, I mean—say that we trust in God and we take no steps to protect ourselves. No country can do that and no responsible authority, for all countries have to be vigilant to protect their freedom and, therefore, they have to take steps to protect it. I agree to that until such time when the atmosphere of the world is completely different. But after agreeing to that, the whole attempt should be to change the atmosphere of the world and not to take steps which vitiate it more and more, and piling up of armaments vitiates the atmosphere more and more. Disarmament would gradually improve it step by step and each step that one takes releases energies and resources for bettering humanity, which is a far greater way and a better way of dealing with these problems than the way of violence and conflict.

I have ventured to place some considerations before this distinguished audience because you did me this great honour. But so far as I am concerned, my major occupation is to deal with the problems of my country, to deal with the economic and social problems of India. And they are as terrific as our population is big. Someone asked me: How many problems have you got in India? What are they? I answered: We have 360 million problems in India. Each human being is a problem, and we try to think of them as human beings, each individual of 360 million, and not as some figure of statistical data or as some unknown masses. We have to improve the lot of each individual human being and each individual human being is a little different from somebody else. So it is not an easy matter to deal with them. We have these terrific problems and as you, Sir, were good enough to mention, we have the Second Five Year Plan dealing with these many matters and we try to discover the best path for us to pursue. We try to learn from every country, both in the political field as well as in the economic and social field. But, at the same time, we try to find out what is best for our country and our people. We think that it is never a good thing to copy others, merely and rather blindly. We don't think that is good for any country, more so for a country like India, with very deep roots of its own. It is true that for a number of years, for hundreds of years, India became very static. Indeed, I might say that India became rather worse than static, it became stagnant. And it is bad for a country to become static and unmoving and to be left behind. It thought of the past only and hardly of the present, and, so, it suffered. Nevertheless, it has deep roots, and if we pull out the roots of a great country or even of an individual, it becomes

rootless. It may learn much but a community or a nation must have roots. Having its own roots, it may learn and develop as much as it likes from other countries, as we must. Therefore, in developing our policy, too, we try to follow no doctrinaire or rigid method, but consider how we can best reach the objectives we aim at, which are primarily higher standards for our people, equality of opportunity for our people, adequate food, adequate clothing, adequate housing, adequate education, adequate sanitation and health. These are the primary necessities of life which everyone should have. After that, of course, other things too. Work and adequate work for everybody. You will find that in the past the study of economics in western Europe and in America has largely concerned itself with the problem of industrialized communities. They were their own problems, naturally, but now the problems differ in a non-industrialized community, and more specially when it wants to advance rapidly, and more specially, still when it wants to advance rapidly and yet maintain fully its democratic structure.

The problem that has come up is rather unique. It is neither the Russian problem—they discarded the democratic structure, nor is it the problem of a country which is going to spend a hundred years in reaching a certain standard. We have to do it rapidly, so that one has to find his own ways and means, learning from the experience of others, whoever they might be. We are trying to do that. I cannot say, naturally, what the future will bring to us, but having some knowledge of my own people, and being rather devoted and very fond of them, because they have done me the greatest honour of all, and that is, they have given me their affection, I believe that they have it in them to perform these great tasks that we have set them. There is no question of a Government ordering from above because no Government can do this without the fullest cooperation of the people. We hope to have that cooperation but we shall have to work very hard indeed! We know that we shall have to rely upon ourselves, chiefly, but naturally, we welcome such cooperation and such assistance as may come to us from others. And I am grateful to the Government of Germany and to various institutions here who have helped us in training our people and helped us in other ways. And may I say that I have been rather moved by one of the students of Hamburg University coming here just before I spoke and offering, on behalf of the students here, to take some Indian students. I think that was more moving than if some big organization or the Government did it. And I am quite sure that this will be appreciated, specially in India. May I express, Your Magnificence, again, my grateful thanks to you, to your eminent colleagues in the University and to others for this great honour. It seems to me that either you, Sir, or the Lord Mayor of this city have even taken the trouble to arrange today a typical Indian summer's day for us. I thank you all.

(iv) Yugoslavia

1. The Global Picture[1]

. . . Jawaharlal Nehru: I am quite sure that the visit of President Tito to the Soviet Union[2] has wider significance for the world and that it has helped to widen the outlook of the Soviet leaders and people. The process of change there has been going on for the last year and it has affected, step by step, their approach to various questions. When they came to India, Khrushchev and Bulganin repeatedly said to me that they had to change their opinions very much about India and that they had been misinformed. India was the first non-Communist, though friendly, country which they had visited. They could see that even those who did not agree with them can be friendly.

Their visit to England also widened their outlook and helped the British Government to understand them better. This process of mutual contacts, taken together with other developments, is breaking down the barriers to understanding. Eden told me that he much appreciated these talks which had given him a new perspective. He did not of course agree with the Soviet leaders but he felt that they spoke sincerely. Bulganin told our Ambassador that Eden showed much patience and tried to understand their viewpoint. President Tito's visit has no doubt done a great deal of good.

Looking at the world as a whole, there are two or three big problems. In Europe, there is a German question; in the Far East the questions of the new China, Taiwan, etc. Then there is the question of disarmament which is connected with the fear of the hydrogen bomb and the general feeling that a major war should be ruled out. But the cold war continues; this is clearly illogical. It is evident that all these problems are due to fear and suspicion on both sides. On the Soviet side, there is the fear of a rearmed Germany and of the USA.

1. Proceedings of a conference between Nehru, the Yugoslav President Josip Broz Tito and the Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser held at the island of Vanga, Brioni, on 18 July 1956. V.K. Krishna Menon Papers, NMML. Extracts.
2. Tito visited the Soviet Union in June 1956.

Tito: We are also afraid of a rearmed Germany.

JN: The Soviets are afraid that their great influence in the East European countries may diminish and that they may go out of their control. On the other hand, as Adenauer told me, they fear that the Soviets want to absorb East Germany and later on West Germany and, step by step, the whole of Europe.

Another interesting factor is that it is being said in both Germany and France that the Soviets are becoming afraid and apprehensive of the new China and its huge population. Their relations are certainly by no means so cordial as people sometimes imagine them to be. It is of course absurd to say that China is a satellite. In fact, Bulganin complained at the way that China sometimes treated them in spite of the fact that they are helping China to develop. I entirely agree with President Tito that the process of democratization should be allowed to go on without interference. I am also sure that various foreign agencies have been interfering in one way or another. Both sides are interfering with propaganda and all that. In Eastern Germany, a great majority of the population, perhaps 70 to 80 per cent, wants union with the rest of Germany and is not at all happy with the existing conditions.

Tito: That is difficult to say for in the last ten years or so, a new economic and political system has been built up in East Germany.

JN: I am not referring to the economic and political system but people there are dissatisfied as economic conditions are not good. In West Germany, the trouble is that there is an excess of prosperity. There are already nine to ten million refugees from East European countries and there is still a continuous stream, which reflects the considerable dissatisfaction felt in East Germany and elsewhere.

Take the question of Poland where the rising at Poznan had a definitely popular character. Even the army was friendly with the demonstrators. The causes of that rising were largely economic although there were some political reasons also. If the process of democratization goes on, the people also are freer to demonstrate, and if repression takes place, the trouble brews under the surface. There is no way out except to continue with the process of democratization for it is not possible to turn the clock back either in the Soviet Union or in the East European countries.

In my discussions with the French leaders and with Adenauer, there was of course the fear of the USSR, but there was also fear of the United States at the back of their minds. The European countries cannot stand up to either colossus.

They feel that the immediate danger is from the Soviet Union but in tying up too much with the United States, they cease to function independently and their destinies are practically controlled by that country. West European integration therefore is the only way of maintaining their identity. If Russia is included in such integration, they feel that they would lose themselves in that vast country. The only way before them therefore is to try and keep a balance between the two colossi. In a European confederation, the French say that they could control Germany, otherwise they would be lost.

Both Adenauer and Mollet and Pineau said that it was their definite impression in their talks with the Soviet leaders[3] that they were becoming apprehensive of China. To save their souls and their bodies, if possible, from the two colossi, they felt that some kind of European integration must be achieved. I said that any type of integration against somebody produces a reaction in the others and does not help.

As regards the German question, the German view in regard to the legal position is that the Four Powers had agreed to free elections but I agree with President Tito that things should be allowed to develop, as the Soviet Union will never agree to a hostile frontier right up to Poland. I asked Khrushchev if he would agree to a neutral unified Germany, but he did not give an answer.[4] There cannot of course be any adequate logical answer to the proposition that the people themselves should be left to decide. I had the feeling that some people in West Germany, although they spoke about unification, did not really want it.

Tito: There are such people in England and France also.

JN: They prefer a divided Germany on their side rather than a united Germany not fully on their side.

Nasser: Maybe for economic reasons.

JN: There is an amazing economic recovery in West Germany. Given the chance, they can build up a tremendous army in two or three years' time, but there was a strong feeling against rearming as the people are rather tired and are afraid of war. But one cannot say which mood will prevail. I was surprised at the immense popular welcome which I received, for in some way I represented Peace to them.

3. Konrad Adenauer, Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany, visited the USSR from 9-13 September 1955. Guy Mollet, the French Prime Minister, and Christian Pineau, the French Foreign Minister, visited Moscow in May 1956.
4. For details, see *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 31, pp. 303-304.

Adenauer's position today however is not so strong even in his own party, and the future might bring about a change.

On the question of disarmament, I am in entire agreement with President Tito regarding the banning of atomic weapons. But how to bring it about is the problem. The Disarmament Commission invited us to express our views and the practical proposals made by Krishna Menon produced some effect.[5] We asked for the stoppage of experimentation in, and the future production of, weapons of mass destruction. At the same time, we asked for the reduction of conventional armaments but unless there is progressive disarmament, these fears and suspicions will continue. Disarmament therefore is a vital issue today. The questions of the Far East and China were not much discussed. With the French leaders Indo-China was discussed a little and in England there was some talk regarding the Far East, but not much.

Adenauer accused the Soviets of pushing themselves into Middle Eastern affairs and he called them trouble makers. Adenauer has a very rigid mind but although he is eighty-one, he is strong and tough.

I had talks with the French Government on the Algerian question.[6] They referred to the recent resolution of the Socialist Party, and said that their Socialist Government was bound by it, but the Algerian parties must first react to it. France is beset with internal difficulties and the Government is not very stable, but the next Government is likely to be very Rightist. I said that though it was not for us to interfere, we are for the cause of freedom. But if any positive course of action is to be found, fighting must first be stopped. The Socialist Party resolution asks for the stoppage of the fighting, for free elections, negotiations, equality, and a link with France. I asked what "equality" meant, but they said it was a matter for discussion. The important thing was that neither party should be crushed by the other. I asked about the link with France and they said that something like the Commonwealth relationship might be established.[7] If the Socialist Party resolution is accepted by the Algerians as a basis, a tremendous reaction in its favour would develop.

5. On 12 July 1956. Krishna Menon's statement covered India's appeal for the cessation of nuclear and thermonuclear explosions.
6. See *post*, pp. 408-410.
7. On 18 July, in response to a question at the Paris airport about what links should be retained between France and Algeria, Nehru stated, "You know that in spite of India becoming independent, of our own free will we maintained some kind of association with the British Commonwealth. Links are always a good thing if they are without a dominating element."

Nasser: Did they comment on your five point proposal?[8]

JN: That was not discussed specifically this time. The main difference seemed to be on the question of equality which the French said should be discussed.

Nasser: Mollet refused to agree to the "recognition of Algerian nationality in freedom."

JN: The question arises, whether in Europe, Algeria or the Far East, what kind of steps can be taken to achieve results. Messali Hadj[9] wrote to me that he was agreeable to my five principles. I was told that he had great influence with the Algerians in France but not outside. The killing should be stopped first and after the ceasefire, negotiations should be opened.

Nasser: I had talks with Pineau on his return from India and offered our good offices between the French and the Algerians. Three meetings were held in Cairo but while they were going on, the French sent more troops to Algeria. The French delegates began talks with the Algerians in Cairo but they returned to France for further instructions and did not show up again. In Algeria the military position is that all mountainous areas are dominated by the Algerians; if there is a ceasefire, they will lose the initiative.

JN: Pineau said that they could agree not to spread out their troops or take any military advantage in the event of a ceasefire. There must be two types of negotiations: first, to establish a ceasefire and, secondly, for a political settlement. If the Algerians were to agree to talks, it would put the French in the wrong.

8. For Nehru's five suggestions on Algeria, see *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 33, pp. 481-483.
9. Messali Ahmed bin Hadj (1898-1974); Algerian nationalist leader; served in the French army during World War I; founded the independence movement, L' Etoile Nord-Africaine (North Africa Star), 1925, which was dissolved by the French in 1929 after he called for revolt against French rule; banned and imprisoned in 1929 and 1934-35; founded the *Al Oumma* (The Nation), 1929; started the Algerian Popular Party in the mid-thirties and was imprisoned for the subsequent disturbances in 1936; sentenced to 16 years hard labour, 1941; pardoned and placed in enforced residence, 1943-45; founded the Movement for the Triumph of Democratic Liberties (MTLD) in 1946 (MTLD split into MNA, the Algerian Nationalist Movement, and FLN, Front de Liberation Nationale, a year later); lived in enforced residence in France, 1952-62.

Nasser: I know that the Algerians are ready to negotiate but I do not know if they are ready to negotiate on the basis of the Socialist Party resolution. They insist on negotiations on the basis of the recognition of their independence, if not now, then in three to five years' time. To this however the French will not agree.

JN: Perhaps conditions can be created for the French to agree to some such basis, otherwise might there not be some danger of partition?

Nasser: Partition is not possible geographically as the French are in the coastal areas while the Algerians dominate the mountains. The Algerians would be able to invade the coast and retire to the mountains. The only possibility for a settlement is to have direct negotiations between the Algerian national movement and France. We got in touch with the nationalists who said they are ready for negotiations but the French broke them off.

JN: What the French are aiming at is presumably to gain a strong military position before they start negotiations.

Nasser: The Algerian leaders said they were sure of their military position, but my estimate of the situation is different to that of the Algerians. I was worried after the mobilization in France and I was astonished when the Algerians said that they were not worried. . . .Egypt and I personally have been attacked for interference in Algeria. This however is not true as the movement springs from inside the country. Of course we help the Algerians morally, sometimes financially, but the main fault is that of French policy. Tunisia will be an even more difficult problem. Recent developments in Algeria are shocking and the French are actually using the guillotine for public executions. I think the French are afraid of open negotiations because of their internal difficulties and that they really want secret negotiations. Last February the French were on the point of defeat and this situation will be repeated next October or next February.

JN: What is the US's public attitude?

Nasser: They are with France. But they have no policy; they make it up from day to day. What about your talks with Eden about the Middle East?

JN: Selwyn Lloyd made a statement about the Middle East which largely concerns Cyprus. In that connection, he laid great stress on the importance of an uninterrupted flow of Middle East oil. The Western position in the Middle East

is crumbling. But no settlement there is possible without the participation of the Soviet Union.

Nasser: There are many factors which affect their policies and actions. In the first place, the Middle East occupies a "bridge position" and has large oil reserves. The West wants the oil and therefore wants to keep the Middle East as its area of influence. They wanted an alliance with Egypt but we refused and insisted upon the evacuation of British troops from the Suez Canal Zone. Then there is the question of Israel. Israel has been supplied with weapons mainly from France and secondly from Britain although America has also supplied some. Soon after the Baghdad Pact was concluded, there was aggression from Israel. We asked for arms and the Western countries refused. This was before Bandung. Shuckburgh[10] of the British Foreign Office said that they wanted to see the attitude of the Egyptian Premier at Bandung before they took a decision. When we received arms from Russia, they were somewhat nervous and called it Russian interference. They raised the question with Khrushchev and Bulganin, but I do not think they got much out of them.

The nationalist movement in the Arab world is spreading and the British blame us for it. The news about General Glubb's[11] dismissal was received when Lloyd was at a dinner party in Cairo. Later, he was stoned at Bahrain.[12] I told Robertson that we are not against their taking oil but we are against their influence. On the 29th September 1955, the arms deal with Russia was announced.

The British position in Jordan is somewhat weak.

JN: The curse of oil is on the Middle East. In Saudi Arabia also, there is difficulty with the Americans regarding the renewal of the oil agreements. Then there is difficulty with the British in regard to the Buraimi Oasis; there is also trouble in Aden; in Syria there is a united party government which is opposed to Western

10. Charles Arthur Evelyn Shuckburgh (b. 1909); British diplomat; Principal Private Secretary to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 1951-54; Assistant Under-Secretary, Foreign Office, 1954-56; Senior Civilian Instructor, Imperial Defence College, 1956-58; Assistant Secretary General (Political), NATO in Paris, 1958-60; Deputy Under-Secretary, Foreign Office, 1960-62; Permanent British Representative to the North Atlantic Council in Paris, 1962-66; Ambassador to Italy, 1966-69.
11. After a series of anti-Western riots in Jordan, on 2 March 1956 King Hussein ordered the immediate dismissal of John Bagot Glubb, the Commander-in-Chief of the Arab Legion.
12. For Nehru's description of this incident, see *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 32, p. 439.

domination. Lebanon wanted first to join the Baghdad Pact but not now. The Baghdad Pact Council set up a committee for doing propaganda in Arab countries; they also set up an economic committee in which America is participating.

Nasser: As a result of our new policy, everything is quiet on the Israeli frontier. Our talks with Hammarskjoeld[13] were useful and some progress was made. We told him that we could help to ease the tension, but the time for a settlement was not yet. Then there is the question of the refugees whose plight is desperate.

Regarding the Aswan dam, we held talks in December last. We were given an aide memoire by the British and Americans and also by the World Bank regarding the terms of the agreement. We felt that there were some clauses which interfered with our sovereignty and we wanted to make certain changes. The World Bank agreed to these changes. But we have not yet received any reply from America and Britain. We have accepted the offer in principle but not the conditions attached to it. The Soviets made an offer in general, but I refused to discuss it in detail and told Shepilov[14] that I would discuss the matter on my visit to Moscow next month.

13. UN Secretary-General.
14. Dmitri Trofimovich Shepilov (b. 1905); Soviet Foreign Minister, June 1956-February 1957; earlier he edited *Pravda*, and headed the Foreign Affairs Commission of the Supreme Soviet. Shepilov visited Cairo in June 1956.

2. Joint Statement[1]

In the course of the visit to the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia of the President of the Republic of Egypt, Gamal Abdel Nasser, and of the Prime Minister of India, Jawaharlal Nehru, talks between President Josip Broz Tito, President Nasser and Prime Minister Nehru took place at Brioni on July 18 and

1. Nehru's draft, Brioni, 19 July 1956. The final statement based on this draft was issued on 20 July 1956. JN Papers (M.O. Mathai), NMML.

19, 1956. During the talks which were conducted in an atmosphere of cordiality and friendship, a detailed exchange of views took place on matters of common interest.

2. The three Heads of Government reviewed developments in the international sphere since they met each other separately twelve months ago. The similarity in their approach to international questions has led to close cooperation among them and they noted with satisfaction that the policies pursued by their countries have contributed to some extent towards the lessening of international tension and to the development of relations between nations based on equality.

3. Recent developments and contacts and talks between the leaders of various countries following differing policies have contributed to a better understanding of each other's viewpoints and a growing recognition of the principles of peaceful and active coexistence. The Heads of Government consider that these contacts and exchanges of opinions should continue and be encouraged.

4. The Bandung Conference held last year laid down certain principles which should govern international relations. The three Heads of Government reaffirm these ten principles which they have always supported. They realize that the conflicts and tensions in the world today have led to fears and apprehensions in the present and for the future. As long as these fears and apprehensions dominate the world, no firm basis for peace can be established. At the same time, it is difficult to remove these fears and apprehensions rapidly and progressive steps will have to be taken towards their removal. Every such step helps in the easing of tension and is therefore to be welcomed.

5. The division of the world today into powerful blocs of nations tends to perpetuate these fears. Peace has to be sought not through divisions, but by aiming at collective security on a world basis and by enlarging the sphere of freedom and the ending of the domination of one country over another.

6. Progress towards disarmament is essential in order to lessen fears of conflict. This progress should be made primarily within the framework of the United Nations and to include both nuclear and thermonuclear weapons and conventional armaments, and adequate supervision of the carrying out of the agreements made. Explosions of weapons of mass destruction, even for experimental purposes, should be suspended as they involve a possible danger to humanity, a pollution of the atmosphere, affecting other countries and large peaceful areas, regardless of frontiers, and are a violation of international morality. Fissionable material should in future be used only for peaceful purposes and its further use for war purposes should be prohibited. The three Heads of Government are deeply interested in full and equal cooperation among nations in the field of peaceful uses of atomic energy. Such cooperation should be organized within

the framework of the United Nations and the proposed international agency should be representative of all nations.

7. The intensification of efforts to quicken the development of underdeveloped areas in the world constitutes one of the principal tasks in the creation of permanent and stable peace among nations. In this connection the three Heads of Government recognize the importance of international economic and financial cooperation and consider that it is necessary and desirable that the proposed Special United Nations Fund for Economic Develoment be constituted and be enabled to function effectively.

8. In the course of their talks, the three Heads of Government emphasized the great importance of removing embargoes and obstacles to the normal flow and extension of international trade.

9. The three principal areas of tension and possible conflict are Central Europe, the Far East of Asia and the Middle East region between Europe and Asia. The problems of the Far East cannot be adequately solved without the full cooperation of the People's Republic of China. The three Heads of Government express their belief that the People's Republic of China should be represented in the United Nations. They also consider that those countries which have applied for membership and are qualified in accordance with the Charter, should be admitted to the United Nations.

10. The problems of Central Europe are intimately connected with that of Germany. This important question should be solved in conformity with the wishes of the German people by peaceful negotiated settlements.

11. In the Middle East, the conflicting interests of great powers have added to the difficulties of the situation. These problems should be considered on their merits, safeguarding legitimate economic interests, but basing solutions on the freedom of the people concerned. The freedom and the goodwill of the people of those areas are not only essential for peace, but also to safeguard legitimate economic interests. The situation in Palestine is particularly one of danger to world peace. The Heads of Government support the resolution of the Bandung Conference in this regard.[2]

12. The three Heads of Government considered the situation in Algeria, which, in their opinion, is not only of great importance, but requires urgent attention, both from the point of view of the basic rights of the people of Algeria and of the consolidation of peace in that part of the world. Believing as they do that colonial domination is wholly undesirable and is injurious to both those who rule and those who are ruled, they must express their sympathy for the desire for

2. Nehru added the last two lines of this paragraph in his own hand.

freedom of the people of Algeria. They recognize that there are considerable numbers of people in Algeria of European descent whose interest should be protected, but this should not come in the way of the recognition of the legitimate rights of the Algerians. They warmly support all efforts directed towards the finding of a just and peaceful solution and, in particular, for a cessation of violent conflict in that area and negotiations. The ceasefire and negotiations between the parties concerned should lead to a peaceful settlement of the problem.

The three Heads of Government recognize that the problems of the world cannot be settled at one step and that it is necessary to persevere patiently and with goodwill in attempts to find solutions. It is essential, however, that every effort should be made to create a climate of peace and to act in accordance with the basic principles laid down in the Charter of the United Nations.

(v) Observations on the Visit

1. To Vijayalakshmi Pandit[1]

New Delhi
August 4, 1956

My dear Nan,

You are getting sheaves of telegrams from us about the Suez Canal matter.[2] I do not know if they make much sense. The question is a difficult one. It need not have been so, but the passions on both sides have resulted in rigid attitudes and when nations become rigid, it is difficult to get them to adopt a sensible course. On the whole, Nasser appears to have toned down somewhat and is taking up a more reasonable line. But all the sabre-rattling that is going on in England and France appears to me to be foolish in the extreme. This evening I read the speeches of Pineau and Mollet before their National Assembly. These were pretty bad. I am astonished that any responsible person should now speak in this manner. This might have been good enough a generation ago.

1. JN Collection. Extracts.
2. See *post*, pp. 318-375.

Thank you for your letter of the 28th July. I am surprised at the reactions in England to my visit to West Germany.[3] As a matter of fact, that visit was quite remarkably successful from almost every point of view. I had certainly a fine popular welcome wherever I went. The Government went out of their way not only to welcome me but to discuss both serious world problems and particular economic needs of India. They have done something which no other Government has done. They have appointed an official committee to examine our Second Five Year Plan in order to find out what they can do to help. They have further offered us a fine technological institute and about 600 or 700 scholarships for Indian students for technical studies.

I spoke frankly and yet in a friendly manner. I may not have pleased everybody, but I do not think I displeased any person. Even Adenauer was quite friendly.

I have seen the number of *Time* that you refer to.[4] Why do you worry about such things? It really does not make much difference. The picture on the cover is certainly not complimentary to me. But do you think that it makes much difference?

I have had another letter from Eisenhower again pressing me to go there before the end of the year. It is difficult to go, but perhaps I might be able to do so in mid-December. . . .

Yours,
Jawaharlal

3. Vijayalakshmi Pandit stated that "the reactions to your visit to West Germany were particularly vicious both here and in the US." She wondered why Nehru had allowed himself to be "persuaded" to go to Germany. "Obviously, you could not rise to Adenaeur's expectations," she noted.
4. Vijayalakshmi Pandit referred to the *Time* magazine (31 July 1956) which produced on the cover an "utterly wicked picture" of Nehru. According to her, an article therein drew heavily on Krishna Hutheesing's article, originally published in an American magazine, *Ladies Home Journal*, in January 1955. Vijayalakshmi Pandit wondered whether "all this [was] calculated to bring our countries closer together." She added: "I despair of the USA. I am afraid in our time the relationship has small chance of improving." For Nehru's comments on Krishna Hutheesing's article, see *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 30, p. 540.

III. USA

1. Cable to G.L. Mehta[1]

Your telegrams 343 of June 20 and 344 of June 21 were placed in my hands after my arrival here last night.[2] Clearly there is no other course open to me than to accept the advice given by Dulles and others and suggest to President Eisenhower a postponement of my visit. I would like you to transmit the following message[3] immediately to the President. . . .

1. London, 23 June 1956. JN Collection. Extracts.
2. After meeting Dulles on 20 June, Mehta, India's Ambassador to the US, reported that President Eisenhower's advisers were doubtful whether the President, who was convalescing after undergoing an operation earlier in the month, would be adequately fit to conduct prolonged talks with Nehru during his visit to Washington from 7 July onward. Dulles suggested that the Indian Prime Minister could postpone his visit for this reason and write to the President accordingly.
3. See the next item.

2. Message to Dwight D. Eisenhower[1]

I have been much gratified to learn of the continuing progress of your recovery from your recent illness, but feel that the programme of our personal talks should not impose an additional strain on you during your convalescence. I am most anxious that this should be avoided, and suggest therefore for your consideration

1. London, 23 June 1956. JN Collection.

that my visit to the United States might be postponed. I had been looking forward greatly to the opportunity of personal talks with you, but I think it still more important that no undue strain should be placed upon you in the coming weeks which might in any way retard your progress to full recovery. I send you my warm personal regards and best wishes for your speedy and complete restoration to normal health.[2]

2. Acknowledging Nehru's "gracious message", Eisenhower replied on 24 June that he was inclined to accept Nehru's "considerate suggestion" that his visit be postponed. He also expressed the hope that the delay would not be for long and that Nehru would, at his convenience, suggest another date. On 25 June, the US Government and the Government of India simultaneously released the text of Nehru's message and Eisenhower's reply.

3. To G.L. Mehta[1]

Camp: Aclare Hou[illegible]
Ja[illegible]reland)
8 July 1956

My dear Gaganvihari,

The postponement of my visit to the United States to see President Eisenhower has naturally led to a great deal of comment and criticism in America. I cannot say that I am at all happy at this postponement, though, in the circumstances, it perhaps became inevitable. I am inclined to think, however, that some important people around President Eisenhower, more especially Dulles and Nixon,[2] were not keen on my going to Washington at this stage.

It is obvious that the later I go to Washington and the nearer to the Presidential

1. JN Collection.
2. Richard M. Nixon (1913-1994); US Republican statesman; lawyer in California, 1937-42; Member, US Congress, 1947-50; Senator from California, 1950-53; Vice-President of the USA, 1953-61; Republican candidate for the Presidency, 1960; President of the USA, 1969-74; resigned in 1974 under the threat of impeachment; wrote several books, including *Six Crises* (1962), *Memoirs* (1978), *No More Vietnams* (1986) and *In the Arena: A Memoir of Victory, Defeat and Renewal* (1990).

election,[3] the more embarrassing it is likely to be. As I told you previously, it is exceedingly difficult for me to leave India during the next few months. We are having a difficult time in India because of the States Reorganization Bill and I cannot possibly leave in the middle of a serious internal crisis.

At the same time, I have given some kind of an assurance that I would go to Washington if the President is well enough to meet me. My going therefore depends on several major factors. One, the President's health; two, my own preoccupations and, three, developments in American politics.

If, for instance, it is finally decided that the President is not going to stand for election, then the necessity for my going there becomes somewhat less. Also, I can hardly go there almost on the eve of the election.

I am merely putting these considerations to you so that you may know how my mind is working. As far as I can see, the only possible time when I can go there might be the first half of September, though even that will be difficult enough. Our Parliament is going to meet very soon and I must be there throughout the session. In the second half of September I have promised to pay a short visit to Saudi Arabia. Apart from this, we shall have another session of Parliament in October and visits from the Emperor of Ethiopia and other dignitaries.

What I want you to do is to keep me informed of the President's health and developments in American politics which might affect my going there. Obviously, I can say nothing at all about anything till I know definitely that the President is well enough to see me and have talks with me.

This is entirely for your personal information and I should not like you to make the slightest commitment to the State Department about my visit at this stage.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

3. The US presidential election was due in November 1956.

4. To C. Rajagopalachari[1]

New Delhi
July 27, 1956

My dear Rajaji,
Thank you for your letter of the 26th July.

I thought you had dropped 'ji' long ago and quite rightly too. It is absurd for you to deal with me with 'ji' attached.[2]

About my going to America, I am much troubled. I agree with what you say.[3] On the other hand I feel a certain commitment. In any event there is no question of my going there before the American elections. The only point to be considered is whether I should indicate now that I should go after the elections.

Yours affectionately,
Jawahar

1. JN Collection.
2. Rajaji began his letter with "My dear Jawaharlal" and then wrote in his own hand, "You will not mind my dropping the 'ji' " normally suffixed to Jawaharlal.
3. Saying that he was glad Nehru did not visit the US, Rajaji noted: "Apart from the immediate cause . . . for your change of programme, there is another thing to be considered. I think Dulles is incorrigible and his government must be defeated if America is to be at all decent in international affairs . . . If you go now and have talks with Ike, it will give a tremendous pull to him in the elections which I feel is not good. I would like you to go to America only after the election of the President is over."

5. Cable to G.L. Mehta[1]

Your two telegrams 392 and 398 of 24th and 25th July.[2] I have given much thought to this question of my visiting Washington. Conditions here are such that it is becoming increasingly difficult for me to leave India, more especially during Parliament sessions. As you must know, I have for the present taken charge of Finance portfolio also. The controversies over States Reorganization Bill continue and are bitter. Our own elections are coming early next year. The only possible time when I might be able to pay short visit to Washington is perhaps during second half of December. But I should not like even this vague date to be fixed at this stage. It would be much better for us to wait for some time, say till the American elections are over early in November, and then fix a possible date in December. That would be more appropriate also.

2. I suggest, therefore, that you might tell Sherman Adams[3] about my difficulties and suggest that the question of my going to Washington might be considered some time later when the situation here clears up a little.

3. For your personal information, I think it is politically unwise for my visit to be announced before American elections. It seems to me that there is some tactical advantage for the American elections by the announcement of it. I would rather avoid this. Also, recent developments about Suez Canal are likely to create grave situation and cause us also some headaches. I would much rather that during this period no announcement was made about my visit.

1. New Delhi, 28 July 1956. JN Collection.
2. Referring to his conversations with John Sherman Cooper, the outgoing US Ambassador in India, Mehta telegraphed on 24 July: "Cooper assured me that President is still most anxious to have a meeting with you at earliest possible date." Subsequently, Mehta reported that the White House proposed to send a note inquiring whether December would suit Nehru to visit Washington.
3. (1899-1986); Chief of White House Staff and Assistant to the US President, 1953-58; author of *First Hand Report* (1961).

6. Drafting a Reply to Eisenhower's Letter[1]

I am returning to you President Eisenhower's letter,[2] as I would like you to draft the answer. Your last draft was eminently successful.

The question, however, is what answer I should send him. I have written and telegraphed to our Ambassador that the only possible time when I can go there is about the middle of December. Even that is by no means certain. Apart from our difficulties here, this new Suez Canal development introduces another uncertain factor.

I had indicated to our Ambassador that while the middle of December might be kept in view rather vaguely, I would prefer that no announcement should be made at this stage. We might reconsider this matter about the beginning of November when I shall be in a better position to judge of my own programme and the American elections would also be over.

However, in view of President Eisenhower's new letter to me, I feel that I have to send a more definite answer. You need not fix any firm date, but I might indicate that perhaps I might be able to go about the middle of December if that is convenient to the President. It might further be said that this date might be kept in view and later perhaps this might be finalized.

I wonder if it will be right to make any reference to the new development in the Suez Canal,[3] which has introduced a measure of uncertainty about future programmes.

I realize that it is rather difficult to be both vague and precise. However, could you have [a] shot at this and then we can consider it further in consultation with others.[4]

1. Note to Secretary General, Ministry of External Affairs, 4 August 1956. JN Collection.
2. This refers to Eisenhower's letter of 31 July to Nehru. G.L.Mehta reported on 1 August that Sherman Adams, Assistant to the US President, had shown him a letter which Eisenhower addressed to Nehru expressing his disappointment that the Indian Prime Minister had postponed his visit.
3. See *ante*, pp. 325-333.
4. Nehru replied to Eisenhower on 10 August 1956. See the next item.

7. To Dwight D. Eisenhower[1]

New Delhi
10th August, 1956

My dear Mr President,

I am grateful to you for your personal and secret letter of July 31, the text of which has been delivered to me by your Chargé d'Affaires here. I have followed with close interest the progress of your convalescence and I am very glad to learn that your health has been improving.

I have been giving thought myself to the possibility of fixing a date for my postponed visit to the United States. I am anxious to have the opportunity to meet you and discuss matters of common interest with you. I have delayed somewhat in answering your letter because I was not quite sure when it might be possible for me to leave India. Normally the next few months are very fully occupied for us with meetings of Parliament and other important engagements. Exceptional circumstances this year make the coming months busier still. We are in the middle of a complicated legislative measure, involving an amendment of our Constitution, which will change the shape of our States and, in effect, result in a new map of India. After the legislation is passed by Parliament, this will have to be followed by extensive administrative action. Early next year we are having our general elections all over the country. We are also expecting a number of distinguished foreign visitors in the closing months of this year. All this makes it difficult for me to leave India for any appreciable period.

I shall, however, make every effort to pay a visit to Washington if I can possibly manage this. It might be desirable to keep a possible date in view for this visit, however provisional it might be. So far as I can see at present, it might be possible for me to be absent from India for a short period about the middle of December. If this should suit your convenience, we could keep this date in view. For the present this might be considered a tentative date only and somewhat later in the year we might perhaps be in a better position to finalize it. I would suggest that no public announcement of the visit might be made until we are in a position to take a final decision. An early announcement if followed by a further

1. JN Collection.

postponement might produce unfortunate public reactions.[2]

It is a matter of very real pleasure to me, Mr President, that an opportunity may be given, even before the close of the year, for the personal talks we had planned, and I very much hope that it will be possible, when the position becomes clearer, to finalize my visit to Washington on the basis now provisionally proposed.

I need not tell you how anxious we have been about the recent developments in regard to the Suez Canal. I earnestly hope that the great influence of the United States will help in arriving at a peaceful settlement of this difficult and intricate problem. It would be disastrous if the efforts to solve this problem peacefully failed and conflict resulted.[3]

With cordial personal regards,

Sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

2. Eisenhower was happy to learn that Nehru planned to visit Washington about the middle of December. With regard to publicity, Eisenhower pointed out that when reporters questioned his press secretary, James Hagerty, on 14 August about the possibility of Nehru's visit, he "merely confirmed the renewal of my invitation, adding that I had suggested no particular date and that no date had been set."
3. Appreciating Nehru's remarks concerning the Suez Canal problem, Eisenhower stated: "I, too, sincerely hope that we can arrive, in London, at a peaceful solution of the problem. We have been most anxious to find a formula satisfactory to the parties concerned which will still maintain the character of the canal as an important international arterial waterway." The Suez Canal Conference began in London on 16 August.

8. To G.L. Mehta[1]

New Delhi
August 19, 1956

My dear Gaganvihari,

Your letter of August 4 with which you have enclosed a personal letter to you from Paul Hoffman.[2] Please thank Hoffman for having taken the trouble to write on this subject. I am glad that Nixon has explained his position in regard to India. Unfortunately a statement he made in Karachi[3] drew a great deal of attention here in our Press which criticized it.

I entirely agree with Hoffman that Nixon has the right to hold his opinion, just as we are entitled to hold our opinions. Also that there need be no misunderstanding between us.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. JN Collection.
2. US Republican politician.
3. A few days before visiting Karachi, Richard Nixon, the US Vice-President, said in Manila on 3 July 1956 that the USA respected the right of each country to chart its own course and appreciated the friendship of neutral countries that adhered to democracy and freedom. But, he added, the US had no sympathy "for that kind of neutralism which draws no moral distinction between the Communist world and the free world." On 9 July, answering a question in Karachi, Nixon said that if, as the questioner had suggested, Nehru had described his views on neutrality as "undemocratic", then Nehru was, of course, entitled to his opinion. Nixon added: "My answer to Nehru would be that for anyone who suggests that Communist assistance . . . is not inconsistent with independence and freedom is not reading correctly the lesson of history."

IV. SUEZ

1. Cable to Vijayalakshmi Pandit[1]

Deputy High Commissioner UK[2] saw Pillai[3] today and said that Anthony Eden will make short statement in British Parliament today about Egyptian announcement to nationalize Suez Canal.[4] Also that Eden will have one or more meetings with High Commissioners in London to discuss situation arising from Egyptian Government's decision.

2. It is evident that British Government is much put out by this announcement. I confess that we are not happy about it either and it is likely to add to our headaches in various ways. Your attitude at High Commissioners' meeting should be one of listening and not committing ourselves in any way.[5]

3. When I was in Egypt recently, there was no mention of Suez Canal although we had long talks.[6] Indeed, even about Aswan Dam Nasser said that they were

1. New Delhi, 27 July 1956. JN Collection.
2. William Arthur Weir Clark.
3. N.R. Pillai, Secretary-General, Ministry of External Affairs.
4. Describing the Suez Canal Company as an "exploiting" company and a "state within a state", President Nasser announced the company's nationalization at a mass rally in Alexandria on 26 July. He added that the income from the Canal would be used to build the Aswan Dam. Prime Minister Anthony Eden stated in the British Parliament on 27 July that the Egyptian Government's unilateral decision to "expropriate" the company affected the rights and interests of many nations, and that the British Government were "consulting other governments immediately concerned, with regard to the serious situation thus created."
5. Reporting on a meeting of the High Commissioners convened on the 27th morning by Douglas-Home, the British Commonwealth Secretary, Vijaylakshmi Pandit, India's High Commissioner in the UK, stated: "Lord Home was obviously disturbed and, as the Canadian High Commissioner (Norman A. Robertson) remarked, 'almost panicky'." Home spoke of the "impossibility of allowing a gangster to remain in complete control" of the Suez Canal and "emphasized that Egypt could, if this action was not firmly curbed, destroy Western prestige and cripple UK economy in a matter of weeks". Eden met with the High Commissioners later the same day.
6. After the tripartite talks between Nehru, Tito and Nasser at Brioni on 18 and 19 July, Nehru and Nasser flew together to Cairo to continue their meetings on 20 July.

likely to give up this project.[7] I agreed with him and mentioned that such an enormous project would absorb all resources of Egypt for next ten years leaving nothing for other developments which could bring results sooner. It seemed advisable therefore to concentrate on many other things. I do not know if any fresh offer of help has been made to Egypt by Soviet Union about Aswan Dam.[8]

4. Any foreign government which gives major help for Aswan Dam is bound to have powerful influence on economic policy of Egypt. I feel that Egyptian Government is undertaking more than it can manage and is being pushed by some extremist elements and by angry reaction to American and British refusal to help Aswan Dam project.

5. This is for your information only.

7. The Aswan Dam project, envisaging the construction of a 365 feet high dam on the Nile, was estimated to cost $ 1.3 billion. In December 1955, the US offered Egypt a $ 56 million grant for building the dam. However, it withdrew the offer on 19 July 1956 on the plea that the grant was contingent on "Egyptian willingness and ability to concentrate its economic resources" on the project, "but developments have not been favourable" and Egypt's ability "to devote adequate resources to assure the project's success has become more uncertain than at the time the offer was made." The UK and the World Bank had also announced loan offers of $ 14 million and $ 200 million, respectively, to Egypt for constructing the dam. They also withdrew their offer on 20 and 24 July respectively.
8. Ahmed Hussein, the Egyptian Ambassador in Washington, announced on 17 October 1955 that the USSR had offered his country a loan of $200 million for the Aswan dam.

2. Cable to Ali Yavar Jung[1]

You will remember that during our talks Nasser told me that they were going to give up Aswan Dam project. I said to him that quite apart from foreign help being available or not, it seemed to me wiser not to mortgage all resources of Egypt for next ten years to one major project which would not bring results till end of that period. From practical point of view it appeared more desirable to have large number of smaller projects yielding early results.

1. New Delhi, 27 July 1956. JN Collection.

2. I was surprised therefore to learn that Egyptian Government has decided to proceed with Aswan Dam project. It seems obvious that Egypt cannot carry this burden itself. Has Soviet Union promised help for this?[2]

3. It is clear that any country giving major help for Aswan Dam will largely control Egypt's economy.

4. We are also rather surprised to learn of Egyptian Government's decision to nationalize Suez Canal immediately, although concession due to expire in 1967.[3] This raises difficult and complicated issues. It seems that Egyptian Government has come to these decisions as angry reaction to American and British action in regard to Aswan Dam.[4] The British Government is of course much put out by this decision and probably many other Governments also will react strongly because Suez is considered international highway. Financial implications also are likely to be heavy. I confess I am not happy at these developments. I would like you to send us your appraisal of situation.[5]

2. Ali Yavar Jung, India's Ambassador in Egypt, reported on 30 July that Nasser and Kiselev, the Soviet Ambassador, had told him that the Soviet Foreign Minister, Shepilov, during his visit to Cairo in June 1956, had not renewed the reported Soviet offer for the Aswan Dam though he had spoken of long term loan for industrial development. Yavar Jung added that soon after Nehru's departure from Cairo on 21 July, Kiselev met Nasser and told reporters that Soviet assistance for the dam would be forthcoming should Egypt ask for it.
3. A 99-year concession was granted to the Suez Canal Company in 1869 under an Act of Concession obtained in 1856 by Ferdinand Marie de Lesseps, a former French vice consul at Alexandria and the founder of the company, from Said Pasha, the Viceroy of Egypt under the Ottoman Empire. The concession would have, in fact, expired in 1968.
4. Ridiculing the argument that the withdrawal of Western support for the Aswan Dam was based on doubts about Egypt's economic strength, Nasser stated on 24 July that the Americans either lied or were ill-informed. He warned: "May you choke with rage . . . But you will never succeed in ordering us about or in exercizing your tyranny over us . . . We Egyptians will not allow any colonizer or despot to dominate us . . . We shall yield neither to force nor to the dollar."
5. Ali Yavar Jung telegraphed to Nehru on 30 July that he was convinced that the Anglo-American offer was pressed as a counterpoise to the original Soviet offer, and that the main reason for its withdrawal was because the Soviet Union had not renewed it. He thought Egypt reacted so sharply because, "the parting kick was calculated to . . . damage her credit." Pointing out that Nasser was not disposed to act "purely on pique or anger", Yavar Jung argued that the "need for regaining public confidence in the regime" had accounted for the decision. "Not only Arabs but even Egyptian public opinion would not have understood Nasser swallowing the humble pie", he added.

3. Cable to Vijayalakshmi Pandit[1]

Your telegrams 1901[2] and 1911 of July 27.

2. I have already informed you that there was no reference whatever to Suez Canal during talks with Marshal Tito and Nasser at Brioni[3] or later during my talks with Egyptian Ministers in Cairo. Indeed I did not discuss Anglo-Egyptian relations at all with Nasser. There was some brief reference to American offer for Aswan Dam being withdrawn. I suggested that Egyptian Government might go slow over this question and consider it calmly.

3. Our first information of Egyptian Government's decision about Suez Canal came from newspapers here and surprised us greatly. You may inform British Government of this.

4. We should await developments. I do not propose to make any public statement about this question at present.

1. New Delhi, 28 July 1956. JN Collection.
2. Douglas-Home asked Mrs. Pandit whether "we had had any indication of Nasser's intentions."
3. For Nasser's remarks at the tripartite meeting at Brioni relating to the US offer for building the Aswan Dam, see *ante*, p. 304.

4. Message to S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike [1]

Thank you for your message[2] sent through our High Commissioner.[3] We were ourselves greatly surprised when we saw Egyptian Government's announcement about nationalization of Suez Canal Company. There was no reference whatever to this subject in joint talks with Marshal Tito and Nasser at Brioni; nor was any mention made of Suez in course of my talks with Egyptian Government in Cairo. We learnt of this matter for the first time through newspapers here. I confess that I am not happy at new situation which has arisen. It is clear that this may have far-reaching consequences.

I do not think a meeting of Colombo powers for this purpose is desirable. This may well lead to further difficulties and embarrassment to all of us. For the present it seems to me that we should await developments and keep in touch with each other. I do not propose to make any public statement.

1. New Delhi, 28 July 1956. JN Collection.
2. In his message of 27 July, Bandaranaike, Prime Minister of Sri Lanka, expressed the fear that grave consequences might follow the sudden nationalization of the Suez Canal, and presumed that no such action had been contemplated at Brioni. He also wanted to know whether Nehru considered it desirable for the Colombo powers to consider the situation, though he himself foresaw difficulty in having a meeting "as [the] attitude of Pakistan and possibly of Indonesia uncertain." India, Sri Lanka, Myanmar, Pakistan and Indonesia were known as the Colombo powers, because their Prime Ministers had first met at Colombo in 1954 and agreed to stay in regular touch.
3. B.N. Chakravarty, India's High Commissioner in Sri Lanka.

5. Message to Josip Broz Tito[1]

We were much surprised to learn from newspapers about Egyptian Government's decision to nationalize Suez Canal Company immediately. As you know, no reference was made to this subject at Brioni. Nor was it mentioned in the course of my talks at Cairo later. It appears to be an angry reaction to American and British decision not to give help for Aswan Dam.

A difficult and embarrassing situation has been created which is likely to add to international tensions. I should like to have your views on situation created.[2] I do not propose to make any public statement at present about it.

1. New Delhi, 28 July 1956. JN Collection.
2. Marshal Tito, the Yugoslav President, stated in his reply sent on 2 August: "In my opinion, the whole issue, although very serious, is not so dramatic as some quarters want to present. The main thing now is not to be nervous. I believe that it is possible to act towards both sides with a quietening effect." Tito also wanted to know "as to what could be undertaken in order to get the excitement gradually calmed down and to reach a reasonable solution."

6. Awaiting Developments[1]

So far as I know, we have received no particular representations from the UK High Commissioner[2] here about the Egyptian crises.

2. In your reply, you might say that we have sent no particular instructions to our Ambassador in Cairo or elsewhere. We have informed Ceylon, Burma, Indonesia, Yugoslavia and Moscow that there was no reference to the Suez Canal during our talks at Brioni and Cairo. Also that for the present we are awaiting developments and I do not intend issuing a public statement for the time being.

3. There is no justification for saying that we have given full support to the UK. It would be equally incorrect to say that we have given full support to Cairo in regard to what is being done. As we have already informed London, we are going to watch developments and not make any commitment for the present.

1. Note to Subimal Dutt, Foreign Secretary, 29 July 1956. JN Collection.
2. Malcolm MacDonald.

7. Background Note for Indian Missions[1]

You might reply to this telegram more or less as follows:

"There is no question of a conflict between Commonwealth loyalties and Egyptian friendship. Certainly we want to be friends with Egypt as well as other countries. We have refrained thus far from any formal expression of opinion in regard to Suez Canal issue, partly because we were not acquainted with all the facts and are collecting them and considering them, partly because we want to be helpful if occasion and necessity arises. Most Indian newspapers have already expressed their sympathy with Egypt in this matter.

We feel that the way the US and UK Governments dealt with Egypt in regard to the Aswan Dam after encouraging the Egyptian Government for a considerable time and even considering plans for the dam, was very discourteous. Certain statements made in the United States about Egyptian Government's general political policy and especially recognition of China,[2] made it appear that decision was based on political reasons and in order to bring pressure on Egypt to change that policy or to be made to suffer.[3] All this was considered very insulting by Egyptian Government and people.[4]

Egypt's right to nationalize the Suez Canal, if it chose to do so, cannot be doubted provided it is done in a proper way and to ensure the continuation of the Suez Canal as open international highway. What we regret, however, is the manner all this was done and strong and offensive language used[5] which makes it difficult for suitable agreement to be reached.

1. Note to the Foreign Secretary, 31 July 1956. JN Collection.
2. On 16 May 1956, Egypt formally recognized the People's Republic of China and withdrew recognition from the Nationalist Government in Taiwan.
3. *The New York Times* editorially commented on 20 July: "Egypt has mortgaged its future for arms from the Soviet bloc to such an extent that it is no longer capable of utilizing and repaying the Western aid it seeks for the Aswan Dam. In these circumstances the United States could do no other than refuse participation in the project."
4. On 26 July, Nasser said that there had been a "conspiracy" between the World Bank, the UK and the US to "trick" Egypt into building the Aswan Dam and then to "impose conditions on Egypt affecting her independence and integrity." He added: "We shall rely on our own strength, our own muscle, our own funds" for building the dam.
5. For example, Nasser disclosed at a public meeting in Alexandria on 26 July that he had threatened to "throw out of his office the US Assistant Secretary of State, Mr George Allen," when he had come to present him "with a violent note from Washington following Egypt's purchase of arms from the Soviet bloc."

UNVEILING A PORTRAIT OF LOKMANYA TILAK, INDIA HOUSE, LONDON, 12 JULY 1956

AT THE DUBLIN AIRPORT, 7 JULY 1956

This is our informal reaction. Naturally we would like this matter to be settled peacefully and so as to maintain Suez Canal as international highway."

If you like, you can send some similar background information to some of our other Embassies also and making it clear that this is an informal background.

8. Cable to Vijayalakshmi Pandit[1]

Your telegram 1959 dated August 1.

2. With reference to Lord Home's questions,[2] our answers are that we are naturally interested in the Suez Canal being used as an international highway. As for India's participation in any conference, that would depend on nature and terms of Conference and countries participating in it. We feel that this question should be settled peacefully and it should not be difficult to do so because of the clear declarations made by the Egyptian Government on this subject. Colonel Nasser said on 31st July that action Egypt has taken "does not in any way or to any extent affect the international commitment of Egypt" and that he is determined to honour all international obligations and both the Convention of 1888 and the assurance given in the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement of 1954.[3]

1. New Delhi, 2 August 1956. JN Collection.
2. Mrs Pandit stated that Douglas-Home had asked her to ascertain (i) whether India would be interested in participating in a conference to discuss the question of international control of the Suez Canal, and (ii) if the conference produced a plan, whether India would be prepared to enforce its implementation. Home also pointed out that Nasser could not be trusted to stand by his treaty obligations on freedom of navigation, and that Britain would be prepared to use "all available means of enforcement in case of need."
3. Under the Convention of Constantinople of 1888, all the countries were guaranteed freedom of navigation on the Suez Canal without discrimination. The Egyptian Government specifically recognized this right in the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement of 1954. Accordingly, Britain agreed to relinquish the Suez Canal base.

3. We think that any attempt to use force is likely to defeat its own purpose and create widespread resentment in many countries of Asia. I have refrained from making any statement on this issue. But Indian press has generally expressed sympathy for Egypt, while emphasizing that Suez Canal must continue to be international highway.

4. We cannot obviously commit ourselves to any course of action without knowing definitely what it is. In any event, we think that attempts at coercion will not be successful and will lead to far-reaching and harmful consequences.

5. You may give this indication to Home orally. It is possible that I might send you message for Eden later.

6. For your information. Egypt's right to nationalize Suez Canal can hardly be doubted, however much we may regret the manner this has been done. The real question is to ensure continuation of Suez Canal as an open international highway. This can best be secured by agreements peacefully arrived at and not by threats and coercion.

7. It is clear that discourteous and peremptory manner of American statement refusing aid for Aswan Dam angered Egyptian people greatly. From American newspapers and magazines it appears that this was deliberately done in this way and timing, just when we were meeting at Brioni, was also deliberate. We understand that two days before American statement, UK Government tried to dissuade US from acting in this manner.

8. Press message from New York that I have sent personal communication to President Eisenhower in regard to Suez Canal is wrong. I have sent no message.

9. Message to Gamal Abdel Nasser[1]

Soon after my return to Delhi from Cairo and Beirut,[2] I learnt of your decision about Suez Canal. As this had not been mentioned by you in the course of our talks at Brioni and Cairo, I thought that decision must have been taken after I left Cairo. Our Ambassador in Cairo has confirmed this[3] after a talk he had with Minister Ali Sabri.[4] This has helped me to understand this aspect of the matter. I have today received from your Ambassador[5] in Delhi a copy of your statement of 31st July. Thank you for this.

2. I have till now made no comments on these developments beyond saying in Parliament[6] that this matter was not discussed between us at Brioni or Cairo. I was hoping to have fuller information about the future to enable me to make a statement in our Parliament. A matter of this kind has international repercussions and I wanted my statement in our Parliament to be as helpful as possible. Our direct interest is as users of the Canal like others, but we are naturally also interested in a friendly settlement.

3. We are in no doubt as to the sovereign rights of Egypt and note that the position adopted by you in 1954 is that "the Suez Maritime Canal, which is an integral part of Egypt, is a waterway economically, commercially and strategically of international importance" and that you have expressed "the determination to

1. New Delhi, 2 August 1956. JN Collection. The message was sent through Ali Yavar Jung.
2. Leaving Cairo on 21 July, Nehru stopped in Beirut on 21-22 July en route to India. He reached Delhi on 23 July.
3. After meeting Ali Sabri, Nasser's political aide, on 1 August, Ali Yavar Jung reported that the decision to nationalize the Suez Canal "was taken two days before it was announced and on reports of public reactions to withdrawal of Western offer", and that "linking of nationalization with high dam project was more for public opinion than part of any firm decision to carry on with project." Sabri also told Yavar Jung: "Cabinet had not yet considered whether, in circumstances, to drop, postpone, stagger or take up only part of project, specially that relating to irrigation."
4. (1920-1991); Egyptian politician; Director of the Office of the Egyptian President, 1956; Minister for Presidential Affairs, Egypt, and later the United Arab Republic (UAR), 1957-62; Prime Minister, UAR, 1962-65; Vice-President, UAR, 1965-67 and 1970-71; Secretary General, Arab Socialist Union, 1965-67 and 1968-69; Deputy Prime Minister, UAR, 1967; tried for treason and sentenced to life imprisonment, 1971.
5. Mustapha Kamel.
6. On 31 July 1956.

uphold the Convention guaranteeing the freedom of navigation of the Canal signed at Constantinople on the 29th October 1888."

4. Recognizing the sovereign rights of Egypt as above and welcoming your statement of the 31st July that your present position "does not in any way or to any extent affect the international commitments of Egypt" and that you are "determined to honour all your international obligations [7] and both the Convention of 1888 and the assurance given in the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement of 1954", I venture to express the hope that you will decide to take the initiative yourself to call together all those interested in the international aspects of the development and on the basis of Egypt's sovereignty. Such a step would be fully in accord with your declared intentions and help the consideration of such mutually agreeable arrangements consistent with your law as well as international usage and to clear away misconceptions.

5. I am sure you will appreciate that my suggestion is in no way designed as an interference in Egypt's affairs or with your decision, but actuated by the desire to see that there should be as little acrimony about this as possible and to assist in a peaceful and conciliatory approach.

6. My own attitude and desire is only to see that all questions that have arisen should be settled by peaceful means, and I feel sure you share this desire.

7. There have been repercussions and some of these might well increase tension, but it should be the wish of all parties concerned to settle all problems and questions arising from this development by talks in a friendly way. Our own attitude will be governed by this consideration and with due adherence to our friendships and international usage.

8. I trust you will give consideration to what I have said above and take your own initiative or respond to any legitimate step taken by others which does not prejudice the sovereignty and dignity of Egypt.

9. I shall be most grateful to you for your views.

7. The Egyptian Ambassadors in London, Paris and Washington, in statements issued on 31 July, and Ali Sabri, in a press conference the same day, gave assurances that the security and freedom of navigation in the Suez Canal would be maintained and the international obligations would be honoured.

10. Cable to Ali Yavar Jung[1]

Continuation telegram No. Primin 21689[2] of August 2, the following is for your background information and guidance in your discussions with the Egyptian Prime Minister and other authorities in Egypt.

2. Egypt as a sovereign country has the right to nationalize the Suez Canal Company which is an Egyptian joint stock company. At the same time Suez Canal is an important international waterway and many other countries including several countries in Asia are vitally interested in its proper management and freedom of navigation through it. Whether the obligations imposed on Egypt under the 1888 Convention are binding or not, our view is that all efforts should be directed to secure a friendly and peaceful settlement which without detracting from Egypt's sovereignty would guarantee continuance of the Canal as an open international waterway.

3. In this matter the sympathies of the public and press in most countries in Asia are with Egypt. Whatever the rights and wrongs of the situation, we however cannot join in any measures which are likely to create a war-psychosis or to hinder any steps which are intended to promote a peaceful settlement of the problem. You should therefore avoid giving any impression that we as an Asian country will not participate in any discussions about peaceful settlement of the dispute without Egypt's specific consent to our doing so. In other words in this matter we should not appear to line up completely with Egypt and other countries sympathetic to Egypt just as we will not line up against Egypt with powers hostile to her. You must have seen the press message about the Anglo-French-US decision to call a 16-power conference.[3] We have not yet received a formal invitation to the conference. Naturally before we take any decision we should like to see what the scope of the conference is to be. We feel, and this you should stress, that now that Egypt has got physical control of the Canal, she can

1. New Delhi, 3 August 1956. JN Collection.
2. In this telegram, Nehru asked Ali Yavar Jung to convey to Nasser his message of 2 August (see the preceding item).
3. In a joint communique issued on 2 August, Britain, France and the US called for a twenty-four nation conference in London on 16 August for creating an international body to control the Suez Canal. The decision to convene the conference was reached during talks held in London on 1-2 August between the British Foreign Secretary, Selwyn Lloyd, the French Foreign Minister, Christian Pineau, and the US Secretary of State, Dulles.

afford to take a calmer view of the situation despite provocation and excitement in the UK, France and other western countries. She is in a better position therefore to take initiative in international talks with a view to giving assurance to other countries interested in the future of the Suez Canal. In the alternative she should respond to any legitimate step taken by others which does not prejudice sovereignty and dignity of Egypt.

4. There is not the slightest truth in the press report that Prime Minister has sent any personal communication to President Eisenhower in regard to the Suez Canal.

11. To Lord Mountbatten[1]

New Delhi
August 3, 1956

My dear Dickie,[2]
Thank you for your letter of the 24th July and for the music of the Harmonised Sunset.[3]

My tennis elbow continued to give me some little trouble after I left England. There was some gradual improvement. Then, I took electric treatment, and this did me a lot of good. My pain, etc., has almost entirely gone. I propose to continue this treatment for a few days more. The idea of having a local anaesthetic was considered but given up as I was improving fairly rapidly.

I suppose that you and the Royal Navy are kept busy now because of developments in the Suez Canal. We do not seem to have much peace in this world and something or other happens to keep up tensions. Nasser behaved

1. JN Collection.
2. Britain's First Sea Lord.
3. Nehru wrote to M.K Vellodi, Defence Secretary, on 3 August: "When I was in London, I visited a tattoo by the Defence Forces in Olympia. There I heard a band of the Royal Marines, I think, play something which I liked. I asked Lord Mountbatten to send me the score. He has done so. I believe this is called the Harmonised Sunset. I enclose this. Will you have it tried by some of our bands?"

oddly and unreasonably, but I do not understand why the UK should react in such an excited manner.[4]

I was with Nasser when he heard first about the American refusal to give aid for the Aswan Dam. This was I think on the 19th July at Brioni. On the 20th, we were together in Cairo, and on the 21st morning I left Cairo. There was no mention of any kind of the Suez Canal. And I am almost sure that the Egyptian Government had not considered this question. It was during the next two or three days that their decisions were taken. I have no doubt that these decisions were a reaction to the very discourteous and almost contemptuous way the USA had treated them. It was not that they did not get the aid which had been promised to them, but the manner of proclaiming this. The American newspapers and magazines clearly stated that this was meant to snub Nasser and to keep him in his place. It was also particularly stated in these American papers that the timing of the announcement was carefully considered so as to reach us when we were meeting at Brioni.

Well, we have had the reaction. We can easily criticize it and the language that Nasser has used is certainly not good at all. But, how this question is going to be settled by show of force is more than I can understand.

Yours,
Jawaharlal

4. Eden told the House of Commons on 2 August that the "movement from this country of certain naval, army and air force units" and a planned partial reserve call up would "strengthen our position in the Eastern Mediterranean." It was announced the same day that three aircraft carriers would sail for the Mediterranean within a few days, and a number of Canberra jet bomber squadrons would fly out to Malta from bases in the UK.

12. Cabinet Meeting on the Suez Crisis[1]

The minutes relating to the first item of the agenda are much too long. I am, therefore, redrafting them as follows:

"The Prime Minister referred to the recent developments in regard to the Suez Canal, which had created a critical situation. It appeared that the decision of the Egyptian Government was taken rather suddenly and after the Prime Minister had left Cairo on the morning of the 21st July. This decision appeared to have been taken because of the powerful reaction of Egypt to the refusal of the United States to give aid for the construction of the Aswan Dam. The manner of communicating this refusal was also considered as an affront by Egypt. It appeared to have nothing to do with economic reasons and was based on political considerations. Probably, the recognition of the People's Government of China by Egypt had irritated the United States greatly. The timing of the US rejection was also significant. It coincided with the Brioni meeting.

2. The Egyptian Government's action created very strong reactions, more especially in the United Kingdom and France. The language used by Egyptian leaders was also provocative. On the other side, in England[2] and France,[3] the

1. Note to Y.N. Sukthankar, Cabinet Secretary, 4 August 1956. JN Collection. A meeting of the Cabinet was held on 4 August 1956.
2. After a stormy meeting on 27 July with the Egyptian Ambassador, Kamal Eddin Abdel Nabi, who refused to receive an aide memoire setting out the French case against Egypt's decision to nationalize the Suez Canal, the French Foreign Minister, Christian Pineau stated that he had told the Ambassador that the "Egyptian dictator" had committed an "act of plunder" and that France would not accept Egypt's unilateral action in nationalizing the Suez Canal Company. Eden said in the House of Commons on 2 August that "in view of the uncertain situation created by the actions of the Egyptian Government," the British Government had "thought it necessary to take certain precautionary measures of a military nature." Intervening in the debate, Selwyn Lloyd said: "It is a situation in which anything could happen and the Government would be failing in its duties if it did not take precautionary measures."
3. In a statement on 30 July, the French Premier, Guy Mollet, denounced Nasser as a "would-be dictator" and imitator of Adolf Hitler. Quoting from Nasser's pamphlet *The Philosophy of Revolution* that called for "efforts to unite the Arab world from the Atlantic Ocean to the Persian Gulf", Mollet said that it should have been entitled *Mein Kampf*. He warned that France and her allies were determined to launch "an energetic and severe riposte" to Nasser's ambitions.

language used was also provocative, and military measures were taken,[4] which could only be interpreted as an attempt to intimidate Egypt. Certain financial steps like the blocking of sterling payments to Egypt[5] were also taken. All this had created a very serious situation, and passions were high on both sides.

3. India had received an invitation from the British Government to attend a conference which had been summoned to meet on the 16th August 1956 in London. The invitation or the joint communique of the three powers, the UK, the USA and France, was vague[6] and the exact terms of reference were not given. Nor was it clear on what basis the invitations had been issued. It was intended to seek clarification in regard to these and other matters before a decision was taken as to whether India should attend this conference or not. Meanwhile, Foreign Office was in communication with Egypt and the UK as well as some other countries.

4. There was considerable discussion on this subject, and the Cabinet was broadly of opinion that no sudden decision should be taken about the conference and we must wait for further information. Also, that our decision should be based on our own judgement and not on some other country's decision.

5. The right of Egypt to nationalize the Canal was admitted, and President Nasser's assurance to maintain the use of the Canal as a free international highway was welcomed. At the same time, it might be necessary to have certain institutional arrangements to ensure this free use of the Canal according to previous agreements and conventions.

6. So far as India was concerned, the main objective was to prevent hostilities and to have a peaceful settlement which would ensure the use of Canal as heretofore. Any restriction of traffic through the Canal or blockade or imposition of higher tolls would have harmful results and might even prejudice the progress of the Second Five Year Plan."

4. French sources announced on 29 July that talks were underway on a joint Franco-British military action in the event of the Suez crisis deteriorating. It was reported on 2 August that the French Navy's Mediterranean squadron, including a battleship, two aircraft carriers and a cruiser, had been placed on alert.
5. On 28 July, the British Treasury forbade transfers into or out of Egyptian sterling accounts in the UK without Treasury permission affecting over fifty per cent of the Egyptian National Bank's £100 million in long-term investments. Eighty per cent of Egypt's foreign trade was conducted through sterling accounts.
6. The three-power communique of 2 August stated that the proposed London conference would take steps "to establish operating arrangements under an international system designed to assure the continuity of operation of the canal consistently with legitimate Egyptian interests."

13. Cable to Ali Yavar Jung[1]

Your telegram 165 of 3rd August.[2]

2. I shall await Nasser's reply before sending a formal reply to UK invitation. Apart from UK invitation, I have also had a personal message from Eden. We are continuing our enquiries as to scope and purpose of conference as well as terms of reference which are not mentioned in invitation. We are ascertaining what British views are on these matters and whether it would be an open conference for the consideration of the question without prior commitments.

3. I should like to know, if possible, what kind of message was sent to Egyptian Government by UK Government about this conference apart from the three-power communique.

4. For your own information. We have not adopted any attitude that our acceptance of the invitation is dependent upon other acceptances. It will depend upon our own judgement of it leading to something useful or not. Our approach to this matter would be to find a way by which the two sides can come together. It is our national interest also that arrangements in regard to the Canal should be such as to promote confidence all round. We should like to function in such a way that whatever step, including any conference, that takes place next is not by way of creating a barrier but leads to a further stage towards settlement. I am glad to note from your telegram that Nasser's attitude is not one of positive rejection but of considered reply which I await.

5. I would like you to tell Nasser that we will give the best consideration to his message when it comes and also our concern about nothing being done in the meanwhile which would have the result of shutting the doors against peaceful arrangements and creating greater rigidity on the respective sides. We are saying the same to the United Kingdom.

6. I agree with you that British and French military preparations and sabre-rattling and attempts at intimidation are objectionable.

1. New Delhi, 4 August 1956. JN Collection.
2. Ali Yavar Jung reported that Nasser hoped the Indian reply to the British invitation would not be sent before his reply to Nehru's message of 2 August (see *ante*, pp. 327-328).

14. Message to Anthony Eden[1]

I am grateful to you for your message[2] conveyed to me on the 3rd August by your High Commissioner who also gave me a copy of your communique. I can well appreciate your not being able to telegraph earlier in the present circumstances.

The invitation to the proposed conference and the communique do not make it clear what the scope and purpose of the conference will be. We are communicating with the UK Government requesting them to enlighten us about these matters.[3] I note that it is your present view that the Canal must be put under international authority. I would like to enquire whether the conference to which you have invited us is convened on a prior acceptance of this as a basis.[4]

I am anxious that there should be an approach to this problem which will lead to a settlement and shall be glad to assist in any way possible. To commit ourselves to the principle mentioned above prior to discussions and agreement can lead to our being of little help in the present situation or in the future. We have also not yet given detailed consideration as to how this principle would or would not accord with the relevant agreements and conventions, as well as with the prospects of a settlement ensuring the free use of the Canal in conditions of cooperation.

Our earnest desire is to help a settlement in such way as we can and that any step taken does not create a barrier to a further stage towards settlement.

1. New Delhi, 4 August 1956. JN Collection.
2. Eden said that the three-power communique "reflects the decided view of all of us that in future the Canal must be put under an international authority. Your support for this principle and for the convening of the conference which it is proposed to call would be of the greatest help and value and I much hope that you will be able to give it."
3. In their communication to the UK Government on 4 August, the Government of India asked "whether the conference would be, as stated in the invitation, on the question of the Suez Canal without any limitation in regard to the scope or whether the acceptance by the invitees of the principles set out in the communique issued by the three powers is expected." They also wanted to know whether the list of invitees was closed. In this connection, S. Dutt told Mrs Pandit: "Exclusion of Burma and some Arab countries closely affected does not appear to be reasonable."
4. Bandaranaike, who had received from Eden a message similar to the one sent to Nehru, asked B.N. Chakravarty on 3 August to ascertain Nehru's interpretation of the message, saying there was little point attending the conference if a decision had already been taken to put the canal under an international authority. Nehru informed Chakravarty on 4 August: "We are trying to ascertain British views on these matters . . . Our decision about acceptance or not of invitation will depend on whether in our judgment it will lead to something useful. We shall not finally decide till we have much further information."

15. Message to Gamal Abdel Nasser[1]

I am grateful to you for your kind reply[2] to my message and appreciate your assurance that you are doing everything to make conciliatory approaches[3] I would like to express the hope that your attitude will remain firmly conciliatory in spite of provocation. It is more likely this would lead to more satisfactory results and strengthen reasonable positions.

2. We are studying your proposal and will send you reply very soon[4] The proposal for reference to the United Nations requires further consideration, but I welcome your readiness to execute fresh treaties with concerned nations on an international basis. This may well give an opportunity for others to find a common ground for coming to suitable arrangements.

3. With regard to our own position in regard to the British invitation we have sent them no reply and are considering the matter.[5] We shall not in any event accept the invitation without reservations regarding the arguments and grounds stated in the joint communique and the composition of the conference and certain other matters. We cannot also subscribe to any form of settlement without full considerations ourselves and consultation with you.

4. Our object would not be to weaken your position but, as you yourself have

1. New Delhi, 5 August 1956. JN Collection.
2. Nasser stated in his reply on 3 August that Egypt was not prepared to accept the British invitation to participate in the proposed conference. Acccording to him, it was against Egypt's "sovereignty and dignity" that the three powers should, without consulting her at all, lay down future methods of controlling part of Egyptian territory. Nasser further said that he proposed, instead of rejecting the invitation, to make a counter proposal that all international waterways be brought under the UN regime. He added that Egypt should also be willing to execute a fresh treaty with all the concerned nations guaranteeing the security of the canal and freedom of navigation, and that treaty could be registered with the UN.
3. Pointing out that the announcement of military preparations by the British and the French was "not peaceful approach and force is threatened because we are comparatively weak and an oriental people", Nasser said that he was doing everything to make his own approaches conciliatory.
4. Nasser said that he would await Nehru's advice regarding his proposal before announcing it and would welcome any other suggestion.
5. Nasser hoped that, "you will appreciate my reasons for not agreeing to respond to the British invitation and I do sincerely trust that, in view of those reasons, you will also oblige us by not accepting it."

been doing, to work for conciliatory approaches. In this way it may be possible to prevent the proposed conference from becoming a barrier to settlement.

5. We wish to emphasize these aspects and not to support any unilateral action taken by one nation or any group of nations.

16. Message to Gamal Abdel Nasser[1]

We have given further and careful consideration to your message dated 3rd August 1956 and to the ideas which you are considering for inclusion in your reply to the United Kingdom by way of your counter proposals.

2. I appreciate your decision that you propose "instead of rejecting the British invitation to make a counter proposal". This readiness to consider with other Governments proposals to resolve present difficulties can only improve the prospects of a settlement and the position of Egypt in this matter.

3. I would suggest that you express your surprise at the UK convening a conference on the Suez Canal issue without consulting or even referring to Egypt and deciding on the countries to be invited as well as indicating future action in regard to this. Egypt is prepared to confer with all countries but cannot agree to any course of action against her own sovereignty and dignity.

4. Your reply may say that Egypt is agreeable to a conference, to be composed of an agreed list of invitees, based on the Constantinople Convention, the present concerned parties in the use of the Canal, and any other relevant consideration. It would be useful to add that it should not be difficult to agree on such a list.

5. That the conference will be convened without requiring from the participants any prior commitments on any basis of a future settlement such as is set out in the joint communique. Egypt agrees, however, that the question should be considered on the basis of the Constantinople Convention of 1888 and the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement of 1954. Participants would also not be required to abandon beforehand, in so far as they are concerned, any positions they hold. It would be desirable not to put any restrictive conditions on invitees.

6. Egypt would be willing either to execute a fresh treaty with all concerned nations, or to a convention which will guarantee the security of the Canal, freedom

1. New Delhi, 5 August 1956. JN Collection.

of navigation and neutral passage and such other matters as are covered by the previous agreements. This convention may be open to signature by any nation and may be registered with the United Nations.

7. Egypt cannot agree to any challenge to her sovereignty and stands by the position both in regard to the Canal being an integral part of Egypt and to its being a waterway of international importance, in terms of Article 8 of the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement of 1954.

8. Such a conference may be convened by UK, France and Egypt, and this would be in conformity with the Constantinople Convention. The venue of the conference may also be fixed by agreement.

9. Egypt is willing to participate and cooperate in any properly convened conference to consider the internationalization of all international waterways, the Suez Canal included, if there is agreement to convene such a conference. This may be under United Nations auspices or otherwise.

10. We do not think it wise for you to suggest that the present problem should be considered by the United Nations.[2] In the present state of the world, the alignment of forces there may not be favourable. Further, it can also lead to the interpretation of a prior acceptance of international control. It is wiser to be cautious about bringing in the UN just now.

11. The Egyptian reply could usefully include the strong expression of Egypt's desire for the recognition of all legitimate rights and treaty obligations and for a peaceful settlement which would lead to cooperation. It might also state that all parties should strive to create a climate of peaceful approach and negotiation. Egypt has sought to do so by maintaining freedom of navigation and by making these proposals.

12. I have made these suggestions in response to your kind request and in the belief that they would contribute to a helpful approach to the problem. Your constructive proposals are bound to have an influence on world public opinion and even on London Conference.

2. Arguing that there was no reason to single out the Suez Canal for international control, Nasser wondered in his message of 3 August to Nehru: "Why, if this issue is so internationally important, it should be discussed outside the UN and only between countries which the three powers have selected by their own standards."

17. Message to Anthony Eden[1]

We are waiting for the reply from the UK Government about the proposed London Conference[2] which will enable us to decide about our acceptance of the invitation to attend it. Meanwhile, I must confess to you of a growing feeling of anxiety at the turn events are taking which might well lead to disastrous conflicts which, I know, you must be eager to avoid.

2. We are all agreed that the Suez Canal should continue as an international waterway open to all. The question is how best this can be done. It is clear that some consultation among the nations concerned or a conference is necessary. More particularly, it is necessary for Egypt to be intimately concerned with these consultations. Any decision taken without the presence or agreement of Egypt will not be a settlement and many other countries might also not agree with it. The question may then arise of enforcing such majority decision by force which presumably will lead to armed forces being sent not only to the Canal Zone but to other parts of Egypt also. This will not only involve serious conflict in Egypt but will also produce powerful reactions all over Asia and in parts of Africa.

3. I do not know what the attitude of the Soviet Union might be now or later. Presumably, it will not be in favour of force being used in Egypt. This will lead to further complications.

4. I am alarmed at all these prospects which are likely to flow inevitably from the use of armed force. If force is to be avoided, then the approach has to be different.

5. Whatever the Egyptian Government might have done previously, it seems to me that they are quite agreeable to arrive at satisfactory settlements with other countries to ensure in every way the working of the Suez Canal as an international waterway. I think that it is possible to take advantage of this Egyptian attitude and arrive at satisfactory settlements. If however force and coercive tactics are used then the consequences all over Asia and in North Africa will be far-reaching.

6. You will forgive me for putting my apprehensions before you. I felt that I should share my thoughts with you as I am naturally greatly concerned at what is happening.

1. New Delhi, 5 August 1956. JN Collection.
2. The Government of India had sought some clarifications regarding the proposed conference. See *ante*, p. 335.

18. Message to Josip Broz Tito[1]

You must have seen the communique issued in London after discussion by France, UK and USA. We do not see how Egypt can accept an invitation to the conference in terms of this communique. We hope however that instead of turning down the invitation outright, Egypt will make counter-proposals for a conference to consider the matter.

2. We ourselves have asked for further elucidation of the terms of the conference and shall make our decision whether or not to participate in the conference after we hear further from the UK Government. Among other matters we think that the list of invitees is not satisfactory. For example, in our view Yugoslavia, Poland, Saudi Arabia and Burma should be included in any conference intended to discuss problems concerning the Suez Canal. However, our approach is that we should avoid taking a rigid stand which may come in the way of a settlement. Of one thing there can be little doubt: if Egypt does not participate in any conference called to consider this problem there will be no settlement and whatever decision is reached can only be imposed on her. Any attempt to impose a decision on Egypt will inevitably mean conflict apart from the fact that it will not lead to a solution of the difficulties. I am glad to know that your Ambassador in Cairo has suggested moderation and conciliation to the Egyptian Foreign Minister.[2] We are giving similar advice to both Egypt and the UK.[3]

1. New Delhi, 5 August 1956. JN Collection.
2. Informing Nehru that the Yugoslav Ambassador in Cairo had talked to the Egyptian Foreign Minister, Mahmoud Fawzi, recommending moderation and conciliation, Tito felt that it would be desirable to act also towards the other side in the same direction. "We have suggested to our press to write in the same spirit", he remarked in his letter of 2 August. Rajeshwar Dayal, India's Ambassador in Belgrade, reported that the Yugoslav press had uncritically backed the earlier Egyptian actions.
3. Rajeshwar Dayal cabled to Nehru on 6 August that Koca Popovic, the Yugoslav State Secretary for Foreign Affairs, to whom he had delivered Nehru's message for Tito, was grateful for India's support of Yugoslavia's participation in the London Conference. Popovic bemoaned that Yugoslavia was the only Mediterranean country that had been excluded from the conference "which is designed to ensure majority decision for Anglo-French position."

WITH EAMON DE VALERA, DUBLIN, JULY 1956

WITH IRISH PRIZE-WINNERS OF SHANKAR'S INTERNATIONAL CHILDREN'S DRAWING AND WRITING COMPETITION, DUBLIN, 10 JULY 1956

19. Message to Ali Sastroamidjojo [1]

Thank you for your letter[2] which was handed to me today by your Charge d' Affaires.[3] I have already sent you today a message about the Suez Canal question.

If we had the time, it might have been desirable for the Colombo countries to meet to consider the situation. But this is not feasible now and because of the pressure of time and fast pace of events few of us can leave our headquarters. Certainly Colonel Nasser could not possibly leave Egypt. There is also the difficulty that Burma has not been invited to the London conference. I understand that Pakistan has already accepted the invitation to attend that conference. Thus the three countries that remain are Indonesia. Ceylon and India. I think that the best course is for us to keep in very close touch with each other in the next two or three days during which time we shall have to decide whether to attend the conference or not.

We are waiting now for the reply of the UK Government. On receipt of that, we shall have to decide and shall inform you.

We do not expect much to come out of the London conference and in any event there can be no settlement without Egypt. It might be, however, that if no conditions are attached, our attendance could prove a check on the policy of intimidation and sabre-rattling to which you refer. We are all of course entirely opposed to any armed intervention by Western or any power.[4] All we are anxious about is that there should be peaceful settlement and that the Suez Canal should continue to be an open waterway.

It is possible that the London conference might prepare the ground for a later conference with which Egypt is associated.

1. New Delhi, 6 August 1956. JN Collection.
2. Sastroamidjojo doubted if the London conference could settle the Suez Canal issue. He suggested an emergency meeting of the Colombo powers to put a brake on the "sabre-rattling" policy of the UK and France. Sastroamidjojo wanted Nasser to be invited to the meeting.
3. F.W.M. Tiwon.
4. Sastroamidjojo hoped that Nehru would exert his influence on the UK not to resort to arms. Armed intervention by a Western Power, he feared, might endanger the feeling of security of most Asian-African countries vis-à-vis the West.

I do not think that the revenues from the Suez Canal are likely to help much in the construction of the Aswan Dam.[5]

I shall communicate with you again soon.[6]

5. Sastroamidjojo believed that Nasser's main motive in nationalizing the Suez Canal "was an economic one, to be in command of the canal revenues he badly needs for the construction of the Aswan Dam."
6. Prime Minister Bandaranaike of Sri Lanka also suggested to Nehru on 6 August that some form of consultation might take place among the Colombo powers before the London conference. Nehru, in his reply stated: "It is very difficult, from the time point of view, for the Colombo countries to meet before this conference. As for consultation, the only way to do is to keep each other informed . . . We should keep in touch with each other. It is important of course that we should keep in touch with the Egyptian Government."

20. Cable to Ali Yavar Jung[1]

Your telegram 174 dated 6th August.[2] We did not anticipate that Egypt could or would participate in view of the way Conference has been called and the Western communique.

2. We received today clarifications from London[3] which enable us to feel assured that participants are not restricted to or bound by the terms and approach set out in the Western communique.[4]

1. New Delhi, 7 August 1956. JN Collection.
2. Nasser made it clear to Ali Yavar Jung that he would not accept the invitation to the London conference.
3. Selwyn Lloyd clarified to Vijayalakshmi Pandit on 6 August (i) that acceptance of invitation to the conference would in no way commit the participating countries to the principle set out in the three-power communique; and (ii) that in order not to make the conference too unwieldy, the membership had been restricted to 24: eight signatories to the Constantinople Convention, eight countries with heavy tonnage and eight other main users of the Canal.
4. Eden also stated in his message of 7 August to Nehru that the UK and France "regard the purpose of the conference as being to secure agreement that the Suez Canal shall be put under an international authority," and that they did not want the conference to be deflected from its main purpose into considering questions like those relating to other international waterways or to the Aswan Dam. Referring to this message, Nehru cabled to Mrs Pandit on 8 August, "This was not very satisfactory. However . . . we have decided to attend London conference."

3. We have decided to send representatives to the conference in view of the gravity of the developments and in the hope that our participation might help towards a more rational approach to the issues.

4. The London conference can reach no final decisions, for this Egypt's participation is necessary. Our efforts in London will be devoted to finding ways of peaceful negotiation and settlement. Our participation will in no way injure Egypt's interests or her sovereignty and dignity. Our position has been outlined to you in previous telegrams and in my message to President Nasser. There is hardly any need for us to assure the Egyptian Government that we have not decided to participate disregarding Egypt's attitude which we understand and respect.

5. I shall await Nasser's reply before I communicate with him again. Meanwhile you might inform him of our decision and our approach to the conference.

6. I propose to make a statement[5] in Parliament to this effect tomorrow 8th August afternoon. Till then our decision to attend the London Conference should be kept secret.

5. See *post*, pp. 348-354.

21. Message to Ali Sastroamidjojo[1]

In my telegram of the 6th of August[2] I had intimated to you that we would make a decision about attending the London conference after obtaining some clarifications from the United Kingdom Government. We have now received them and feel sure that our attending this conference will not in any way involve or imply that we accept either the basis or the approach to this problem, as set out in the joint communique of the Western Powers, or endorse any step taken in this respect.

I have all along felt that Egypt in any case could not and would not attend the conference, if for no other reason than that it was wrong, so far as she is

1. New Delhi, 7 August 1956. JN Collection.
2. See *ante*, pp. 341-342.

concerned, to call a conference on the Suez Canal issue without consultation with her or in accordance with previous international agreements. But the position of other parties, including our two countries, is somewhat different. Our attitude, in my view, has to be decided by our desire to bring about a peaceful solution. Such a solution would have to be based on the respect for Egypt's sovereignty and dignity and the free and neutral use of the Canal as an international waterway and as provided by the Constantinople Convention.

Further, we have to consider whether our staying away or attending is best for Egypt, world cooperation and our own countries. We think that in view of our having assured ourselves that the conference is not on a restricted basis, our presence at the conference may help towards a more balanced approach.

It would also not be to our advantage if we allow this problem to be discussed in London by the Western countries only. Our support of the legitimate claims of Egypt and our desire to find a peaceful solution would, I feel, affect the Conference to some extent. I do not expect that any finality can be reached in London, if for no other reason than that Egypt is not there.

The Government of India have therefore decided to be represented at the Conference and much hope that in view of the similarity of the views and approach of our two countries to this question, Indonesia also will decide similarly. We will keep in touch with you on all developments, and our representative at the Conference will also do the same with your representative.

We are conveying these views and our decision to Prime Minister Bandaranaike also.[3]

3. Nehru's message of 7 August to Bandaranaike is not printed.

22. Message to Dmitri Shepilov[1]

The Government of India have given careful consideration to the invitation sent to them by the United Kingdom Government to attend a conference "on the question of the Suez Canal" on the 16th August.

2. In view of the joint communique issued by the Western Powers which set out their approach to this conference and the attitudes that have prevailed, particularly display of force, the Government of India had refrained from making a decision until they had obtained clarifications about the scope and basis of the conference from the United Kingdom. They have now assured themselves that participation in the conference does not mean acceptance of the approach or of the principles adopted by the Western powers.[2]

3. They have always considered that Egypt could not and would not attend the conference in view of the attitudes adopted and the threats of force and because she has not been consulted in the calling of this conference on the question of the Suez Canal in respect of which she has sovereign rights. The Government of India's approach to this problem is based upon their respect for the sovereignty and dignity of Egypt and the continued use of the Canal as an international waterway for neutral passage as provided in the Constantinople Agreement of 1888. Their participation in this Conference will be on this basis. It is also determined by the consideration of the usefulness of such participation in helping towards a settlement consistent with the sovereignty and rights of Egypt and at the same time with the use of the Canal as an international waterway in terms of the Agreement of Constantinople of 1888 and the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement of 1954.[3]

1. New Delhi, 7 August 1956. *Foreign Policy Series II. Suez Crisis-1956*, Vol.1, Historical Division, MEA.
2. On 7 August, Nehru informed Tito about India's decision to participate in the London conference.
3. K.P.S. Menon, India's Ambassador in the USSR, reported on 8 August that Shepilov, the Soviet Foreign Minister, had told him "that [the] stand taken by India was absolutely correct", and that the Soviet Government "would take much the same attitude." The next day Kuznetsov, the Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister, read out to Menon a tentative draft of the Soviet reply to the Western Powers' invitation, asking him to communicate an outline of the draft reply to Nehru. Menon stated that the reply was a "spirited defence of Egypt's action and vehement denunciation of reaction of Western Powers."

23. Message to U Ba Swe[1]

I am anxious to keep you informed about our position and the developments in regard to the Suez Canal issue, and the proposed conference in London.

We much regret that this issue is not considered more calmly and have expressed ourselves in this way to both the United Kingdom and Egypt. On the question itself our position is:

a) that the sovereignty and dignity of Egypt must be fully respected;
b) that the Canal is an international waterway along which in accordance with previous agreements freedom of navigation and neutral passage must obtain;
c) that the present difficulties should be resolved peacefully; and
d) that the threats of force and strong language are regrettable.

We believe that a settlement which recognizes the full sovereignty of Egypt and her rights and the unrestricted use of the Canal as an international waterway by the world is possible. Egypt has already stated her intentions in accord with this.

With regard to the conference we consider that no final decision can be made without Egypt's agreement.

The communique of the Western Powers set out this position. If the conference was on this restrictive basis we would not consider accepting the invitation to participate sent to us by the United Kingdom. We have now assured ourselves by obtaining clarifications from the United Kingdom that this is not the case. Our attendance therefore will not commit us to the position taken up by others and will not affect our well known position in regard to the sovereignty and rights of Egypt.

We have always taken the view that Egypt could not and would not attend the conference in view of the attitude adopted by the Western Powers and the feelings engendered. Also Egypt should have been consulted and invited to sponsor the conference.

The United Kingdom should have invited Burma, as the basis of the invitation to the others applies to Burma equally. We regret and disapprove of this omission.

1. New Delhi, 7 August 1956. JN Collection. U Ba Swe was the Prime Minister of Myanmar.

We consider however that we should keep you in touch with the developments and our attitude and decisions.

We are satisfied that our participation in this conference would not be against Egypt's interests or our friendship with her and it might perhaps help towards the adoption of a wider view and a rational approach on this issue. The London Conference can reach no final decisions because that requires Egypt's participation.

I will keep you informed of further development, if any, prior to the conference and I hope that your Ambassador[2] in London can keep in touch with our representatives.

There have been suggestions about calling a conference of the Colombo countries. There has been no time to do this and the fact that Burma had not been invited is another factor, as we would not like a Colombo countries' meeting in which Burma is not represented or is not on the same footing as ourselves. Further Egypt who should be invited to any such meeting would not be able to send representatives at this juncture.

We shall however continue to keep in touch with each other on any developments.[3]

2. U Kyin.
3. U Ba Swe wrote to Nehru on 17 August that Myanmar agreed with the position set out in the second paragraph of Nehru's message. Endorsing Nehru's view that the London conference would not reach any final decisions because of Egypt's non-participation, U Ba Swe stated: "For this reason, we frankly do not feel too strongly about being left out at this stage though we are naturally most thankful to you for drawing attention to our omission. However, at an appropriate stage, we would be happy to do what we can towards bringing about a peaceful solution of this problem."

24. Cable to R.K. Nehru[1]

We have now received clarifications from the United Kingdom which enable us to feel assured that by our participation in the London conference we are not bound or restricted by the principles adopted by the Western Powers in their communique. We have after full consideration decided to send representative to London. This in no way affects our position on this issue. We have no reason to think that our acceptance will injure Egypt's position or our friendship with Egypt. We feel that the participation of ourselves and some other countries might help towards a more rational approach and a peaceful settlement. The London conference can reach no final decisions for which Egypt's cooperation is essential.

Please convey this information to Chou En-lai. . . .

1. New Delhi, 7 August 1956. JN Collection. Extracts.
R.K. Nehru, the Indian Ambassador in Beijing, met Chou En-lai on 4 August and explained to him the stand of the Government of India on the Suez question. Chou En-lai remarked that India was in "a key position" and had "initiated efforts for peace and strengthening of national independence on behalf of African-Asian nations." He added that, as a Commonwealth country, India could exert influence on Britain, and hoped that she would succeed in bringing about relaxation. Chou En-lai also wanted to be kept informed of further developments.

25. Statement in Parliament[1]

On the 26th of July, President Nasser announced in a speech at Alexandria that the nationalization of the Suez Canal Company had been effected. The control of the offices of the company at Port Said, Ismailia, Suez and Cairo was taken over by the Egyptian Government following the promulgation of the nationalization law by Presidential decree.

The assets and obligations of the company were taken over by the State. The law provides for compensation to shareholders at the market value of shares as

1. 8 August 1956. *Lok Sabha Debates*, Vol. VII, Part II, 1956, cols 2536-2544.

on the day preceding nationalization. Such compensation is to be paid after the State has taken delivery of all the assets and properties of the Company.

The management of the Suez Canal traffic service was entrusted to an independent authority, with an independent budget and all powers, without being subject to Government rules and regulations.

The funds and assets of the nationalized company were frozen. The new authority was under obligation to retain the existing personnel who, in turn, were not to relinquish their posts without permission. The decree also provides for enforcement of the law and penalties attaching to breeches thereof.

The announcement has had worldwide repercussions. A grave crisis which, if not resolved peacefully, can lead to conflict, the extent and effects of which it is not easy to assess, has developed. In this crisis, the foremost consideration must be to strive for a calmer atmosphere and a rational outlook. When passions dominate, the real issues recede into the background, or are viewed or presented so as to emphasize the differences between the disputants and to rouse or feed the passions already engendered.

It is not easy for anyone, much less for the disputants, to escape this tragic involvement, and even for others, total objectivity is not possible. In crisis of this kind we deal not merely with the issue in dispute, but we witness the upsurge and conflict of mighty forces.

So, we have to deal with the problem as it confronts us or be overwhelmed by it. It is appropriate, therefore, to glance at the facts and the history of this problem.

The Suez Canal Company, which is nationalized by Egypt, controls the operation and the equipment, and holds the concession of the Suez Canal. The Canal itself is in Egypt and an integral part of Egypt. The sovereignty of Egypt is thus beyond question. This is recognized both in the Charter given to the Company in 1856 by the Viceroy of Egypt under the Ottoman Empire as well as in subsequent agreements and until as late as 1954. The original Charter of 1856 which set out the terms of the canal concession provided that the Canal "shall always remain open as a neutral passage to every merchant ship crossing from one sea to another without any distinction, exclusion, or preference of persons or nationalities. . . ."

The Convention of Constantinople of 1888[2] reiterates that the Canal shall always remain free and open.

The position in regard to the sovereignty of Egypt on the one hand and the

2. The signatories to the Convention of Constantinople, or their successor States, were: Egypt, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Turkey, the UK and the USSR.

character of the international waterway is well set out in the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement of 1954, negotiated by the Governments of the United Kingdom and Egypt.

The House would be interested in the formulations in this Agreement, which is a very recent Agreement between Egypt and the United Kingdom, two of the main parties in the present crisis:

> Article 8 reads: "The two contracting Governments recognize that the Suez Maritime Canal, which is an integral part of Egypt, is a waterway economically, commercially and strategically of international importance, and express the determination to uphold the Convention guaranteeing the freedom of navigation of the Canal signed at Constantinople on the 29th of October 1888".

The sovereignty of Egypt on the one hand and the character of the waterway as one "of international importance" is recognized in a solemn agreement by Egypt and the United Kingdom, and they both have also expressed their determination to uphold the Convention of 1888.

The Suez Canal Company is an Egyptian company and, in Egypt's view, subject to the laws of the country. The shares are held, except for a small portion, by foreign governments or nationals. The British Government hold 44 per cent of the shares. There are 32 Directors on the Board: 9 British, 16 French, 5 Egyptian, 1 American and 1 Dutch.

The concession of the Suez Canal Company would have expired in 1968, and the Egyptian Government, the present and previous ones, have publicly declared that the concession would not be renewed. The assets and obligations would then have reverted to Egypt under the Agreement of 1856.

The present decision of the Egyptian Government therefore would appear to ante-date the taking over by them of the Company. No question of expropriation has arisen since the shareholders are to be compensated at market value. Even if there remain any outstanding differences in this matter, they do not call for developments which lead to an international crisis.

The Egyptian Government have also reiterated that they will honour all their obligations arising from international agreements, and in their reaffirmation have referred both to the Convention of 1888 and to the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement of 1954.

The French and the United Kingdom Governments reacted to the Egyptian announcement quickly, sharply and with vehemence. Honourable Members of the House have seen press reports of military and naval movements ordered by

the United Kingdom and France, and some military measures in Egypt.[3] These have received much publicity and have aggravated the situation. All this has influenced public opinion not only in Egypt but over the Arab world. In Asia as a whole, with its colonial memories, great resentment has been aroused.[4]

I have no desire to add to the passions aroused, but I would fail in my duty to this House and the country and even to all the parties involved in this crisis, and not least of all to Britain and France, if I do not say that threats to settle this dispute, or to enforce their views in this matter by display or use of force, is the wrong way. It does not belong to this age and it is not dictated by reason. It fails to take account of the world as it is today and the Asia of today. If this were all, we could perhaps possess ourselves in patience and reflect that the mood will pass. But it would be unrealistic and imprudent not to express our deep concern at these developments and point to their ominous implications.[5] We deeply regret these reactions and the measures reported to be taken in consequence, and we express the hope that they will cease and the parties will enter into negotiations and seek peaceful settlements.

We also much regret that, in the steps that have led up to this crisis, there has been no exercise by one side or the other of their respective or common initiative to inform or consult one another.

We have great respect and regard for the sovereignty and dignity of Egypt and for our friendly relations with her. The Egyptian nationalization decision

3. On 5 August, the Egyptian Government recalled an unspecified number of reservists for active duty. Sports and social clubs were turned into military training centres, and Liberation Rally party centres were used for recruitment.
4. For instance, C. Rajagopalachari stated in his letter of 28 July to Nehru: "Unless all the Bandung States unite at once and express themselves clearly and in no uncertain terms about the Egyptian crisis at once, the Western Powers might send warships down to Suez or near about for purposes of intimidation. The question here is not the cold war but the freedom of Asiatic States to self-rule."
5. Eden, in reply to Nehru's message of 5 August (see *ante*, p. 339), said that while the use of force should be avoided, "it would be highly imprudent for us in the United Kingdom not to take certain military precautions." He added: "We have no intention whatsoever of trying to coerce the conference by military threat or action. But we cannot ignore the fact that what the Egyptian Government have sought to do is to put themselves into a position where they can strangle us at will and do irreparable damage to the trade of the many countries who use the Canal." Nehru received this message on 8 August.

was precipitated by the Aswan Dam decision of the United States Government[6] in which the United Kingdom Government later joined. More than the decision, the way it was done, hurt Egypt's pride and self-respect, and disregarded a people's sentiments.

The suddenness of the nationalization decision and the manner in which it has been implemented may have contributed to the violent reactions. But the terms of the nationalization itself under the laws of Egypt are within the province of that Government.

As I informed the House some days ago,[7] the Suez Canal issue was not discussed between President Nasser and myself when we met recently. The consideration of it and the concerned decision must have been made later.

The Governments of the United States, United Kingdom and France have held urgent and prolonged consultations and their views are set out in a joint communique which honourable Members must have seen in the press reports.

This communique recognizes the sovereign rights of Egypt, but appears to limit these sovereign rights to nationalize only assets. which in the words of the communique are "not impressed with an international interest".[8] If this was the point at variance, the violence of the reactions and the warlike gestures—I would still hope they are not war-preparations—were unnecessary and have been grievous in their results.

The three powers also agreed that a conference of the parties to the Convention of 1888 and other nations largely concerned with the use of the Canal should be held on the 16th of August 1956 in London in which they agreed to participate. The United Kingdom has in pursuance of this decision extended an invitation to 23 countries which are:

Australia, Ceylon, Denmark, Egypt, Ethiopia, Federal Republic of Germany, France, Greece, India, Indonesia, Iran, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand,

6. In his conversation with G.L. Mehta, India's Ambassador in Washington, on 9 August, Dulles said that while he appreciated Nehru's statement in Parliament, he did not agree with the reference to the withdrawal of aid by the US for the Aswan Dam. Dulles argued that his government was compelled to take this decision, because the Congress would have interposed legal prohibition against any assistance to Egypt for the dam in the Foreign Aid Bill. The decision was meant to ensure flexibility for future action.
7. On 31 July 1956.
8. The Western Powers, in their joint communique of 2 August, said that they did not question Egypt's right "to enjoy and exercize all the powers of a fully sovereign and independent nation, including the generally recognized right" to "nationalize assets not impressed with an international interest." The statement charged, however, that the seizure of the Suez Canal Company was "arbitrary and unilateral."

Norway, Pakistan, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, the USA and the USSR.

The Government of India received an invitation from the United Kingdom on the 3rd of August to a conference in London "on the Suez Canal question". Prior to this, the United Kingdom Government kept the Government of India informed of developments.

Aware as they are of the extreme gravity of the situation that has developed and of the circumstances that obtain, the Government have given anxious and careful consideration to all aspects of this question, including the reply to the invitation. The Government have also been in contact with interested countries, including Egypt.

It has always been quite clear to the Government that they could not participate in any conference which bound its participants beforehand as to the conclusions to be reached. The Government would equally decline participation in any arrangements for war-preparations or sanctions or any step which challenged the sovereign rights of Egypt. They have also been concerned at the exclusion from the list of invitees of various countries who should be included in the categories of signatories to the Convention of 1888 or of principal users. Without seeking to make invidious distinctions, I would like to say to the House that the exclusion of Burma is to us a particularly regrettable omission. Yugoslavia, by virtue of being a succession state in respect of the Convention of 1888 and a maritime power, should also have found a place among the invitees. The Government of India, therefore, do not subscribe to the appropriateness of the list of invitees.

They have sought clarifications from the United Kingdom Government and feel assured that their participation in the Conference does not in any way imply that they are restricted to or bound by the approach and the principles set out in the joint communique. They recognize that Egypt could not and would not participate in a conference on the Suez Canal to which she is merely an invitee and in respect of which there have been no consultations with her.

The Government of India had to take a decision in the situation as it confronted them. India is not a disinterested party. She is a principle user of this waterway, and her economic life and development is not unaffected by the disputes, not to speak of worse development, in regard to it.

Even more, India is passionately interested in averting a conflict. She is in friendly relations with Egypt, and associated with her in the acceptance of the Bandung Declarations and the "Five Principles". India has also good and close relations with the principal Western countries involved. Both these relations are held in great esteem by us, as this House and all the world knows. The considerations and the criteria on which the Government had to base their decision, and not an easy one, is how best they could serve the cause of averting

conflict and obtaining a peaceful settlement before it is too late. The House will appreciate the gravity of the situation as the Government have done. The settlement of this problem, on the basis of the sovereignty and dignity of Egypt, and by agreement amongst all concerned, and the abandonment of postures of threats and violence, and of unilateral action by either party, are therefore of the utmost concern to India.

The Government therefore obtained the necessary assurances from the United Kingdom and made their own position quite clear. They have satisfied themselves that their participation in the London conference will not injure the interests or the sovereign rights and dignity of Egypt. With the sense of grave responsibility that rests on them, the Government have decided to accept the invitation and to send representatives to the conference.

They have kept in close contact with Indonesia and Ceylon and with others who broadly, have a similar approach and attitude to that of India on this question.

The Government are well aware that this conference can reach no final decisions; for that requires the agreement of Egypt.

Sir, the House, I am aware, shares the grave concern of the Government in this matter. In all humility, I ask it to share with them the hope that the participation of India will assist in the endeavours for a peaceful settlement.

26. Cable to Ali Yavar Jung[1]

Your telegram 176 dated 7th August.[2]

I made our suggestions in regard to the reply of Nasser to the United Kingdom in response to his mentioning that he would like me to do so. The counter proposal of a conference which Egypt could sponsor herself or with the United Kingdom was considered by us as a reply which would show that Egypt was not adopting a nonpossumous attitude but made a constructive approach. The joining with

1. New Delhi, 8 August 1956. JN Collection.
2. Ali Yavar Jung pressed the case, "on grounds both of substance and of tactics", for Egypt and Britain jointly sponsoring a conference on Suez, but the overwhelming opinion of the Egyptian Cabinet went "against association with Britain, or inviting Britain to associate herself in any invitation to a conference."

the United Kingdom only arises because the United Kingdom has sent the present invitation and I did not in fact make a suggestion quite to that effect.

2. Para 8 of my message to Nasser[3] only mentions a conference jointly convened in terms of the Constantinople Agreement of 1888. I also mentioned the conference as part of the procedures to a fresh treaty or convention mentioned in para 6 of my message and also suggested by Nasser in his message to me.

3. Counter proposals by Egypt, whatever they are, have relation in practice only to the future as the present Conference will take place anyhow. Egypt's reply, with her own proposals, would be an important element which might turn the course of the conference into constructive steps toward a peaceful settlement. Those proposals would not have resulted in the present conference being called off. The issue therefore is not one of a joint invitation by Egypt and the United Kingdom or one by Egypt alone in regard to the present Conference.

4. My statement in Parliament[4] sets out our position. It is not a question of our accommodating Britain but of finding ways if possible by which the present situation which may lead to conflict can be dealt with. This is our main purpose in making the decision to attend the Conference.

5. Our acceptance does not in any way imply that we are biased[5] but only that we are seeking to use the conference if we can, for a settlement in which the points made in my statement to Parliament are the essential basis.

6. It should not appear that we are imposing our view on the Egyptian Government or competing with others in such an exercise. My message to Nasser and my statement in Parliament sets out our position and our thinking on the matter as at present.[6]

3. For Nehru's message of 5 August to Nasser, see *ante*, p. 337-338.
4. See the preceding item.
5. Ali Yavar Jung felt that the Soviet Ambassador had had some hand in influencing the decision against association with Britain in any way. "There is perhaps some suspicion also that we are inclined to be more accommodating towards Britain owing to Commonwealth connections."
6. Referring to this cable, Ali Yavar Jung replied on 9 August: "Position as stated is quite clear and is fully appreciated here."

27. Cable to G.L. Mehta[1]

Your telegram number 428 of August 6.[2] Kindly inform Dulles that I much appreciate his letting us know his views and concern about the Suez Canal question. The Government of India decided to accept the invitation after receiving clarifications from the United Kingdom. . .

You may tell Dulles that we hope that the influence of the United States will be used to bring an end to the present attitude of display and threats of force and to utilise the present conference which Egypt will not attend towards bringing about her cooperation in respect of the essential international aspects of the question.[3] Egypt will not accept any international authority, but she will, we believe, agree to fresh agreements with all concerned to reaffirm the international aspects of the Agreement of 1888.

We understand that Egypt will make counter proposals one of which may be that she will herself invite concerned countries. If this is the case, it may be entertained as evidence of her willingness to consider the matter internationally and should be favourably considered. This will allow efflux of time and help to cool down tempers.

Egypt may also propose reference to Security Council or to the United Nations. Our present view is that all this will lead to further complications. But, the use of force or the threat to do so without reference to the United Nations is regrettable. The United States can probably further persuade France and Britain that all this will lead to conflicts and drive Egypt further into hostility and push her into seeking assistance where she can find it.

The US representatives can keep in touch with ours if they are so disposed.

1. New Delhi, 8 August 1956. JN Collection. Extracts.
2. Dulles, the US Secretary of State, told Mehta on 6 August that President Eisenhower wanted his views on the Suez crisis to be conveyed to Nehru. Dulles said that he had visited London at the express desire of Eisenhower, "who felt deeply concerned about serious developments and the strong feelings in Britain and France." As the governments of both these countries seemed determined to use force in order to oust Nasser if necessary, Dulles added, it was with considerable difficulty that he persuaded them to agree to a conference. He also hoped that Nehru would participate in the London conference.
3. Dulles told Mehta that the US could not rely upon Nasser "to look after the canal on his own as shown during the last two years and some kind of international supervision was essential."

28. Message to S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike[1]

Thank you for your message.[2] You must have seen statement[3] I made today in our Parliament about Suez Canal issue. This makes clear our broad attitude although ways and means will have to be discussed later with you and others. It seems to me that London conference cannot possibly come to any settlement as Egypt will not be there. Our main purpose at this conference has, therefore, to be to prevent any wrong and dangerous steps being taken and to leave door open for further conference or consultations in which Egypt must necessarily play important part.

2. This is clearly not UK view and their draft proposal is, as you say, unacceptable. It is true that US are exercising moderating influence.[4]

3. In view of statement from UK that we are in no way bound by their communique or proposal and can take up any attitude we like, we have decided to participate in London conference. I am afraid it is impossible for me to go to this conference, but we are sending strong delegation headed by Krishna Menon who will stop for one day in Cairo to meet Nasser.

4. I think it is necessary that all those invitee countries who are prepared to take independent view and to work for peace and against policy of coercion of Egypt, should attend London conference to strengthen this viewpoint. There should be full consultation and cooperation between them.

5. We have been in close touch with Egypt.

1. New Delhi, 8 August 1956. JN Collection.
2. Bandaranaike made it clear to B.N. Chakravarty that Sri Lanka did not accept the idea of international control of the Suez Canal, contemplated in the draft resolution which the Western Powers proposed to move at the London conference. According to him, the Asian countries would, however, attend the conference if the Western Powers allowed consideration of some alternative proposal which, while acquiescing in Egypt's nationalization and control, ensured the freedom of the international use of the Canal.
3. See *ante*, pp. 348-354.
4. Chakravarty informed Nehru on 7 August: "American Ambassador had talks with Bandaranaike today requesting him to attend conference. Bandaranaike got the impression that America generally anxious for moderation and may support alternative proposals that Bandaranaike has in view."

29. The Suez Crisis and India's Commonwealth Connection[1]

I have received from Shri Rishang Keishing, MP, a notice of his intention to ask for leave to move a motion for adjournment,[2] a copy of which is attached.

2. I would like to bring to the notice of Mr Speaker that this proposed motion is from every point of view very undesirable. It is undesirable to discuss the Suez Canal issue when a conference is meeting in London soon. The Government of India have stated their policy clearly before Parliament. Any further discussion of this matter is likely to come in the way of the Government of India to secure a peaceful settlement.

3. Secondly, the notice is, in effect, a condemnation of the activities of some foreign governments.

4. Thirdly, it proposes a course of action of high importance, namely the withdrawal of India from the Commonwealth of Nations, in a casual way and with a view to bringing pressure on the UK Government and other governments in regard to a matter which has no direct relation to the Commonwealth.

5. I would, therefore, submit to Mr Speaker that it is not desirable to allow a discussion on this motion.

1. Note to M.N. Kaul, Secretary, Lok Sabha, 9 August 1956. JN Collection.
2. The motion suggested that India should withdraw from the Commonwealth as a protest against "the ostentatious war-manoeuvres" of the British Government which was, in collaboration with the French, threatening to seize the Suez Canal despite India's condemnation of such manoeuvres.

30. Cable to Vijayalakshmi Pandit[1]

We have given careful and intensive thought to the Suez Canal issue as you will have seen from my statement.[2] It is the toughest international problem that we have had to face since our independence and the chances of our doing anything really helpful are strictly limited. It is likely that in our efforts to help a settlement, we may displease even such friends as we have. Anyhow we have to face this situation with such wisdom and patience as we possess.

2. We have selected a strong delegation consisting of Krishna Menon (Leader), N.R. Pillai, C.S. Jha,[3] Arthur Lall[4] (who will come from New York) and Jagat Mehta[5] (Secretary). We want you to be a member of this delegation,[6] as it is important that you should be in full touch with developments.

3. There is one consideration, however, which I have in mind. In this matter we are adopting a line opposed to UK attitude which appears to be very rigid. This means our coming in some conflict with them in the conference. Normally we do not want our Ambassadors to be put in an embarrassing position of conflict with the country to which they are accredited. On the other hand it seems to me important that you should be closely in touch with developments. I do not know whether other countries are appointing their Ambassadors or High Commissioners to their delegations. If they are appointing them, then

1. New Delhi, 9 August 1956. JN Collection.
2. See *ante,* pp. 348-354.
3. Joint Secretary in the MEA.
4. Permanent Representative of India at the UN.
5. Jagat Singh Mehta (b.1922); joined the IFS, 1947; Under Secretary, MEA, 1948-51; served in Indian Legation, Berne, 1951-53, and Indian High Commission, London, 1954-56; Deputy Secretary, MEA, May 1956-March 1960, and Director, 1960-61; leader of the official Indian team for discussion of the Sino-Indian boundary question, June-December 1960; Counsellor, Indian Embassy, Bonn, 1961-63; Counsellor and later Chargé d'Affaires, Beijing, 1964-66; Joint Secretary, MEA, 1966-69; High Commissioner to Tanzania, 1970-74; Additional Secretary, MEA, 1974-76; Foreign Secretary, 1976-79.
6. Vijayalakshmi Pandit informed Nehru on 7 August that K.M. Panikkar was in London at the time and asked whether his presence there could be of some use to the Indian delegation. Nehru replied on 8 August: "I have consulted Pillai and Dutt. Both of them feel and I agree with them that Panikkar's association with our delegation may lead to difficulties and complications. He is a person of strong views which he expresses in an uninhibited manner . . . He has not been in touch with us for some months and is therefore not fully acquainted with our approach."

undoubtedly you should join our delegation. If, however, Ambassadors and High Commissioners in London are not being made members of delegations, then probably it will be better for you not to be formally associated with our delegation, though in any event you should remain in close touch with it. You can find out what procedure other countries are likely to adopt and decide accordingly.

4. You might inform UK Government about our delegation to Suez Canal Conference. Our Ministry will be informing you separately about time of arrival and other particulars.

31. Cable to G.L. Mehta[1]

You might have another talk with Dulles before the United States Delegation for London leaves.

2. We have received a copy of the United States', the United Kingdom and French proposals for setting up an "international authority" sent to us by the United Kingdom. We are somewhat surprised at the United States' sponsoring it in view of your last report on your talk with Dulles.[2] The proposals can only be put into effect by seizure and use of force for operation. They disregard national sovereignty and treaty rights and in fact seek to repeal the nationalization and to put the international authority in the place of the old Company. They also give them extraterritorial rights and power in respect of security and enforcement functions, which the Company never had. Neither the Charter of 1856 nor the Agreement of 1888 conferred on the Company these functions.

3. I would like you to tell Dulles that we are much concerned about the way things continue to be approached.[3] The display of force and the approach of the United States, United Kingdom and France to the Conference will only stiffen Egypt. We hope that the United States will use its influence with Britain and France to abandon the method of threats and war preparations, and to try for a peaceful settlement. It is unrealistic to think that Egypt, or even the Arab world,

1. New Delhi, 10 August 1956. JN Collection.
2. For Mehta's report of his talk with Dulles, see *ante*, p. 356, and *post*, p. 364.
3. Nehru also sent a letter to President Eisenhower earlier in the day, that is, 10 August, in which he wrote about the Suez problem. See *ante*, p. 316.

is not behind Nasser. There is no prospect of the United States, United Kingdom's proposals being a basis for settlement. They can only be implemented by imposition. We gathered from you and the speeches of Dulles[4] and others[5] that the United States would not subscribe to the method of force and imposition. We hope that United States would be able to prevent this Conference giving an ultimatum or breaking up without taking steps to negotiate with Egypt.

As I was sending above telegram I have received your telegram 435 of August 9.[6] The above stands. Please act accordingly.[7]

4. According to Dulles, "some people [presumably in the UK and France] counselled immediate forceable action", but this "would have been contrary to the principles of the UN Charter."
5. Eisenhower announced at a news conference on 8 August that he could not "conceive of military force being a good solution, certainly under conditions as we know them now." The US Defence Secretary, Charles E. Wilson, told reporters on 7 August: "We should seek honourable means of reaching a peaceful settlement rather than wave the big stick and threaten people."
6. Mehta telegraphed that Dulles had informed him on 9 August that "the question of Suez was not only one of legal rights but of distrust of Nasser" because of his "gigantic ambitions" and his "attitude and policies". Dulles added that "there was a point beyond which it was difficult for the US to restrain Britain and France but he would try his best to do so."
7. When Mehta saw Dulles on 11 August he was told that, although the proposal for an international authority seemed formidable, it could be worked out in a form acceptable to Egypt. Emphasizing the need for some kind of international agency to prevent Egypt possessing unilateral powers in respect of the authority to "hire and fire" persons and to levy toll, Dulles felt that a serious situation would arise in the event of Egyptian disagreement. He further said that "we should consider the use of force only as a last resort if a proper resort at all."

32. Message to Gamal Abdel Nasser[1]

As you know, we have been giving the most earnest and intensive thought to the Suez Canal issue. You must have seen the statement I made in our Parliament which represented our considered view. Our entire approach is to help a peaceful settlement keeping in view Egypt's rights and sovereignty. Any other development, leading to conflict, would be most disastrous for all concerned. Unfortunately passions and fears have been roused everywhere and this makes clear thinking difficult.

2. We are sending strong delegation to London conference, Krishna Menon will be leader and our Secretary-General Pillai will be one of the members. I have asked them specially to break journey at Cairo so that they might be able to meet you and some of your colleagues and discuss various aspects of this question. They will reach Cairo early Sunday morning and leave for London on Monday morning.

3. I hope that it will be possible for you to meet them and discuss matters with them. In view of the gravity of the situation I think it is important that our delegates should be fully informed of your viewpoint and that you should also know our general approach to this question.[2]

1. New Delhi, 10 August 1956. JN Collection.
2. Krishna Menon, who met Nasser twice during his stay in Cairo on 12 August, reported from London on 15 August: "Talks in Cairo were satisfactory to some extent . . . Nasser has however expressed himself inclined to some form of international cooperation without control or takeover . . . Nasser was unyielding on the issue of Israel ships. I conveyed your view on this and also on the catastrophic character of conflict. He is more mellowed and appears to realize in his mind that perhaps he was precipitate . . . " Britain charged Egypt with preventing Israeli ships from passing through the Suez Canal and blockading ships going to Israel.

33. Message to Anthony Eden[1]

We are sending Krishna Menon, our Secretary General N.R.Pillai and some others as our delegation to the London conference on the Suez Canal issue. They will reach London on Monday evening. I was anxious that they should reach London sometime before the conference itself so that they might be able to meet you, if it is convenient to you, before the conference and explain our general approach to this difficult and very complicated question. I feel that an exchange of views would be profitable to us also. I know that you must be exceedingly busy but if it is at all possible, I would welcome such a meeting.[2]

I have asked Krishna Menon and Pillai to break their journey at Cairo for a day to meet members of the Egyptian Government and acquaint themselves with their views.

I earnestly hope that the London conference will help in lessening the tensions that have arisen and in finding some way for a peaceful and cooperative consideration of this question.[3]

1. New Delhi, 10 August 1956. JN Collection.
2. Eden stated on 13 August that he would be glad to see Krishna Menon and Pillai, but expressed his distress "at the manner in which the balance has been struck in India between Egypt and the Western Powers." Describing some actions taken by Egypt as "dictator methods reminiscent of Hitler and Mussolini", Eden stated: "It would seem hardly surprising that we should be concerned at a man with this record having his thumb on our windpipe."
3. In a message sent to Selwyn Lloyd the same day, Nehru stated: "Even though there is marked difference in approach between the UK Government and India, I hope that it will be possible to find some common ground leading to a peaceful settlement. I need not tell you how earnestly I desire this."

34. To C. Rajagopalachari[1]

New Delhi
August 10, 1956

My dear Rajaji,
Thank you for your letter of the 9th August.

The Suez Canal affair has troubled us greatly and we have thought about it intensively for these many days. We have been in constant touch with Egypt and with several other countries. I think that the Egyptian Government behaved rashly to begin with. But the reaction of the British and the French, more especially the French, has been astonishing. It almost appears that both of these are bent on military operations, although this would do them great injury.

After much thought, we decided to attend this Conference. There is no point in our asking for change of venue or the date, unless we decided not to go there. The conference would not have been postponed. It was indeed with some difficulty that the British had agreed to this particular date of 16th August. They wanted it earlier.[2]

Ultimately we felt that it was too grave a risk for us and for some other countries who think like us, not to attend the conference. Some very foolish decision might probably have been taken there which would have made it practically impossible to bring back. This is far the most difficult and dangerous situation in international affairs we have faced since independence. I do not think that we can do very much, but it is just possible that we might stop the rot. Probably we shall end by displeasing our friends on both sides.

Yours affectionately,
Jawaharlal

1. JN Collection.
2. Dulles told G.L. Mehta on 6 August that the British and French representatives "wanted a conference within a week or otherwise their people would feel that the matter had been allowed to drift too long."

35. To Vijayalakshmi Pandit[1]

New Delhi
11-8-1956

Nan dear,

This Suez Canal business has become more and more difficult and we have been much troubled by it. I cannot understand the reason or logic of the military and other measures that the UK and France have been taking. Do they want war? I have no doubt that [if] real war came it would do tremendous harm to both UK and France. In fact, they would not survive as first class powers. Egypt of course would suffer but it is already so low down in the scale that this does not make much difference.

If UK & France do not want war, then why put themselves in a position from which they cannot withdraw without great loss of prestige? Eden's broadcast[2] was in astonishing bad taste and was in addition bad politics.

I am afraid we are up against a very difficult proposition. We deal with it officially but how to get behind the iron curtain in people's minds? We cannot help much unless there is some such mental contact apart from the official level. This applies to both sides—Egypt and the UK. France appears to be far difficult. Indeed it appears to be rather pleased that something else has come and pushed out, for the moment, the Algerian problem.

Dulles has sent me a message suggesting that I should go to the London Conference. I do not think I should go but there is a remote chance that later if my presence is considered really necessary, I might go. I do not think this will happen and I doubt if this Conference will last more than a week.

Krishna Menon left for Bombay this morning. N.R. Pillai and C.S. Jha & Co.

1. Vijayalakshmi Pandit Papers, NMML. Nehru wrote this letter in his own hand.
2. Eden said in a televised broadcast on 8 August: "Our quarrel is not with Egypt, still less with the Arab world. It is with Colonel Nasser . . . (who) is not a man who can be trusted to keep an agreement." He further said: "With dictators you always have to pay a higher price later on —for their appetite grows with feeding." Pointing out that the Suez-shipped oil was "a matter of life and death to us all" in Britain and western Europe, Eden asserted that they could never accept that they would be at the mercy of one man for the supplies on which they live. "Just now Colonel Nasser is soft-pedalling," but one could not be sure, Eden feared, "that the next time he has a quarrel with any country he wouldn't interfere with that country's shipping." Eden added that the London conference had been called to avoid "a solution by force", but "we have too much at risk not to take precautions."

are going this afternoon. All of them will travel together from Bombay and break journey at Cairo.

I do not like the look of things at all. But I hope all of us will survive this conference without too much damage.

To amuse you, I am sending a letter from 'Sunya' Sorensen.[3]

Love

Your loving brother,
Jawahar

3. Reginald W. Sorensen, Labour Party Member of the British Parliament for many years.

36. Italian Proposal[1]

I think you might say to the Italian Chargé d'Affaires that since this proposal[2] has been handed to the Egyptian Government, we should await their reactions. For our part, we feel that any concrete proposal put forward in the London conference in the absence of Egypt, would not be helpful, even if the proposal is on the merits desirable. Also, you might mention that the question of sanctions and who will enforce them will create difficulties. Broadly speaking, the adoption of an international statute as suggested would probably be a good idea. This could be registered at the UN.

As for the constitution of an international commission, this is a matter which can only be discussed with the Egyptian Government first and any such or like proposal should preferably come from them. Any attempt to put forward a definite proposal like this in the London conference is likely to be considered an imposition by Egypt and will therefore fail.

1. Note to S. Dutt, Foreign Secretary, 11 August 1956. JN Collection.
2. The Italian Government proposed to place before the London conference, a proposal for the adopting an international statute establishing the reciprocal rights and obligations of Egypt and of the users of the Canal together with possible sanctions in case of violation. It also envisaged the constitution of an international commission of Vigilance for the implementation of the Statute. The Italian Chargé d'Affaires, who informed Dutt on 11 August about this proposal, wanted to know India's reaction.

37. Cable to Ali Yavar Jung[1]

Your telegram 184 August 11th.[2] I would suggest your discussing this matter with our delegation which is in Cairo. My own reaction is not in favour of Egypt sending any delegation to London conference and certainly Nasser should not go there.

2. I welcome however Nasser's desire to be conciliatory. You know and you may tell Nasser that our policy in the past under Gandhiji's leadership was to be firm on principles but at the same time conciliatory in approach.[3]

1. New Delhi, 12 August 1956. JN Collection.
2. Ali Yavar Jung stated that Nasser had sought "your immediate advice and guidance" whether he should send delegation to the London conference. According to Yavar Jung, Nasser had thought for a while even of leading his own delegation.
3. Nasser, in a radio broadcast on 12 August, rejected the Western contention that the Suez Canal Company had always had an international status; denounced the proposed London conference and Anglo-French military moves as attempts to enforce "collective colonialism" on Egypt; refused participation in the London conference; and proposed instead a conference of all Constantinople Convention signatories and the forty-five states using the Suez Canal in 1955 to review the convention and consider an agreement reaffirming and guaranteeing freedom of navigation on the Canal to be registered with the UN. In a message sent to Nehru on 15 August, Nasser said: "I thank you deeply for all your suggestions, advice and help at this critical moment and for your bold and independent statement in your Parliament which I value very much."

38. Message to Ali Sastroamidjojo[1]

Thank you for your message[2] and for the draft joint statement which you have proposed. There is nothing in this joint statement with which we or indeed any other country cannot agree. It is an enunciation of certain obvious principles. But I am rather doubtful about the advisability of such a statement being issued by us at this stage. You know that we have already expressed our views on the Suez Canal issue at much greater length. Our statement[3] contains everything that has been put down in the joint statement. I presume you have also expressed your views separately.[4] Ceylon Prime Minister has also given expression to his views.

2. In view of all this, for us to issue a brief joint statement laying down some broad principles which are generally accepted may be somewhat in the nature of an anti-climax.

3. Your representatives and ours are already on their way to the London Conference and the seat of activity is shifting to London where no doubt there will be full consultations and attempts made to find out some constructive approach to the problem. The situation is undoubtedly a very serious one and hopes of peace largely depend on the success of our joint efforts at the conference. If any untoward development takes place there, we shall have to consult with each other as to what we should do.

1. New Delhi, 12 August 1956. JN Collection.
2. Agreeing with Nehru about the inadvisability of holding a meeting of the Colombo powers (see *ante*, pp. 341-342), Sastroamidjojo, in his message of 11 August, suggested, that the Colombo powers issue a joint communique, instead of having a meeting. Saying that the joint communique issued at Colombo in 1954 had had a beneficial effect on the Geneva conference, Sastroamidjojo hoped that a statement issued now would have a similar effect on the London conference, more so because, the five Colombo powers were recognized "as the sponsors of the Asian-African conference, the influence of which in world affairs cannot be denied."
3. See *ante*, pp. 348-354.
4. In a statement issued on 7 August, the Indonesian Government expressed its grave concern at the Anglo-French military preparations which, it said, constituted a threat of war. They also proclaimed their adherence to the principles unanimously adopted at the Asian-African conference at Bandung in April 1955.

39. Cable to Niranjan Singh Gill[1]

Your telegram 25 August 15th. Please express my gratitude to Emperor for his message and tell him that I am glad that in this grave Suez Canal issue, our thinking is generally the same.[2] I am glad he has asked his Foreign Minister[3] to contact Krishna Menon. I am informing Krishna Menon of this.[4] I agree that we should keep in touch with each other on this issue.[5]

1. New Delhi, 16 August 1956. JN Collection. Niranjan Singh Gill was the Indian Ambassador in Addis Ababa.
2. In his message, Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia laid stress on foolproof guarantees on the freedom of navigation, arguing that Ethiopia was a small country and nearer the Suez. It also had memories of the Fascist's using the Canal during aggression against her. He added that there was the possibility of strained relations with "Egypt and Moslem neighbours." He also regretted that the Suez question should be treated purely as one of Arab or Muslims versus the imperialist interests.
3. Ato Abte-Wold Aklilou.
4. Nehru cabled to Krishna Menon the same day.
5. Seoud, the Egyptian Ambassador in Karachi, had on 4 August, stated that he did not approve of the invitation extended to Ethiopia to the London conference, saying that invitations should be issued "to the countries interested rather than to countries likely to woo [the] Western line."

40. Cable to V.K. Krishna Menon[1]

I have seen copy of your telegram 2209 of August 20th to our Ambassador in Cairo.[2]

2. I should like to know what more constructive proposal you can make which you consider reasonable. I agree with you that it is far better for such constructive approach to succeed than for crisis to continue. We cannot do much from this end but I might try to put our viewpoint to Nasser.

3. I am telegraphing to Ali Yavar on these lines[3] but not knowing your possible further constructive proposal, I cannot be definite.

1. New Delhi, 21 August 1956. JN Collection.
2. Krishna Menon informed Ali Yavar Jung that the Indian proposals, placed before the London conference on 20 August, provided for, among other things, Egyptian ownership and operation of the Canal and association of international user interests with the Egyptian corporation for the Canal, had proved "ineffective". On the other hand, the Western proposals for international operation of the Canal, submitted by Dulles earlier the same day, held the field. Having maintained that the proposals of Dulles were "basically impossible", the Indian delegation might have made some headway in negotiations if their proposals had "the quality of compromise." But, Menon added, they had been restrained in making more "reasonable" proposals in view of the inability of Ali Sabri, the informal Egyptian observer in London during the Conference, "to commit his Government although he (Sabri) himself was convinced". Menon suggested that "unless there is some advance from your side, the pivot will shift to the US . . . and also the situation will develop more grave."
3. See the next item.

41. Cable to Ali Yavar Jung[1]

You must have received Krishna Menon's telegram 2209 of August 20th. I agree with him that it would have been better for some more concrete proposal to be put forward on our behalf. Otherwise Dulles' proposal will gain considerable support. I do not know how far Krishna Menon can go. I have asked him to indicate this to you and to us. But this must naturally depend on Egyptian Government's attitude.

2. Considering all the circumstances, I feel that it would be advisable for Egyptian Government to be a little more flexible in this matter. If Sabri is agreeable to some further positive approach on our behalf, then presumably Egyptian rights are fully safeguarded.

3. You may in your own way put this aspect to Colonel Nasser.[2] Obviously, a settlement preserving Egypt's dignity and rights is preferable to continuation of crisis.

1. New Delhi, 21 August 1956. JN Collection.
2. After meeting Fawzi, the Egyptian Foreign Minister, on 21 August, Ali Yavar Jung cabled to Krishna Menon that Fawzi was strongly opposed to India suggesting, in any form, that representatives of international user interests, albeit in a small minority, should be associated with the Egyptian corporation without ownership rights. Though he acknowledged Yavar Jung's argument that the "proposal was clearly not the most Egypt could concede but the least" to make the Indian formula acceptable to the Western powers, Fawzi said that "the circumstances in which this was demanded had made the proposal worse than it was intrinsically." He, however, agreed to discuss the matter with Nasser. Yavar Jung suggested to Menon that it might be wiser to adjourn the conference for some time and seek solutions outside the conference.

42. Cable to V.K. Krishna Menon[1]

Your telegram 2213 August 21.[2] From newspaper accounts it appears that conference is ending soon and it is too late for us to take any step at this end. However, we are communicating with Ethiopia[3] and Ceylon, though it appears that Ceylon has supported your proposal.[4]

2. As for course to be adopted in regard to proposals before conference, you can exercise your discretion. Our objective must necessarily be to keep door open for further negotiations and avoid crisis.

1. New Delhi, 22 August 1956. JN Collection.
2. Krishna Menon reported that Pakistan and Iran backed the US proposals, and suggested that the MEA might speak to Iran, Ceylon, Ethiopia and others.
3. By 21 August, the US proposals, as modified by some minor amendments jointly suggested by Pakistan, Iran, Turkey and Ethiopia, had the backing of 17 nations. The next day, the Ministry of External Affairs directed Gill to convey to the Ethiopian Government India's fears about the amended proposals not being acceptable to Egypt, and to ask for Ethiopian support for the Indian point of view. Haile Selassie wrote to Nehru on 25 August saying that Ethiopia "had as its aim the safeguarding of the legitimate interests of all the parties concerned" rather than following the Western Powers, and that her joining with Pakistan, etc., was meant only to improve the US proposals. He added that the contacts between his foreign minister and Krishna Menon in London "were not extensive due to the pressure of Mr Menon's work." The Emperor also assured Nehru that Ethiopia's friendship with India was stronger and closer than with Pakistan.
4. Indonesia, Sri Lanka and the USSR supported the Indian proposals.

43. Cable to V.K. Krishna Menon[1]

I have received message from Eden and MacDonald has also seen me to elaborate it and appeal for some kind of broad agreement on general principles of declaration contained in Dulles's proposal. Evidently, they expect us to influence Egypt in this direction. I need not repeat this message as it contains usual arguments which must have been stated to you by Eden. It is emphasized that declaration is in no sense an ultimatum and that it only establishes principles without indicating exact methods and without any derogation of sovereignty.[2] Advisory body suggested by you[3] considered inadequate to secure free navigation and development of canal. Also, danger of Nasser discriminating against individual nations or diverting revenues. Further that Egypt is in no position to run Canal alone, and technicians refuse to work for Nasser's new company. Thus we shall all be faced very soon with rapid deterioration of service of Canal and maybe complete breakdown.

2. Eden further says that they have constantly in mind need to settle by peaceful methods but Nasser must play his part.

3. I pointed out to MacDonald that whole approach of UK and USA was one of imposition and of scrapping nationalized Company. So far as I knew, Egypt would never agree to this. Under suitable circumstances, peaceful agreement was possible. But, approach must be different. Our approach was to create these circumstances. Further, I enquired what passing of Dulles's declaration would lead to, if Egypt refused to accept it. MacDonald had no answer, except to say he hoped there would be further negotiations.

1. New Delhi, 22 August 1956. JN Collection.
2. Krishna Menon felt that the position stated on behalf of the UK "that West proposals are not derogatory to sovereignty is totally incorrect because their essentially irreducible minimum is setting up of International Authority displacing Egyptian Corporation on which Egypt will be given representation."
3. The Indian proposals included the formation of a consultative body of user interests on the basis of geographical representation and interest charged with advisory, consultation and liaison functions.

44. Cable to V.K. Krishna Menon[1]

Your telegram 2242. Entirely agree with broad position taken up by you, but do not understand why this should necessitate walking out of conference.[2] Our position can be made perfectly clear without our taking a step which may create bitterness and add to difficulties later.[3]

1. New Delhi, 23 August 1956. JN Collection.
2. Krishna Menon stated that India might have to withdraw from the conference, if the Western Powers pressed it to adopt a New Zealand proposal to the effect that a group of countries from among those supporting the amended US proposal, also called the five-power proposal, should approach the Egyptian Government to find out if they would negotiate a convention on the basis of the proposal. He argued that the proposal "was against the whole basis of our presence here."
3. New Zealand dropped its proposal on the concluding day of the conference on 23 August. Selwyn Lloyd, the chairman, undertook to communicate the full proceedings of the meetings, including both the five-power proposal and the Indian proposal, to the Egyptian Government.

45. Cable to V.K. Krishna Menon[1]

Ali Yavar telegraphs that Menzies has intimated desire to meet and discuss matter relating to Suez Canal with Egyptian Government without making specific mention of five-power resolution.[2] Egypt's agreement has been sought only to principle of meeting, place and time being left to be settled later. Egypt's reply being sent agreeing to principle. Meeting not likely to take place before 3rd September and will have to be in Cairo.

2. Ali Yavar points out that your visit to Cairo on invitation of Egyptian Government can well take place before Menzies goes there. In any event you cannot pass Cairo now without stopping there as this would be discourteous to President Nasser.[3] Indonesian Foreign Minister has already been there.[4] I suggest therefore that you might arrange to break journey in Cairo well before Menzies goes there.[5]

1. New Delhi, 27 August 1956. JN Collection.
2. The countries supporting the five-power proposal met outside the conference on 23 August, and agreed that R.G. Menzies, Prime Minister of Australia, and representatives of Ethiopia, Iran, Sweden and the US should approach the Egyptian Government to ask if they would negotiate a settlement on the basis of the proposal.
3. Ali Yavar Jung reported on 24 August that Nasser was keen on talking to Krishna Menon before meeting Menzies. He wanted him to visit Cairo "for two days at least" on his way back from London.
4. Abdulgani, the Foreign Minister of Indonesia, visited Cairo on 25-27 August after the London conference.
5. Nehru had telegraphed to Menon on 24 August wondering whether it was desirable for his visit to Cairo to overlap with that of Menzies. "This might appear to be attempt on our part to interfere with or undermine Menzies' mission and might thus give rise to misunderstanding."

V. INDIA'S NEIGHBOURS

(i) Pakistan

1. Talks with Mohammad Ali[1]

Mohammad Ali, Prime Minister of Pakistan, came to see me this morning and stayed nearly two hours. No one else was present during our talks. The interview had been fixed two or three days earlier at the request of Mohammad Ali who telephoned to me.

2. We discussed the proceedings of the Prime Ministers' Conference for some little time and, more particularly, the importance of bringing China into the UN. Unless this was done, the situation in the Far East would not improve.

3. He then referred to Kashmir and we talked about this subject at some length. His approach to this and other subjects was quiet and almost ingratiating. He did not refer to past history much, but said that he was very anxious that India and Pakistan should solve all their problems and cooperate together. Much that had happened, including Pakistan's differences in regard to foreign policy and defence, was largely due to these conflicts with India. If these conflicts were removed, friendly cooperation would inevitably result in all fields. He pointed out that his own position in Pakistan was obviously not one which would enable him to impose any decision. My position was much more stronger and if I decided to do something, I could put it through.

4. While there were other problems, Kashmir was the crux and if this was settled, there would be no difficulty in solving others.

5. He said something about the American military aid and made out that this had nothing to do with any aggressive intent on India. It was true that they did not expect any direct attack on Pakistan from the Soviet Union, but there was a possibility, in case of war, of Soviet forces entering Afghanistan and then Pakistan. They wanted to be prepared to meet any such contingency.

6. Even with the help that they had got or were likely to get from the United States, India would remain considerably stronger than Pakistan both in a military sense and even more so economically and otherwise. No sane person in Pakistan could think of war with India. It was true, however, that early in 1951 (this was

1. Note to V.K. Krishna Menon, Minister without Portfolio, Secretary General, MEA, High Commissioner of India in the UK, and Commonwealth Secretary, MEA, 5 July 1956. JN Collection. At this time Nehru was in London to attend the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference.

just before the Liaquat Ali-Nehru Pact) people in Pakistan had grown very apprehensive about a possible attack by India.[2] At that time Indian forces had been concentrated on the Pakistan borders, apparently because it was thought in India that Pakistan was strengthening her forces on the borders of Kashmir. This was entirely untrue. What had happened was partly replacements on the Kashmir border and partly sending some fresh troops there to meet trouble in Azad Kashmir. There was no thought whatever of renewing hostilities with India. Nevertheless, the situation became a very serious one and was only eased by the Liaquat Ali-Nehru Agreement.

7. I told Mohammad Ali that, quite apart from the merits or demerits of the Kashmir question, and we hold strong opinions on the subject, what we always had in mind was the effect of any step that we might take on the Muslims of India and the Hindus of Pakistan. Kashmir had been a symbol to us of Hindus and Muslims living together. If we once did anything, or if any kind of a decision was made on the basis of Muslims going on one side and Hindus on the other, this would have very far-reaching and disastrous consequences in India and in Pakistan. In fact this would not be a solution of the problem and tension between India and Pakistan would become much worse. Further, I pointed out that there was strong feeling in India in regard to Kashmir and no leader, however important, could ignore or bypass it.

8. I referred to the difficulties we had experienced during the last seven or eight years in solving even some of the preliminary questions. If we had failed during these years, it was not likely that we would succeed now in solving these questions; and then there were other important questions. There had been constitutional developments and no step could be taken by us without the consent of the Kashmir Government which was more autonomous than the other State Governments of India.

9. Mohammad Ali said that all that he suggested was that we should go back to the Agreement made in 1953 to hold a plebiscite (he referred to the statement issued after the visit of his predecessor, Mohammad Ali, to Delhi).[3] There should be no difficulty in solving the preliminary questions. The question of quantum of forces was not difficult, nor would other difficulties arise. If a plebiscite was held, the result of it would be accepted by both sides without any great difficulty, even though one side might dislike it. He however hinted

2. This refers to the year 1950. The Nehru-Liaquat Ali Khan Agreement was signed in New Delhi on 8 April 1950.
3. For the joint statement issued in New Delhi on 20 August 1953 by Nehru and Mohammad Ali, the then Prime Minister of Pakistan, see *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 23, pp. 344-346.

at the plebiscite being by regions. This would prevent any large migration of people, to the possibility of which I had referred. He pointed out that the 1953 Agreement was made after the constitutional changes in India relating to Kashmir. He said that the sole reason for the deadlock after that 1953 Agreement was American military aid to Pakistan. That should not come in the way after he had explained the position.

10. I explained our position to him and how it seemed to me very difficult and dangerous to unsettle conditions in Kashmir by any step that we might take. This could only have disastrous consequences. Further, I pointed out that there was a sense of grievance as to the way this subject had been dealt with in the past. The real points at issue had never been considered and therefore misunderstandings had arisen in the minds of the people. If we had to proceed with this matter any further in this way, we must go back to first things which largely governed the Kashmir issue. I said something about Pakistan's denial of the presence of their troops in Kashmir, the later statement of General Gracey, etc.[4] We talked for some further time more or less repeating our arguments and without any kind of agreement.

11. We discussed for a while the canal waters issue. He said that he met Iliff[5] of the World Bank in London. Pakistan had agreed to carry on as suggested by the World Bank.[6] The main issue now appeared to be financial. The cost of the link canals and the reservoirs was likely to be much greater than anticipated and would be a very large sum.

12. We referred to the exodus of Hindus from Eastern Pakistan and to the evacuee property matters. Mohammad Ali repeated that all this could easily be solved when the Kashmir question was over. If no settlement could be reached on the Kashmir issue, then we might inevitably have to go to the Security Council.

13. This is just a brief account of my talks with Mohammad Ali for record.

4. Douglas David Gracey, the British Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistan Army, told the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan (UNCIP) at Lahore on 8 July 1948 that, in the aftermath of an Indian offensive in May 1948, the Government of Pakistan had no other choice than outright military intervention. This came a day after Pakistan's foreign minister, Zafrullah Khan, admitted to the UNCIP that Pakistan troops had been fighting in Kashmir since 8 May 1948. In the eyes of the Commission, the presence of Pakistan troops constituted "a material change in the situation."
5. William A.B. Iliff, Vice-President of the World Bank, was associated with the Bank's mediatory role in the Indus waters dispute.
6. The World Bank, in its aide memoire of 21 May 1956 addressed to India and Pakistan, suggested an adjustment in its proposals of 1954 in regard to the canal waters issue. It also proposed a continuance of the period of the cooperative work until 31 March 1957. Both India and Pakistan accepted the Bank's proposal. See *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 33, p. 433, pp. 441-442 and p. 543.

2. Proposing an Extradition Treaty with Pakistan [1]

. . . 2. I do not think that the reasons given for the avoidance of an Extradition Treaty [2] are valid, although they may come in the way of an agreement between India and Pakistan.

3. Thus, as regards the territory to be governed by the Treaty, obviously, the Treaty will be between the Republic of India and its territories and the Republic of Pakistan. I do not know that it is necessary in any such Treaty to specify States of either country. If Pakistan wants to exclude any State, such as Jammu & Kashmir or Hyderabad, of course, we will not agree and our negotiations will break down. We can state this in Parliament later, if necessity arises.

4. As for the spirit in which the Treaty is to be worked, this question arises in every arrangement with Pakistan. If Pakistan refuses to work the Treaty properly and in a bona fide manner, we shall have to renounce the Treaty. In any event, even now, Pakistan refuses to extradite criminals from India, and so it cannot make matters worse.

5. As for the suggestion that it might be used to victimize minority leaders and other political offenders, it is clear that the Treaty cannot apply to political offenders. But it may be that false criminal charges are trumped up against them. It should be possible for us to protect ourselves against this misuse. That is a matter for the drafting of the Treaty.

6. I really do not see any adequate reason for not proposing such a Treaty with Pakistan. It may be that, when we discuss the terms of the Treaty, no agreement is reached. There this matter will end for the time being at least. I think, therefore, that this matter should be reconsidered and a draft Extradition Treaty prepared, keeping various points in view. This draft Treaty should not refer to any specific part of India or of Pakistan. After that, we can ask Pakistan for talks about it or the draft can be sent to them for their consideration.

7. Meanwhile, this question has to be answered. The answer should be:

"The matter is still under consideration". . . .[3]

1. Note, 4 August 1956. JN Collection. Extracts.
2. The reference is to the draft answer and the note for supplementaries prepared in the MEA in connection with a question that H.V. Kamath proposed to ask in the Lok Sabha about the steps taken for the conclusion of an extradition treaty or agreement with Pakistan.
3. Prime Minister answered the question in the Lok Sabha on 9 August 1956.

3. Cable to Mohammad Ali[1]

Please refer to our correspondence on the Nekowal incident ending with my letter of 30th May.[2] I regret there has been no reply from you particularly on the subject of simultaneous publication of our correspondence in the Nekowal case in Delhi and Karachi on an agreed date.

2. While dealing with supplementary questions in the Lok Sabha in another case on 24th July[3] I had occasion to refer to the agreement of your Government to give Rs 100,000 for the relief of the families of those who were killed in the Nekowal incident. I am surprised to find that the Pakistan Government in a press handout on 4th August have contradicted the statement that Pakistan Government have agreed, as a special case, to give Rs 100,000 for the relief of the families of those who had been killed in the Nekowal incident.[4]

3. I had mentioned in my letter of 28th April[5] that the Nekowal incident had naturally attracted a great deal of anxious interest in India and frequent questions had been asked in Parliament and suggested simultaneous publication of our correspondence on this subject. In view of this interest and to avoid any further misunderstanding of our respective positions, I would request you to agree to simultaneous publication of our correspondence in the Nekowal case on 16th August 1956.

1. New Delhi, 7 August 1956. File No. 11(29)-Pak-III/55, MEA.
2. See *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 33, pp. 434-436. The Nekowal incident took place on 7 May 1955 when the Pakistan Border Police fired on an Indian Army escort supervising ploughing operations at Nekowal in Jammu district. It resulted in the death of twelve persons — an army officer, five other ranks and six civilians.
3. In reply to a question whether any principle determined compensation in cases where the lives of Indian citizens were lost in border incidents, Nehru stated in the Lok Sabha on 24 July that while India had agreed to compensation, Pakistan had not. He added that in the case of Nekowal, Pakistan had agreed as a special case to give a hundred thousand rupees for the relief of the families of those who had been killed.
4. The Pakistan Government held India responsible for the Nekowal incident and it did not accept "any liability to pay compensation on account of the loss of lives on the Jammu side of the border as a result of the incident."
5. See *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 32, pp. 328-331.

4. Cable to Mohammad Ali[1]

I have just received your telegram[2] 4566 of August 9. I am sorry if any statement of mine has embarrassed you. We have been having questions in Parliament in regard to Nekowal frequently and I have consistently avoided answering them. You will remember that I wrote to you last on May 30 on this subject. To that letter I have had no reply yet.

2. Some days ago, in answer to a supplementary question in Parliament I stated you had offered to pay Rs 100,000/- in Parliament I stated you had offered to pay Rs 100,000/- as a special case to help victims of Nekowal incident. I did not repeat not say that this was as compensation. Unfortunately, some newspapers referred to this as compensation.

3. Today this matter was raised as an urgent matter in our Parliament asking for a statement from me in regard to the handout issued by the Pakistan Government. I had to reply to this. I quoted some sentences from your letter of 19th May[3] in my reply. I made it clear that your Government do not consider themselves liable to pay any compensation; nor do you admit liability for Pakistan's part of this incident. But you made this offer as an ex gratia contribution for rehabilitation of relatives of those who have lost their lives.[4]

1. New Delhi, 10 August 1956. JN Collection.
2. Mohammad Ali stated that the Government of Pakistan had issued a handout disclaiming responsibility for the Nekowal incident and liability to pay any compensation. Pakistan's offer of "an ex gratia contribution" towards the rehabilitation of those who had suffered was without prejudice to their stand on this incident, and its publication was to be accompanied by a joint statement making this clear. Mohammad Ali added: "Your premature announcement concerning this offer in terms contrary to our stand has considerably embarrassed us."
3. For the views expressed by Mohammad Ali in his letter of 19 May 1956, see *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 33, pp. 434-436.
4. While explaining Pakistan's stand on the matter, Nehru also said in the Lok Sabha on 10 August that the Pakistan Government "might have stated" in their communique "that they agreed to give Rs 100,000 for the relief of the people concerned."

5. To Mohammad Ali[1]

New Delhi
August 13, 1956

My dear Prime Minister,

Thank you for your letter of the 9th August which reached me on the 11th August. A day before the receipt of your letter, that is on the 10th August, I had received your telegram on the subject of a statement I was reported to have made in the Lok Sabha. The same day I sent you a reply.[2]

2. On the 10th of August, as I mentioned in my telegram to you, an urgent motion was made in our Parliament and I was asked for a statement in regard to the handout issued by the Pakistan Government. I had to reply to this. I enclose a copy of the statement[3] made by me in Parliament on that occasion.

3. You will no doubt appreciate that, in the circumstances, it was impossible for me to refuse to reply or to give an evasive reply. Hence I was compelled to quote a part of your previous letter.

4. Now that I have made the statement in Parliament and made it quite clear in your own language, that you do not consider your Government as liable to pay any compensation, I see no advantage whatever in any kind of a joint statement issued by us.[4] So far as I am concerned, I have made a statement. If you wish to say something more in order to make your position clear, you can certainly say so. A joint statement, when we differ in our approach to this question, has little value. It can only give the two different viewpoints which have already been stated or can be stated separately where necessary. For my part, I wish to say nothing more on this subject. It is obvious, however, that if questions are asked in Parliament, I have to reply to them.

1. JN Collection.
2. See the preceding item.
3. Not printed.
4. Mohammad Ali suggested a draft joint statement: "While the Government of Pakistan have accepted the findings of the UN Observers in regard to the Nekowal incident, they disclaim responsibility for this incident or any liability to pay compensation on its account. However, guided by a desire to relieve human suffering, they have offered, and the Government of India have accepted, a contribution of Rs 100,000 towards the rehabilitation of the relatives of those who lost their lives on the Jammu side of the ceasefire line as a result of this incident. . ."

5. You will appreciate, therefore, that the question of a joint statement does not now arise. Apart from this, the draft joint statement that you have sent is not one with which I could agree without much modification. I need not, however, go into this matter now.

6. I am sorry that you do not want our correspondence on this subject to be published. You say that the Secretary-General[5] of the UN and General Nimmo[6] are against the publication as a matter of principle. I do not know what principle is involved when a subject has been so fully discussed in public. My own information has been that the Secretary-General had no objection to its publication provided you and I agreed.

7. You refer in paragraph 2 of your letter about our claiming "sovereign rights over Nekowal territory".[7] I did not wish them and do not wish now to enter into this controversy. The whole point related to the ceasefire line which is obviously known and an established fact. Any persons on our side of the ceasefire line have to be treated as Indian nationals.

8. In paragraph 3 of your letter you have again referred to a committee of Indian and Pakistani officials being constituted to consider the question of compensation in respect of future border incidents.[8] If necessity arises in the future, we may consider this. But, so far as the ceasefire line is concerned, it is obvious that the findings of UN Observers will have to be accepted by us. There appears to me no necessity for setting up a permanent committee for the future. I hope there will be no incident in future. In any event every incident will have to require special consideration between our Governments and the necessary machinery can be evolved.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

5. Dag Hammarskjoeld.
6. Robert Harold Nimmo (1893-1966); Australian army officer; Chief Military Observer, UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan, 1950-66.
7. Mohammad Ali wrote that Nehru "had claimed sovereign rights over Nekowal territory and had referred to Nekowalis as Indian nationals." He added: "As you know, we have never accepted and do not accept the claim that the State of Jammu and Kashmir is Indian territory or that its residents are Indian nationals."
8. Ali had suggested such a committee in his letter of 19 May 1956. Later, he wrote in his letter of 9 August that this committee "would doubtless take into consideration whatever international conventions govern such matters."

6. To Mohammad Ali[1]

New Delhi
August 26, 1956

My dear Prime Minister,
Thank you for your letter of August 22.

In view of your agreeing with what I had suggested that no joint statement need be issued about the Nekowal incident, there is nothing more to be said about it. I do not propose to refer to this matter again. But, as I said previously, if a question is asked in Parliament, I shall have to answer it. In answering it, I do not wish to make any answer controversial if I can help it.

I note that you are instructing your High Commissioner in Delhi to hand over to us a cheque for Rs 100,000 representing your ex-gratia contribution towards the rehabilitation of the relatives of those who lost their lives on the Jammu side of the border.[2]

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. JN Collection.
2. Nehru stated in a note to M.J. Desai, Commonwealth Secretary, MEA, on 26 August that in the matter of disbursement of the amount to be received from Pakistan, the Army Headquarters could be most helpful, and asked him to enquire from them "what, if any, compensation had been given thus far to the relatives of those who lost their lives in the Nekowal incident." Nehru added: "Perhaps we can find out from the Jammu and Kashmir Government too . . . There were some civilians too, probably working under the Food & Agriculture Ministry. That Ministry . . . can give us some information." On 31 August, Mian Ziauddin, High Commissioner of Pakistan in India, met Nehru and presented to him a cheque for Rs 100,000.

(ii) China and Myanmar

1. Chinese Incursions into Myanmar[1]

I agree generally with the note of Joint Secretary, Shri T.N. Kaul, dated 25th August.

2. I think that we must take some action in this matter[2] with the Chinese Government, both because the Burmese Government have approached us[3] and in order to protect our own interests, present and future. The question is what action we should take. It is better to proceed informally, though there is not very much difference between a formal note and an informal aide memoire.

3. It will not be enough for our Ambassador[4] in Peking to have a talk with the Chinese Premier.[5] I think something more precise has to be given to the Chinese Government. This can be in the shape of an aide memoire.

4. Such an aide memoire should be prepared. We shall not send it till we have seen the Burmese Ministers who are likely to come here in about a week's time.[6] But it would be a good thing if this aide memoire was prepared and fully

1. Note to the Foreign Secretary and the Commonwealth Secretary, MEA, 26 August 1956. JN Collection.
2. This refers to the Myanmar-China frontier question in the context of Chinese incursions into Myanmar. On 31 July 1956, *The Nation* (Yangon) reported that 1,500 Chinese soldiers had penetrated up to 60 miles within Myanmar and seized 1,000 sq. miles of territory in Wa state. A few days later, the newspaper reported that the Chinese troops had made their presence felt during the previous few weeks at several points along a 50-mile stretch of the Myanmar-Yunan-Tibet border. Simultaneously, there were reports of the Chinese troops having entered Kachin state at two points. U Ba Swe, the Prime Minister of Myanmar, confirmed at a press conference on 7 August that the Chinese troops had occupied 750 to 1,000 sq. miles of the territory of Myanmar.
3. U Ba Swe requested India to intercede on behalf of Myanmar towards the solution of the border problem with China. *The Hindu* reported on 31 August that U Nu, former Prime Minister of Myanmar, had made a personal appeal to Nehru for India's good offices in effecting China's withdrawal from the occupied areas.
4. R.K. Nehru.
5. Chou En-lai.
6. A trade delegation led by Sao Hkum Hkio, Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of Myanmar, arrived in New Delhi on 31 August to finalize a trade agreement with India.

considered by us even before the Burmese Ministers come here. The Foreign Affairs Committee of the Cabinet might also discuss this matter. Probably Shri V.K. Krishna Menon will also be returning here before the end of the month. I should like him to study this matter also and see our aide memoire.

5. This aide memoire will require very careful preparation and we shall have to decide what we should say and what we should not say. I think that we should not raise directly the question of the Indian frontier with Tibet or China. But, indirectly, this may well come up in connection with the Macmahon line and also because it is alleged that the Chinese have come across our frontier also somewhere near the Burmese frontier (This has to be verified as soon as possible).

6. I entirely agree that the Colombo Powers should not be brought into the picture, so far as we are concerned. I take it that we shall, however, have to mention that the Burmese Government have discussed this matter with us.

7. I do not think it will be desirable for us to discuss in any detail the Burma-China frontier question. We should not enter into a detailed argument about the various parts of that long frontier. But we might well say that a large part of this frontier has been determined and sometimes demarcated previously by treaties, exchanges of notes, etc. We are aware that the People's Government of China have claimed that they are not bound by previous treaties and agreements; but in international usage, no previous treaty or agreement can be denounced or altered unilaterally as other Governments are concerned with it. Also long user and possession, history, tradition, custom and natural geographical features are factors of considerable importance.

8. In any event, no change can be made unilaterally. It appears to be admitted that in July 1955, some Chinese forces took possession of certain areas in Burma. Whatever the argument may be about certain areas between Burma and China not being properly demarcated or being in dispute, any action involving the sending of forces to occupy such areas by one party is itself a unilateral change in the status quo then existing. The Chinese argument that the present status quo should remain,[7] appears to me that the previous unilateral change in the status quo should be allowed to exist and then the matter discussed.

7. The *People's Daily* (Beijing), in a special article on 4 August 1956, denied that the Chinese troops were in Myanmar. It said: "Although China and Burma have different opinions on the undemarcated zone, such differences should be settled through negotiations. Both sides should maintain the status quo and avoid disputes before the question is settled—and it is in such a friendly spirit that the Chinese frontier troops have always been stationed there."

9. Apart from international usage and convention, any such unilateral action would be against both the spirit and the letter of the Panchsheel doctrine to which China, Burma, India and other countries have adhered.

10. Some mention might be made of the apprehensions of some countries in South East Asia which fear Chinese expansion. China is a great and powerful country respected all over South East Asia and elsewhere. At the same time, the mere fact of its great extent and strength gives rise to this misapprehension. Fortunately the friendly relations that have subsisted and have been strengthened during the past two or three years between these various countries and China, have had an effect of lessening these apprehensions. But recent developments on the Burma-China border have evidently increased these apprehensions again. Foreign agencies who do not approve of friendship between Burma and China exploit these differences and apprehensions, and other countries in South East Asia are also affected. Thus, not only the friendly relations between Burma and China, but the larger interests of peace in Asia are concerned and every effort should be made not to give any cause for suspicion or apprehension to these countries of South East Asia.

11. With the Burmese Government, we should make it clear that we are greatly interested in this matter, both for their own sake and ours, and we shall take it up in our own and rather informal way with the Chinese Government. But we can only do so with any effect if other countries are not brought into the picture, like the Colombo Powers. More particularly, if it is at all thought by the Chinese Government that the US Government is in any way behind all this objection on the part of Burma or India, the effect would be the reverse of what we desire, in view of the highly strained relations between the US and the People's Government of China. Every question between Burma and China, viewed in relation to the US Government and their views, will assume a different character and will inevitably stiffen the attitude of the Chinese Government and lessen the chances of any satisfactory agreement.

12. I have merely indicated very broadly the line of approach. I suggest that an informal aide memoire to be presented to the Chinese Government on our behalf might be drafted for consideration.

13. Meanwhile, it would be desirable to send copies of these notes to our Ambassador in Peking by bag, so that he may have this full background before him and may be able to deal with it adequately when he receives our aide memoire.

2. Cable to R.K. Nehru[1]

Premier Chou En-lai's visit to India. You informed us he would be coming here on December 8 and might stay for a fortnight. We would welcome his visit. But on reconsideration, dates suggested are rather inconvenient for me. Apart from numerous other engagements, which do not much matter, there is possibility of my having to go abroad about middle December. It would obviously not be proper for me to leave India while Chou En-lai is here. I would, therefore, very much like him to come here earlier and conclude his visit to India about 10th December.

2. I understand he is going to Burma.[2] Perhaps he could go to Burma after his visit to India. I should like you to explain my difficulty immediately to Premier Chou En-lai and express hope that his programme could be adjusted.

3. For your personal information, I promised some time ago that, if possible, I shall pay a brief visit to President Eisenhower about middle of December.[3] This has not been finalized yet and will not be announced before American Presidential election. I can find no other time to go to America subsequent to that date because of heavy engagements in January, February and later, including our General Elections. Therefore, if I go to America, it will have to be about middle December.

4. Suez Canal situation is still fluid and there may be untoward developments which might affect my programme. But apart from this I should like to pay a visit to Washington, as suggested.

1. New Delhi, 30 August 1956. JN Collection.
2. U Nu said in an interview to *The Nation* on 29 August that Chou En-lai was likely to visit Myanmar in the first week of December in response to an invitation from the Myanmar Government for talks on border problems.
3. See *ante*, pp. 315-316.

(iii) Nepal

1. Cable to K.P.S. Menon[1]

Soviet Chargé d'Affaires saw Prime Minister and me this morning and informed us that Governments of Nepal and Soviet Union have agreed to establish diplomatic relations at Embassy level and Soviet Union is going to have separate Embassy in Kathmandu.[2] He also said that the two Governments will sign a Treaty of Friendship within the next two weeks.

2. We are surprised at this information. The Nepalese Government have not told us anything about it although in view of our special relationship with them and the far-reaching implications of the proposed move we would have expected them to consult us. We are taking the matter up with the King of Nepal[3] through our Ambassador[4] pointing out the implications of these developments and expressing our surprise and regret at their failure to keep us informed of them. We should also like you to see the Soviet Foreign Office immediately. You should thank them for their courtesy in letting us know. You should however draw their attention to the special relationship between us and Nepal and point out to them the implications of a separate Soviet Embassy in Kathmandu. US and other countries are also likely to demand similar representation which the Nepalese Government will not find it possible to resist. Further, at the present juncture in international affairs the opening of a separate Soviet Embassy in Kathmandu

1. From Foreign Secretary, New Delhi, 27 July 1956. JN Collection.
2. The Nepalese Foreign Office announced in Kathmandu on 20 July 1956 that Nepal and the Soviet Union had decided to establish diplomatic relations at the embassy level. The same day the Prime Minister of Nepal, Tanka Prasad Acharya, stated: "Following the noble example set by India, we too are establishing contacts with the great powers of the world and it shall be our endeavour to promote fraternity and peace in the world." Also see *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 32, p. 342 and p. 345.
3. Mahendra Bir Bikram Shah Deva.
4. Bhagwan Sahay.

and a new Treaty between Nepal and Soviet Russia would give rise to widespread misunderstanding about Soviet intentions of which countries not friendly to the USSR will take the fullest advantage. In view of all this, you should ask the Soviet Government not to take a firm decision about the Treaty between Nepal and the Soviet Union until we and Nepal have discussed this matter. We can of course have no objection to the Soviet Ambassador in India being concurrently accredited to Kathmandu.

3. You might remember that early this year Menshikov[5] approached us on behalf of the Soviet Government and suggested a Treaty of Peace and Friendship between India and the Soviet Union based on the Five Principles. The Prime Minister told him that while there was no objection to such a treaty as it would actually represent our present relations, there appeared to be no special need for it. Indeed, it might have some adverse reactions and create misunderstandings in some countries. India was anxious not only for friendship with the Soviet Union but also to help in removing barriers to peace and understanding in the world. Anything that might come in the way of India's role in this respect, would not be helpful. The matter was then dropped.

5. Mikhail Menshikov, the Soviet Ambassador to India.

(iv) Sri Lanka

1. Cable to K. Kamaraj[1]

Bandaranaike, Prime Minister of Ceylon, referred in Press Conference in Colombo yesterday that Vanniasingam,[2] Ceylon Member of Parliament has gone to Madras to organize agitation there on Ceylon language issue.[3] He expressed hope that neither Government of India nor Government of Madras will lend support to such agitation in regard to a purely domestic issue of Ceylon as otherwise this would impair good relations between India and Ceylon.

2. Whatever our views might be on this subject, I think we should take care not to encourage this agitation or interfere in any other way in a domestic issue of Ceylon. I hope that you will explain this situation to your colleagues in your Cabinet and to others, if necessary.

3. I have been surprised to receive bunch of telegrams from Socialist Party of Madura, Kumbakonam, Sholavandan, Tiruchengodu and Poonamallee condemning my attitude towards Ceylon Indians and asking me to resign if I cannot solve their problems. I should like to know who is organizing this business at this stage particularly.

1. New Delhi, 26 July 1956. JN Collection.
2. C.Vanniasingam (1911-1959); advocate and leader of the Tamil-speaking people of Ceylon; co-founded the Federal Party of Ceylon, 1949; President, Federal Party, 1956-58.
3. In June 1956, C. Vanniasingam opposed the passage by the Sri Lankan Parliament of the Official Languages Bill which made Sinhalese the sole official language. In April, the People's United Party, led by S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike, won the general elections on the "Sinhalese only" promise.

2. To K.T. Kosalram[1]

New Delhi
August 17, 1956

Dear friend,[2]
I have received your letter about the problem of Indians coming from Ceylon. This is really a question which should be considered by you with the Tamilnad PCC or with the Madras Government.

My own advice to you would be not to agitate about this matter as the PSP or the Dravida Kazhagam are doing, but, at the same time, to try to give help in deserving cases without making a fuss about it. The people of the PSP or of the Kazhagam will do little but shout. If they help someone, well and good. We have no objection, but we should not imitate them in merely agitating.

The question of people of Indian descent can be divided up into two parts: one relates to Indians as such who are Indian nationals and who have been in Ceylon for business and other purposes for some time; the other relates to the people of Indian descent who are not Indian nationals and who have been in Ceylon for a long time.

The real problem we have been dealing with relates to the second category. In regard to the first, naturally we have dealt with it also and tried to induce the Ceylon Government not to take any steps which would lead to large numbers having to leave Ceylon. But, in regard to Indian nationals, in theory, the Ceylon Government can refuse to extend their permits. It is a matter of grace for them not to do so. To the extent that our relations with Ceylon are good, they will be allowed to remain there for some time longer. If our relations are bad, then this will affect the Indians there.

You must remember that in Ceylon a big problem of unemployment has arisen among the Ceylonese themselves.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. JN Collection.
2. K.T. Kosalram (1915-1985); participated in the freedom movement and imprisoned for over four years; President, Tirunelveli District Congress Committee for fifteen years; General Secretary, Tamil Nadu Congress Committee for three years; President, Salt Workers Union, 1935; started the first rehabilitation centre for Sri Lankan repatriates at Nazareth in 1954; member: Madras Legislative Assembly, 1946-56, Tamil Nadu Legislative Council, 1957-62, Tamil Nadu Legislative Assembly, 1962-67; member, Rajya Sabha, 1977-79 and 1980-84.

VI. INDO-CHINA

1. Technical Assistance to Laos[1]

I agree that we should wait for the visit of the Laotian Prime Minister to Peking.[2]

I am agreeable to our sending a small technical mission to Laos.[3] I am only anxious that we should not commit ourselves in any way to future expenditure or any kind of financial aid. We are having a hard time in India and we cannot add to our difficulties. You can enquire from the Ministries concerned what kind of a technical mission could be sent from here. It should be a fairly small one.

I agree that it would not desirable for me to send letters to the two parties congratulating them on the result of their meeting at Vientiane.[4] But perhaps it would do no harm if our representative informally conveyed to them our satisfaction at the progress made at the meeting.

1. Note to M.J. Desai, Commonwealth Secretary, MEA, 19 August 1956. File No. 2(2)-IC/56, Vol. II, MEA.
2. On 5 August 1956, after five days of talks at Vientiane, the Royal Government of Laos and the Pathet Lao regime in northern Laos cleared the ground for ending hostile acts against each other and establishing a government of national union. Regarding foreign policy, their joint declaration stated that Laos would adopt the principles of Panchsheel. It would neither join any military alliance nor authorize any military bases on its territory except those provided for in the Geneva Agreements. Expressing satisfaction at the clause relating to foreign policy, Desai suggested in his note of 9 August that it might be worthwhile "to consider persuading France to make some sort of a generous gesture to Laos and reduce its dependence on American aid." Desai also thought that the forthcoming visit of the Laotian Prime Minister, Souvanna Phouma, to Beijing might lead to an offer of assistance by China.
3. Desai had suggested sending a small technical mission to Laos to give the "benefit of our experience and some sort of technical assistance."
4. Desai did not agree with N.V. Raj Kumar, the Indian Chargé d'Affaires in Laos, that Nehru should congratulate the Prime Minister of Laos and the Pathet Lao leader Souphanouvong on the success of their talks. "We should not give to Western Powers the impression that we are pushing Laos in any way," noted Desai.

2. Polish Resolution on Laos[1]

The resolution is not necessary.[2] But, at the same time, I see nothing to object to it. I would, therefore, inform Sen that, in view of what has already been done (as you say), we do not think it is necessary to have this resolution. We have no objection to the resolution ourselves, but a resolution of this type would lose some grace if it was merely passed by a majority of the Commission.

2. If, however, the Poles insist on moving it, then I suppose we must support it, though, even then, we might try to get the resolution varied, so that the Canadians also agree to it. The main point is that a gesture of this kind should normally be unanimous.

1. Note to the Commonwealth Secretary, Ministry of External Affairs, 22 August 1956. File No. 2(2)-IC/56, MEA.
2. Samar Sen, Chairman of the International Commission for Supervision and Control in Laos, informed the MEA on 21 August that the Polish delegation had moved a resolution that welcomed the recent joint declaration by the Royal Government of Laos and the Pathet Lao regime and approved of Laos being an "independent, neutral, democratic and united state." However, the Canadian delegation did not like any references to any particular part of the joint declaration, maintaining that it was "not the Commission's business to give judgement on agreement." Sen felt that India should support the Polish resolution with minor modifications.

3. To Ngo Dinh Diem[1]

New Delhi
August 30, 1956

Dear Mr President,[2]

I was happy to meet your Minister, His Excellency Nguyen Huu Chau,[3] when he visited us here last week. He gave me your kind message of the 18th August, which I read with pleasure.

I entirely agree with Your Excellency that the first need for both our countries as well as the other countries of South East Asia is the maintenance of peace so that we can devote all our energies for the advancement of our peoples. The most urgent need of Asian countries is economic and social development and raising of the standard of life. To that we are devoting ourselves in our own country, and we have drawn up plans for this purpose. We realize, however, that it is necessary for all these countries to develop and advance and to cooperate among themselves for this purpose.

The visit of the delegation Your Excellency sent, has developed new contacts between our countries, which I trust will bear fruit. Your delegation visited some of our industrial centres and community development projects and also had discussions with our Planning Commission and some of our Ministries. I trust that this will prove of mutual benefit.

I was happy to meet Mr Nguyen Huu Chau and to exchange views with him about problems of common interest.[4]

I send you, Mr President, my regards and my good wishes.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. JN Collection.
2. Ngo Dinh Diem, President, Republic of Vietnam.
3. Minister of Interior, Republic of Vietnam.
4. Replying to Nguyen Huu Chau's letter of 24 August, Nehru wrote to him on 30 August: "I was happy to meet Your Excellency and your colleagues and to have an opportunity of a talk. Your visit was a very brief one, but it has enabled us to meet and know each other a little and, therefore, it has served some purpose. You were good enough to refer to me in generous language both in the course of our talk and in your letter. For this, I am grateful."

VII. IRAN

1. Cable to Subimal Dutt[1]

Your telegram 24854 of July 6th.[2]

2. The Iranian Ambassador[3] in London saw our High Commissioner today on the same subject and more or less said the same thing.

3. I am surprised at the complaint made by the Iranian Government. I consider it highly improper and irresponsible. Are the Iranian Government going to lay down what routes our aircraft or airline should follow. Bahrain is the normal route for our aircraft which frequently go to Europe from India.[4] I had no business at Bahrain and I am not concerned at all about its affairs. I had never heard previously of any claim by Iran on Bahrain.[5] In any event I am not interested in this question. Nor has any reference been made to it in London or elsewhere.

4. I was met by the Sheikh[6] and the British Resident[7] at Bahrain. I received no deputation, but I think some papers were handed over to me by some persons in a crowd. I paid no attention to them.

5. I think that it is for us to protest against this kind of complaint made to us by the Iranian Government without any enquiry and with no basis of facts. You should express yourself strongly to him on this subject.

1. London, 7 July 1956. File No. 52(13) MEA.
2. Subimal Dutt, Foreign Secretary, informed N.R. Pillai, Secretary General, MEA, that the Iranian Chargé d'Affaires in New Delhi had met him on 6 July to express his Government's "regret that the Prime Minister (Nehru) should have passed through Bahrain" and "received representation from some people regarding their rights knowing Iran's claim to sovereignty over Bahrain." Dutt added: "I also expressed surprise at their complaining about Prime Minister's plane touching Bahrain which is an international airport . . . I left him in no doubt of my disapproval of his Government's . . . lodging a complaint without first trying to ascertain facts."
3. Ali Soheily.
4. On 21 June 1956, Nehru's aircraft made a halt at Bahrain en route to Damascus.
5. The status of Bahrain had been a subject of controversy between Britain and Iran for many years. Bahrain, originally under Persian suzerainty, was captured in 1783 by a Kuwaiti sheikh. In 1861, the then ruling sheikh secured British protection. On 8 April 1956, Iran reiterated her claims of sovereignty over Bahrain.
6. Sheikh Sulman bin Hamad al Khalifa.
7. Bernard Burrows.

VIII. EAST EUROPE

1. To K.P.S. Menon[1]

Camp: London
6th July, 1956

My dear KPS,[2]
Count Edward Raczynski[3] came to see our High Commissioner here today. He was Polish Ambassador to the Court of St James's from 1934 to 1945.

The Count is apparently the leader of the Polish emigres abroad. He wanted to see me very much, but I had no time. Thereupon he conveyed a message for me to the effect that what was happening in Poland[4] had in no way been inspired or instigated by Poles abroad. They were somewhat nervous that reprisals would take place in Poland and begged me to put in a word to Moscow or Warsaw, so that unduly severe punishments may not be imposed on those who are suspected of having started the present trouble.[5]

I happened to see Malik,[6] the Soviet Ambassador here, today. I mentioned

1. JN Collection.
2. India's Ambassador in Moscow.
3. (1891-1993); Polish diplomat and politician; Minister accredited to the League of Nations, 1932-34; Ambassador to the Court of St James's, 1934-45; Chairman, Polish Research Committee, London, 1940-67; Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, 1941-42; Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, 1942-43; Hon Chief Polish Adviser, Ministry of Labour and National Service, 1952-56; Chairman, Polish Cultural Foundation, since 1970; Chairman, Polish Institute and Sikorski Museum, 1966-77; President-in-exile, 1979-86.
4. Serious rioting broke out in Poznan on 28 June 1956 soon after a delegation of workers returned from Warsaw. Fifty-three persons were killed or died of wounds in the riots. The Polish Government attributed the responsibility for the Poznan disturbances to "imperialist agents" for exploiting "economic difficulties and grievances in certain factories."
5. On 4 July 1956, M. Cyrankiewicz, Prime Minister of Poland, announced the setting up of a special commission to investigate into the Poznan riots. There would be "no appeal" against its findings. It was disclosed on 13 July that 285 persons would be brought to trial.
6. Jacob Malik.

this matter to him. He smiled and said in reply that the Americans have been behind these troubles in Poland.[7]

I am conveying this information to you so that perhaps you might informally convey it to the Soviet Government and also possibly to the Polish Ambassador in Moscow. Of course, all this should be done quite informally.

You will remember what I said to you before you left. I hope that this trouble in Poland will not lead to any reprisals or heavy repression. That would be playing into the hands of those who instigated the trouble. It is not of course for us to interfere in any way in Poland or elsewhere;[8] but, in the course of conversation, some hint might be thrown out about these matters.

I was glad to meet you in London though I am sorry I could not give you enough time. I was happy to see that you were looking well.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

7. In a statement on 29 June, the US State Department expressed shock at the civilian casualties in the Poznan disturbances and said that they had occurred because the Poles had been brought "to a breaking point" by their grievances. Poland described this statement as "interference in Polish internal affairs."
8. In Hungary, for instance, increasingly outspoken criticism of the government and the Hungarian Workers' Party led the Central Committee to warn the workers to be on guard against "demagogues." It also denounced "demagogic statements directed against the party and the people's democracy."

2. Changes in Czechoslovakia[1]

When I was in London recently,[2] the former Czech Ambassador to India, B. Kratochvil, came to see me. He told me that the present Czech Ambassador[3] in London had been approaching him and asking him to go back to Czechoslovakia.[4] Apparently, some other prominent Czech emigres had also been so approached. Kratochvil told me that he had not given a definite answer, but he had indicated that, if some further changes took place in Czechoslovakia, making it clear that a new policy was being pursued,[5] he might go there.

2. Kratochvil also asked me to convey this message to the Yugoslav people when I saw them in Brioni. He gave me a copy of his letter of resignation which he addressed to the Czech Government on leaving India in February 1951. I enclose this for record.

1. Note to the Foreign Secretary, 19 August 1956. JN Collection.
2. In June-July 1956.
3. Jiri Hajek.
4. Kratochvil was appointed Ambassador to India in 1947 by the then Czech Foreign Minister, Vladimir Clementis. Clementis was dismissed in March 1950 for "bourgeois nationalist deviationism" and charged, along with some others, with complicity in a plot to overthrow the regime. In February 1951, Kratochvil was recalled to Prague for consultation, but he sought asylum in Britain.
5. Political and cultural liberty was curtailed and purge trials were conducted in Czechoslovakia from 1950 to 1952. After the riots of 1953 reflecting economic discontent, a modest liberalization trend was begun which continued till 1957.

IX. AFRICA

1. To Anthony Eden[1]

Camp: London
4 July 1956

My dear Eden,
Thank you for your letter of July 3rd about the Gold Coast.

I entirely agree with you that the Gold Coast should be admitted to Commonwealth membership on attaining self-government. From your letter it appears that both the parties standing for elections there are in favour of full self-government and only vary in regard to the procedure to be adopted. Whatever the result of the elections, in so far as relative strength of the two parties is concerned, the demand for it and the necessity for it is likely to be the same.

Although, so far as I know, no official announcement has been made by the UK Government, it is widely believed that it is the intention of the UK Government to grant full self-government to the Gold Coast and admit it to Commonwealth membership. The Gold Coast has become a symbol of approaching freedom in Africa and large numbers of people in the rest of Africa are also looking eagerly to the Gold Coast attaining it. If I may say so, it will be a significant day not only for the United Kingdom, but for the Gold Coast and for Africa, when the Gold Coast becomes a full self-governing member of the Commonwealth.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. JN Collection.

2. To Kwame Nkrumah[1]

New Delhi
August 4, 1956

My dear Dr Nkrumah,[2]

On the formation of your new Cabinet, I am writing to you to send you my congratulations on the success of the elections at the Gold Coast.[3] I am sure that under your wise leadership the Gold Coast will prosper and will soon join the ranks of independent nations.[4] This will be a significant development in Africa as well as in the Commonwealth and it may well have far-reaching consequences. I hope you and your colleagues will always remember that there is great goodwill in India for the people of the Gold Coast.

I am happy that, on the initiative taken by the Indian Delegation, a satisfactory settlement of the question of Togoland was reached in the Trusteeship Council.[5]

With all good wishes,

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. JN Collection.
2. Prime Minister of the Gold Coast.
3. The Convention People's Party, led by Nkrumah, won 71 seats out of 104 in the Legislative Assembly elections held on 17 July 1956.
4. On 6 March 1957, the Gold Coast became the independent state of Ghana and also a member of the Commonwealth.
5. On 12 December 1955, the Trusteeship Committee adopted an Indian resolution which (i) called for a plebiscite in British Togoland under UN supervision to ascertain the wishes of the inhabitants on the future of the territory; and (ii) noted French assurances that political reforms would be introduced in French Togoland as a prelude to a "popular consultation" in that territory during the next few years. Henry Hopkinson, the British Minister of State for Colonial Affairs, announced in the UN General Assembly in December 1955 that the British vote for the Indian resolution marked a "decisive step in the first termination of a trusteeship by an administering power according to the UN Charter." In 1957, British Togoland became part of Ghana. In 1960, French Togoland became independent as the Republic of Togo.

3. To S.M. Patel[1]

New Delhi
August 19, 1956

Dear Shri Patel,[2]

I have received your letter of the 27th July, 1956 and I have read it with interest.

2. You have raised a number of points in your letter which concern not only the immediate issues in Tanganyika but our wider policies. In regard to these matters, the Government of India's broad policies are being communicated to our Commissioner in Nairobi[3] and I suggest that you get in touch with him and discuss these subjects with him.

3. I might here indicate to you, however, our broad approach to these problems of Africa. The exact application of that approach might vary in different parts, but the general principles should apply almost everywhere.

4. It is naturally our wish to protect the interests of our fellow-countrymen abroad, wherever they might be. Prior to independence, we could do little in this respect, except to rely on the goodwill of the colonial authorities. Even then, however, it was clear to us that we could not attain much through that goodwill only if, in the process, we lost the goodwill of the indigenous population. We laid down a general rule then that Indians abroad should cooperate with the people of the country and not seek in any way to exploit them.

5. Since independence, India's position is in some ways stronger and it grows in strength from year to year. At the same time, because of that very growing strength, the colonial authorities have become a little jealous of it and afraid of the future. In effect, therefore, we cannot do much at present to protect our citizens abroad in most of these territories. In Rhodesia, Indians, including our Consul there, have frequently to put up not only with racial discrimination but with discourteous treatment. We protest to the British Government as well as to the Central African Federation. We get some kind of an apology, but there is no improvement.

6. Meanwhile, there has been a rapid development in the African scene in a greater or lesser degree. The whole of Africa is affected by this, and powerful movements are growing up to represent this new urge of the Africans. Sometimes

1. JN Collection.
2. President, Tanganyika Hindu Council.
3. Prem Krishen.

they are even against our own people. The fact, however, to be recognized is that conditions in Africa are rapidly changing. Within a year the Gold Coast will have achieved full independence within the Commonwealth. Nigeria will follow. This example is affecting the rest of Africa. There can be no doubt that within a measurable distance of time many of the African territories will be self-governing and that the Africans there will have a predominant voice.

7. Apart from any high principles, although principles are good, looking at this objectively and from the point of view of the future, we have to consider this situation that is rapidly arising and changing the face of Africa. I cannot say how long this process will take, but I rather doubt if the period will be longer. The pace of events is faster now than ever before. For our part, the principles which we hold and which we proclaim to the world, must lead us to help this process and to expedite this change-over.

8. From the long term point of view, therefore, it seems clear that Indian nationals in Africa will have to depend upon the goodwill chiefly of the Africans. Any step taken which alienates that goodwill will be injurious from that long term point of view.

9. Even from the short term viewpoint, we are not likely to further the interests of our fellow-countrymen abroad by pursuing any other policy and by seeking special privileges for our people. I do not think we shall get them even if we try and the effect of our trying will put us a in a false position and really endanger the interests and position we may now have.

10. In your letter you refer to the report of the Maharaj Singh Delegation of 1947.[4] That report was a good one and we can learn much from it. But the world has changed greatly during the last ten years and India has functioned as an independent power in the world during this period. I have no doubt that many countries in Africa require the services of outsiders in considerable numbers. Further that recruits from India can do good work there in many ways. They will be more suitable and certainly less expensive than recruits from other foreign countries. We are in fact sending our technical men and teachers and others already to several African countries. We are also training African students in

4. A three-member official delegation led by Maharaj Singh visited East Africa in 1946 to examine the proposed restrictions on immigration into Kenya, Uganda, Tanganyika and Zanzibar. The delegation, in its report submitted on 16 October 1946, concluded that the proposed bills would, in practice, adversely affect the immigration of Indians much more than that of Europeans. It also found the provisions of the bills extremely stringent and feared that they would encroach on the liberty and security of individuals.

India. But our recruits will go there at present or in the future only if they are welcome there. They cannot be thrust on unwilling people.

11. I have indicated our general approach to this problem. The specific application of it can be discussed with our Commissioner in Nairobi.

This letter is not for publication.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

X. THE ALGERIAN QUESTION

1. Algeria's Quest for Freedom[1]

Mr President, Prime Minister,[2] Excellencies, ladies and gentlemen,

You will forgive me for not making my speech in your beautiful language. I need not tell you how grateful I am for your welcome and for the generous words in which you expressed it. On arriving in Damascus today I was greatly moved, moved because from my boyhood I had thought and read about Damascus—this great city with a tremendous past and tremendous historical heritage. I had so often wanted to come here. Now that circumstance has brought me here, I felt a great emotion at the realization of a very old wish. Maybe that aspect of it was quite sentimental, but there was much more to it than that, because in these later years, when at last a number of countries of the East have gained freedom and independence, we have picked up old threads again, old threads of history, and developed contacts with each other which had been broken for, sometimes, hundreds of years.

And so my country and yours, Sir, have again come into much closer contact and found satisfaction and pleasure in renewing those old contacts. We have

1. Speech at a banquet hosted by Shukri el-Kuwatli, President of Syria, Damascus, 21 June 1956. JN Collection. On his way to London, Nehru stopped for a day at Damascus.
2. Sabri Assali.

AT THE HOWALDT SHIPYARD, HAMBURG, 16 JULY 1956

WITH GUY MOLLET, PRIME MINISTER OF FRANCE, PARIS, 17 JULY 1956

found also, naturally, that we have a great deal in common, that we have sometimes similar problems to face and that in many things relating to the wider spheres of the world we also thought and spoke alike. In one matter, of course, our past experience in a sense has brought us together in our thinking, just as it brought other countries of Asia and some of Africa also with the same experience. That is, your country and ours and many other countries were under alien rule. One can call it colonialism or imperialism or by any other term for the development in the last two hundred years of domination of large parts of Asia and Africa by certain countries, mostly of Europe. Now, fortunately, there has been a change, a great change in fact, and I think that one of the most important features of the present age we live in is this fact of the new life forcing itself through the old veins of Asia and Africa. When I say Asia I include Africa too, and this renascence of Asia, this removal of foreign authority from the countries of Asia, has been a dominant feature of the age. I think that in the future years to come this factor will become more and more important. When we say, from the point of view of history, that the age of domination by some European countries in Asia and partly in Africa —I will not say entirely, because the case of Africa is somewhat different — that age has practically ended, we say this and yet I know it has not ended; in a historic sense or perspective it has ended because it must end, because all the forces must necessarily make it end and yet the fact of it is that even before our eyes we see certain areas where colonialism continues, and is trying to dig itself in or sometimes changing its shape, putting on new clothes or putting on a new look and yet essentially remaining the same thing.

We see in the present age the awful tragedy of what is happening in Algeria, a country which surely nobody can doubt is as entitled to freedom as any other country and yet most unhappily we see death and tragedy taking place there. I have no doubt of course that like elsewhere Algeria will attain her freedom. The only sad part of it is that there is so much conflict, so much misery, so much disaster before the inevitable end comes. That is why, some time ago, my Government ventured to suggest[3] that there should be a ceasefire, so as to avoid this killing, so as to give a chance for a peaceful settlement which can only be in accordance with the freedom of Algeria. It was not for us to say what the detailed terms of that settlement should be. That is for the people of Algeria and their representatives, and the other party which is the Government of France. But we did venture to suggest that there should be a ceasefire and then negotiations; because after all sometimes or other there is bound to be negotiations. It is

3. See *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 33, pp. 481-483.

impossible to conceive that people will go on killing each other indefinitely. If that has to come some time or other why should it not come today instead of a week, or a month, or a year later? Why should we have to go through more killing and disaster before we arrive at a stage which is inevitable? We made that suggestion in all humility because we believe earnestly that every problem should be solved or attempted to be solved through peaceful methods. War is becoming out of date and attempts at solving a problem by war usually produce more problems.

So, Mr President, we are living now through an age of great change in the world of this atomic era, and as part of that great change is the change coming over the ancient countries of Asia. And standing here in this city, which you were pleased to call the immortal city of Damascus, I have a sensation of seeing vast perspectives, long perspectives through which Asia has passed. Another great change has come over the countries of Asia, not a change of conflict with other countries but a change in which we of Asia will stand in freedom on our own feet, and live our own lives in friendship with others, in cooperation with others and under no one's domination and under no one's subjection. That is the only way that there can be friendship; there is no friendship when one country dominates another. Friendship can only exist as between equals, as between free peoples. Some of our countries have arrived at the end of one journey, that is to say, we have gained our independence. But even arriving at the end of that journey does not mean that we have reached haven or harbour, for immediately we have to face great social problems, the problem of raising the levels of our people, the problem of poverty in our countries and making them prosperous, and getting rid of poverty. These are terrible problems we have to face, but we have to face them because only then and only by overcoming them can we really take our rightful place in the world. So our journey continues and there is no resting place for a long time for us.

I am very grateful, Mr President, to you and to Your Excellencies, ladies and gentlemen, for your welcome and friendship. I wish you, Sir, your country and its people all prosperity and, if I may say so, with all respect, I look forward with all respect to the fullest measure of cooperation between your country, Sir, and mine.[4]

4. Reuter reported that at a reception hosted by the Indian Legation in Damascus on 22 June 1956, a Syrian school teacher of Algerian descent pinned on Nehru's jacket a brooch showing the green and white emblem of the Algerian nationalist movement and asked him not to forget the cause of Algerian nationalism. Nehru said: "You know our interest in Algeria and we will not forget it. I will give Algeria attention as if I were an Algerian."

2. Cable to Subimal Dutt[1]

Your telegram 24843 of June 28th.[2]

2. Proposal of Syrian Government involves two points: (i) to have a conference of Bandung countries and (ii) to have such a conference at ambassadorial level. So far as we are concerned, we do not think such a conference at all advisable at this stage. If we have conference at all, it should necessarily discuss many matters and not be confined to Algeria. This will require long preparation. As for Algeria, the position is a difficult and developing one and it is better to exercise such influence as we possess diplomatically rather than by public conference. In any event, Ambassadors cannot deal with these problems which have to be dealt with by Governments.

3. As you know, I shall be seeing both the French Prime Minister and President Nasser this month. I shall no doubt discuss the Algeria question with them.

4. You might therefore inform our Legation in Damascus that such a conference in the near future may not yield results and might perhaps somewhat come in the way of other developments and that in any event Ambassadors will not have enough authority to deal with these intricate questions without frequent references to Government.

1. Camp: London, 4 July 1956. V.K. Krishna Menon Papers, NMML.
2. The Foreign Secretary, S. Dutt, cabled from New Delhi that the Syrian Government had asked for India's reaction to a proposal to convene a conference, at the ambassadorial level, of the Bandung countries. This followed after the Security Council rejected, on 26 June, the move by thirteen Asian-African countries to debate the Algerian situation. Dutt believed that India's support to the proposal would be inconsistent with her recent response to the move by the Asian-African countries.

3. To V.K. Krishna Menon[1]

Camp: Paris
17th July, 1956

My dear Krishna,
I am writing this letter to you very late at night and early tomorrow morning we are going away.[2] This business of travelling every day and feasts, calls, parties and talks everywhere, is rather exhausting.

I received your telegram about your breaking journey at Paris, on arrival here today. I mentioned the matter to Pineau[3] when I saw him.

I talked about various matters with Mollet and Pineau, among them, of course, Algeria. They referred to a resolution which their Socialist Party passed about two weeks ago which, according to them, was a very fair offer.[4] This resolution refers to:

1. Establishing peace.
2. Free elections.
3. Negotiations on the basis of strict equality, a new statute for Algeria recognizing the Algerian personality.
4. Links with France.

You had better see the full resolution. I have hardly had time to read it carefully.

They complained that this generous offer of theirs had met with no response. Someone, I think Ferhat Abbas,[5] had issued a statement enquiring if this offer

1. V.K. Krishna Menon Papers, NMML.
2. Nehru flew into Paris from Hamburg on 17 July after a four-day visit to West Germany.
3. Christian Paul Francis Pineau, Foreign Minister of France.
4. On 1 July, the Congress of the French Socialist Party overwhelmingly voted in favour of a resolution appealing to the Algerian rebels to accept a ceasefire and to respond to the French Government's policy which "guarantees them a real emancipation within a Franco-Algerian community of brotherhood." The resolution called for accelerating and extending the reform programme and referred to a "wide autonomy of administration" guaranteed by local institutions which would possess executive and legislative powers. It also called for an end to reprisals and the adoption of stern measures against the French Press in Algeria, "which has always served the interests of the masters of Algeria."
5. (1899-1985); Algerian nationalist leader; leader of Association des Etudiants Musulmans, 1926-31; took part in organizing the Algeria People's Union, 1938; Leader, Union Democratique du Manifeste Algerien, 1946-56; elected to Algerian Assembly, 1948 and 1954; joined the National Liberation Front, 1955; Prime Minister, Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic in Tunisia, 1958-61; President, Chamber of Algeria, 1962-63; detained, July 1964-June 1965; became President of the National Constituent Assembly after Algeria's independence in 1962.

was to be considered a Government offer or merely a Party offer. Mollet said that this was an absurd enquiry as he and his colleagues were bound by the offer of the Socialist Party of which they were members.

The position appears to be that they are prepared to:

1. A ceasefire.
2. Elections.
3. Recognition of Algeria as a separate entity.
4. Negotiations on the basis of links with France and equality between the descendents of Europeans there and the Arabs.

What this equality means exactly is not quite clear to me. In fact they did not wish to define it clearly themselves. All they said was that there should be adequate protection of both groups from the other.

The President[6] of the Republic also spoke to me at some length about Algeria and said that he was prepared not to attach any importance to the legal and constitutional ties existing at present with France. But some tie has to continue. Also he said that France was a proud country and was not prepared to be coerced or interfered with.

Mollet told me that Messali Hadj[7] was certainly very popular among the Algerians in France and was, as an individual, probably best known in Algeria also; but his party had little influence. The Algerian National Front was the most important group carrying on the fight against France. He attached, therefore, little importance to what Messali Hadj might say.

I might add that Mollet and Pineau told me that they were prepared to have elections under some kind of an international auspices or according to some arrangement agreed upon by the other party. They did not expect any fresh development in the next two or three months. In fact, I had the impression that they were not very keen on any such development just now. They would rather wait a month or two to show that they were in full control of the situation from a military point of view and then be generous. Of course, if the Algerians accept the Socialist Party's suggestion as it is and without much argument, then the Government would be compelled to take some further steps.

I met some Tunisians at the party tonight. They seemed to imply that the Algerians would be prepared to accept the Socialist Party's proposals provided

6. Nehru called on Rene Coty, the President of the French Republic.
7. Hadj, the President of the Algerian Nationalist Movement, lived in enforced residence in France. He had sent a message to Nehru in the last week of June through his close associate, Abed Bouhafa. Bouhafa had come to London from Zurich to deliver the message. See also *ante*, p. 301.

they came formally from Government. I pointed out to them that if they were prepared to accept these proposals, the obvious thing was to say so clearly and thus put the burden on the Government.

This is a brief and rather hurried account of my talks just to give you some indication of what they were.[8]

I enclose copy of a telegram from Bhabha which is meant for you.

Yours affectionately,
Jawaharlal

8. Nehru stated at the Paris airport on 18 July: "I believe the French Government is earnestly desirous of bringing peace (in Algeria), but it is not for me to agree or disagree with the French Government. To another question, he replied: "I am Foreign Minister of India, not of France or Algeria."

4. Helping the Algerian Cause[1]

Please acknowledge this letter from our Ambassador[2] in Paris. You might tell him that the Algerian nationalists are mistaken in thinking that I did not help their cause in Paris. In Paris and elsewhere, I think we did a deal of good work on their behalf. I am convinced, however, that it would be desirable for the Algerian nationalists to take advantage of the French offer as contained in the Socialist Party resolution. What they should do is to accept that resolution broadly and ask for negotiations on that basis for a ceasefire.

2. You might also say that I entirely disagree with the opinion expressed about President Nasser. I think President Nasser is quite intelligent and knows what he is about. Of course, he has to face numerous difficulties in Egypt.

1. Note to the Foreign Secretary, 25 July 1956. JN Collection.
2. H.S. Malik.

XI. MISCELLANEOUS

1. Machinery for Settling Disputes: K.M. Panikkar's Views[1]

I wonder if you have seen two articles by K.M. Panikkar on the Commonwealth which appeared in *The Manchester Guardian*.[2] The reference in these articles to the evolution of some machinery for settling disputes is, I think, not only premature, but likely to prove somewhat embarrassing to us and, maybe, to others. Take the Kashmir issue or the question of people of Indian descent in South Africa.

1. Note to the Secretary General, Ministry of External Affairs, 26 June 1956. File No. 6-17/56-UK, MEA.
2. In an article titled "Commonwealth Changes" published in *The Manchester Guardian* of 18 June 1956, Panikkar suggested establishing a machinery "with a panel of men with a record of distinguished services from different parts of the Commonwealth . . . to deal with any disputes which parties agree to refer for conciliation and settlement."

2. Sale of Indian Handmade Products[1]

It seems to me very odd that in a place like London there is no proper arrangement for the sale of Indian handloom products and handicrafts. Some small shops contain a few articles, but, generally speaking, these Indian products are not available here. I have no doubt whatever that there is a good demand for them, though of course that demand is for particular types of things and not for anything that we might send across.

Even Pakistan has better arrangements and Selfridges[2] has got a corner for Pakistan. I am told that Pakistan really deals in Indian made sarees, etc., having nothing special which it produces.

There was an Indian salesroom till about three years ago. It was closed because it had been run at a considerable loss. I am inclined to think that these losses were largely due to an attempt to run them on government lines and not by efficient salesmen on business lines. I gather that there are some talks in progress now to get some of the major stores to stock Indian goods. That is all right. But I feel that something in addition should be done not only for display, but for actual sale. I am almost sure that this can be done at a profit provided it is intelligently organized. Anyhow I should like this matter to be considered and discussed with our High Commission here.

1. Note to the Minister of Commerce and Industry and Minister of Production, London, 12 July 1956. File No. 1/A/17(184)/56-PMS.
2. Selfridges, a leading store in Oxford Street, London, was started in 1909.

3. A Special "India Number" of an Argentine Magazine[1]

I am sending you a copy of a letter[2] from our Ambassador in Paris and a magazine from the Argentine called *Sur*. This is edited by a well known author of the Argentine, Madame Victoria Ocampo, who was a friend of Tagore and who has a high reputation as a liberal thinker.

2. You will see from the letter that she wants to bring out a special number of her magazine devoted to India.[3] For this purpose, she wants a good deal of material, both old and new, with articles, photographs, paintings, etc.

3. I have no doubt that the production of such a work in the Spanish language would be very useful for us for Latin America as a whole. Naturally, we shall have to send the material in English, and it will have to be translated there. Much of the material can be collected by our I & B Ministry, part of it from our Planning Commission and especially the Community Projects Organization.

4. I shall be grateful to have your views about this matter and if this can be organized and further how this should be done. External Affairs Ministry will, of course, help.

1. Note to the Minister for Education, 4 August 1956. JN Collection.
2. Replying to the letter of 24 July from Ambassador H.S. Malik, Nehru wrote: "I have known about Victoria Ocampo for some years, although I met her for the first time in your house (in Paris on 17 July 1956). She has corresponded with me also . . . She was not in favour of the previous Government of Argentina and was considered too liberal a person. For this reason also, she hesitated to write to me. You can tell her that I was happy to meet her and that I am only sorry that I did not have a chance of having a talk with her."
3. Malik wrote that Victoria Ocampo, who had called on him and his wife on 23 July, had also requested Nehru to write a foreword to the special issue she intended to bring out. Malik concluded that, "the whole idea seems to me to be one well worth following up by us. . ."

4. The Phoenix Ashram and *Indian Opinion*[1]

Since the death of Manilal Gandhi[2] in South Africa, various problems and difficulties have arisen there in regard to the Phoenix Ashram and *Indian Opinion,*[3] the paper which he used to issue. The major difficulty is that there appears to be no competent person either to look after the Ashram properties or to run the paper.[4] Manilal Gandhi's wife[5] has been asked by the Trustees there to do so. She is a good woman but hardly capable of this kind of work. She used to help her husband, but she cannot be put in independent charge. Even if formally she takes up the editorship of the paper, she must have [a] competent trained journalist assistant.

The question is whether such a trained person, if we find him, can be sent to South Africa. Will he be allowed to go there and to stay there?[6]

There is also another and rather personal question and that is about the son[7] of Manilal Gandhi. His mother wants to send him to India to get him married. Will he be allowed to take his wife to South Africa afterwards? I understand that in some rare cases, such brides of persons born in South Africa had been admitted. Manilal Gandhi's son was born and brought up in South Africa. Can we find out about this?

1. Note to the Commonwealth Secretary, MEA. 12 August 1956. JN Collection.
2. Manilal Mohandas Gandhi (1892-1956); second son of Mahatma Gandhi; trustee of the Phoenix Settlement near Durban in South Africa, founded by Mahatma Gandhi in 1904.
3. Weekly journal started by Mahatma Gandhi in June 1903 in South Africa. For about ten years, Mahatma Gandhi wrote regularly for *Indian Opinion* and invested all his savings to keep the paper alive as a tool of his satyagraha campaign.
4. Nehru wrote to the Congress President, U.N. Dhebar, on 13 August: "I would like it (*Indian Opinion*) to continue." He did not think that it was fair to place the responsibility on Sushila Manilal Gandhi, Manilal's wife.
5. Sushila Manilal Gandhi (nee Mashurwala); married Manilal in 1927.
6. Nehru wrote to Dhebar that even if a "suitable person" was found, "no such person will be allowed entry into South Africa", to look after *Indian Opinion*. Nehru added that this had been India's experience "during the past several years."
7. Arun Manilal Gandhi (b. 1932).

5. Flexibility in Interpreting Visa Rules[1]

I do not quite know what a long-term visa signifies. Does it mean one of permanent residence in India? How does it affect his citizenship rights? At present, Dr Airan is presumably a Pakistan citizen, having gone there in 1947 and remained there for eight years. If he comes to India on a long-term visa, does this simply mean that he can stay here for a particular or an indefinite period, maintaining his Pakistan citizenship, or is he for all practical purposes an Indian citizen? Or, does he qualify during this period for Indian citizenship?

2. It is clear that there is nothing against Dr Airan personally. The District Magistrate of South Satara, after enquiries, has stated that there is nothing against him and, in fact, has recommended that a long-term visa be given to him. Therefore, the only reason for denying him this is not that we object to him in any way but that, as a matter of principle, we do not wish to encourage such long-term visas for foreigners or, at any rate, for those from Pakistan. It has to be remembered that Dr Airan has his other members of the family still in India and they are Indian citizens.

3. In regard to other foreigners, that is, non-Pakistanis, what is our policy? I take it that, if we do not object to them on personal grounds, we allow them to come to India on business or otherwise and stay here for fairly lengthy periods. Under our new Nationality Law, a person can become an Indian citizen if he has been a resident for a certain number of years and is otherwise qualified. That means that we permit him to reside here for that number of years. If we do not permit him to do so, then no foreigner can qualify under that rule.

4. It may be said that foreigners coming here add in a small way to the unemployment problem. In the case of engineers, there is really no real unemployment problem. In fact, we require more and more of them, and we get them from abroad.

5. I think that a case like Dr Airan's certainly deserves favourable notice, and no rigid rule can be applied to it. It is obvious that he went to Pakistan and stayed there for reasons of employment and for no other reasons. It does not seem to me right that, in cases where families have been separated by partition, we should enforce this separation and prevent them for joining each other merely because of a technical interpretation of the rule. Of course, this is subject to the individual concerned not being undesirable.

1. Note to the Commonwealth Secretary, MEA, 15 August 1956. JN Collection.

6. In the present case, the Home Ministry has agreed to the issue of a short-term visa for six months, which may be extended to a year. Personally, I will be inclined to give him a long-term visa. But, perhaps, for the present, a visa for, let us say, a year, might be granted to him, and the matter might be considered further later. It should not be said later that because a short-term visa has been granted to him, therefore he cannot get it extended or changed to a long-term one.

7. This matter has been in correspondence for some considerable time. The easiest course would be to grant him some kind of a visa while further consideration is given to this question.

8. You may send this note to the Home Ministry.

6. Grant of Diplomatic Passports[1]

I agree generally with your note.[2] We should have some kind of definite rules to guide us and to prevent doubt and confusion.

2. If diplomatic passports are given for special missions as to a head of a mission, then surely, it must be limited for that mission.[3] There is no reason why a person should get a diplomatic passport for a mission and should be allowed to use it for other purposes at other times.

3. I do not understand why wives and children should have diplomatic passports, unless they are covered by one passport.

4. The case of non-officials will always have to be considered separately, and it is not possible to lay down rules except to say that a non-official head of a delegation might have a diplomatic passport. Such cases will be rare, but they cannot be ruled out. They need not be mentioned in the list.

5. On the whole, I am inclined to think that we should be a little strict in making our list.

1. Note to S. Dutt, the Foreign Secretary, 16 August 1956. File No. 35-47/56-P.V. I, MEA.
2. Agreeing with C.S. Jha, Joint Secretary, that the government had not followed a uniform policy on diplomatic passports, Dutt wanted the procedure to be rationalized. He suggested the drawing up of a list of persons eligible for diplomatic passports to guide the passport office.
3. Dutt noted that, "according to international usage, holders of diplomatic posts are entitled to diplomatic passports as a matter of course."

7. To Lakshmi N. Menon[1]

New Delhi
August 20, 1956

My dear Lakshmi,[2]
You wrote to me on the 4th August about some rules which have been framed for the Indian Foreign Service, Branch B. In particular, you referred to sub clause iii(d) of clause 5, which says that "women candidates who are married will not ordinarily be eligible, but an exemption may be made in respect of those who are already serving in the Ministries or in the Missions abroad.

I entirely agree with you that we should avoid any discrimination on grounds of sex. We shall see that the rule is suitably amended to make it clear that there is no bar to the recruitment of married women.

But, in practice, we have found it difficult to find suitable posts for women in these Services, more especially in the subordinate positions in our Missions abroad. If they are married, the difficulty increases: either they have to be sent to some place and parted from their husbands or we must give up the idea of posting them in the normal course. They cannot be separated from their husbands. This is a real difficulty. Then, again, some unmarried women who had been taken into our Service, have married and left the Service. We have, as a matter of fact, allowed women who married while in Service to continue in service so long as the question of transfer does not arise.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. JN Collection.
2. President, All India Women's Conference.

8. Publicity of Prime Minister's Statements[1]

I agree with you.[2]

It is rare that I indulge in personal criticisms. But when I referred to what Mr Dulles said about Goa,[3] it was not a personal criticism, but the obvious reaction to an important public statement.

1. Note to S. Dutt, Foreign Secretary, 24 August 1956. File No. 32/28-XP(P)/57, MEA.
2. Ambassador G.L. Mehta wrote to Dutt on 7 July that Dulles had drawn his attention to the Indian Embassy's press release giving the text of Nehru's speech at a rally of Goans in Mumbai on 4 June 1956 in which he was mentioned by name. Dulles complained that the Embassy had issued a press release containing a critical reference to him, though he did not and could not object to Nehru having criticized him in the first place. Mehta suggested that the Embassy should be allowed to exercise its discretion in the presentation of publicity material that is sent from India. P.N. Haksar, Director, External Publicity Division, MEA, suggested, in his note of 18 August, that Indian Missions should publish only authentic texts of important statements of policy by the Prime Minister and other ministers. If, however, in the opinion of a Mission, publishing of a statement would cause offence to the government of a country, it would, in such circumstances, be better not to publish it at all rather than censor it or modify it. Dutt agreed with Haksar.
3. On 2 December 1955, Dulles issued a joint statement with Cunha, the foreign minister of Portugal, recognizing Goa as one of the "Portuguese provinces" in Asia. See also *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 31, pp. 423-426 and 428-433. For Nehru's speech of 4 June 1956, see *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 33, pp. 405-420.

9. To G.B. Pant[1]

New Delhi
August 26, 1956

My dear Pantji,
Maulana Saheb has spoken to me on two or three occasions about the issue of a passport to Muhammad Tayyib[2] of Deoband. The District Magistrate of Saharanpur is not in favour of it and says that he is a double starred CID history sheeter, a communist, a person of highly communal views and an active worker of the Jamiat-ul-ulema.[3] All this is slightly contradictory and this mixture of various matters rather takes away from the report of the District Magistrate. The fact that a man is an active worker of the Jamiat is certainly not against him, because we encourage the Jamiat. I doubt very much if he has anything to do with communism, but it is quite possible that he is rather communal.

It is said about him that he issued some kind of a statement or fatwa on the occasion of Bakr Id. Maulana points out that this was just a quotation from the Quran in which it was stated what was the value of various types of sacrifice.

Muhammad Tayyib wants to go, I believe, to East Africa and to Afghanistan to collect money for Deoband. Deoband depends on these contributions. It is not right for us, unless there are strong reasons to the contrary, to prevent him from going abroad for this purpose. There is some risk of his speaking ill of India. Even in regard to this matter, Maulana points out that things have changed somewhat. In the early days after the partition, many of these *moulvis* were communally inclined and rather pro-Pakistani, but that they have gradually adapted themselves to new conditions.

1. JN Collection.
2. Qari Muhammad Tayyib (1896-1983); Educator and administrator at Dar al-ulum, Deoband, in Saharanpur district, UP; its Pro-Vice Chancellor, 1924-29 and Vice-Chancellor, 1929-1983; founder President, All India Muslim Personal Law Board, 1973-1983; author of scores of books.
3. Nehru pointed out in his letter of 15 August 1956 to Maulana Azad that the district magistrate of Saharanpur had written "as recently as last month very strongly against the issue of such a visa to him. He is described both as a person of confirmed communal views, a pro-Pakistani and a rabid communist. It is stated that he even suggested raising batches of Muslims in India to help Pakistan in regard to Kashmir."

Maulana feels therefore that in the circumstances we should issue him a passport. I agree with him. In the balance, not to issue it will be worse than issuing it. I hope you agree.

I had sent the whole file to Maulana and it is after studying it that he spoke to me. I am now sending you the file.

Yours affectionately,
Jawaharlal

PRIME MINISTER'S HOUSE
NEW DELHI

11 - 8. 1956

Nan dear,

This Suez Canal business has become more and more difficult and we have been much troubled by it. I cannot understand the reason or logic of the military and other measures that the U.K. Powers have been taking. Do they want war? I hope we can still avert war even if it could do tremendous harm to both U.K. & France. In fact, they would not survive as first class powers. Egypt of course would suffer but it is already so backward in the scale that it does not matter much in this difference.

If U.K. Powers do not want war, then why put themselves in a position from which they cannot withdraw without great loss of prestige? Eden's handling was in astonishing bad taste and was in all their bad practices.

I am afraid we are up against a very

TO VIJAYALAKSHMI PANDIT

difficult questions. We deal with it officially but how to get behind the iron curtain in people's minds? We cannot help much unless there is some such mental contact apart from the official level. This applies to both sides — Egypt & the U.S. Yemen affairs to be put for difficult — Indeed it appears to be rather pleased that something else has come and pushed out, for the moment, the Algerian problem —

Dulles has sent me a message suggesting that I should go to the Bonn conference. I do not think I should go but there is a remote chance that later if my presence is considered really necessary, I might do. I do not think this will happen and I dislike the Conference will last more than a week.

10
PRESS CONFERENCE

1. National and International Issues[1]

Jawaharlal Nehru: I suggest that you might start off putting questions so that I need not waste your time talking about matters which perhaps might not interest you. I have, of course, plenty of things to talk to you about, mostly about what we are doing in India—our Five Year Plan, our Community Development Programme, our agricultural matters and so on. But inevitably we are dragged, almost against our will, into international matters and we have to play some part in them because no country can be isolated. I wish we could at least for a few years devote all our energy to solve our problems, of which, of course there will be no end. The mere fact that a country is developing means more and more problems; it is only a static country which tends to have few or no problems. Whatever our problems and virtues, we are not static today. Conditions in India are dynamic and therefore they lead to new problems daily. In so far as our Five Year Plans and other development schemes are concerned, we have a certain outlook but essentially we proceed by trial and error. Ours is no rigid doctrinaire approach. Naturally our main objective is to increase the wealth of the country, to raise standards of living, to lessen the distance between the wealthy and the poor, in fact to get rid of poverty and unemployment. These are our major objectives and we try to learn from others, although essentially we have to find our own methods of dealing with them. We have found by experience that merely trying to copy what is being done in some other countries, whether it is England or America or Russia, does not do us much good. Conditions are different, quite apart from philosophy or theory. So really we have to do some creative thinking based on our own experience of developments in India and we are learning from it. We are a little wiser than we were five years ago, a little more experienced and no doubt will be more experienced still, five years later. So that is the position in India and now it is up to you to ask me questions.

Question: [Inaudible]

JN: Well, first of all there appears to be a certain variety of opinion in the United States on this issue. And one does not quite know which opinion might be said to represent the official opinion of the United States. You will remember

1. Press Conference, India House, London, 6 July 1956. From AICC tapes, NMML.

that President Eisenhower put in a good word for what is called neutralism, I do not like the word neutralism. The word is normally used in wartime. There are belligerents and neutrals and the use of it in peace time itself denotes a kind of war mentality which we do not wish to encourage. But today's world of the great powers, there are two major groups having definite policies. It is true that we do not align ourselves with either group. What does that mean again? It means simply that we have an independent policy and we judge questions on their merits, naturally keeping in view our own broad outlook, our national interest and international interests and peace. And that we seek to maintain friendly relations with all countries. We may agree with some more than others.

So far as our entire political and economic structures are concerned, politically our structure is one largely derived from the parliamentary structure of the United Kingdom and we have every intention of adhering to it. We believe in democracy, we believe in individual freedom and liberty, we believe indeed that every individual is worthwhile and we cannot treat him merely as some peg in a hole. That is our broad outlook. At the same time necessarily following from that belief, we believe in economic betterment of every individual and in the removal of great distinctions between various groups and classes and a gradual approach to equal opportunities for all. This is our broad approach. In the economic field, we are faced with the question of developing India as rapidly as we can and raising standards of life. There are social forces which compel us to do that, which do not leave much choice. Now how are we to do that? That is dealt with in our Five Year Plans. Some of you might care to look at them when you have the chance. We have said that our broad objective is to work for a socialist pattern of society. We have deliberately used those phrases because we do not adopt any rigid doctrinaire pattern but something which will lead us to higher standards and progressive equality. In India today there are great disparities between the rich and the poor, bigger than in England. They cannot be removed by magic. It will take time. Nevertheless, we do not want to take a hundred years over it. We cannot afford to do that. We have to do it within a relatively brief period of time, may be ten years, fifteen years. Therefore in the circumstances quite inevitably the state has to play a great part in economic development and we have what is called the public sector that is, state enterprises, and the private sector, that is private enterprises, and most of the basic industries and the what might be called the strategic industries are reserved for the state sector and the private sector deals with vast fields though it is open to the state to start anything in that sector too. In fact the whole thing is considered not as two major divisions but as an integrated whole.

To come back to neutralism. Mr Dulles said he considered countries which

were neutral as verging on immorality.[2] You see the whole idea is, I suppose, dividing up the world between good and bad, and obviously if you have a clear choice you must choose the good or else, you inevitably belong to the evil group. I think that approach is not a happy approach at all. I doubt if any country is very good or totally bad. We try to be good as far as we can, we have our weaknesses, our failings, and specially in a democratic system, we have all kinds of groups and peoples, not all working for good, according to our thinking. So no country is totally good and no country is totally evil, just as no individual is totally good or totally evil. In wartime, there is a tendency, naturally, to consider your enemy as evil to be combated and crushed. Speaking rather philosophically I think that is not a good approach even in wartime. Certainly to take that war approach to peaceful times is I think not wise and does little good. After all there is great variety in the world. Even in my country, India, there is tremendous variety. The states of India differ in many ways of living, in food and clothing and so on. We have large tribal areas. If I started thinking of just one part of India as the good part and the rest not good, I get into trouble. We have given under our Constitution the vote to every single adult Indian, regardless of whether it is a man or woman, regardless of the property he possesses, regardless of, the education he possesses. It was, if you like a brave and rather risky adventure but there it is. And we have to treat them alike and not let any person feel that one part of India is superior to the other. We have been trained in India always to think of a variety of people and a variety of opinions and trying to have a certain unity of approach and outlook in spite of that variety. Now if that applies to India, much more does it apply to the wide world, with its tremendous diversity of historical background, thinking, philosophy of life, religions, habits etc. To say that we should all think alike is, well, I do not think it is at all feasible. It is not very democratic either. I think it is a totally undemocratic outlook to imagine that all people will agree with you. The essence of democracy is the opportunity you give to various minority groups to express their opinions and to convert others. That surely is the essence of democracy. I do submit for your consideration that in Mr Dulles's position there seem to be something which is opposed to the democratic way of life and the democratic philosophy. I would not dare to call anyone or any country, even those who are totally and absolutely opposed to our policies, immoral. I think that would take me into the religious and philosophical sphere. As I recently said somewhere, I am a pagan and I rejoice in being a pagan and a pagan's chief virtue is tolerance of opinion, and not to impose his opinion or religion or ways of life on others. I think that the pagan outlook is a

2. See *ante*, p. 276.

very democratic outlook. I venture to say that the countries that are not aligned are functioning in the real democratic way. They are not giving up their freedom of thinking and freedom of action. Aligned means a matter of regimentation. I object to the communist regimentation of individual or countries. I object equally to the non-communist regimentation of individuals or countries. Both are regimentation of different types and both are opposed to democracy as I conceive it. But apart from all these basic reasons, in the position in which we are today in the world, big changes are taking place. Almost everybody agrees that a major war is out of the question. If we rule out a major war, we must also rule out minor wars, because a minor war may lead to a major war. If we rule out a settlement or problems by war then necessarily we must settle them by peaceful methods. This means necessarily that we should not encourage what is called the cold war. If you rule out a major war, then what is the point of a cold war which merely keeps up tensions and prevents the solution of problems. I can understand, of course, that you cannot by some philosophical analysis wipe out fears and apprehensions. Let us deal with them and solve them step by step. Nobody can ask any country to give up its principles. But never lose your friendly approach.

Q: Does the Prime Minister feel that the objectives of the Conference which he has attended have been achieved largely?

JN: We discussed a large number of major problems and I think we profited by our discussions. The communique refer to the major problems, but not in detail. Broadly our thinking was alike, but in our national policies, there might be different approaches and so we had to express ourselves in that communique in a broad way. But I can assure you that the major problems were discussed.

Q: You said that your statement emphasizes the need to settle world problems peacefully. Could you say, Sir, as to when we can expect a solution of the Kashmir problem in similar manner?

JN: It is a long way to a solution of the Kashmir problem. Everyone who visits Kashmir can see that Kashmir is peaceful. I believe last year there were 50,000 tourists in Kashmir and 100,000 eyes could see what is happening in Kashmir. It is estimated that there will be more tourists this year. I recognize, of course, that there are some problems, notably, these concerning Pakistan, which should be dealt with in a friendly, peaceful way.

[Q: Could you please tell us something about your forthcoming talks with Marshal Tito and President Nasser?]

JN: I might tell you that it is rather accidentally that my meeting with both of them at Brioni was fixed. We had originally decided to have a private conference of our Heads of Missions abroad. We hold it in some place like Vienna, Geneva or Paris. We selected Yugoslavia this year but the whole idea of going there was to pay my respects to Marshal Tito. The conference in Yugoslavia could not take place because I was in a hurry to get back to India. But I had promised to see Marshal Tito. So we fixed up a day. Later I discovered that President Nasser was going to pay a visit to Yugoslavia at the same time. Naturally as he was there, we thought we would meet together. Well, as for the subjects we shall discuss every subject that we can think of, the subjects that interest Marshal Tito and President Nasser and subjects that interest me.[3]

Q: [The next question related to Cyprus.]

JN: In the last few days that we have been here, there has been a good deal about Cyprus in the newspapers. From that you have gathered and I have gathered that the problem is an exceedingly complicated one and that apart from other capitals, the Turkish Government and people have also strong views about it. The problem is complicated and it is a little difficult for me to give a positive and definite opinion as to what can be done straightaway. Naturally we believe in people having freedom and even hope that a satisfactory solution will be found.

Q: [The question related to China's membership of the United Nations.]

JN: I should have thought that our views were fairly well known. We are strongly and patently in favour of the recognition of the Government of People's Republic of China as the representative of the Chinese people in the United Nations. Remember this, it is not a question of admitting a new member. China is a member. The question is what is China? As you look at the map and know something about it, you can hardly say that some people of Formosa are China. Patently, it is not China, whatever else they may be. Their representing China in the United Nations, and the nearly 600 million people on the mainland not being represented in the United Nations seems to me basically wrong. It has nothing to do with my views or somebody else's views on China. After all, other

3. For Nehru's talks with Tito and Nasser, see *ante*, pp. 297-304.

Communist countries are represented in United Nations. The result is that in considering any major problem of the Far East, you are without the country which is the biggest and the most powerful in that particular area. Take a problem like disarmament. Other countries come to an agreement; China, a huge country with growing strength and power, is left out and is therefore not bound by any agreement. That is not a good thing for the rest of the world. I think it is obvious that so far as the Far East is concerned and the rest of the world is concerned, the inclusion of China in the United Nations is of high importance. I do not go about giving advice to other countries, excepting in so far we express our broad opinions on some subjects. I do not intend to be an adviser to anybody or mediator. We are a big country. We are struggling with our own large problems. We have no desire for so-called leadership anywhere. We want to bend all our energy to building up our own country. But naturally when we meet other friendly countries, we discuss problems, we express our opinions, we hear their opinions.

Q: [The question was about the concept of *Brahmacharya* developed in the Indian tradition.]

JN: I do not know if all members present here understood the question. *Brahmacharya* means celibacy and I do not quite see its relation to economic problems. According to the old Indian conception, life was divided into four parts. The first period was devoted to learning and growing up, and during this period a person should adopt *Brahmacharya*, celibacy. The next was the householder's stage when presumably, you were not celibate. Then came the third period when you played the elder and gave advice. And the fourth period was complete retirement and devotion to religion and other pursuits.

Q: [The question was about India's relations with Ireland.]

JN: We try to cooperate with all countries. We should be very happy indeed to have the cooperation of Ireland in the United Nations and elsewhere. I do not quite know what problems, you might have in mind. But I am not visiting Ireland to discuss any particular problem. It was a very old invitation and it so happened that when my proposed visit to see President Eisenhower in the United States fell through because the President was convalescing, I suddenly have five days at my disposal. I did not quite know what to do. I could not change the rest of my programme. And it struck me I might pay a visit to Ireland accepting the old invitation. I like Ireland, it is a beautiful country and I hope I shall also have two or three days rest there.

Q: [The question was about Goa.]

JN: The first thing to be clear about is, if Goa is in India. Some people seem to forget that part because Portuguese Government by a law, passed five years ago, suddenly called it Portuguese territory. How does India become Portuguese? It is beyond me. The Portuguese attitude appears to me unreasonable and illogical. There is nothing for me to say. One can argue with a country or an individual on matters bearing some relation to facts, but if a person came to me and talked to me as if he was still in the 15th century, I have no answer. We live in the 20th century and I suppose the 20th century is bound to win in a conflict with the 15th century. Let us look at the question of Goa. When the British became the dominant power in India they left little enclaves for the French and the Portuguese. Obviously they could not have been left there unless the British agreed, but they did not do any harm to the British, so they were left there. Now, we never contemplated at any time that India should be free but bits of India should not be free. We looked upon these enclaves as more or less similar to some of our petty Indian States which on the independence of India would inevitably come into independent India. We were considerably surprised that the French and Portuguese Governments thought differently. The French Government was at least reasonable. We could discuss the matter, and it took us a few years to come to an agreement. As you all know the French enclaves in India were transferred de facto first, and then de jure to the Republic of India. The Portuguese Government have taken up an attitude of not even talking to us about it. We opened negotiations to help in this process, but even after a year or two they did not talk to us. Meanwhile, we have to face very strong opinion within India. We did something which, I venture to say, few Governments could have done. We stopped these great popular movements at the height of their passion because a large number of our people who were without arms had been shot down in cold blood. They walked into Goan territory, they were just mowed down in cold blood. You might remember that many thousands had gone to prisons in Goa, Goans and others who are outside Goa, because there is a large population of Goans in Bombay and other places. All this is a continuous irritant to our people and yet we held them in check because we wanted the matter to be settled peacefully. Even now there are large number of people in prison there under very bad conditions. Most of them belong to what you will call the middle classes—doctors, engineers, writers—they have been there for years. In Goa itself there is some complete absence of what might be called freedom of expression or civil liberty. Not even a religious meeting can be held without permission; you have to tell them what you are going to say. Naturally, when they see that outside the confines of Goa, people enjoy much better freedom

and liberty, with the economic conditions improving, the people of Goa are not at all happy. I just cannot understand how any person, logically or reasonably, can support the Portuguese claim to Goa.

Q: [The question related to the Prime Minister's proposed visit to the Federal Republic of Germany.]

JN: Yes, I am going to Western Germany. Again, the topics for discussion would be both political and economic. Normally speaking we refrain from raising European problems which do not directly affect India. We are interested in the major problems that affect the world. It is not my intention to go to Germany to advise them what to do and what not to do. Broadly speaking I suppose most people agree that the German people would like to live together. The question is how this is to be brought about with goodwill among parties concerned.

Q: [The question related to India's requirement of foreign aid.]

JN: I think the best answer to your question has been given or attempted to be given in our Five Year Plans. Obviously when a country develops fairly rapidly, external resources are needed. If they are denied then the progress becomes slow. The type of external aid needed at this stage of India's development is very largely aid in plant and machinery. Obviously a very great burden has to be borne by India and the Indian people themselves. We recognize that and we would not have it otherwise. We do not want our people to feel that they are too dependent on others and therefore not make their biggest effort. Apart from our desire to achieve our objectives, we attach importance to the way that is done. We want our people to grow stronger, grow more self-reliant, grow independent. But it is perfectly true that external aid is desirable and is welcomed. In our Five Year Plan the total sum involved is about £ 3600 million or Rs 4800 crores. And we have calculated as to how much we can raise in India by taxation, and internal loans, how much we expect from external aid. Having calculated all that we still come to a deficit, I forget now exactly I would say about 500 million pounds for the five years, which we have to find. We may partly make it good, by tapping our internal resources, more partly by loans or otherwise. As for the country's approach, well thus far, our normal economic ties have been principally with the United Kingdom; secondly with the United States, thirdly with other countries in Europe. Those ties remain and we hope that they will be helpful. But we do not rule out any kind of aid from any other country, the principal condition being that there should no political strings attached to it. Perhaps you have in mind our recent dealings with the Soviet Union. Those dealings have consisted

chiefly in a major steel plant being built there by the Soviet Union. They have helped us built it, it is not aid as such. We pay for it. We are having three major steel plants, one by the Germans, one by Soviet Union and the other one by British, all state-owned plans. They are all business transactions, and it may be that we may have some other plant or machinery put up there by the Soviet Union. At the most, we may get credit on easier terms, a longer period on interest, or maybe slightly lower interest than we may have to pay elsewhere. This is the last question.

Q: [The question was about the arrest of Shaikh Abdullah.]

JN: I agree with you that it is very unfortunate that a man of Shaikh Abdullah's position should be in prison. I hope he will not be long there. It is really rather difficult for me to deal with the matter and the Kashmir state Government is fully autonomous government and the responsibility lies with that Government.

Thank you.

11
LETTERS TO CHIEF MINISTERS

I[1]

New Delhi
16 August, 1956

My dear Chief Minister,

I am attaching to this letter a somewhat belated note on my tour abroad in June-July last.

2. On the very day of my return to Delhi from my tour, I was faced with the resignation of a colleague, the Finance Minister. This was not entirely unexpected, as there had been some reference to it before I left Delhi, but to be faced with it on my arrival here was slightly disconcerting. I dislike parting with colleagues. If this has to be done, it should be done with grace and goodwill. Unfortunately both were lacking in the present instance.

3. I was charged by Shri C.D. Deshmukh with various sins of omission and commission and notably with bypassing the Cabinet in arriving at important decisions. It was not becoming for me to refer to Cabinet decisions in reply or to prolong this unseemly debate. But I might inform you that I referred this matter to my colleagues in the Cabinet subsequently and they were unanimously of opinion that Shri Deshmukh's charges were not justified. Apart from numerous discussions we had in the Cabinet about the States reorganization in all its aspects, the final draft Bill was placed before it on two occasions and passed. On both these occasions Shri Deshmukh was present.

4. He referred also to a much earlier matter, the decision about the formation of the Andhra State. This decision had been formally taken by the Cabinet even before Shri Deshmukh joined the Government. There was a reservation to it in regard to Madras city. The moment this difficulty was removed, the decision came into effect and I answered a question accordingly in Parliament.

5. It is possible that some minor decisions may be made by any Minister without particular reference to his colleagues in the Cabinet. As a matter of fact, it has been our practice here to refer every important matter to the Cabinet and in regard to other matters there is usually consultation between Ministers concerned. We have numerous Cabinet Committees at work. I have attached

1. File No. 25(30)/56-PMS. These letters have also been printed in G. Parthasarathi (ed.), *Jawaharlal Nehru: Letters to Chief Ministers, 1947-1964,* Vol. 4 (New Delhi, 1988), pp. 398-424. Apart from the letters printed in this section, Nehru also wrote two other letters to Chief Ministers on specific matters during the period covered by this volume. See *ante,* pp. 50-55 and 61-65.

great importance to this practice of frequent consultation, not only because of constitutional requirements but because I think it is essential for a Cabinet to work as a team and to be acquainted with what is happening. Indeed, you might remember that I have sometimes drawn the attention of Chief Ministers to this matter and suggested to them to have frequent consultations formally or informally with their colleagues.

6. For the time being, I have taken the Finance portfolio myself. I have the help of two Ministers of State, Shri M.C. Shah[2] and Shri A.C. Guha[3] as well as a Deputy Minister.[4] Nonetheless, it means an additional burden on me. This does not matter so much, but I am anxious that this important portfolio should have justice done to it and it is obvious that I cannot continue as acting Finance Minister for long. We have to face difficult problems in which Finance is intimately concerned. There is the rise in prices[5] and the possibility of inflation. There is nothing to be alarmed about this at present. But the greatest care has to be taken to prevent any untoward happening. Then there is the rapid depletion of our foreign exchange resources owing to large demands for machinery, etc.[6] All these are basic to our Plan and to our future progress and I seek your active and earnest cooperation in these matters.

7. I sent you a letter a few days ago about food production and drew your attention to the urgency of this question. It hurts me to see that our foreign exchange resources have to be spent in importing foodgrains.[7] And yet this has to be done because we lack them and can take no risk in this direction. But it is not merely a question of having just enough for our requirements. We have to increase our agricultural production even for purposes of export so that this may help us in adding to our resources. This is of vital importance.

2. Member of Rajya Sabha and Minister of State for Revenue and Civil Expenditure (Finance), 1954-57.
   Minister of State of Revenue and Defence Expenditure (Finance), 1954-57.
4. Bali Ram Bhagat (b. 1922); Congressman from Bihar; Member, Provisional Parliament, 1950-52, Lok Sabha, 1952-77, and 1980-84; Speaker, 1976-77; Parliamentary Secretary, 1952-55; Deputy Minister for Finance, 1956-63; Minister for Planning, 1963-66, for Defence, 1967, for External Affairs, 1967-69, 1985-86, of Foreign Trade and Supply, 1969-70, and for Steel and Heavy Industry, 1970-71; Governor, Himachal Pradesh, February-June 1993, and Rajasthan, 1993-98.
5. The wholesale price index, with 1939 as the base, rose from 376.0 in January 1956 to 404.2 in July 1956.
6. During the First Five Year Plan the net fall in the foreign exchange reserves was Rs 73.12 crores. There was also a fall in sterling balances.
7. Later, on 20 August, the Lok Sabha passed supplementary demands totalling Rs 89.65 crores of which Rs 80.48 crores were for additional import of foodgrains.

8. Of the many things that have happened in India during the past three weeks, three are perhaps the most important. There has been with us the States Reorganization Bill dealing with a matter which has led to so many upheavals in some parts of the country. There is, in foreign affairs, the Suez Canal issue[8] which has suddenly confronted the world with a dangerous crisis. Today the London Conference must have met and we should know in a few days the result of this Conference. The third matter is of no immediate significance but of great importance for our future. That is the production of atomic energy in India — the first time in Asia.[9]

9. I shall not write here much about the Suez Canal issue. What I write might well be out of date by the time you get this letter. But, you will observe that, whether we wish it or not, a heavy burden has again fallen upon us, and many countries look to us for help in finding a peaceful solution. We have sent a strong team to the London Conference, led by Shri V.K. Krishna Menon. Apart from his great ability, he has a remarkable capacity for dealing with situations of this kind. It was partly due to his efforts that success came in the Geneva Conference on Indo-China and in the earlier Korean negotiations. But, we must realize that this is far the most difficult task that we have undertaken in international affairs.

10. In the relatively brief history of our Parliament, there have been no such dramatic developments as in the case of the States Reorganization Bill. Upto the 2nd August, we were fully committed to the Bill as originally framed, that is, separate States of Maharashtra and Gujarat and centrally administered Bombay State. Rather suddenly, on the 2nd August, some private Members of Parliament, without distinction of party, got moving. This kind of thing is very unusual in any Parliament and, while I respect the initiative of private Members, I am not sure that this business of getting signatures is a wholesome one. Nonetheless, I must admit that, on this occasion, it yielded rich results and created a situation which the Government could not ignore. Indeed, we did not wish to ignore it either, because it was in line with our own thinking. Our only difficulty had been the lack of agreement among the parties concerned. And so, within a few days, this major change was made, debated and passed by the Lok Sabha. At the conclusion of the third reading, there was not even one dissentient voice raised. That was an extraordinary culmination of the fierce and angry debates and all the upheavals and riots that had taken place during the past many months.

11. I have no doubt that this was a right solution and there was a sign of relief

8. See *ante*, pp. 318-375.
9. See *ante*, p. 210.

not only in Parliament but in many parts of the country, as if a burden had been lifted.

12. We were a little premature, however, in our rejoicing, and in Ahmedabad especially and in some other parts of Gujarat, trouble flared up. Some dissatisfaction, some demonstrations were to be expected. But, for rioting on a major scale and arson, none was prepared. It was peculiarly distressing that this strong and disciplined province of Gujarat, with its long traditions so intertwined with Gandhiji and historic movements, should fall a prey to this crude violence.

13. This particular phase will pass, but every thinking person in India must be wondering in what direction we are going. In Ahmedabad, the vast body of textile workers kept away from rioting and violence. It was apparently mainly the students who took the lead. What exactly has happened to our young men and young women that they should act in this distressing way? There are, of course, people who exploit and encourage this. But there must be some deep malaise for this kind of thing to occur. We talk of indiscipline, but the gravest of all indisciplines is emotional indiscipline which upsets the balance of the individual. We have seen in India these emotional upheavals and, what is worse, we have seen them take to violence.

14. Able observers from abroad have visited India recently and given us their appraisals of our work. We have had the Appleby Report, to which I would draw your particular attention, the Wilson[10] Report[11] about our community projects and national extension service and many other reports. In foreign countries there is a keen and vivid interest in India's development plans as well as in India's role in international affairs. What is all this worth to us if we lack confidence in ourselves and have no standards of behaviour?

15. Most intelligent observers tell us that the next five or ten years are of vital importance to India and, in a sense, to the world, because India will make a difference to the world. If we do not make good during this period, we go down. We are no longer carrying on a static existence at a low level. There is a dynamism in India, and we are playing for high stakes, to win or lose. At no time in India's

10. M.L. Wilson (1885-1969); US agricultural economist and administrator; Under Secretary of Agriculture, 1934-40; Director of extension work, 1940-54; author of *Comments on Community Development in India —Report of a Survey* (Delhi, 1956).

11. The report stated: "A great deal of social invention and new creative thinking has gone into the movement in India," and hoped that "people's programme" would take over the "administered government programme." It appreciated the work of Block Development Officers and hoped that the individual farmer would understand the cooperative idea and participate freely in the democratic process.

history was a concentrated and cooperative effort and a spirit of dedication more necessary than today.

16. Two years or so ago, when the Congress passed the Avadi resolution on a socialist pattern of society,[12] and Parliament also accepted this objective, there was the infusion of a new life in the country. Then came the question of States reorganization and suddenly all the evil hidden in our hearts came out and took possession of us, blinding us and leading us to wrong action. We stood out before ourselves and the world as narrow and parochial minded, caste-ridden people who were unworthy of what we had ourselves proclaimed.

17. Perhaps, it was as well that this happened and this hidden evil came out. If it was in us, as it was, then it has to come out some time or other. Have we exorcized this spirit of evil and got rid of it or does it still possess us?

18. There is the distant noise of approaching elections, and candidates and aspirants are preparing for the contest. Elections make a difference. In our democratic set up, they are important and have to be taken seriously. But, far more important than elections is the spirit of the country and the mind and heart of the growing generation which will represent this country in the future. Far more important are the ideals which we proclaim and the faith and hard work that we put in for their realization. Far more important are the standards of behaviour that we maintain.

19. We live in a period of historic happenings in our country and in the world. Do we realize this tremendous opportunity and responsibility and try to raise ourselves up to that high level? Whether we like it or not, a high destiny has caught us in its grip. We may master it and shape it to our will, or fail and prove ourselves false to the opportunity that came to us.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

12. For Nehru's draft of the resolution on a socialist pattern of society passed at the Avadi session of the Indian National Congress in January 1955, and his speech on the resolution, see *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 27, p. 255 and pp. 279-283.

Enclosure

I am writing this note on Independence Day, August 15, 1956. It is just a little over three weeks since I returned to India[1] after a month's tour abroad. These three weeks have brought so many developments, both within the country and outside, that my tour is already old history and I feel a little reluctant to write about it. In any event, I cannot write in such detail as I had at first intended. Not to write some brief record of this very interesting and instructive visit of mine to European and other countries would probably not be right.

2. I am therefore drawing your attention here to a few salient facts. The main purpose of my visit abroad was to attend the Prime Ministers' Conference in London. Gradually other engagements were fixed up. On my way to London, I stopped for a day at Damascus. On my way back to India I spent a day in Beirut, the capital of Lebanon. These visits to Syria and Lebanon were very brief, but they were worthwhile and they gave me a picture of these two small but important Arab countries, both steeped in old history. I had the opportunity to meet the leaders of these countries and to have fairly long talks with them.

3. Among the other countries I visited, were West Germany, a brief day in Paris, a day in Yugoslavia and a day in Cairo. The last place was visited on my way back.

4. I was to have gone to the United States to see President Eisenhower but this had to be postponed owing to the President's illness. This change in my programme at the last moment gave me four or five extra days. I utilized them to pay a visit to Ireland,[2] which had been long overdue.

5. In the course of this month's tour, I thus visited a wide assortment of countries and came in contact with leading statesmen who were playing an important part in world affairs today. My brief visit to Damascus and Beirut brought to my mind long vistas of past history. Damascus is supposed to be one of the oldest cities of the world. In that respect, it is a rival of Banaras. Thousands of years of history lie buried there, under its sands and in the memories of men. So, also, with Beirut where one can see layer upon layer of civilization existing for a while and then passing away, giving place to another. Armies and proud conquerors have passed this way from Asia to Europe and Europe to Asia. Here, for hundreds of years, Christendom fought Islam during the Crusades and, ultimately, acknowledged defeat. Indeed, the Crusades brought the rather backward European countries of those days into touch with the more cultured people of Western Asia.

1. On 23 July 1956.
2. From 7 to 11 July 1956.

6. In Damascus stands a great mosque which was a great Christian cathedral before Islam came. There lies buried Saladin or Salah al-din, the Moslem hero of the Crusades. There also is a tomb supposed to be that of John the Baptist. In Damascus, there is still a road named "The Street called Straight" which is referred to in biblical history. So, as I flew over these tracts of Western Asia and halted for a brief while at Damascus and Beirut, the panorama of ages long past came before me, and I had a sensation that past was not quite dead. It impinged on the present, even though the present was so different. As in India, there is a curious combination and overlapping of the past and the present with dreams of the future. Just as the bullock cart is as much a part of India today as the railway train or the aeroplane, so also many ancient relics continue in these Arab countries of Western Asia together with modern factories and buildings and ways of life. But it is not merely in the external sense that old and new combine and intermingle in India and in these Arab countries.

The texture of life itself and the mind of man in our country, as in these Arab countries, is also a part of this curious mixture,which is somewhat deeper than the externals of civilization. Some people may argue that these relics of the past are just evidence of backwardness. Probably, they are so to a large extent. Perhaps, also, there is something else about them, which is not easy to grasp. With the coming of industrilization in full flood, most of those relics will disappear, in so far as external evidence is concerned. Will the texture of man's mind also change in the same way in our country and in these regions? I do not know. In any event, these conflicts of past and present, the interplay of forces and movements, the ferment in men's minds, were fascinating phenomena for me. They exist of course, in India, but we are used to them more or less in our own country. In a somewhat different context and environment, they strike one with greater force.

7. These two small Arab countries, Syria and Lebanon, are probably more advanced intellectually and in physical standards than the other Arab countries. Cairo, the capital of Egypt, is of course a great Arab intellectual and cultural centre. Even so, Damascus and Beirut hold their place and have a tradition of scholarship and great universities. Indeed from both Syria and Lebanon, vast numbers of their citizens have migrated in the past, chiefly when these countries were under Turkish rule, to North and South America. There are, I believe, more Lebanese and Syrians outside these countries than there are in them. Large numbers of engineers, doctors, and the like go from Lebanon now to Saudi Arabia and perhaps other Arab countries. Lebanon is a very attractive little country, offering a variety of climate, from the warm seaside to snow-covered mountains which can be reached in two or three hours' drive. And so, one can

bathe in the sea and, after three or four hours' travel, have winter sports.

8. In both these countries, the question of Palestine or Israel was almost the dominant issue. It was quite extraordinary to see the passion over this issue. Half the population of Lebanon is Christian, the principal Christian sect being the Maronites. But these Christian Arabs were, if anything, even more anti-Israel than the Moslem Arabs. The President[3] of Lebanon, a highly accomplished person, spoke to me quietly, but with concentrated anger and dislike, of Israel. This dislike could hardly be due to religion. It seemed to me that there was an element of economic rivalry, so far as Lebanon was concerned. Beirut is a great mercantile city, and there was probably a fear there that the growth of Israel might come in its way.

9. From Damascus we flew to Athens and Rome for refuelling, passing over the Acropolis of Athens and the Colosseum and other ancient buildings of Rome. The illusion of the past remained, the past wherein lay the roots of European culture. The Mediterranean had been the link between these past civilizations of Europe and Western Asia. The spread of the Ottoman Empire had resulted in breaking the links between these Mediterranean regions of the East and West, and in later years the Arab areas suffered much under Turkish rule and became very backward. As I have said above, large numbers of Arabs from Syria and Lebanon migrated to foreign countries in those days. It was only at the end of the First World War that this Arab world came out of the Turkish sphere and new movements began to work there which led, after some conflicts with Western countries, to independence. Even now there is Israel, in the heart of the Arab country, unabsorbed and unaccepted by these neighbouring States and a source of continuous trouble to that region. Both on the side of Israel and the Arabs there is passion and uncompromising attitudes. There is no doubt that Israel is industrially and scientifically a fast developing country, small as it is. At the same time it is difficult to imagine how it can function satisfactorily if walls of hostility surround it. The Arabs today refer casually to the Crusades and say that they are prepared to wait. Ultimately, even without major war, they will squeeze out Israel. Whether they really believe in this or not, I do not know. I rather doubt it, and they are probably prepared for some compromise on the lines of exchange of some patch of territory and compensation for the refugees. On this question of territorial change Israel is adamant. The whole question of course is tied up with wider international problems and it must be remembered that the

3. Camille (Nimer) Chamoun (1900-1987); President of Lebanon, 1952-58; leader of Liberal Nationalist Party from 1958; Minister of Interior, 1975-76, of Foreign Affairs, 1976, of Finance, 1984-85.

United States of America and even to some extent the United Kingdom are rather inclined towards Israel. The Soviet Union in recent months has shown favour to the Arabs.

10. And so to the Commonwealth Conference in London. There was nothing unusual about this. I found, however, a feeling of unease among some people in England and more so among the Australians and the New Zealanders at the Conference about the present functioning of the Commonwealth. They said that it was too loose and that something should be done to give it a greater coherence. The Prime Minister[4] of Australia wrote some articles on this subject in the London *Times*.[5] But this subject was not pursued. Most people realized that any such effort might well lead to the breaking up of the Commonwealth as it is today. Apart from Asian countries, South Africa was entirely opposed to this. There was no discussion on this issue in the Conference itself.

11. I found that the visit of Mr Bulganin and Mr Khrushchev to London had evidently made an impression. Oddly enough this impression was greatest on Prime Minister Eden and some of his other Ministers. Partly because of this visit, Sir Anthony Eden recognized that significant changes had taken place and were taking place in the Soviet Union as well as in the East European Communist countries. To some extent, he agreed with us on this appraisal and this was reflected in the joint communique issued by the Conference at the end.[6] This was in a sense a major issue because on this proposal depended much else. I might add that Mr Bulganin and Mr Khrushchev's visit to England influenced them also considerably. I think that they were rather surprised to see the high standards of life there generally and the vast number of automobiles in the streets. But, more than this, it made them feel a little more friendly, or a little less unfriendly, to the British Government. Unfortunately, the Labour Party of Britain did not participate in this slight coming together.

12. In a vague kind of way, India's influence was felt in the deliberations of the Conference. This made not only some difference to the communique at the end but, to some extent, influenced the thinking of others present.

13. My visit to Ireland took me to an entirely different world, different from the travails and ferments of both Europe and Asia. Somehow I passed out of the present age to a period of a generation or more ago. Ireland was peaceful,

4. Robert Gordon Menzies.
5. On 11 and 12 June 1956.
6. The communique issued on 6 July welcomed the Soviet decision to reduce armed forces and her willingness and expressed desire to increase contacts and improve relations with other countries.

soothing, almost soporific. It was a good place for me to have a little rest. The Government and people were extraordinarily friendly, more especially the President,[7] whose guests we were. But almost all our talk was about the Rising of 1916 and the Civil War of the early twenties. Also of the experiences and incidents and conflicts of prison life. These were subjects in which we fitted in easily with our own experiences of conflict and prison. After having to face the difficult problems of today in India or in Europe, our Five Year Plans, the rivalry between two great blocs of nations, political issues and economic issues, suddenly we were transported to a dreamy world of the past. This does not mean that Ireland has not got its problems today. Of course, they have their economic problems and difficulties and the biggest thing of all is the continuing depopulation of Ireland. The Irish people are very prolific. Each family produced at least half a dozen or more children. But large numbers migrate continuously to America or to England or to Australia or some other country and many make good there. This is one of the present-day headaches of the Irish leaders.

14. After this Ireland, living still in an earlier part of this century, we came up suddenly against Western Germany of today. Here was bustle and activity, hard thinking and hard work. Within the few years after the War, they had rebuilt their cities which had been grievously damaged by bombing. They had spread out their industries and absorbed about nine million displaced persons who had come from East Germany or Poland or Czechoslovakia. Indeed, in spite of this vast influx, there was actually a lack of manpower in Germany and they had to bring a hundred thousand Italians for road-building. One could not but admire the tremendous energy, ability and discipline of the German race. Twice defeated in war and suffering enormous loss and damage, here they were again vital, confident and advancing. There are very few countries in Europe with that abundant vitality and confidence which we find in Western Germany.

15. Almost everywhere that I went, but more especially in Western Germany, there was deep interest in what was happening in India. During the past two or three years there has been a marked change in outlook in regard to India. There is a definite belief in these countries that India is making good and is well set on the way to industrial progress. Because of this belief, there is a keener desire than ever before for closer association with India in this business of industrialization. Both political and economic reasons make these countries look towards India and try to find ways of cooperation. In Germany, the greatest interest was taken in our Second Five Year Plan. I exhausted all the copies I had of it and there were demands for more. The Federal Government appointed a

7. Sean Thomas O'Kelly, President of Ireland.

special Governmental committee to examine our Second Five Year Plan to find out how they could cooperate and help. They offered to build for us a technological institute in India and 600 to 700 scholarships of various kinds were also offered.

16. The official policy of the Federal Government of Germany of international affairs is, broadly speaking, opposed to ours. I had long and frank talks with Chancellor Adenauer and his colleagues. We did not convince each other, but I think we did influence each other to some extent and certainly we understood each other. Chancellor Adenauer struck me as an impressive figure. Eighty years old, he was fit and straight. His face, rather shrunken, looks like an old lion's. A day or two after I had left Germany, he came out with a statement approving of our Five Principles of Panchsheel, much to the surprise of many Germans who did not expect this from him.

17. The popular welcome that I got in Western Germany was greater than in any other country I visited on this occasion. The crowds in the streets were friendly and sometimes they waited long hours along the route I was to pass. This was especially so in Hamburg which was a city with a peculiar flavour of its own. It is a Free City with very special privileges. Being a port and a great mercantile centre, its outlook on the wide world was somewhat more cosmopolitan. The Mayor was in effect something like the Chief Executive or the Chief Minister of that City State. His Rathaus or Corporation building was a magnificent old palace.

18. I had mentioned the change in the approach of several Western countries towards India. There was no sentiment behind this, although there were sentimental people about. It was a hard-headed appraisal of the situation and a desire to be associated with a country that was advancing rapidly and would have influence in the world. Partly it was due to the success of our foreign policy, but even more so, I think, to the success of our First Five Year Plan. To a slight extent also there was a feeling that with China having gone Communist, India offered some hope to stem the tide of Communism in Asia. Therefore, these countries of the West rather opened out to India. But there was the difficulty still of getting any financial help in the shape of loans, etc., from them. In the Communist countries of Eastern Europe, which I did not visit this time, the desire to be associated with India is even greater for a variety of reasons. As there are no large private industries there, there is no question of patents or secret devices or knowhow. They are very ready to share with us what they know, more so than the Western European countries.

19. From Hamburg we travelled to Paris and spent a day there. Algeria was of course the principal topic of discussion, apart from the general European and world situation. It seemed to me that under pressure of events, the French

Government had gone fairly far in accepting the suggestions we had made.[8] They accepted the idea of ceasefire and negotiations with the Algerian nationalist leaders. It is true that they wanted to give a few knockout military blows to the Algerians before they sat down at a conference table. And so, while they expressed a wish for negotiations, they did not go too far in that direction and wanted the other side to take a step or two. It is possible that the other side would have done that. Indeed our proposals were accepted by one eminent leader[9] of the Algerian nationals and the others were to some extent prepared to do so. Neither side wanted to appear as the weaker and to make definite offers. There the matter stood when we came to Egypt on our way back. Colonel Nasser and his colleagues agreed to pass on our advice to the Algerian leaders and there was some hope of progress.

20. But, all this has now been shattered by the developments in connection with the Suez Canal. One might almost think that the French Government, sitting on the horns of a terrible dilemma, was happy at this Suez Canal development because it relieved them of the pressure of the Algerian problem. Even when I was in Paris, I found Premier Mollet and Foreign Minister Pineau very anxious about the whole future of North Africa. Algeria, though very important, became part of the larger picture of French Dominions and influence in North Africa, including a vast region in Central Africa under the French. Part of this is very rich and has uranium. Some speeches of Colonel Nasser about the Arab world had rather frightened the French Government and, I suppose, to some extent, even the British Government. M. Pineau talked with some excitement about Colonel Nasser's wanting to build up an Arab Empire.

21. From Paris, we went to Brioni,[10] a lovely little island in the Adriatic Sea. And there we met President Tito and President Nasser. We had long talks. President Tito told us of his visit to the Soviet Union[11] and the very favourable

8. In a statement in the Lok Sabha on 22 May 1956, Nehru made five suggestions to resolve the conflict in Algeria. See *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 33, pp. 481-483. On 20 August 1956, in answer to a question in the Lok Sabha whether there was any change in the French policy towards Algeria as a result of his suggestions, Nehru said: "Without formally accepting or rejecting those suggestions, the French Government at that time did move towards two things, ceasefire and negotiations, which were the main points suggested by us. So also the other side. But, unfortunately, other things have supervened now like the Suez Canal crisis which have diverted attention from this issue."
9. Messali Hadj, the leader of a major group of Algerian nationalists.
10. On 18 and 19 July 1956.
11. Tito visited the Soviet Union from 2 to 23 June 1956.

impressions that he had brought of the great changes taking place there. Evidently he had been greatly influenced. He hinted at some inner conflict among the top circles of the Soviet Union, that is, between Bulganin, Khrushchev and Mikoyan[12] on the one side and some other top-ranking leaders on the other. Bulganin and Khrushchev represented the new and more liberal urge. Others still clung to a more Stalinist position. President Tito was all for encouraging this liberal trend of Bulganin and Khrushchev as well as similar developments in Poland, Czechoslovakia and other East European countries. In Poland, a little while before, had occurred the Poznan riots.

22. I had looked upon my visit to Brioni as rather a friendly call with a view to talks with President Tito and President Nasser about recent developments. But both Yugoslavia and Egypt had publicized this meeting of us three as a major event in world politics, with the result that about two hundred foreign correspondents had gathered there. They had little to do and were much disappointed. In drafting our joint communique, there was no major difficulty, but there was a tendency on the part of Yugoslavia and Egypt with which I did not wholly agree, to bring in slogan-like phrases and sometimes rather strong expressions of opinion. However, we came to an agreement about the wording of the communique which was subsequently published.[13] I doubt if anyone of us three quite liked that wording as it finally emerged, but that usually happens where a middle way is sought between various opinions.

23. I should like to add here that both in Germany and in France, there was a good deal of vague apprehension about the new colossus, China. They were thinking more of the future than of the present. What was going to happen with this huge country, with a tremendous and ever growing population, when it becomes industrialized? Even now, it had a population of nearly six hundred millions. In twenty years' time, this figure was expected to reach nearly one thousand millions. This was rather a terrifying prospect. Chancellor Adenauer and M. Pineau both told me of the impressions they had got in Moscow that all was not well between the Soviet Union and China. They did not mean that there was any present conflict, but rather that there was an apprehension in the Soviet Union about what China might be like and might do in the future.

12. A.I. Mikoyan, First Vice-Chairman, Council of Ministers, USSR.
13. For Nehru's draft of the communique, see *ante*, pp. 304-307.

24. As we were leaving Brioni, we heard about the American refusal of aid to Egypt for the Aswan Dam. We did not talk about it much there. In Cairo, in the course of our talks with President Nasser and his colleagues, some reference was made to the Aswan Dam. I gathered the impression that Egypt was going to give up this project for the present. In fact, I casually mentioned that it might be more advantageous for them to have a large number of smaller projects, yielding quicker results, than one mighty project which absorbed all their resources and did not yield any results for ten years or more. Colonel Nasser appeared to agree with me. There was no reference whatsoever to the Suez Canal. I left Cairo on the morning of the 21st July. It was, I think, on the 26th July that the announcement about the nationalization of the Suez Canal was made. I have little doubt that, while I was in Cairo, Colonel Nasser had not thought of this. He had been away for nearly ten days previously in Yugoslavia and, indeed, the question could not arise till the American refusal to give aid for the Aswan Dam.

25. And so, I left Cairo and after a brief stay at Beirut, we landed on Indian soil at Jamnagar, on the 22nd July evening. The next day, we reached Delhi in the forenoon, full of impressions of this changing and dynamic world.

26. I might add as a kind of postscript that, on my way to London, our aircraft stopped for refuelling at Athens and Rome. At Athens, I met the Prime Minister[14] and the Foreign Minister[15] at the airport and had an hour's talk with them. At Rome also, I met some Ministers. The Athens talk was largely concerned with the Cyprus issue. I chiefly listened to them. They gave me to understand that they were sure they could satisfy the Turks. I told them, if that was so, the major hurdle would be removed and a settlement ought not to be difficult. As it turned out later, the Turks took up a very difficult and a very rigid line.[16] This encouraged the British to adopt a stiff attitude.

27. Cyprus, for the British, was a symbol of their retaining some position and influence in the Middle Eastern region. It was also some kind of an assurance about their continuing to get oil, though why it was so considered I have not understood. Oil had suddenly become (or perhaps, this line of thinking began

14. Constantine Karamanlis, Prime Minister of Greece.
15. Evanghelos Averoff.
16. On 30 June, the Turkish Prime Minister stated that their negotiations with Britain on the future constitutional status of Cyprus had failed. During the negotiations, Turkey refused to accept any new status for Cyprus. Subsequently, on 12 July, Britain set up a Commission to consider the framing of a new constitution for Cyprus.

with Abadan and Mossadeq[17] in Iran) a vital issue in British thinking, something on which their entire future depended. This fact has to be remembered in order to understand the violent reactions to Egypt's nationalization of the Suez Canal. Suddenly, the British people and the French felt that their entire future was imperilled. They would be starved out, their industries ruined, and they would sink into insignificance in world affairs. The act of nationalization was the first major step to this end and this was likely to be followed by others. It was as if someone had put his hands on their throats and was strangling them. They were trying to recover their breath and to release themselves from the stranglehold. This was the reaction to the Suez Canal nationalization. The reaction was unjustified and the military and like steps taken by these two powers were foolish, because they could do them no good and they might even bring ruin upon them. Of course, it was true that because of various factors, there is a progressive elimination of British and French influence in Asia and Africa. They saw this as something vastly bigger than it was in the present and something that endangered their very existence. I have mentioned this so that it might help us to understand these powerful reactions, especially in the United Kingdom and France.

New Delhi
August 15, 1956
Independence Day

Jawaharlal Nehru

17. The Abadan refinery, the largest in the world at the time, stood idle as a result of the nationalization of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company's installations by Muhammad Mossadeq, Iranian Prime Minister, 1951-53.

II

New Delhi
26 August, 1956

My dear Chief Minister,

The States Reorganization Bill has been passed by Parliament.[1] This long journey has ended so far as Parliament is concerned and now we have to implement these decisions. I earnestly hope that this will be done with as great a measure of cooperation as possible.

2. During these last ten or eleven months, ever since the report of the Commission came out, we have seen many extraordinary happenings in various parts of India. There has been much violence on the part of the public and there has been sometimes shooting at violent crowds by the police. Many of us have criticized this violence and pointed out how it undermines the whole conception and structure of a democratic government.

3. That is so, of course, and yet, at the same time, it is not enough for us merely to lay down high principles and not seek to understand these rather alarming developments. Governments, engrossed in their activities, lose touch with the people and then are surprised at some reaction. A popular government cannot afford to live in its secretariats and offices. It has to be in direct touch with the people and constantly to explain to them its own problems and measures and get their reaction. I fear that we do not attach enough importance to these contacts with the public.

4. We must always remember that there is a gap between one generation and another. Even in relatively static periods, there is some gap. In periods of transition and great change in the political or economic structure, the gap is much greater. In Europe and elsewhere, there have been vast changes during the last forty years or so, because of two great World Wars. The new generation in Europe is vastly different from the pre-War generations or even the generation between the two Great Wars. They are different in their thinking, in their approach to life and its problems.

5. I mention this because I find there is not enough realization in our country of this fact of a new generation thinking along its own lines and, to some extent, being rather disdainful of the older generation. This applies to the better type of the new generation which thinks; so far as others are concerned, the gap is still bigger, because it is the result not of thinking but just the reaction to events. In

1. The Bill was passed by the Lok Sabha on 10 August and by the Rajya Sabha on 25 August. It received the President's assent on 31 August 1956.

India today one of the most striking features is this distance between people of our generation and the students in the schools and colleges. We live in different worlds of thought and feeling. And so, we do not affect each other as normally we should. There are, of course, other reasons too—the quality of our education, the fall in standards both among the teachers and among the students, the change-over in the medium of instruction which has led often to this fall in standards, the progressive lessening of the influence of English which was a certain unifying factor as well as a window to the world of thought outside India, the reaction after independence had been gained, and the lack of personal experience of the younger generation of our struggle for freedom.

6. Anyhow, the problem before us is not solved by our declaiming against it or against any people. We have to understand it in so far as we can and then try to deal with it. Mere strong expressions of opinion only irritate others instead of influencing them.

7. In the troubles we had recently in various parts of India, culminating in Gujarat and Ahmedabad, one fact has stood out: a public demonstration is held; this tends to become violent; the violence grows and there is arson and stone-throwing; there is conflict with the police; there is firing by the police resulting in the deaths of a few persons and in injury to many others. Often the persons who have died are quite innocent; sometimes a woman or child dies. As soon as this happens, popular sentiment gets greatly excited, not so much because of the original cause, but because of the firing and the deaths of apparently innocent people. There is much more violence then, more conflicts with the police. And so this vicious circle goes on creating conflict and bitterness and a wall between the Government and administration on the one side and the people on the other.

8. This has been a story often repeated in various parts of India. It is a bad story, bad from the point of view of the people and of the Government. We may argue about it and defend what Government has done, but that does not take away from the badness of it. We shall have to find out some other way of dealing with a situation like this. Of course, this should not happen when there is close contact and understanding between administration and the people. But there are anti-social and other forces which can nevertheless make breaches in that contact or incite people to violent behaviour. If we respond to that violence by violence on the part of the Government, we play into the hands of those who want trouble and we widen the gap between Government and the people. Where firing takes place and deaths, there is an immediate and powerful reaction among people of all kinds against Government, even though the firing might be justified.

9. Recent cases have occurred where there was an enquiry into some incident of firing by the police. Often the enquiry has led to a finding that the firing was

not justified. Whenever police firing takes place, there is a demand for an enquiry. It seems obvious to me that there can be profitable enquiry into occurrences such as took place in Bombay, because that was more in the nature of a widespread revolt than some individual case of firing. But, normally, it seems to me desirable, there should be an enquiry. Even in the interests of the police, it seems desirable because otherwise they are inevitably condemned in the public mind.

10. But far more important than this is to avoid the firing. We cannot say that under no circumstances must there be firing, because sometimes there can be no choice about it and not to do this is to yield a city to violent and disorderly elements and abdicate the function of Government. At the same time, I have a feeling that there has been far too often a recourse to firing by the police than there need have been. Our police appear to be becoming rather too much trigger-conscious. In most countries the police do not even have rifles and their chief function is the regulation of traffic, etc., or to deal with criminals. This kind of repeated conflict between the police and the people generally is very bad from the point of view of both, and each begins to look on the other as the enemy. Where firing takes place and deaths, an added element of extreme bitterness comes in. The police suffer, of course, but so does also the Government. After all, none of us who are Ministers likes this kind of thing and every report of such firing distresses us, more especially when young men and women are the victims of it.

11. A practical consideration is that, in effect, the result of that firing is actually to inflame the populace and make conditions worse. It may be that the immediate situation is controlled by firing, but this leads to other and worse situations later. Therefore, the principal object of the firing is not usually obtained and we get into a quagmire of conflict and violence.

12. I feel, therefore, and I am sure you will agree with me, that we must examine this matter carefully and issue strict injunctions to our police not to use firearms, except under the gravest danger. It should be pointed out to them that we do not approve of the use of the firearms and we shall examine each case very strictly. I can imagine a case like the burning of the High Court building at Indore when firing had to be resorted to,[2] or some other cases of widespread arson or individual killing that may be going on which has to be met in this way, as there is no other way. But, broadly speaking, we must try to put an end to firing by the police and the strictest injunction should be issued in regard to it.

2. On 21 July 1954, following incidents of rioting and incendiarism at the High Court premises at Indore, the police resorted to firing wherein eight persons were killed and thirty injured.

The police can use their batons or lathis, though even that should be done in moderation. They can use tear gas bombs where considered necessary. But let us try to put an end to this vicious circle of firing and killing which leads to such disastrous results.

13. It is difficult to frame specific rules. Existing rules, in a sense, are clear enough. The question is of their implementation and how they are understood. It is in this matter that we can perhaps help in explaining the situation very clearly to our magistrates and police officials and they should be asked to explain it to the lower officers and others. I hope that you will take some steps to this end.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

12
MISCELLANEOUS

1. To Lady Mountbatten[1]

Camp: Aclare House Hotel
(Ireland)
8 July 1956

My dear Edwina,
I do not want to waste your time, but you might perhaps be interested in these analyses of what Jawaharlal Nehru is and stands for.[2] It is extraordinary how a simple and straightforward person like me should be considered so mysterious.

Yours,
Jawaharlal

1. JN Collection.
2. In an article titled "Clues to Jawaharlal Nehru – and to India" and printed in *The New York Times Magazine* of 1 July 1956, A.M. Rosenthal, the newspaper's correspondent in India, wrote: "A great many people throughout the world spend a great deal of time trying to figure out the Prime Minister of India." Describing Nehru as a Brahman, "a man with a mystical quality of reaching other masses of men", and "a secret Caesar", Rosenthal said: "He loves the British, he resents Western influence on his life, he is an artist, he is an intellectual snob."

2. To Radha Raman[1]

New Delhi
August 7, 1956

My dear Radha Raman,[2]
Your letter of August 1st with the Sadhus Bill.[3] I think it is desirable to have a Bill about the registration of sadhus. The point to be remembered is to have

1. JN Collection.
2. Member of Parliament, 1952-62.
3. On 27 July, Radha Raman introduced a Bill in the Lok Sabha to provide for the registration and licensing of sadhus and sanyasis in India.

some legislation which is feasible and can be implemented easily. I rather doubt if an attempt to register every independent sadhu is possible.

It might be easier, to begin with, to get the regular sadhu organizations to be registered with their membership. This really means covering most of the so-called sanyasis. Also, I think that there should be something about the age-limit. That is, minors should not be permitted to become sadhus.[4]

I think it would be worthwhile to discuss this matter with some of the people connected with the recently formed Bharat Sadhu Samaj which is connected with the Bharat Sewak Samaj. Many of them told me that they would like some way of distinguishing decent sadhus from bad ones.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

4. For Nehru's views on the subject, see *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 31, pp. 545-46.

3. To Pyarelal[1]

New Delhi
August 8, 1956

My dear Pyarelal,[2]

Your letter of August 6. I cannot possibly remember what I said on a certain date in New York. Louis Fischer[3] is not a person whose memory or whose report I can trust. I can hardly imagine my saying this at a public meeting. But I might

1. JN Collection.
2. Pyarelal was Mahatma Gandhi's secretary since 1942. He was, at this time, finalizing the manuscript of the second volume of his book, *Mahatma Gandhi – The Last Phase*.
3. American journalist and author of several books on Mahatma Gandhi. For Nehru's views on Louis Fischer, see *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 18, p. 575.

conceivably have said that if we had known the terrible consequences of partition in the shape of the killings, etc., we would have resisted this division of India.[4]

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

4. *The Hindu* of 21 October 1949 reported Nehru as having stated at a banquet in New York the previous night, "We agreed to partition, but it proved to be far worse than anticipated." Pyarelal gives the date of Nehru's remarks as 16 October 1949 in his book, ibid, p. 256.

4. To Suresh Chandra Bose[1]

New Delhi
August 13, 1956

My dear Suresh Babu,[2]

I have just received copy of your letter[3] dated 10th August 1956 addressed to the Chairman, Netaji Enquiry Committee[4] in New Delhi. I have read this and find it difficult to understand what you have written.

The Chairman, Shri Shah Nawaz Khan, and the other Member of the Committee, Shri Moitra, came to see me on, I think, the 3rd August and presented me with the report of their Committee as well as the evidence, etc. I enquired about you from them. They informed me that you had come to Delhi, as arranged, to help in writing the report, but had later suddenly left Delhi without any previous

1. JN Collection.
2. Elder brother of Subhas Chandra Bose and a member of the Netaji Enquiry Committee.
3. Bose took exception to Shah Nawaz Khan's cable asking him to submit his dissenting report at Delhi within a stipulated time frame. According to him, the tone of his remarks "befits a bully and not a sensible person."
4. The Netaji Enquiry Committee was set up in April 1956 to enquire into the circumstances of Subhash Chandra Bose's alleged death as a result of an aircraft accident. It was headed by Shah Nawaz Khan, a former member of the INA and, at this time, Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Railways. The other two members were S.C. Bose and S.N. Maitra, ICS, the West Bengal Government's nominee.

intimation to them. They gave me a paper also which was signed by you and which contained the broad points of agreement, on the basis of which the report was to be written.

I enquired from them if you were likely to sign the report later or send a separate note. They said that they did not know.

The report, the evidence and the other papers were handed over to the External Affairs Ministry who now possess them. In the ordinary course, the Ministry will examine these papers and will place the report before the Cabinet. If the Cabinet so decides, the report will then be placed before Parliament. That will mean its publication also. Probably the report will be placed before the Cabinet soon. It is likely to be printed.

That is the procedure, and Shri Shah Nawaz Khan and the other Member of the Committee have nothing to do with the report now, as the Committee has ceased to function. Should you, however, wish to send any kind of note, we shall consider it. I am afraid no papers can be sent away from here now. If you so wish, you can come here and examine such papers as we have.

You refer in your letter to the Chairman, Netaji Enquiry Committee, to some announcement in the *Amrita Bazar Patrika* of the 9th August, and you accuse the Chairman of having broken the rule of secrecy in making this announcement.[5] On enquiry, I find that he has made no announcement and, in fact, that he did not even know of this item which appeared in the *Amrita Bazar Patrika*. As a matter of fact, the report was submitted to me many days before that announcement in the press. It would appear that the reference in the press was some kind of an intelligent guess by some reporter or some clerk in our office here. Obviously, the Chairman of the Enquiry Committee had nothing to do with it.[6]

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

5. The newspaper report claimed that the main finding of the Netaji Enquiry Committee was that Netaji Bose's death "is established" and that it occurred in Formosa (Taiwan) during World War II. The report added that the committee had taken evidence from some seventy witnesses in Japan, Thailand, India and other countries, and that sixty-six of them had told the committee that they had no doubt about Netaji's death. The *Amrita Bazar Patrika* also observed that Bose might not sign the report "for special reasons."
6. Nehru wrote to B.C. Roy that Bose "makes all kinds of fanastic charges against Shah Nawaz Khan. Some of them to my knowledge are completely incorrect."

5. The Importance of Geography[1]

I have looked at some of the articles in this first number of the *Indian Geographer.* Some of them deal with rather fascinating subjects to an Indian and, it may be, to others also.

I often wonder how many of us in India know much about our own country. I know that I have been constantly making new discoveries about this great country of ours with its tremendous variety and yet a basic unity. Here we find the past ever with us. There is the present of course with all its problems and there is the future for which we build. And so the past and the present and the future in India get intertwined and entangled and it is rather difficult to separate them.

Maps have always fascinated me because they open out long vistas of thought. I look at the changing map of Asia and think of the old days when long caravans went along the silken route; of the great travellers who traversed this vast continent; of the pilgrims and men of commerce who braved the perils of the mountains and the seas in days gone by; of the various peoples who came across the Himalayan passes into India and merged in the sea of Indian humanity; of ideas travelling from one country to another and influencing and moulding great numbers of people.

It has often struck me that our viewpoint in regard to the world depends so much on where we are. Perhaps many of the differences and conflicts in viewpoints could be explained by this simple fact. A person living at one of the Poles would have a very special idea about the world. A person in America or Europe would look upon the world as if he was at the centre of things and the others rather at the circumference. So also a person in India or China would imagine himself to be at the hub and would judge others accordingly.

Perhaps the tremendous development in communications and means of travel is making a difference now and we know more of the rest of the world. But even so, it is difficult to get out of this egocentric habit of mind wherever we may live. Geography counts in a multitude of ways and it is well, therefore, that we pay attention to it not only in the rather narrow way it is taught in our schools and colleges but as something which tells us of the development of humanity and of the mighty forces that have moulded man since the beginning of his life on the earth.

1. Message to the first issue of *Indian Geographer*, a journal of the Association of Indian Geographers, New Delhi, 17 August 1956. File No. 9/2/56 PMS.

6. To Durgabai Deshmukh[1]

New Delhi
August 19, 1956

My dear Durgabai,[2]
Thank you for your letter of the 18th August and a copy of *Samaj Kalyan*.[3] This appears to be a very attractive publication, and I congratulate you upon it.

There is one aspect of these publications, however, which has troubled me somewhat. We issue very good publications, but their circulation appears to be limited. Quite a large number of copies are issued free. I do not know what kind of circulation to expect for *Samaj Kalyan*.[4] If it has to do much good, it must reach a large number of people, even in the villages. We could utilize the Community Projects Administration for this purpose. I do not suppose you could provide free copies to the thousands of the Centres that we have got, but perhaps we might have a reduced rate for them, and a few free copies to the main Centres.

There is another aspect. Is it possible to issue a somewhat cheaper edition on perhaps a little cheaper paper? This might be investigated. Of course, the cover should be attractive enough. But I find that most of our magazines are issued on heavy and thick paper. This is not normally done elsewhere, except in very superior periodicals.

The whole point is to get a large circulation and, therefore, for this purpose, to price it cheaply. I find that this number is priced at 12 annas. It is not much, but from the village point of view, I suppose it is a great deal.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. File No. 17(19)/56, PMS.
2. Chairman, Central Social Welfare Board, Government of India.
3. It was the first annual number of the Welfare Board's monthly magazine.
4. In her reply to Nehru on 23 August, Durgabai Deshmukh admitted that the "circulation can be subsequently increased, particularly of the Hindi journal." She added that "with an enlarged circulation, it would be possible to reduce still further the price at which these magazines are sold."

7. To Krishna Gopal Dutt[1]

New Delhi
August 20, 1956

My dear Krishna Gopalji,[2]

I am sorry for the delay in answering your letter of August 8th. Partly this was due to the fact that I did not know what to say in answer. It is true that I used the words, I think, of invisible forces at work.[3] This did not mean anything very mysterious, so far as I am concerned, although the world is full of mystery. Each person emanates some kind of atmosphere and force. The greater the person, the greater this emanation or influence. Sometimes, whole countries are affected and behave heroically.

As far as my general beliefs are concerned, I do not quite know how to define them. But I have said something about them in my books.

When I said that an evil spirit has descended upon us,[4] I meant India.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. JN Collection.
2. (1899-1957); Freedom fighter, journalist and political thinker; joined the non-cooperation movement in 1921; graduated from National College, Lahore, 1923; General Secretary, Punjab Swaraj Party, 1926; suffered imprisonment in 1929-31, 1940-42; elected member of Punjab Legislative Assembly, 1938; first chief whip of the Congress party in the Legislative Assembly, 1938; deputy leader of the Opposition in the Assembly, 1938; appointed General Secretary of the All-India Central Refugee and Vigilance Board after 1947; appointed Minister, East Punjab Cabinet, 1948, and held portfolios of Finance, Industries and Local Self-Government.
3. See *ante*, p. 125.
4. See *ante*, p. 129.

8. Centenary Celebrations of the 1857 Movement[1]

I agree that the 100th anniversary of 1857 struggle for independence should be celebrated. Further that it is desirable to connect this with the tenth year of our Independence celebrations. The appropriate dates for these would be the 15th and 16th August 1957.

2. A National Committee should be formed. I would prefer the Home Minister to be Chairman of this.

3. Programme of Celebrations:

(i) I do not like increasing our holidays. August 15th is already a holiday. I would rather not make the next day also a holiday. But in this matter we have to see what others think.

(ii) I do not like the idea of what is called feeding the poor. The whole conception rather distresses me. It means that the poor are a permanent feature in our structure.

(iii) I do not know what type of places in different States connected with 1857 movement it is proposed to acquire.

(iv) I have received deputations from the women of Gwalior suggesting that there should be a memorial to the Rani of Jhansi and further that the proposed Institute of Physical Culture which the Government of India is going to put up, should be this memorial and should be situated in Gwalior. Our Education Ministry wanted to have this Institute at Bhopal. I think that they are veering round to the view that Gwalior might be chosen for it.[2] I think that this would be a more suitable memorial to the Rani of Jhansi than some kind of a statue.[3]

4. I agree generally with the other suggestions for the programme of celebrations.

5. As for the National Committee, I have no particular suggestions to make. It

1. Note to the Home Ministry, 26 August 1956. JN Collection.
2. Nehru wrote to Maulana Azad on 16 August that his "chief interest" was that institutes and offices "should not be concentrated in the capital cities . . . There is usually too much of a tendency to concentrate on the capital."
3. Nehru informed Azad that a deputation representing the Maharani Laxmibai Memorial Asociation had suggested to him on 28 May that the proposed Institute of Physical Culture "might be located in Gwalior and might be the memorial for the Rani of Jhansi or at any rate in some way be associated with her."

would certainly be desirable to have some well known non-officials in the Committee, apart from the officials, who will include, I take it, the Chief Ministers of the States concerned. The Congress President might be invited to join it. Perhaps the selection of non-officials might be made chiefly from Members of Parliament including the Opposition.

9. The National Emblem[1]

"Please inform the Secretary to the President in reply to his letter, that whatever justification there may be in Dr Mookerji's remarks,[2] there is none in our proceeding to change our present State Emblem which has become well established and well known all over the world."[3]

1. Minute recorded in August 1956 and reproduced in File No. 16/21/56-Public-I, MHA. In August 1956, President Rajendra Prasad had drawn Nehru's attention to two articles on the Asoka Chakra written by Radha Kumud Mookerji, member of Parliament, and published in the *AICC Economic Review* in May 1956.
2. Mookerji, in his first article, argued that the wheel appearing on the capital of the Asokan pillar was primarily to be associated with the Buddha and not with Asoka. Second, he noted that the wheel appearing in the national emblem did not represent its original form, which, according to him, "included a wheel of outstanding size . . . placed on the shoulders of four lions set back to back." He suggested that "in loyalty to Asoka's ideal" it was necessary to restore the wheel to its original form and position as it appeared in the crown of the Asokan pillar.
3. A Home Ministry note of 24 August 1956 pointed out that the Cabinet had approved of Nehru's proposal on the State emblem on 11 December 1947, with the direction that the seal should conform, as far as possible, to the original of the Sarnath lion capital of Asoka minus the lotus.

GLOSSARY

bhai	brother
brahmacharya	celibacy
dund-baithak	a strenuous physical exercise
Jai Hind	victory to India
ji	an affix denoting respect
mohalla	locality
moulvi	a Muslim learned person, well versed in Arabic and Persian literature
saudagar	trader
swaraj	self-rule
taluk	territorial subdivision of a district
yogasanas	postures of yoga

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